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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the First World War’s impact on the exercise of state authority 
in both Britain and Germany. The project shows the extent to which expansive and 
intrusive domestic policies triggered a reconfiguration of the relationship between 
the state and its citizens. These processes are studied through a focus on the ‘state 
of exception’ and the wartime systems of emergency government in both countries. 
Legislation such as the Defence of the Realm Act in Britain and the German ‘state 
of siege’ laws served as major instruments of emergency rule and thus shaped the 
policies on the home front. Yet, despite its historical significance, historians have 
broadly neglected this aspect of the First World War.  
In order to address this gap in literature, the thesis examines how the emerging 
systems of emergency government in Britain and Germany were entangled with 
political, legal and social developments in both countries. Moreover, it shows how 
categories of ‘enemies within’ influenced the exercise of emergency powers by the 
police, the military and the courts. The thesis also considers how dissenting activists 
reacted to repressive emergency measures and how these experiences provided 
stimuli for civil liberties activism. 
Based on extensive research in German and British archives, this study offers an 
insight into policy-making on the home front and into the inner workings of the 
institutions entrusted with enforcing emergency measures. By adopting a 
comparative approach, it identifies national specificities, yet it also notes striking 
similarities in the British and German state responses to a totalising war. Despite 
 
 
 
the different political traditions and institutions in the two countries, the application 
of emergency powers produced comparable results in several respects.  
Overall, this thesis offers a fresh perspective on the ways in which European 
societies experienced the First World War on their home fronts. It shows how 
emergency measures sought to enforce endurance and support for the war effort in 
Britain and Germany. Moreover, it intervenes in the current debates about the 
legitimate limits of state power in the face of prolonged crisis. This study thus 
contributes to the understanding of the phenomenon of the state of exception in 
modern Europe. 
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Introduction 
 
In an article titled ‘The Rule of DORA’, written in 1919, the historian Sydney W. 
Clarke lamented that, ‘(…) of the phenomena exhibited during the four years of 
warfare, none is more remarkable than the docility with which the people of this 
country submitted to the abrogation of many of their most cherished rights.’ He 
went on to complain that under the Defence of the Realm Act of 1914 (DORA): 
Such fundamental principles of the Constitution as those expressed 
by the phrases Government by Parliament, the Responsibility of the 
Executive to the Legislature, the Liberty of the Subject, Trial by 
Jury, Open Law Courts, Freedom of Speech, the Freedom of the 
Press, and An Englishman's House is his Castle, were attacked, 
whittled down, and in some cases reduced to mere shreds of their 
former consequence.1 
Two years earlier, in October 1916, the liberal German newspaper Münchener 
Neueste Nachrichten adopted a similar tone when it criticised the repressive regime 
under the Belagerungszustand (state of siege) in their country: 
A system sufficiently characterised by catchwords such as detention 
without trial, postal censorship, suppression of the freedom of 
expression and newspaper bans, has haunted the German people like 
a nightmare for almost two years now. […] It has become a constant 
feature of our daily life. 
It then somewhat ironically concluded that, ‘if one day a historian will look at this 
aspect of the war, he will only be able to grasp the whole thing with a strong sense 
of humour. Terms such as Burgfrieden and New Course will appear in this history 
as merely satirical references.’2 
                                                          
1 Sydney W. Clarke, ‘The Rule of DORA‘, Journal of Comparative Legislation and International 
Law, 1, 1 (1919), pp. 36-41, p. 36. 
2 Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, 19 October 1916 [translation by the author]. 
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The opinions expressed in these two articles illustrate the often critical 
contemporary perceptions of emergency government in Britain and Germany 
during the First World War. Yet, surprisingly most historians in Britain and to some 
extent also in Germany have failed to recognise the profound significance of 
emergency legislation during the Great War and its far-reaching cultural, political 
and social impacts on the history of the twentieth century.3 This is particularly 
remarkable if we take into account the multitudinous publications dealing with 
almost every aspect of the First World War. Nonetheless, only very few of them 
mention the problem of emergency government at all.4  
The neglect of this issue in the historiography of the First World War does, 
however, not reflect the actual relevance of emergency laws such as the Defence of 
the Realm Act in Britain or the state of siege in the German Empire. These pieces 
of legislation provided the main legal and constitutional frameworks under which 
both countries were transformed into wartime societies. Moreover, they created the 
historical precedents for some of most problematic state practices in the twentieth 
century such as detention without trial, the large-scale internment of ethnic 
minorities and the prosecution of oppositional groups.5 It is almost impossible to 
understand these phenomena without taking their emergence during the First World 
War into account. 
                                                          
3 Charles Townshend, Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 56-57. 
4 See for example: Annie Deperchin, ‘The Laws of War’, in Jay M. Winter (ed.), The Cambridge 
History of the First World War. Vol. 1: Global War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
pp. 615-638. 
5 For a theoretical discussion of the emergence of the ‘coercive state’ and wartime experiences see 
Ted Robert Gurr, ‘War, Revolution and the Growth of the Coercive State’, Comparative Political 
Studies, 21, 1 (1988), pp. 45-65. 
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This study seeks to address this problem by highlighting the crucial 
importance of emergency measures for understanding home front politics in Britain 
and Germany during the Great War. It examines and compares those practices and 
discourses related to the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) in Britain and the state 
of siege in the German Empire. These two pieces of emergency legislation have 
been interpreted as examples of ‘constitutional dictatorships’, which emerged 
during the First World War in all belligerent countries, albeit to different degrees.6 
These emergency laws suspended essential elements of the existing constitutional 
arrangements, which had hitherto limited the powers of the state and protected the 
individual rights and liberties of its citizens. Moreover, they enabled government 
agencies to regulate, control, and intervene in nearly all aspects of daily life. As a 
result, the relationship between state and civil society was profoundly changed by 
the end of the war. Under the pressure of the emerging total war, a new concept of 
a corporatist and ‘total’ state emerged, which eventually became the blueprint for 
authoritarian rule in the twentieth century.7 Against this backdrop, the First World 
War had not only been a motor of social change but also a catalyst for the 
development of political thought concerning the legitimate scope of state 
intervention in moments of crisis, dictatorship and emergency measures.  
                                                          
6 The term ‘constitutional dictatorship’ was coined by the American political scientist Clinton L. 
Rossiter referring to a specific concept of crisis government in parliamentary systems: Clinton L. 
Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in Modern Democracies, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1948), pp. 3-14. 
7 For the development of the term ‘total state’ in the context of Italian fascism see inter alia Jens 
Petersen, ‘The History of the Concept of Totalitarianism’, in: Hans Maier (ed.), Totalitarianism and 
Political Religion. Volume I: Concepts for the Comparison of Dictatorships, (New York: Routledge, 
2004), pp. 3-20; Sigmund Neumann, Permanent Revolution: The Total State in a World at War 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942); Richard Wolin, ‘Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and 
the Total State’, Theory and Society, 19, 4 (1990), pp. 389-416. 
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Scholars such as the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben have claimed that 
the First World War was a laboratory for the state of exception.8 Many historians 
of the war would agree that it was a ‘testing ground for later radicalised practices’.9 
And indeed, many tools and techniques were developed during this period, which 
would later become integral parts of the arsenal of authoritarian rule. Initially 
however, the state of exception during the First World War was not a clearly 
elaborated programme of measures. As this study will demonstrate, it was to a large 
extent a process of experimentation under unprecedented circumstances. The First 
World War should therefore also be understood as a historical period in which the 
complex relationship between the state and its individual citizens was reconfigured 
in the face of an exceptional crisis. 
The new character of industrialised warfare demanded a high degree of 
economic mobilisation and commitment of the masses. Hence, a domestic policy 
on the home front solely based on coercion was not sustainable for the wartime 
governments.10 Wherever it was possible positive mobilisation of patriotism and 
commitment amongst the population were favoured over mere compulsion and bare 
force.11 Harsh coercive measures remained, nevertheless, a distinct option within 
the system of emergency government in Britain and Germany. Where propaganda 
and self-mobilisation failed, more aggressive measures were applied without 
                                                          
8 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), p.7. 
9 Alan Kramer, ‘Recent Historiography of the First World War (Part I)’, Journal of Modern 
European History, 12, 1 (2014), pp. 5-27, p. 5. 
10 Brock Millman, for example, affirms this approach for the United Kingdom and juxtaposes that 
with the allegedly more severe measures in the German Empire; Brock Millman, Managing Dissent 
in First World War Britain (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 31-33. 
11 See for example John Horne, ‘Mobilising for Total War‘, in idem, (ed.), State, Society, and 
Mobilisation in Europe during the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
1997), pp. 1-17; Anne Schmidt, Belehrung – Propaganda – Vertrauensarbeit: Zum Wandel 
amtlicher Kommunikationspolitik in Deutschland 1914-1918 (Essen: Klartext, 2006), pp. 29-38. 
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hesitation. For the wartime governments in both countries, the question of 
repression and coercion was less a moral or normative issue, but a matter of utility. 
By 1918, most belligerent governments had developed sophisticated systems for 
positive mobilisation and mechanisms for the suppression of dissent. These systems 
were not completely abandoned after the war but deactivated and refined during the 
interwar years. The experiences of the First World War consequently influenced 
other pieces of emergency legislation such as the Emergency Powers Act of 1920 
in the United Kingdom or in the infamous article 48 of the Weimar constitution in 
Germany.12 In fact, the ideas of the state of exception and ‘constitutional 
dictatorship’ became an integral part of political discourse in the twentieth century. 
They remain a challenging issue for many societies today.13 
 
 
Emergency Government and the Historiography of the First World War 
 
The literature on emergency government during the First World War provides a 
contradictory picture: on the one hand, studies about the state of exception during 
the First World War scarcely exist. As has been pointed out earlier, there is, for 
                                                          
12 For the debate about Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution in Germany see for example Marc de 
Wilde, ‘The State of Emergency in the Weimar Republic: Legal Disputes over Article 48 of the 
Weimar Constitution’, The Legal History Review, 78, 1, (2010), pp. 131-158; Rossiter, 
Constitutional Dictatorship, pp. 29-74; see also Ursula Büttner, Weimar: Die überforderte Republik 
1918-1933 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008), pp. 112-120; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, pp. 29-
74. 
13 Especially after 9/11 the question about the fragile relations between freedom and security, 
democracy and crisis government has re-emerged; see for example Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Law in a 
Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11’, University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 6, (2004), pp. 1001-1080; John E. Owens and Riccardo Pelizzo, 
‘Rethinking Crises and the Accretion of Executive Power: The “War on Terror” and Conditionality 
Evidence From Seven Political Systems’, Asian Politics & Policy, 5, 3 (2013), pp. 321-336; Ellen 
Kennedy, ‘Emergency and Exception’ Political Theory, 39, 4 (2011), pp. 535-550, Keith Ewing, 
‘The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: A Comment’, International Journal of Law in 
Context, 3, 4 (2007), pp. 313-318; Mark Neocleous, ‘From Martial Law to Emergency Powers’, New 
Criminal Law Review, 10, 4 (2007), pp. 489-513.  
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example, no comprehensive study on DORA available as a monograph yet. On the 
other hand, the number of books covering topics that at least partially relate to this 
study are too numerous to be counted.  
The assessment of the existing literature will show that the challenge of a 
historical study about the state of exception during the First World War lies exactly 
in striking a balance between theoretical assessments and providing an appropriate 
amount of historical evidence. The following literature review shall therefore firstly 
provide a very concise overview about general trends and new tendencies within 
the field of First World War studies. The second section introduces the widely 
ramified debates around the concept of the state of exception. Following on from 
this some existing case studies on certain aspects of emergency government during 
the First World War will briefly be discussed.  
 
 
The Historiographical Development of First World War Studies 
 
The historiography of the First World War has followed certain paradigms, which 
have undergone a number of changes over the last 40 years.14 The following short 
overview about general developments in First World War studies will help us 
understand why phenomena such as the state of exception have for a long time been 
widely neglected. The first attempts to shape the historical perception of the Great 
War already occurred during the conflict itself.15 Almost immediately after the 
                                                          
14 For a comprehensive overview of the most recent developments in the historiography of -the First 
World War see Heather Jones, ‘As the Centenary Approaches: The Regeneration of First World War 
Historiography’, The Historical Journal, 56, 3 (2013), pp.  857-878; Alan Kramer, ‘Recent 
Historiography of the First World War (Part I)’, op. cit.; Idem, ‘Recent Historiography of the First 
World War (Part II)’, Journal of Modern European History, 12, 2 (2014), pp. 155-174. 
15 The sheer volume of literature produced during the war is illustrated by the German output of 
1914-15. Until the end of 1915, over 235 volumes of war poetry had been published, containing the 
largest part of the c. 500,000 poems published during the war. German clerics published over 2,000 
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outbreak of the war the belligerent governments began to publish collections of 
official documents that were supposed to prove the responsibility of the enemies 
for the unfolding mass slaughter.16 Renowned historians, social scientists and 
intellectuals such as H. G. Wells in Britain, Émile Durkheim in France and Werner 
Sombardt in Germany published accounts and analyses of responsibility for the 
outbreak of the war, the righteousness of the respective national causes and war 
aims, and on the historic mission of their nations.17  
German intellectuals tried to present the conflict as an epic struggle between 
the Western – and especially British – values of materialism and individualism and 
proclaimed intrinsically German values of community and collectivism.18 This 
view was exemplified by the Manifesto of the 93, also known as the Call to the 
Cultured World.19 In this document, famous German academics justified the illegal 
invasion of neutral Belgium and reaffirmed their support for the German war effort 
as a means of protecting their Kultur. The British discourse, on the other hand, 
                                                          
brochures and booklets with war sermons. And 8,000 volumes of general war literature flooded the 
market: Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, Vol. 4: Vom Beginn des Ersten 
Weltkriegs bis zur Gründung der beiden deutschen Staaten 1914-1949, p. 19. 
16 See Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus 
(London: Pearson, 2002), pp. 21-77; esp. pp. 57-77. 
17 See for example Stuart Wallace, War and the Image of Germany, British Academics 1914-1918 
(Edinburgh: John Donald, 1988); Peter Hoeres, Krieg der Philosophen: Die deutsche und britische 
Philosophie im Ersten Weltkrieg (Paderborn: Schönigh, 2004); Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Kultur und 
Krieg: Schriftsteller, Künstler und Intellektuelle im Ersten Weltkrieg (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996); 
Idem, ‘German Artists, Writers and Intellectuals and the Meaning of War 1914-1918’, in Horne 
(ed.), State, Society and Mobilization, pp. 21-38.  
18 Prominent examples are Werner Sombart’s Händler und Helden (Merchants and Heroes, 1915) 
and Johann Plenge’s concept of the ‘ideas of 1914’ and his later conceptualisation of 
‘Volksgemeinschaft’ and ‘National Socialism’; Cf. Werner Sombart, Händler und Helden: 
Patriotische Besinnungen, (Leipzig. München: Duncker & Humblodt, 1915); Johann Plenge, 1789 
und 1914: Die symbolischen Jahre in der Geschichte des politischen Geistes (Berlin: Springer, 
1916);  
19 Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg and Wolfgang von Ungern-Sternberg, Der Aufruf ‘An die 
Kulturwelt!‘: Das Manifest der 93 und die Anfänge der Kriegspropaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg 
(Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996), pp. 144-148. 
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revolved around the claim that the conflict was a ‘war to end all wars’.20 Historians 
and other intellectuals played an important role in making the First World War one 
of the first deeply ideologised propaganda wars. The fundamental ideologisation 
did not only have a profound impact on the actual conduct of the war, it also 
changed wartime politics.21  
Immediately after the war, a flood of memoirs and official historiographies 
was brought onto the market. Through these publications politicians and military 
leaders sought to highlight their role and contribution to the victory or, in the 
German case, to exonerate themselves from responsibility for defeat and 
revolution.22 This established the framework for the traditional historiography of 
the war, which predominantly focussed on military and diplomatic aspects and the 
discussion of the responsibility for the outbreak of the war. There were, of course, 
notable exceptions to this trend such as the extensive publication series on the 
history of the Great War published by the Carnegie Endowment for Peace.23 Yet, 
until the late 1960s major works on the war reflected mostly on its significance for 
the emergence of a new historical era in terms of politics, diplomacy, the military 
and technology.  
                                                          
20 The slogan was coined by the writer and socialist intellectual H. G. Wells who formulated the idea 
in a number of newspaper articles which then were published as a book under the title ‘The war that 
will end all wars’ in October 1914; H. G. Wells, The War That Will End All Wars (London: Frank 
and Cecil Palmer Red Lion’s Court, 1914). 
21 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker argue that the perception of the war reached an almost religious level 
with an eschatological dimension: Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18: Understanding the Great 
War, 159-171. For an excellent collection of similar cultural historical approaches to understanding 
the war, see Heather Jones, Jennifer O’Brien and Christopher Schmidt Supprian (eds), Untold War: 
New Perspectives in First World War Studies (Leiden: Brill, 2008).  
22 See for example Erich Ludendorff, Ludendorff’s Own Story (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1920); Paul von Hindenburg, Out of my Live, 2 vols (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1921); David 
Lloyd George, The War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 2 vols (London: Ivor Nicholson and 
Watson, 1933). 
23 Kramer, ‘Recent Historiography of the First World War (Part I)’, p. 6. 
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It was a book by the (West-) German historian Fritz Fischer in 1961, and the 
ensuing controversy about it, which created renewed interest in the First World 
War.24 Fischer argued that Germany had to take the main responsibility for the 
outbreak of the war as its military and civilian leadership had been determined to 
take the risk of global conflict to pursue their ambition of becoming a global 
power.25 The subsequent debate amongst German and international scholars 
encouraged the search for new sources and materials to prove the opposing 
positions.26 The renewed interest in the First World War was facilitated by the fact 
that a number of records became declassified during the 1960s in Britain, Germany 
and other former belligerents, allowing scholars to pursue new directions in their 
research on the war.27  
Consequently, the 1970s and 1980s saw the publication of a number of 
innovative studies on several aspects of the war, which had hitherto been neglected. 
This was also a time in which aspects of domestic policies and the situation on the 
home fronts received increased scholarly attention, opening up the way for 
innovative approaches to the history of the war. These new approaches reflected 
general historiographical trends such as gender history or the concept of history 
                                                          
24 Fritz Fischer, Der Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland, 
1914/18 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1961). 
25 Fritz Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen: Die deutsche Politik 1911-1914 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1970). 
26 For a comprehensive overview over the impact on the historiography, see Annika Mombauer, 
‘The Fischer Controversy: 50 Years On’, Journal of Contemporary History, 48, 2 (2013), pp. 231-
241; Jonathan Steinberg, ‘Old Knowledge and New Research: A Summary of the Conference on the 
Fischer Controversy 50 Years On’, ibid., pp. 241-250; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, ‘The 
Political and Historical Significance of the Fischer Controversy’, ibid., pp. 251-270; see also Fritz 
Fischer, ‘Twenty-Five Years Later: Looking Back at the “Fischer Controversy” and Its 
Consequences’, Central European History, vol. 21, 3, (1988), pp. 207-223; John A. Moses, The 
Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography, (London: Barnes & Noble, 
1975); Matthew Stibbe, ‘The Fischer Controversy over German War Aims in the First World War 
and its Reception by East German Historians’, The Historical Journal, 46, 3, (2003), pp. 648-669. 
27 A large number of British records became declassified in 1966 and enabled the study of topics 
like domestic censorship or propaganda: Deian Hopkin, ‘Domestic Censorship in the First World 
War’, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 5, 4, (1970), pp. 151-166, p. 151. 
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from below.28 The same tendencies could be observed in the German case where 
social history, gender history, and the political history of the home front became 
matters of scholarly interest.29 Wilhelm Deist’s work on the role of the German 
military in domestic policies during the war from 1970, for example, is still the only 
annotated edition of primary sources available on this topic.30 With regards to the 
German historiography of the First World War, the contribution by East German 
scholars tends to be overlooked. Yet, despite the fact that publications on the war 
from the socialist GDR were strongly influenced by orthodox Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, they tackled issues such as the socialist opposition to the war, state 
repression, the precarious situation of the working class, or the November 
Revolution of 1918, which the West German historiography broadly neglected for 
a long time.31 Many of these studies used unpublished archival materials from East 
German and Eastern European archives for the first time. Although the general 
arguments of most of these studies have to be considered as outdated, they still 
serve their purpose as references for German archival sources very well.32  
The 80th anniversary of the end of the war in 1998 and the 90th anniversary of 
the beginning of the war in 2004 saw a number of comprehensive studies being 
                                                          
28 To name a few examples for these trends: Jay M. Winter, The Great War and the British People 
(London: Routledge, 1985); Arthur Marwick, The Deluge: British Society and the First World War, 
(London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1965); Gail Braybon, Women Workers in the First World War: The 
British Experience (London: Routledge, 1981); Bernard Waites, A Class Society at War: England 
1914-1918, Lemington Spa: Berg, 1987). 
29 Just to point out a few examples: Ute Daniel, The War from Within: German Women in the First 
World War (Lemington Spa: Berg, 1997; first published in German in 1989); Jürgen Kocka, 
Klassengesellschaft im Krieg: Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1914-1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoek und 
Rupprecht, 1973); Günter Mai (ed.), Arbeiterschaft in Deutschland 1914-1918 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 
1987). 
30 Deist, Militär und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914-1918, op. cit. 
31 Fritz Klein et al. (eds), Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, 3 vols (Leipzig: Leipziger 
Universitätsverlag, 1968-1970). 
32 Fritz Klein, ‘Der Erste Weltkrieg in der Geschichtswissenschaft der DDR’, Zeitschrift für 
Geschichtswissenschaft, 42, 4, (1994), pp. 293-301. 
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published. This reflects a tendency in First World War studies to draw conclusions 
about the war and its place in twentieth century history on the one side, and to 
present very detailed studies on specialised topics on the other.33 However, until 
today conclusive, extensive and comprehensive histories of the First World War are 
still comparatively scarce.34 After nearly 100 years of historical research there are 
still blank spots and understudied areas within the field of First World War studies. 
Comparatively recent theoretical trends such as postcolonial studies, the history of 
mentalities, and transnational history, however, open up exciting new perspectives 
on the Great War. It is, for example, not completely understood how the war 
influenced the relations between colonial powers and their colonies after all sides 
had mobilised significant numbers of colonial subjects for their war efforts.35 Due 
to the focus of the traditional historiography on the Western Front, the war at the 
other fronts such as the Balkans, the Alps, or the gigantic battles on the Eastern 
Front did not receive appropriate representation in popular memory or in 
comprehensive accounts of the war. Some historians speak of the ‘forgotten fronts’ 
of the war in the East and in the Balkans, which differed in many aspects from the 
                                                          
33 Very critical towards Britain’s entry into the war: Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining 
World War I (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Very good comprehensive study linking, economic, 
social and military aspect but with strong focus on Britain: David Stevenson, 1914-1918: The 
History of the First World War (London: Allen Lane, 2004). Compact and with strong focus on 
military history: Sönke Neitzel, Blut und Eisen: Deutschland und der Erste Weltkrieg (Zurich: 
Pendo, 2003); integrating the First World War in longue durée narratives of modern German history 
but very comprehensive: Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, op. cit.; Heinrich August 
Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen, Vol. 1: Deutsche Geschichte vom Ende des Alten Reiches bis 
zum Untergang der Weimarer Republik (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2000).  
34 To name a few notable exceptions: Hew Strachan, The First World War. Vol. I: To Arms (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002); Jay M. Winter (ed.), The Cambridge History of the First World 
War, 3 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), Herfried Münkler, Der Große Krieg: 
Die Welt 1914-1918 (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2013); Jörn Leonhard, Die Büchse der Pandora: Geschichte 
des Ersten Weltkriegs (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2014). 
35 For a very recent example, exploring the situation of over 140,000 Chinese workers on the 
Western Front, see Gouqi Xu, Strangers on the Western Front: Chinese Workers in the Great War, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Bill Nasson, Springboks on the Somme: 
South Africa and the Great War 1914-1925 (Johannesburg: Penguin, 2007); Michael Pesek, Das 
Ende eines Kolonialreichs: Ostafrika im Ersten Weltkrieg (Frankfurt et al.: Campus, 2010). 
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one in the West.36 Whereas on the Western Front, civilian populations were 
predominantly not present in the actual conflict zone – with the exception of the 
first weeks of the war in Belgium – the Great War in the East was in large parts also 
a war against the civilian population and saw mass deportations as well as 
uncounted executions of alleged partisans and spies.37 These experiences seem to 
have foreshadowed the violence that dominated the further history of Eastern 
Europe in the twentieth century. 
The experiences of individual soldiers at the front, their daily life and the 
psychological impact of the war experience on their later lives are another area of 
intense debate. This question is indeed of crucial importance to understand the 
legacies of the conflict. It can also help us understand what motivated the soldiers 
to endure trench warfare and how these experiences influenced political culture in 
the interwar period. Historians such as George Mosse argued that the mass killing 
during the war and its trivialisation in post-war memory have caused a profound 
brutalisation of European societies, and thus made violence an accepted part of their 
political culture.38 Others however rejected this generalisation by referring to the 
widespread pacifism of the interwar period.39  
                                                          
36 Gerhard P. Groß (ed.), Die vergessene Front – Der Osten 1914/15. Ereignis, Wirkung, 
Nachwirkung (Paderborn: Schönigh, 2006); Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914-1917 (New 
York: Scribner and Sons, 1977); Gabriel Vejas Luilevecius, War Land on the Eastern Front: 
Culture, National Identity and Occupation in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). 
37 Anton Holzer’s study of war photography in the Balkans and on the Eastern Front presents a 
disturbing image about the violence against civilian populations during the war and the first notions 
of the emergence of ‘war of extermination’ in the east 25 years later; Anton Holzer, Das Lächeln 
der Henker: Der unbekannte Krieg gegen die Zivilbevölkerung 1914-1918 (Darmstadt: Primus, 
2008). 
38 George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, op. cit. 
39 Jon Lawrence, for example, argues that the mere fear of such a brutalisation caused a turn towards 
pacifism in British society: Jon Lawrence, ‘Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence, and Fear 
of Brutalization in Post-First World War Britain’, The Journal of Modern History, 75, 3, (2003), pp. 
557-589. Stating the same tendency for the French society: Antoine Prost, ‘The Impact of War on 
French and German Political Cultures’, The Historical Journal, 37, 1, (1994), pp. 209-217. 
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Another problem which still contains a number of desirable avenues for 
research are the connections between the First World War, the era of European 
fascism, and the Second World War – especially the question how far it is possible 
to speak about a ‘second 30 Years War’ between 1914 and 1945.40 This entails the 
question whether the First and Second World War have to be understood as a 
causally connected historical entity, or whether both conflicts have to be interpreted 
as separate from each other.41 Despite the vast amount of First World War literature, 
it can be expected that the conflict will remain a key field of interest for generations 
of historians to come.  
 
 
The Concept of the State of Exception   
 
As we have seen, the problem of the impact of emergency government on societies 
during the First World War has hitherto not received particular scholarly interest.42 
Yet, some theoretical considerations will help us to understand how the concept of 
the state of exception opens up new perspectives on the history of the Great War 
and its impact on European political culture.  
The idea of the state of exception as a key paradigm of rule in the twentieth 
century has been most prominently articulated by the Italian philosopher Giorgio 
                                                          
40 See, inter alia, Gerd Krumeich (ed.), Nationalsozialismus und Erster Weltkrieg (Essen: Klartext, 
2010); Alan Kramer, Dynamics of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing during the First World 
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), esp. pp. 196-210; Alexander Meschnig, Der Wille 
zur Bewegung. Militärischer Traum und totalitäres Programm: Eine Mentalitätsgeschichte vom 
Ersten Weltkrieg zum Nationalsozialismus (Bielefeld: Transkript, 2007), esp. pp. 275-286. 
41 The phrase was coined by Winston Churchill and later adopted and popularised in Germany by 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler: Winston Churchill, The Second World War. Volume I: The Gathering Storm 
(London: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. III; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ’Die “Urkatastrophe des 20. 
Jahrhunderts – Der Erste Weltkrieg als Auftakt und Vorbild für den Zweiten Weltkrieg‘, Idem, 
Notizen zur Deutschen Geschichte (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2003), pp. 28-40. 
42 A notable exception is Brock Millman’s study the suppression of anti-war dissent in Britain. Brock 
Millman, Managing Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain (London: Frank Cass, 2000).  
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Agamben in his books Homo Sacer and State of Exception.43 Agamben describes 
the state of exception as a paradigm of rule, an actual technology of governance 
which allows the ruling classes to control not only certain aspects of society but life 
itself.44 Although forms of emergency government can be traced back as far as the 
Roman Republic and its institution of the legal or ‘constitutional dictatorship’, the 
state of exception only became a dominant political problem in the twentieth 
century.45 Agamben describes the state of exception as the legal form of a 
phenomenon that actually cannot have a legal form:  
[…] if exceptional measures are the result of periods of political crisis 
and, as such, [they] must be understood on political and not juridico-
constitutional grounds, then they find themselves in the paradoxical 
position of being juridical measures that cannot be understood in legal 
terms, and the state of exception appears as the legal form of what 
cannot have legal form.46  
 
In this context, Agamben identifies two main ways in which European states dealt 
with the issue: firstly, those who tried to regulate and define the state of exception 
in the legal terms of their constitutions, and secondly, those states which had no 
explicit legal regulation of the issue whatsoever.47 This argument is especially 
interesting for this study. The German Empire, for example, had a long and 
problematic tradition of emergency measures enshrined in its constitutional 
arrangements.48 Early pieces of legislation regarding this issue dated back to 1851. 
                                                          
43 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998); Idem, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
44 For a further reading on the key concepts of ‘bio politics’ and ‘bio power’ see inter alia Michel 
Foucault, The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982-1983 
(Basingstoke: Picador, 2011). 
45 Agamben, State of Exception, pp. 67-69. 
46 Ibid., p. 1. 
47 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
48 See, for example, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Imperial Germany: Politics, Culture, and Society in an 
Authoritarian State (London: Hodder Arnold, 1995). 
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The so called Gesetz über den Belagerungszustand (Law regarding the State of 
Siege) of 1851 was consequently included into the constitution of the North German 
Federation of 1867 and formed part of the constitution of the newly formed German 
Empire in 1871.49 This provided the basis for the exercise of emergency 
government in Germany during the First World War. Yet, it also influenced the 
various emergency laws during the Weimar Republic. 
The United Kingdom had no comparable tradition of emergency government. 
Nonetheless, some specific pieces of legislation such as the Riot Act of 1714 served 
very similar purposes.50 Against the backdrop of these different political cultures, 
the comparison between the German Empire and Britain during the First World 
War is not only a comparison between two belligerents but also between two modes 
of the state of exception in Agamben’s terms. His concept remains, however, rather 
vague. Although his work is full of historical references, Agamben does not take 
much interest in locating exceptionality in concrete forms of historical agency. In 
State of Exception, Agamben primarily refers to European fascism and the 
Holocaust as examples for rule under the state of exception.51 Nevertheless, his 
definition the state of exception applies to a broader range of historical cases 
including those examined in this study.  
                                                          
49 Christian Schudnagies, Der Kriegs- oder Belagerungszustand im Deutschen Reich während des 
Ersten Weltkrieges. Eine Studie zur Entwicklung und Handhabung des deutschen 
Ausnahmezustandsrechts bis 1918 (Frankfurt am Main et al: Peter Lang, 1994), pp. 30-31. 
50 See exemplary Richard Vogler, Reading the Riot Act: Magistracy, the Police and the Army in 
Civil Disorder (Bristol: Open University Press, 1991); For an analysis of the discourse around the 
Riot Act see Wilfried Nippel, ‘Reading the Riot Act: The discourse of law-enforcement in 18th 
century England’, History and Anthropology, 1, 2 (1985), pp. 399-426; For the developments of 
crowd control legislations and especially the role of the military see Martin Hinton, ‘And the Riot 
Act was read!’, Adelaide Law Review,24,1 (2003), pp. 79-87. 
51 Agamben, State of Exception, pp. 2-3. 
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The wartime experience of emergency government triggered scholarly 
debates about the fundamental nature of the state of exception. The conservative 
German theorist Carl Schmitt, for example, made the state of exception one of the 
key elements of his political philosophy.52 His definition of sovereignty as the 
ability to define public enemies and declare the state of exception has become 
commonplace in the paradigm of ‘political realism’. Together with his ‘concept of 
the political’, Schmitt’s reasoning underwent a renaissance in the context of the 
neo-conservative paradigm.53 The problem of crisis and ‘constitutional 
dictatorship’ also became subject of debates in political science. The Swedish 
political scientist Herbert Tingsten assessed the various pieces of emergency 
legislation during the First World War and tried to establish typologies through 
comparative analysis.54 Tingsten was very sceptical about the reconcilability of 
democracy and state of exception. In his view the potential permanence of crises 
and therefore of the state of emergency posed a severe threat to democracy. 
Theorists such as the American Clinton L. Rossiter have, however, argued 
that the manifold conflicts and domestic as well as external threats will make 
moments of exceptional rule necessary in modern democracies. His idea of a 
‘constitutional dictatorship’ therefore seeks to define the limits of exceptional rule 
rather than to prevent it in general.55 From his analysis of emergency government 
                                                          
52 For Schmitt’s concept of the state of exception as the actual criteria for sovereignty see Carl 
Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007). 
53 For Carl Schmitt’s influence on one of the most influential thought leaders of American neo-
conservatism, Leo Strauss see Heinrich Maier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
54 Herbert Tingsten, Les Pleins Pouvoirs: L'Expansion des Pouvoirs Gouvernementaux Pendant et 
Après la Grande Guerre (Paris: Librairie Stock, 1934). 
55 Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in Modern Democracies, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948). 
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during the First World War he concluded that: ‘The more complex the 
constitutional structure and the more assured the rights of the people, the more 
necessary and severe the practice of constitutional dictatorship has been.’56 
Furthermore:  
(…) a great emergency in the life of a constitutional democracy will be 
more easily mastered by the government if dictatorial forms are to some 
degree substituted for democratic, and if the executive branch is 
empowered to take strong action without an excess of deliberation and 
compromise.57 
 
This affirmative view of emergency government has, however, been challenged by 
other theorists. The rise of fascism in Europe – and to some extent also of Stalinism 
in the Soviet Union – influenced the formulation of more radical critiques of the 
state and its potentially unrestricted power. German émigrés such as Ernst Fraenkel, 
Franz Neumann, and Hannah Arendt applied concepts of exceptionality to analyse 
the structures of the fascist state. Ernst Fraenkel’s The Dual State (1941) defined 
fascist rule as a permanent state of exception.58 This ‘dual state’, however, is 
characterised by a twofold division of the executive into a ‘normative state’ which 
ensured the functioning of capitalist production and commerce and allowed 
conformist citizens to continue life as usual, and a ‘prerogative state’ where 
emergency powers and violence were used to suppress dissent.59 Fraenkel’s concept 
is particularly relevant for the understanding of the concept of exception in general 
as it reflects on the complex relationship between exception and normality. It raises 
                                                          
56 Ibid., p. 288. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (New York et al.: 
Oxford University Press, 1941). 
59 Ibid., pp. 46-70. 
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questions about the extent to which emergency measures are segmented and 
targeted at certain groups.  
Franz Neumann’s Behemoth (1944) explained the structure of the fascist state 
also as a permanent state of exception and pointed out the transition to 
independence of the executive branch.60 The complete submission of judiciary and 
legislature under the interests of the executive are presented in Behemoth as features 
of a modern absolutism. In a direct reference to Thomas Hobbes’ allegorical figure 
of the Leviathan, Neumann calls this new absolutist state the ‘Behemoth’. Neumann 
analyses the structures of the Nazi-state by pointing out the chaotic and polycratic 
nature of the political system under a permanent state of exception. In it, the 
ambition to exercise total control clashes with the fragmentation of the state into 
several power centres (the tripartite state) thus making this permanent exception a 
combination of extremely intrusive but also extremely arbitrary rule.61 Hannah 
Arendt’s work The Origins of Totalitarianism came to a similar conclusion. Yet, 
her emphasis was put on the mentalities of those exercising totalitarian rule.62 
Totalitarian rule in her view is the perpetuation of the state of exception maintained 
by an ideologised state apparatus.63 As we will see, the nature and extent of 
emergency government can indeed only be understood if the actors, their 
mentalities and motivations are taken into account as well. 
These concepts and analyses are the result of concrete historical experiences 
in the first half of the twentieth century. Against this backdrop, the First World War 
                                                          
60 Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933 – 1944 (New 
York: Harper, 1944). 
61 Ibid., pp. 41-61. 
62 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland: Meridian, 1958 [first published 
1951]). 
63 Ibid., pp. 186-224; pp. 389-418. 
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represents a ‘seminal catastrophe’ of exceptional rule and has been a genuine 
‘laboratory of the state of exception’ as Agamben points out.64 It is therefore 
astonishing that this aspect of the First World War has received so little attention 
within the existing scholarship.  
 
 
The Politics of the Home Fronts and the State of Exception during the First 
World War 
 
It has been pointed out that the history of political culture on the home fronts has 
long been neglected by historians. The questions of protest, dissent, conflict, and 
resistance in particular have not received as much attention as other aspects of the 
war. Nevertheless, almost all recent studies about the First World War deal with the 
home fronts although not always extensively.  
For the German case the political history of the war has primarily been a 
narrative of the struggle for political reform and its role as a catalyst for social 
change.65 The two key works on modern German history, Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s 
Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte and Heinrich August Winkler’s The Long Way 
West both reserved prominent space for an account of the First World War although 
with different aims. Whereas Wehler describes the war as a crisis of the German 
class society that the old elites could not cope with, Winkler emphasises 
parliamentary history and the transformation of German politics during the war.66 
                                                          
64 Agamben, State of Exception, p. 7. 
65 See for example Benjamin Ziemann, ‘Total War as a Catalyst for Social Change’, in Helmut 
Walser Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), pp. 379-399; Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, Great War – Total War: Combat and 
Mobilisation on the Western Front 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
66 Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, pp. 3-7; Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen, pp. 
330-366. 
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To some extent, Winkler describes a process of forced reform, whereas Wehler 
narrates the story of a profound political rupture that marked the end of the 
‘bourgeois era’ in Germany. Both, however, recognise the exceptional 
circumstances of the war although only Wehler explicitly refers to the state of siege 
as a political problem.67 Winkler remains within the rather traditional framework of 
political history with a strong parliamentary focus. Both works, nevertheless, have 
the undeniable merit of providing an excellent contextualisation of the political 
events in Germany during the First World War. They broaden perspectives on the 
conflict and facilitate understanding of the deep impact the conflict had on German 
society.  
Similarly, comprehensive accounts do exist for the United Kingdom, 
although often within the framework of general survey and handbook literature.68 
There have, nevertheless, been some specific case studies about certain political 
aspects of the home fronts. Jay Winter’s study about British Labour theorists and 
the impact of the Great War on their political thought from 1974 is one prominent 
example.69 A similar study on the Conservative Party during the First World War 
by Nigel Keohane has recently been published.70 Despite writing from different 
perspectives, both authors come to similar conclusions. Labour as well as the 
Conservative Party profoundly transformed their conceptions of the state during 
and immediately after the war. The experience of the corporatist management of 
                                                          
67 Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, pp. 39-46. 
68 To name one of the most recent examples: John Horne (ed.), A Companion to World War I, 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).  
69 Jay M. Winter, Socialism and the Challenge of War: Ideas and Politics in Britain 1912-1918 
(London and Boston: Routledge, 1974). 
70 Nigel Keohane, The Party of Patriotism: The Conservative Party and the First World War, 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2010). 
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the wartime state led to a growing acceptance of state intervention and regulations 
in both camps. Whereas Winter concludes that leading Labour theorists abandoned 
their radical critique of the state as a mere agent of capitalist class interests and 
began to see it as potential tool for transformation, Keohane emphasises that 
Conservative leaders acknowledged the legitimacy of state regulation of the 
economy. The First World War thereby narrowed the gap between the two formerly 
hostile political camps and provided the foundations from which British politics 
would evolve in the further course of the twentieth century. The actual domestic 
policies during the war itself do, nevertheless, only play a minor role in both 
arguments. Neither Winter nor Keohane give a clear picture about the positions of 
each party towards the emergency legislations and decrees under DORA. It is, in 
fact, surprising that DORA is widely neglected by most British accounts of the 
Great War. Brock Millman’s study Managing Dissent in First World War Britain 
explicitly tries to fill this gap.71 Millman argues that the British government under 
Herbert Asquith initially sought to maintain the liberal manner of domestic policies 
during the First World War.72 With the emerging necessities of total societal 
mobilisation and the introduction of conscription, however, this practice could not 
be upheld. After the advent of the Lloyd George government, the powers granted 
under DORA were increasingly used to combat growing dissent against the war 
within the British population. Millman concludes that by 1918 a sophisticated and 
efficient system of surveillance and repression had been established. Similar 
arguments about the establishment of a surveillance and censorship system in 
Britain can be found in Taylor and Sanders’ work on British propaganda as well as 
                                                          
71 Brock Millman, Managing Dissent in First World War Britain (London: Frank Cass, 2000). 
72 Ibid., pp. 25-34. 
 
22 
 
in Deian Hopkins’ work on British censorship during the war.73 Although Millman 
gives a comprehensive account of the rather repressive domestic policies during the 
war in Britain, his account seems to be a bit too static at some points and sometimes 
reads like a battle report. In particular, his juxtaposition of dissenters on one side of 
the battle and government and ‘patriots’ on the other does not entirely capture the 
complex nature of the political and social conflicts during the First World War.  
The legal and political problems related to the state of exception in Britain 
have also been analysed in depth by Charles Townshend.74 His focus on the 
experiences and discourses about martial law provide a valuable foundation for 
understanding the emergence of DORA. His work has furthermore the merit of 
contextualising the legal developments within the broader framework of security 
policies in Britain. Similarly, Bernard Porter’s work on the Special Branch of the 
Metropolitan Police and Richard Thurlow’s discussion of the emergence of the 
‘secret state’ in Britain provide valuable insights into the changing nature of the 
relationship between state and individual in Britain before, during and after the First 
World War.75 
Rachel Vorspan has presented an enlightening study about the legal aspects 
of British domestic policies under the circumstances of DORA.76 She examines the 
                                                          
73 Michael Sanders and Phillip M. Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War. 1914-
1918 (London. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982); Deian Hopkin, ‘Domestic Censorship in the First 
World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, 5, 4, (1970), pp. 151-169.  
74 Charles Townshend, ’Martial Law: Legal and Administrative Problems of Civil Emergency in 
Britain and the Empire, 1800-1940’, The Historical Journal, 25, 1 (1982), pp. 167-195; idem, 
Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain, op. cit. 
75 Bernard Porter, The Origins of the Vigilant State: The London Metropolitan Police Special Branch 
before the First World War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987); idem, Plots and Paranoia: 
History of Political Espionage in Britain, 1790-1988 (London: Routledge, 1989); Richard Thurlow, 
The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). 
76 Rachel Vorspan, ‘Law and War: Individual Rights, Executive Authority, and Judicial Power in 
England during World War I’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 38, 2, (2005), pp. 261-343.    
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role of courts and judges within the system of emergency governance under DORA. 
She points out that the judges sought to preserve their privileges and prerogatives 
and acted as self-willed actors within the framework of DORA.77 In fact, they 
became active policymakers with their court decisions often aggravating repressive 
measures by harsh verdicts. Vorspan points out that those concepts of domestic 
enemies had a profound impact on court rulings.78 Civil liberties were barely 
protected by British courts whereas property rights received far-reaching protection 
against government actions such as expropriations or the confiscation of goods and 
land. Keith Ewing and Conor Gearty follow a similar path in their analysis of British 
law-making and the rule of law in the first half of the twentieth century.79 Their 
focus on the role of courts and individual judges in the protection or infringement 
of civil liberties offers a valuable insight into the complex entanglements between 
high politics, the judiciary and individual actors in domestic politics.  
Andrew G. Bone’s unpublished 1994 PhD thesis on DORA offers an 
interesting perspective on certain aspects of DORA such as its use to regulate to 
prevent the spreading of venereal disease and censorship.80 Although his study 
offers a good discussion of certain aspects of emergency government in Britain, the 
appreciation of the entangled political, social and cultural factors that shaped the 
British approach to emergency government remains underdeveloped. As we shall 
see, particularly the problem of the regulation of sexuality and the use of emergency 
                                                          
77 Ibid., pp. 274-276. 
78 Ibid., pp. 329-330. 
79 Keith D. Ewing and Conor Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the 
Rule of Law in Britain, 1914-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
80 Andrew G. Bone, Beyond the Rule of Law: Aspects of the Defence of the Realm Acts and 
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powers to do so can only be fully understood when we take into account the 
conceptions of decency and moral quality of the wartime nation that informed the 
actions of the authorities. 
The institution of the Belagerungszustand in the German Empire has been 
examined in several legal studies. The most relevant work in this context is certainly 
Hans Boldt’s legal-historical study on the development of the state of siege 
legislation in Germany of 1967.81 Despite its age, this work has still to be considered 
as the standard reference work on the issue. Christian Schudnagies’ more recent 
study about the state of siege summarises the law making processes and debates of 
the German experts in constitutional law during that era.82 He emphasises the 
conflicting character of exceptional rule and points out the numerous 
inconsistencies of the ‘state of siege’ system which led in consequence to a 
polycratic structure of governance.83 In fact, this was an ineffective system that 
could not cope with challenges of a total war. Schudnagies’ focus on legal aspects 
leaves gaps regarding the political discourses and general perceptions of the regime 
under the state of siege. Nevertheless, this study is a crucial reading for a 
comprehensive understanding of the legal nature of the German state of siege 
concept.  
A similar approach has been taken by Christine Richstein in her study on the 
‘besieged’ criminal law in the German Empire.84 The study connects the application 
                                                          
81 Hans Boldt, Rechtsstaat und Ausnahmezustand: Eine Studie über den Belagerungszustand als 
Ausnahmezustand des bürgerlichen Rechtsstaates im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Duncker und 
Humblodt, 1967). 
82 Schudnagies, Christian, Der Kriegs- oder Belagerungszustand im Deutschen Reich während des 
Ersten Weltkrieges. Eine Studie zur Entwicklung und Handhabung des deutschen 
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and development of the criminal law as a political tool on one side and the use of 
emergency legislation on the other side. Richstein examines the emergence of an 
explicitly political jurisdiction during the Socialist Laws in the 1880s and combines 
this with the use of law as a weapon during the First World War. She then reflects 
on the infamous article 48 of the Weimar constitution. It is a major merit of 
Richstein’s study that it contextualises the institution of the state of siege within the 
broader legal history of the German Empire. It does, however, miss some crucial 
questions regarding the actual practices outside the legal system, and thus of the 
political dimension of the state of siege. An interesting attempt to tackle the 
challenge of a comparative social and cultural history of the British and German 
home fronts during First World War has been presented by Florian Altenhöner.85 
His analysis of publicity, rumours, and the role of censorship and control of public 
opinion in wartime London and Berlin provides a fruitful example of how 
comparative and theoretical approaches can be combined in a lively account of daily 
life under exceptional circumstances. His work is one of the few available that 
enquire into the actual effectiveness and perception of repressive practices during 
the war. He points out that the attempts to curtail certain information and to censor 
news were often counterproductive. Where reliable information was no longer 
available, rumours spread sometimes leading to outright waves of protest and 
unrest. Yet, Althöner’s study primarily focusses on the role rumours about the 
course of the war played within the German and British public. The actual impact 
of emergency measures on wartime societies as a whole and the transformation of 
their political cultures remains underdeveloped.  
                                                          
85 Florian Altenhöner, Kommunikation und Kontrolle. Gerüchte und städtische Öffentlichkeiten in 
Berlin und London 1914/1918 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2008). 
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Research Questions and Methodology  
 
Research Questions 
 
The First World War was the first time that modern governments used the 
instruments of emergency government over an extended period of time.86 The 
comparative analysis of this phenomenon thus bears great potential for the deeper 
understanding of the historical and theoretical dimensions of the concept of the state 
of exception. Yet, the analysis of the wartime frameworks of domestic policies in 
Britain and Germany also contributes to our understanding how European societies 
endured more than four years of totalising war and the hardships it brought with it. 
It is indeed necessary to emphasise that the First World War was not ‘total’ from 
the outset.87 What we find instead is a radicalisation of the mobilisation of societal 
resources, an unprecedented expansion of the wartime state and a waning 
distinction between combatants and civilians.88 The longer the war continued the 
more radical policies were enacted to enforce endurance on the home fronts, which 
increasingly bore features of a ‘total war’. This ‘totalising logic’ of the war is not 
least reflected by the phenomenon of emergency government.89 Like no other 
feature of wartime politics it represented the radical transformation of conceptions 
                                                          
86 For an overview of precedents, for example during the French Revolution, see Oren Gross and 
Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 17-34; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 
pp. 79-90. 
87 Stig Förster, ‘Introduction’, in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds), Great War, Total War: 
Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
pp. 1-18; Hew Strachan, ‘From Cabinet War to Total War: The Perspective of Military Doctrine, 
1861-1918’, in ibid., pp. 19-34; Wilhelm Deist, ‘The German Army, the Authoritarian Nation-State 
and Total War’, in John Horne (ed), State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First 
World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 160-172. 
88 Purseigle, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-38; Horne, ‘Introduction: Mobilizing for “Total War”’, pp. 1-18. 
89 Horne, ‘Introduction’, p. 3-5. 
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of the state, citizenship and national belonging that emerged in response to the 
changing nature of warfare in this period. 
The topic of this study is thus located within two main contextual 
frameworks, which both open up their own sets of questions. The first framework 
is shaped by theoretical considerations. It concerns the nature of state authority in 
times of crisis and the relation between societal mobilisation and coercion, between 
active commitment and mere endurance. John Horne and Pierre Purseigle amongst 
others have convincingly argued that the understanding of the relationship between 
coercion and consent during the war is crucial to our understanding of wartime 
societies as a whole.90 The dispute about the use of coercion to enforce endurance 
at the home fronts has been particularly fierce in France, where proponents and 
opponents of the ‘war culture’ paradigm struggled over the characterisation of the 
wartime state.91 Yet, the problem of coercion and consent was present in all 
belligerent societies. The analysis and comparison of different systems of 
emergency government during the war offers a unique perspective on the process 
of political, social and cultural transformation that European societies underwent 
during the war.  
The vague character of the emergency powers granted by the legislative 
frameworks of DORA or Belagerungszustand allowed the authorities to regulate 
nearly all aspects of social life. It is therefore of central interest for this study to 
                                                          
90 Cf. Purseigle, ‘Introduction’, pp. 22-27; Horne, ‘Introduction: Mobilizing for “Total War”’, pp. 
1-18. Julien and Bauerkämper identify this question as the key to the historical understanding of 
World War I home fronts: See Arnd Bauerkämper and Elise Julien, ‘Durchhalten! Kriegskulturen 
und Handlungspraktiken im Ersten Weltkrieg, in idem (eds), Durchhalten! Krieg und Gesellschaft 
im Vergleich. 1914-1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Rupprecht, 2010), pp. 7-28, esp. pp. 9-12. 
91 For the impact of the ‘war culture’ or ‘culture de guerre’ concept on First World War 
historiography see Leonard V. Smith, ‘The “Culture de Guerre” and French Historiography of the 
Great War of 1914-1918’, History Compass, 5, 6 (2007), pp. 1967-1979. 
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identify and examine those areas in which these powers were exercised as well as 
those where governments did not interfere.  
This, of course, also raises questions about the groups that were most affected 
by these regulations and practices: how did these measures influence their 
perceptions of the conflict?  How were the lives of people affected by emergency 
measures? Were these forms of rule accepted, or protested against? The 
examination of the agents of emergency government is closely tied to this set of 
questions. Which agencies exercised emergency powers and at what levels? Did a 
system of checks and balances exist within the system of the state of exception? 
And, what impact did dominant ideas about the state, governance and citizenship 
in Britain and Germany have on the exercise of emergency government?  
In addition to this broader framework of research questions regarding the 
nature of the state of exception, the second line of enquiry relates to the historical 
particularities of societal mobilisation and the home fronts during the First World 
War. There are a number of scholarly debates surrounding these issues to which 
this study seeks to contribute. For example, the question about the importance of 
coercive measures for the maintenance of the war efforts will be of paramount 
interest.92 Was it a specific ‘war culture’, a shared perception and hatred of the 
enemy, which fuelled societal mobilisation during Great War?93 Or were the 
coercive measures enacted under the state of exception crucial for enforcing 
                                                          
92 In France an intense scholarly debate about the role of patriotism and coercion emerged in the last 
decade. For an short overview, see Pierre Purseigle, ‘A Very French Debate: The 1914-1918 ‘War 
Culture’, Journal of War and Culture Studies, 1, 1 (2008), pp. 9-14. 
93 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker state this as a crucial factor for the endurance of soldiers and civilians 
during the war. For them, the escalation of the war on front and home front was a result of 
nationalistic self-mobilisation fuelled by hatred of the enemy. See Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and 
Annette Becker, 14-18: Understanding the Great War (New York: Hill & Wang, 2002), pp. 113-
158. 
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endurance on the home fronts?94 Were there significant differences between Britain 
and the German Empire in this respect? And if so, how can these differences be 
explained?  
The question of common experiences and significant differences has become 
especially important concerning the interpretation of the aftermath of the Great War 
and its impact on European political cultures.95 Whereas scholars such as Georg L. 
Mosse emphasised the central role of the common war experience for the 
‘brutalisation’ of the European societies and the rise of fascism, other scholars 
pointed out the differences in war experiences and the different political cultures of 
the interwar period.96 The diversity of interpretations, however, highlights that this 
complex phenomenon is far from being completely understood. In fact, a 
comprehensive history of the political culture of the home fronts remains to be 
published. This study will seek to narrow this gap by examining some aspects of 
home front policies in Britain and Germany. 
The focus on the political and to some extent social and cultural history of the 
state of exception during World War I must necessarily lead to a neglect of other 
important aspects. The spatial restraints mean that this study will only focus on the 
respective mainland. For the British case only the developments in England, Wales, 
and Scotland will be taken into account. For example, the discussion of emergency 
                                                          
94 In opposition to the war culture concept, the French Collectif de Recherche International et de 
Débat sur la Guerre de 1914-1918 emphasises the coercive nature state and military played in order 
to enforce endurance. For a comprehensive account of their positions in this debate see François 
Buton et al., ‘1914-1918: Understanding the Controversy’, available online: 
http://www.laviedesidees.fr/1914-1918-Understanding-the.html?lang=fr (last retrieved 5 July 
2012). 
95 Jon Lawrence, ‘Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence, and Fear of Brutalization in Post-
First World War Britain’, The Journal of Modern History, 75, 3, (2003), pp. 557-589. 
96 George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, (Oxford. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Rejecting this idea with regards to France: Antoine Prost, 
‘The Impact of War on French and German Political Cultures’, The Historical Journal, 37, 1, (1994), 
pp. 209-217. 
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government in Ireland under DORA that emerged after the Easter Rising 1916 
would necessarily expand the scope of this study beyond any reasonable size.97 
Similarly, the role of emergency legislation in the British colonies and dominions 
cannot be taken into consideration.98 The same considerations apply to the German 
Empire. The German colonies cannot be taken into account and neither can the 
system of rule in the German occupied territories such as Belgium or the vast areas 
in Eastern Europe.99  
 
 
Methodology of Comparison 
 
A historical study of the state of exception during World War I poses a 
number of methodological challenges. Depending on how the phenomenon is 
framed theoretically, different questions arise, especially when a comparative 
approach is chosen. First and foremost, there are always the dangers connected to 
applying generic concepts such as the state of exception to historical phenomena, 
                                                          
97 For a good overview about the Irish uprising in 1916 and the harsh responses by the British 
government and military see Charles Townshend, Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion (London: Allen 
Lane, 2005); see also Stephen Morton, States of Emergency: Colonialism, Literature and Law 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013), pp. 35-60; Colm Campbell, Emergency Law in 
Ireland 1918-1925 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), pp. 1-27. 
98 See for example Bohdan S. Kordan, Enemy Aliens, Prisoners of War: Internment in Canada 
during the Great War (Québec and Kingston: McGill University Press, 1999); Gerhard Fischer, 
Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Home Front Experience in Australia, 1914-1920 (Brisbane: 
University of Queensland Press, 1989); Panikos Panayi (ed.), Germans as Minorities during the 
First World War: A Global Comparative Perspective (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014). 
99 For the German occupation policy in Belgium, see Jens Thiel, ‘Forced Labour, Deportation, and 
Recruitment: The German Reich and Belgian Labourers during the First World War’, in Serge 
Jaumain et al. (eds), Une Guerre Totale? La Belgique dans la Première Guerre mondiale. Nouvelles 
tendances de la recherche historique (Bruxelles: Archives générales du Royaume, 2005), pp. 235-
245; Jens Thiel, Menschenbassin Belgien: Anwerbung, Deportation, Zwangsarbeit (Essen: Klartext, 
2007). For a comprehensive account of the German occupation policies in Eastern Europe see 
Christian Westerhoff, Zwangsarbeit im Ersten Weltkrieg: Deutsche Arbeitskräfte im besetzten Polen 
und Litauen 1914-1918 (Paderborn: Schönigh, 2011). 
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which can level particularities instead of revealing them. It is, nevertheless, the 
analytical dimension provided by theories that enables us to make sense of the past.  
Comparative approaches to understanding the history of the First World War 
have flourished in the recent years.100 A growing number of studies such as Heather 
Jones’ study on the treatment of prisoners of war in Britain, France and Germany 
or Adam Seipp’s comparison of demobilisation after the war in Munich and 
Manchester help to understand the general impact of the conflict on European 
societies.101 Depending on the subject of enquiry, the scope of such studies range 
from the comparison of local entities such as specific cities or regions to the 
comparison of entire states and their policies.102 For this study, the emphasis is 
deliberately put on the comparison of Britain and Germany on a national level. This 
allows us to analyse the different systems of emergency government in both 
countries more thoroughly. There are, however, also a number of case studies and 
comparisons based on local developments in cities such as Berlin, Glasgow and 
London. This way the more conceptual level of comparison and analysis can be 
linked with the discussion of concrete examples and case studies. 
The framing of domestic wartime policies and practices within the concept of 
the state of exception allows us to compare different countries and to integrate them 
into the general history of the twentieth century. Otherwise, this study would be at 
risk of merely offering parallel accounts of loosely connected events in Britain and 
the German Empire during the Great War. Depending on the chosen categories and 
                                                          
100 Pierre Purseigle, ‘Introduction’, in Idem (ed.), Warfare and Belligerence: Perspectives in First 
World War Studies (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 1-38, p. 4. 
101 Heather Jones, Violence against Prisoners of War in the First World War: Britain, France and 
Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Adam R. Seipp, The Ordeal of Peace: 
Demobilization and the Urban Experience in Britain and Germany, 1917-1921 (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2009). 
102 Purseigle, ‘Introduction’, pp. 14-18. 
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dimensions of comparison, a certain degree of generalisation is unavoidable.103 This 
must not lead to a total neglect of national particularities but it allows the study to 
transcend the still dominant framework of national historiographies.104 
Fundamentally, comparative approaches to history enable us to discover both the 
essential and the particular in certain developments but also interdependencies and 
entanglements.105 They also help us to understand how common or unique the 
experiences on the different home fronts were during the First World War. 
In order to uncover both dimensions of the state of exception during the First 
World War, the methodology of this study follows two patterns of comparison: 
firstly, a chronological examination of the individual developments in Britain and 
Germany with regards to the politics on the home fronts and the emerging systems 
of emergency government is provided. The comparison between the developments 
in both countries aims at establishing certain patterns in the formation of the state 
of exception during the war. In this context, the focus is placed on the impact of the 
military situation and on emerging protests against the war. This will help to 
understand how the mobilisation of both societies influenced the exercise of 
emergency powers and what role the respective systems of emergency government 
played in their wartime societies. This diachronic approach to the problem is 
                                                          
103 For a critical discussion of the limitations of synchronous comparison, see Michael Werner and 
Bénédict Zimmermann, ‘Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity’, 
History and Theory, 45, 1 (2006), pp. 30-50.  
104 Jay M. Winter, ‘Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914-1919’, in idem and Jean-Louis 
Robert (eds), Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914-1919 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), pp. 3-24; idem, ‘Research Report: Paris, London, Berlin: Capital Cities at 
War, 1914-1920’, International Labor and Working-Class History, 44 (1993), pp. 106-118. 
105 Cf. John Breuilly, Labour and Liberalism in Nineteenth Century Europe: Essays in Comparative 
History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), p. 16; Johannes Paulmann, 
‘Internationaler Vergleich und interkultureller Transfer: Zwei Forschungsansätze zur europäischen 
Geschichte des 18. Bis 20. Jahrhunderts’, Historische Zeitschrift, 267 (1998), pp. 649-685. See also: 
Hans-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, ‘Comparative History: Methods, Aims and Problems’, in 
Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor (eds), Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National 
Perspective (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 23-40. 
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complemented by a more systematic comparison of the agents of emergency 
government in Britain and Germany. This second comparative approach allows an 
examination of some of the relevant dimensions and institutions of the state of 
exception during the war. It highlights the structural changes within the German 
and British state during the First World War with regard to their domestic policies. 
Finally, the comparison of wartime peace activism in Britain and Germany in the 
last part of this study helps to establish certain patterns in the reactions of those 
affected by repressive emergency measures. It also sheds light on the question of 
how political cultures shaped the perceptions of emergency government and how 
these perceptions triggered the emergence of new forms of activism. 
 
 
Sources of the Study 
 
The First World War produced a gargantuan paper trail and this is also reflected in 
the overabundance of available primary sources on the topics of this study. The 
evidence base for this study is mainly drawn from archival research in German and 
British repositories such as the Bundesarchiv in Berlin and the National Archives 
in Kew. The records of the Reichsamt des Inneren (Imperial Home Office), the 
political archive of the Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office) and the records of the 
Reichskanzlei (Imperial Chancellery) provide a rich basis for this study. Until 1990, 
many of these documents were rarely available to Western scholars as they were 
kept at the Central Archives of the German Democratic Republic in Potsdam. In 
addition to the German government records, the archives of the Social Democratic 
Party of Germany (SPD), the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany 
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(USPD) and those of the radical Spartacus Group (the later Communist Party of 
Germany, KPD) have also been assessed in order to reconstruct the perspective of 
those groups most affected by the state of siege. In addition, the available files 
relating to pacifist organisations such as the German Peace Society (Deutsche 
Friedensgesellschaft) have also been consulted. Unfortunately however, most of 
the German military sources about the First World War were destroyed in February 
1945, when the Imperial Archives in Potsdam burned down after an air raid. 
Therefore, almost all German military sources quoted in this study are either taken 
from transcripts kept in other government offices, or they were already edited for 
Wilhelm Deist’s formidable two-volume source collection on the military and 
domestic policies in Germany during the Great War.106  
In addition, a number of local archives such as the Landesarchiv Berlin 
(Berlin State Archives) were consulted to collect material for the case studies. In 
particular the records of the Royal Police Presidency (Königliches 
Polizeipräsidium) in Berlin with its Criminal Investigation Division (Abteilung III) 
and the Prussian political police (Abteilung VII), which are kept at the Berlin State 
Archives, provided invaluable primary sources. Apart from the assessment of 
unpublished sources, a number of edited source collections and books were used, 
for example Ingo Materna and Hans Joachim Schreckenbach’s excellent edition of 
the reports of the Berlin Police Presidency during the war.107 The reconstruction of 
the discourses about the state of siege builds predominantly on the records of 
                                                          
106 Wilhelm Deist (ed.), Militär und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914-1918, 2 vols (Düsseldorf: 
Droste, 1970). 
107 Ingo Materna and Hans Joachim Schreckenbach (eds), Berichte der Berliner Polizeipräsidenten 
zur Stimmung und Lage der Bevölkerung in Berlin 1914-1918 (Weimar: Böhlau, 1988). 
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Reichstag debates and printed sources such as newspaper articles and contemporary 
books.  
For the sections of this study dealing with Britain, the files held at the National 
Archives in Kew including the records of the Home Office, the cabinet papers, War 
Office files, the files of the Ministry of Munitions and the Ministry of Labour as 
well as the records of the Committee of Imperial Defence have been accessed.  In 
addition, the relevant wartime records of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and 
its successor MI5 have been consulted. The records of the Metropolitan Police and 
its Criminal Investigation Division and Special Branch complement the government 
sources from the National Archives. The majority of these files have been available 
to researchers for some years, yet some of the files used for this study were accessed 
for the first time.  
The records of the Labour Party and other labour organisations held at the 
Labour History Research and Study Centre (LHRSC) in Manchester as well as the 
archives of the Union of Democratic Control at Hull History Centre were used to 
reconstruct the effects of DORA on activist organisations. In order to analyse the 
contemporary discourses about emergency government in Britain, the records of 
the House of Commons and the House of Lords, newspaper articles, pamphlets, 
magazines and books were used. 
 
 
Structure of the Study 
 
The structure of this study reflects the aforementioned methodological approach: In 
the first section, consisting of chapters one to three, the concept of the state of 
exception and its historical roots will be located within the context of the First 
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World War. Chapter one discusses the developments and experiences of emergency 
government in Britain and Germany before the First World War. Special focus is 
placed on the evolving practices of political policing and surveillance during the 
period of the Socialist Laws (1878-1890) in the German Empire and the so-called 
Great Labour Unrest of 1911-13 in Britain. With the help of a number of case 
studies, it will discuss how far these events can be seen as historical precedents for 
the development of emergency government during the First World War. Chapters 
two and three present a chronological overview of the evolution of emergency 
government in both countries during the war against the backdrop of the economic, 
political and social developments on the home fronts. The chronological design of 
these chapters aims at pointing out the dynamics of emergency government and its 
dialectic relationship with emerging anti-war protest and strike movements. 
Furthermore, by focussing on the higher levels of political and military decision-
making, these chapters provide an insight into the character of domestic policies in 
Britain and Germany during the war. 
The second part of the study offers a more actor-centred discussion of the 
actual experiences of emergency government on the ground in both countries. It 
examines how the emerging conceptions of domestic enmity influenced and shaped 
the exercise of emergency powers. For this purpose, chapter four will analyse the 
role of the military, police and courts as agents of emergency government, looking 
at the ways in which they interpreted their functions at the home front. The final 
chapter then deals with the impact of repressive emergency measures on activist 
organisations in both countries. It demonstrates that the experiences of 
confrontation with the state triggered a wave of civil liberties activism and left a 
lasting mark on Europe’s cultures of activism. 
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Conclusion 
 
The existing scholarship has hitherto neglected the problem of emergency 
government during the First World War. Neither the available scholarly literature 
nor collective memories of the war seem to reserve a prominent place for this 
phenomenon despite the fact that literally millions of people were affected by it. 
This is underlined by the comparatively small number of studies on the topic in 
German or English. Yet, recent enquiries have suggested that the First World War 
was crucial for the formation of the state of exception as a paradigm of rule. In order 
to capture the rise of the state of exception, approaches are required that transcend 
traditional national frameworks. The methodology chosen for this study sheds light 
on these phenomena not only in their institutional dimensions but also on the 
different perspectives of those people acting in them, and of those who were 
affected by it. Emergency legislation must not only be understood as a legal 
phenomenon but also a social and political issue. For these reasons, a history of the 
state of exception during the First World War must necessarily combine social, 
legal and political approaches to understanding the past.  
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Chapter One 
 
The Rise of a Paradigm: Experiences of the State of 
Exception in Britain and Germany before 1914 
 
 
State, Society and the State of Exception in the Nineteenth Century 
 
The phenomenon of emergency government during the First World War was largely 
the result of long-term developments during the nineteenth century. In order to 
understand its emergence after 1914, it is necessary to analyse its roots in the period 
before the First World War. 
The emergence of new social and political conflicts in the industrial age and 
the aggravation of already existing struggles created new challenges for the 
European states and their ruling classes. Ever-growing numbers of people 
demanded political rights and authentic representation of their interests. They began 
to question their status as subjects to absolute monarchs, demanding rights and 
political participation as citizens. The second half of the nineteenth century then 
saw the growth of the labour movement as a reaction to the immense social 
inequalities created by industrialisation and the virtual exclusion of the working 
classes from political representation.108 In the period between 1880 and 1914, social 
conflicts increasingly amalgamated with political struggles, generating a critical 
test for the state and its institutions.  
This short sketch of these general conditions is important for understanding 
the emergence of the specific concept of the state of exception during the nineteenth 
                                                          
108 See for example Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital: 1848-1875 (London: Abacus, 1975); 
Idem, The Age of Empire: 1875-1914 (London: Weidenfels and Nicholson, 1987); Karl Polanyi’s 
The Great Transformation is still an enlightening contribution to the understanding of the political 
and social challenges created by the industrialisation; Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The 
Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944). 
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century. The notion that constitutional arrangements and civil liberties could be 
subject to temporary suspension in order to cope with an exceptional crisis could 
only emerge against the backdrop of a universally shared belief that these rights and 
arrangements actually existed. This fact may seem patently obvious, but it 
elucidates the contrast between absolutistic reign and a constitutional system under 
a state of exception.  
The liberal concept of the constitutional state also implied that the state and 
its agencies ought to be held accountable for their acts, and that they were bound to 
operate in accordance with the established laws. The autonomy of the executive 
authority was increasingly hedged within a system of public control and laws. The 
liberal concept of the rule of law became the hegemonic concept of European 
political culture.109 In Britain, this dominant line of thought was epitomised by the 
work of Albert Venn Dicey. In his Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution of 1888, Dicey characterised the British model of the rule of law as 
being marked by three basic principles: firstly, by the fact that: ‘No man is 
punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct 
breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary Courts 
of the land’; secondly, by the principle that everyone – except for the monarch – 
was equal before the law; and, thirdly by the prevalence of case law in Britain, 
which in Dicey’s opinion limited the arbitrary use of legislative powers. 110 He went 
                                                          
109 For a general introduction to the history of the rule of law: Pietro Costa, ‘The Rule of Law: A 
Historical Introduction’, in idem and Danilo Zolo (eds), The Rule of Law: History, Theory and 
Criticism, (Springer: New York et al, 2007), pp. 73-149. For the British case see Ewing and Gearty, 
The Struggle for Civil Liberties, pp. 3-35. For the Prussian case see Albrecht Funk, Polizei und 
Rechtsstaat: Die Entwicklung des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols in Preußen 1848-1918 (Frankfurt 
am Main and New York: Campus, 1986), esp. pp. 195-204. 
110 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 5th Ed. (London:  
MacMillan, 1897), p. 179. 
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on to emphasise that the idea of the rule of law was irreconcilable with every form 
of unchecked and unrestrained government: ‘In this sense the rule of law is 
contrasted with every system of government based on the exercise by persons in 
authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint.’111 Dicey’s 
interpretation of the rule of law as a specifically English invention in contrast to the 
allegedly less liberal and less free constitutions elsewhere in Europe shaped British 
identity and political culture during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.112 Yet, despite Dicey’s emphasis on the Anglo-Saxon origins of the rule of 
law, similar ideas and concepts emerged all over Europe. In Germany, the legal 
scholar and political scientist Robert von Mohl coined the term Rechtsstaat, which 
entailed principles of legality and responsible government that resembled those 
Dicey had laid out.113 However, although the idea of the Rechtsstaat became an 
established part of German political thinking by the end of the nineteenth century, 
it was never part of the collective identity of the German Empire in the same way 
the concept of the rule of law was in Britain. Yet, the existence of similar ideals of 
good governance also points to some similarities in the political culture of both 
countries. The idea of the rule of law was not as exceptionally Anglo-Saxon as 
scholars such as Dicey had claimed, and the German Empire did feature more 
liberal elements in its political culture than its characterisation by historians as an 
authoritarian state would suggest.  
                                                          
111 Ibid., pp. 179-180. 
112 Donald M. MacRaild, Sylvia Ellis and Stephen Bowman, ‘Independence Day and Magna Carta: 
James Hamilton’s Public Diplomacy in the Anglo-World, 1907-1940s’, Journal of Transatlantic 
Studies, 12, 2 (2012), pp. 140-162. 
113 Rainer Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État du droit”’, in Christian Starck (ed.), 
Constitutionalism, Universalism and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
1999), pp. 270-306. 
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Nonetheless, the liberal conception of responsible government and 
constitutionalism was not uncontested. The emergence of different forms of 
emergency legislation in almost all European countries during the second half of 
the nineteenth century indicates a certain continuity of authoritarian and absolutist 
concepts of governance. Emergency powers were regularly employed throughout 
the nineteenth century to cope with protest movements and industrial unrest. Their 
use reached a first peak a short time before the outbreak of the First World War.114 
A consideration of these developments in the nineteenth century does not only 
enable us to trace back the political discourses about emergency government and to 
understand the ‘strange death of liberalism’ on the eve of the Great War.115 It also 
allows us to understand the emergence of what Richard Thurlow called the ‘secret 
state’ – those agencies and institutions that would enforce emergency measures 
during war and that continue to exist until today.116 As this chapter suggests, the 
experiences of protest and the state of exception in the nineteenth century led 
political and military leaders in Europe to include domestic policies and 
contingency plans in their pre-1914 war planning.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
114 Anja Johansen, Soldiers as Police: The Army and Protest Policing in France and Germany, 1889-
1914 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 1-33. 
115 Although merely analysing Britain, Dangerfield’s conclusion describes a general tendency in 
Europe where the formerly dominant liberal movements of the nineteenth century could not find 
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The Legal Frameworks of the State of Exception in the Nineteenth 
Century 
 
The legal and constitutional developments during the nineteenth century regarding 
the state of exception varied in Britain and Germany. The concept of emergency 
legislation in Germany was enshrined in the Prussian Law about the State of Siege 
of 4 June. Although officially created for the circumstances of a war, it was also 
applied domestically to suppress protest movements and industrial unrest. In 
Britain, by contrast, no explicit pieces of emergency legislation apart from the 
institution of martial law and a number of repressive laws for Ireland existed before 
1914.117 This was merely an expression of its very different constitutional traditions 
with its rather underdeveloped central state and the absence of a written 
constitution. The Riot Act of 1714, however, represented to a certain extent the 
equivalent to legal institutions like the German Gesetz über den 
Belagerungszustand. Nevertheless, both pieces of legislation enabled the 
authorities to declare a state of exception and to use the full range of the available 
means of coercion at their disposal.  
 
 
The Prussian Law about the State of Siege of 4 June 1851 
 
The German state of siege legislation of 1851 was a direct consequence of the 
revolutionary uprisings in 1848 and 1849. In Prussia, the king was forced to accept 
the demand for a liberal constitution. However, in the course of the restoration after 
1849, this first constitution was eventually repealed and replaced by an imposed 
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constitutional charter on 31 January 1850.118 Nevertheless, even this revised and 
imposed constitutional charter featured significant concessions to the liberal 
demands for greater political participation and for limitations of the absolute powers 
of the King.119 Although simultaneously introducing a socially exclusive three-class 
franchise, it also guaranteed certain civil liberties for all Prussian citizens such as 
freedom of the person (article 5), the inviolability of the home (article 6), the right 
to a fair trial and open courts of law, the prohibition of unlawful detention (article 
7), freedom of expression (article 27), the freedom of the press (Article 28), freedom 
of assembly (article 29), and the right to free association (article 30).120  
However, only one year later the Prussian authorities acquired the legal 
powers to curtail these newly-won freedoms. The so-called Law about the State of 
Siege came into force on 4 June 1851.121 This piece of legislation was later 
incorporated as article 68 into the constitution of the German Empire of 1871 and 
influenced the exceptional powers of the Imperial President enshrined in article 48 
of the Weimar constitution.122 The Law about the State of Siege incorporated many 
aspects of the French legislation regarding the état de siège which dated back to the 
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days of the French Revolution and the following Restoration Era.123 There is a 
certain irony in the fact that a Prussian government took inspiration for its 
essentially anti-revolutionary emergency legislation from revolutionary France.  
In essence, the law enabled commanding officers of fortresses and the 
commanding generals of army corps districts to suspend the guaranteed rights of 
articles 5, 6, 7, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 36 of the Prussian constitution. This was 
originally designed to assist defensive efforts in those provinces already seized, or 
threatened to be seized by the enemy.124 The crucial point was, however, that it also 
provided the King and his government with the right to declare a state of siege in 
cases of ‘unrest and urgent danger for public security’ in peacetime.125 Nonetheless, 
the law did not provide any clear description of what exactly constituted unrest or 
an urgent danger for public security, therefore leaving it open to definition by the 
Prussian authorities themselves. In cases of ‘exigent circumstances’ (Gefahr im 
Verzuge) local military commanders were even allowed to declare a state of siege 
on their own authority. With the declaration of a state of siege, the command over 
all civilian authorities was transferred to the respective military commanders and 
civil servants were obliged to obey their orders.126 This included the local police 
forces as well as all other civil servants in the respective districts.  
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The declaration of a state of siege also aggravated the punishment for certain 
felonies. Article 8 of the law demanded the death penalty for arson, bringing about 
of a flood, and for obstructing an officer or civil servant in the performance of his 
duty by force of arms. For minor offences such as spreading wrong and misleading 
information, the law demanded prison sentences of up to one year. All trials related 
to offences against the state of siege were to be held before extraordinary courts 
martial (Außerordentliche Kriegsgerichte), which consisted of five senior military 
officers.127 Sentences – including the death penalty – had to be executed within 24 
hours after they had been confirmed by the commanding general of the district. 
Military officers and subordinated civil servants were, according to the law, only 
personally accountable to the King (later the Emperor) and could not be prosecuted 
for their actions by regular courts. This suspension of the rule of law was 
additionally aggravated by article 9 of the law which allowed the local commanding 
officers to issue decrees on all possible aspects of daily life. Failing to obey these 
decrees could result in prosecution and prison sentences of up to one year. Article 
9 effectively bypassed the constitutional law-making process, allowing the military 
commanders to rule and administer as de facto dictators in their army corps 
districts.128 
The significance of the Law about the State of Siege resides in its 
constitutional rank as article 68 of the imperial constitution and in its potential to 
overthrow the constitutional system, and in consequence to establish the King – 
later the Emperor – as heads of a de facto military dictatorship. It was – to use 
Agamben’s terms – a law to abolish the rule of law at the free disposal of the head 
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of state.129 This must certainly be seen as a clear symptom of the shortcomings of 
the German constitutional system and the authoritarian tendencies within the 
Empire.130 But the law also highlights the central position of the military within the 
German political arrangements as a safeguard of the monarchic reign. The social 
structure of the officer corps and its exclusive allegiance to the person of the 
Emperor were regarded as the most reliable pillars of imperial reign and as bulwarks 
against liberalism and Social Democracy.131  
The concept of the state of exception gained particular relevance as a means 
of political repression during the time of the so-called Socialist Laws between 1878 
and 1890. After two failed assassination attempts against Emperor Wilhelm I in the 
summer of 1878, Imperial Chancellor Bismarck introduced a number of laws 
against the constantly growing influence of the labour movement in Germany. The 
assassination attempts were a welcome justification for a long planned attack on 
Bismarck’s new ‘enemies of the realm’ (Reichsfeinde) – the Social Democrats. The 
cornerstone of the Socialist Laws was the Law against the Public Danger of the 
Social Democracy of 19 October 1878.132 The law banned all socialist and 
communist associations that ‘aimed at subverting the existing state and social 
order’.133 It also curtailed all publications that promoted socialism, and prohibited 
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all public meetings in which the socialist or communist cause could be advertised. 
The banning of socialist organisations was accompanied by a number of restrictive 
and repressive measures that were enforced by the police authorities.134 Article 22 
of the law, for example, allowed the issue of exclusion orders against ‘known 
agitators’. Particularly relevant for our enquiry is article 28 of the Socialist Laws. 
It enabled state authorities to put certain areas (cities, counties), which were under 
‘imminent threat of socialist subversion’ under a so-called minor state of siege 
(Kleiner Belagerungszustand). Following the example of the state of siege under 
military command, it enabled senior civil servants and police authorities to suspend 
civil liberties such as the freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, and the right 
to possess and bear arms for a period of up to 1 year. In addition, local police 
authorities could issue exclusion orders against social democratic agitators for the 
same duration. However, in public acts of civil disobedience prominent leaders of 
the SPD ignored such decrees and bans on public meetings, and were consequently 
sentenced to prison sentences.135 The minor state of siege was declared on several 
occasions in socialist strongholds such as Frankfurt am Main, Dresden, Leipzig, 
Berlin, Hamburg and Altona with the particular aim of preventing socialist 
candidates from campaigning for the Reichstag elections. The attempts to contain 
the SPD eventually proved futile. Despite being severely obstructed as party, 
individual social democratic candidates could stand for the Reichstag elections. 
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Regardless of the severe repression, the SPD was able to quintuple its vote from 
311,961 in 1881 to 1.45 million votes in 1890.136  
The expiry of the Socialist Laws marked the end of the first attempt to 
establish a form of permanent state of exception. Although initially supported by 
some of the liberal factions in the Reichstag, it soon became obvious that the anti-
socialist measures were targeting any attempt to push for political reform and 
democratisation. Against the backdrop of the increasing violence used against 
striking workers and protesters since the 1880s, this eventually undermined support 
for the prolongation of the Socialist Laws. Nevertheless, the experience of massive 
and often brutal repression had a traumatic effect on German Social Democracy. 
The term Belagerungszustand became a symbol of unrestricted state power and left 
a lasting mark in the collective memory of the German labour movement. The 
leading Social Democrat August Bebel expressed this view in his memoirs when 
reflecting on the personal impact of state repression under the Socialist Laws: 
The fact that we were banished like vagabonds and criminals and 
forcibly separated from our women and children without trial I 
experienced as a mortal insult for which I would have sought retribution 
had I had the power. No trial, no condemnation ever aroused in me such 
feelings of hatred and bitterness as those expulsions that were renewed 
year after year until at last the overthrow of what had become an 
untenable law put an end to that cruel game with human lives.137 
 
The experiences of the Socialist Laws and their impact on the collective conscience 
of the German labour movement may also help to understand the reactions of the 
SPD leadership in August 1914. The threat of the violent suppression of the party 
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and its attached organisations certainly contributed just as much to the acceptance 
of the Burgfrieden policy as the promise of national integration.138 
 
 
Reading the Riot Act:  The British Example of Decentralised Emergency 
Government 
 
It is often argued that Britain did not have a tradition of martial law or emergency 
government before the First World War.139 While this is to a certain extent true, it 
neglects the fact that other pieces of legislation served the same purpose as the 
German Belagerungszustand.140 The Riot Act of 1714 featured some characteristics 
of other pieces of emergency legislation: the suspension of civil liberties, namely 
the freedom of assembly and in consequence to a certain extent also freedom of 
association and freedom of speech; the barely restricted use of (military) force 
against protestors; and the lack of proper legal safeguards against misuse of 
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authority.141 Richard Vogler noted the character of the Riot Act as a form of a state 
of exception by accentuating the fact that ‘rioters were, by proclamation, 
transformed into felons and moreover into traitors who were put outside the law, 
outside the King’s peace and therefore seen as outside the laws’.142 The Riot Act, 
however, was situational and could only be applied to comparatively small spaces 
such as counties, towns or fields where assemblies took place.143 Yet, within these 
limitations the Riot Act constituted a state of exception when it was read. The Riot 
Act remained in force until 1967 when it was replaced by Schedule 3, Part III of the 
Criminal Justice Act, which was finally repealed in 1973.144 It was first read in 1715 
and for the last time in Liverpool in 1919.145  
The Riot Act was among the first pieces of legislation issued by the new 
Hanoverian King George I in 1714.146 Confronted with a number of riotous unrests 
and uprisings especially in the North East of England, the Riot Act introduced 
elements of martial law into domestic policies. Originally, the Petition of Right of 
1628 prohibited the King and his government from declaring martial law in England 
during peacetime, rendering the use of the military for domestic affairs illegal and 
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unconstitutional.147 The Riot Act, however, bypassed this ban by giving local 
magistrates the power to call-in military assistance to disperse assembled crowds.148  
Wherever groups larger than twelve persons assembled in open field 
‘unlawfully, riotously and tumultuously’, the Riot Act could be read by local 
magistrates. The proverbial ‘reading the Riot Act’ required all assembled persons 
to disperse within an hour after the reading, otherwise they could be ‘killed, maimed 
or hurt’ by the aides of the local authorities. In such cases the military was obliged 
to provide ‘military assistance to the civil authority’ when requested by the local 
magistrates. The act stated further that:  
[…] if the persons so unlawfully, riotously and tumultuously 
assembled, or any of them, shall happen to be killed, maimed or 
hurt, in the dispersing, seizing or apprehending, or endeavouring 
to disperse, seize or apprehend them (…),that then every such 
justice of the peace (…) [and] all and singular persons, being 
aiding and assisting to them, or any of them, shall be free, 
discharged and indemnified, as well against the King's Majesty, 
his heirs and successors, as against all and every other person and 
persons, of, for, or concerning the killing, maiming, or hurting of 
any such person or persons so unlawfully, riotously and 
tumultuously assembled, that shall happen to be so killed, 
maimed or hurt, as aforesaid.149 
 
The Riot Act was subject to several amendments during the early nineteenth 
century, extending the powers of local magistrates to an almost absolutist level.150 
In its final form after 1831, the Riot Act enabled local magistrates to ban the holding 
of meetings; to call upon the assistance of the militia, military, yeomanry, or the 
constabulary to command any of these against rioters; to use the posse comitatus to 
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suppress riots; to swear in special constables; to arrest rioters and keep them in bail; 
to read the Riot Act; and to convict and sentence rioters for a range of summary 
offences.151 Nevertheless, no precise definition of what constituted an ‘unlawful’ or 
‘tumultuous’ assembly was given, making potentially every public political 
meeting or picket line a case for the reading of the Riot Act. This opened up 
possibilities for the arbitrary use of the act by local magistrates, who were 
themselves often representatives of the local oligarchy, consisting of the landed 
gentry and owners of mines and factories, and therefore themselves part of the 
industrial and political conflicts. The central state only played a minor role in the 
policing of public order and this would not change until the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The fact that local magistrates could call upon the assistance of 
the military on their own authority without consulting Parliament or the Home 
Office is – in comparison to Germany – very remarkable. This decentralisation of 
emergency powers under the Riot Act was designed to prevent the misuse of powers 
by the central state. Yet, as the subsequent discussion will show, the prominent 
position of the local magistrates was hardly controlled and checked, as incidents 
such as the Peterloo Massacre in 1819 or the deployment of the military to deal with 
strikes throughout the nineteenth century illustrate. Particularly the indemnifying 
clauses of the Riot Act could hardly be reconciled with the liberal ideals of the rule 
of law and responsible government.  
Until the beginning of the First World War, the Riot Act remained the only 
explicit piece of legislation that enabled the application of emergency measures in 
Britain. The discourses about the application of the Riot Act and the use of the 
military in the interior did however shape notions of emergency government by the 
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central state. This would have a profound impact on domestic policies during the 
First World War in Britain and the related pieces of legislation such as the Defence 
of the Realm Act and the subsequent Emergency Powers Act of 1920.  
 
 
Comparison 
 
The legal framework of the state of exception developed along very different lines 
in Britain and Germany during the nineteenth century. Whereas the Law Regarding 
the State of Siege from 1851 emerged as reactionary response to revolution and 
constitutionalism, the Riot Act evolved as an instrument to keep public order. The 
Belagerungszustand was a drafted piece of legislation with clear political 
implications. It was designed as an instrument to preserve the established political 
order against the threat of revolution. The Riot Act gave local authorities spatially 
and temporally limited emergency powers to assume command over the military 
and to order the application of lethal violence against rioters and protesters. The act, 
however, was not in any way designed to change the political order as a whole. Its 
political significance derived from its potential to enable authorities to suppress 
even legitimate assemblies and protest. The constitutional arrangements in Britain 
implied that civil liberties were not guaranteed in the same way as in a written 
constitution. They were merely negatively defined by common law and case law in 
the sense that judges and individual acts of parliament set the limits for actions by 
the state and its agencies. In other words, there was no need for explicit emergency 
laws because there was no clearly defined catalogue of civil liberties that could be 
suspended by such legislation. 
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Against this backdrop, the Riot Act – and in particular its indemnifying 
clauses – can be seen as an instrument to curtail the articulation of political protest. 
Both pieces of legislation, nevertheless, set the framework for the involvement of 
the military in domestic affairs. In Britain, the military remained subsumed under 
civil authority as an instrument of politics. In Germany, by contrast, the army would 
emerge as an autonomous actor in domestic policy without any effective control by 
civilian authorities. This exclusive accountability to the Emperor enshrined in the 
Law Regarding the State of Siege was designed to maintain control over the military 
as an instrument. 
 
 
Public Order and the State of Exception: The Application of 
Emergency Measures before the First World War 
 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the only state agency capable of 
enforcing emergency measures was the military. Yet, a number of controversial 
incidents and the emergence of large scale protest movements during the second 
half of the century led to a differentiation of the agencies of the central state. The 
military proved increasingly insufficient to police public mass meetings and strike 
assemblies. The experience of excessive violence used by the military in dispersing 
meetings finally led to the emergence of the police force as an intermediate agency 
for policing public order and security.152 The emerging labour movement and 
                                                          
152 Vogler, Reading the Riot Act, pp. 17-19; see also Johansen, Soldiers as Police, pp. 275-282; 
Idem, ‘Violent Repression or Modern Strategies of Crowd Management: Soldiers as Riot Police in 
France and Germany, 1890-1914’, French History, 15, 4 (2001), pp. 400-420; idem, ‘Policing and 
Repression: Military Involvement in the Policing of French and German Industrial Area 1889-1914, 
European History Quarterly, 34, 1 (2004), pp. 69-98;  Thurlow, The Secret State, pp. 17-36; Barbara 
Weinberger, Keeping Peace: Policing Strikes in Britain 1906-1926 (Oxford: Berg, 1991), pp. 9-19. 
 
55 
 
liberal politicians saw the deployment of the military in domestic affairs as 
illegitimate and as an attempt to establish authoritarian forms of rule. Consequently, 
professional police forces increasingly took over the task of policing public protests 
and strikes. Yet, this transition of responsibilities also brought new challenges for 
the authorities. The emergence of the modern police was accompanied by 
phenomena that were not always coherent with liberal ideas of the state. Secret 
political police units such as the Abteilung VII of the Berlin Royal Police Presidency 
or the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police represented hybrid types of state 
agencies situated between the normality of police work and domestic intelligence.  
It is crucial for understanding the emerging concept of the state of exception 
during the First World War to analyse these relations between the state, its executive 
agencies such as the military and the police and the public before 1914. The 
discussion of the following examples will show that the existence and actions of 
these agencies were far from being generally accepted. They also illustrate how 
notions of the appropriate response to threats to public order and security changed 
from manifest confrontation to concepts of preventive security. This, of course, had 
wide-ranging implications regarding legality, secrecy and the application of 
emergency measures.  
 
 
Policing the Belagerungszustand: Military and Police as Agents of the 
Authoritarian State in Germany 
 
The preceding description of the state of siege legislation in Germany has already 
drawn our attention to the central position of the military. But what did the actual 
practice of emergency government actually look like? And how did the general 
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public perceive the institution of the Belagerungszustand and the domestic 
deployment of the military? 
The brutal crackdown by Prussian and Austrian troops on the revolutions 
1848-49 left a deep suspicion within the liberal and socialist movement against the 
military.153 Although popular militarism was a widespread phenomenon within 
German society in the second half of the nineteenth century, the use of the military 
for domestic duties was perceived critically.154 The SPD, for example, popularised 
the concept of the military, and in particular the army, as an institution belonging 
to the nation as a whole.155 Its domestic deployment against strikers was thus 
increasingly seen as a contradiction to this inclusive national character. The fact 
that the German army was largely comprised of conscripts from all social classes 
made things particularly difficult. Whereas leading generals and the Imperial 
Government saw the army primarily as a pillar of the monarchy, the liberal parties 
and the SPD popularised the notion of a people’s army (Volksheer) and integrated 
this demand into its Erfurt Party Platform of 1890.156 These conflicting notions 
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about the function and position of the military within German society set the field 
for the debates about the use of the army in the interior.  
The case of a metalworkers’ strike in the Westphalian city of Bielefeld in 
March 1885 illustrates the practice of the military in policing industrial disputes.157 
The years 1884 and 1885 saw an unprecedented wave of strikes in the German 
Empire and other parts of Europe, particularly in France. During the following 
‘decade of class struggle’, the military was frequently used to suppress strike 
movements and protests.158  Bielefeld was at this time a regional centre for textile 
production and its ancillary industries. The occasion for the strike in March 1885 
was the plan of the owners of the sewing machine factory Koch & Co to introduce 
new rules for its workers, including the demand to bring or pay for their own tools. 
This caused outrage among the workers. The eventual layoff of two alleged 
ringleaders by the factory owners provided the last push towards a strike. On 4 
March 1885, the workers of Koch & Co went out on strike. The dispute about 
changes in work contracts soon reached a new level when the German Metal 
Workers Union (Deutscher Metallarbeiterverband) intervened and threatened an 
all-out strike in Bielefeld and the surrounding districts. The factory owners 
attempted to bring in workers from outside, which were immediately attacked in 
the streets by flying pickets.  
From the beginning of the strike, the police made an effort to disperse pickets 
and strike assemblies but was soon outnumbered and overwhelmed. Although 
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several dozen strikers were arrested in the coming days, these repressive measures 
additionally contributed to a general aggravation of the dispute. The conservative 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung reported that ‘people willing to work were 
attacked and beaten by strikers so that the police had to protect them on their way 
to the factory and home’.159 Eventually, protestors gathered around the lodging 
house of the imported strike breakers and started to attack it by smashing the 
windows. The police proved unable to disperse the crowd of several hundred people 
during this night. Eventually, two companies of infantry took position in the streets 
around the factories and held the pickets back from the factory gates. When the 
situation seemed to have calmed down, the soldiers were ordered back to their 
barracks. Yet, according to the newspaper article, the strikers immediately returned 
to the streets and now started to attack the mansion of the factory owners. The troops 
returned and marched to the owner’s residence. After their arrival, they carried out 
several bayonet charges against the largely unarmed rioters in order to disperse the 
crowd. At least two workers were seriously injured by stabs in the chest and several 
others by blows of the rifle butts. The crowd consequently broke up in panic. On 
the following day, the commanding officer of the Bielefeld garrison Colonel Otto 
Köppen declared a provisional state of siege over Bielefeld. All public meetings 
were banned and several trade unionists and strike leaders were detained. The strike 
lasted five weeks and the state of siege was upheld until its end. Soldiers patrolled 
the streets and violently suppressed any further attempts to establish picket lines. 
The strike finally resulted in a defeat for the strikers who could not achieve any 
major concessions.  
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The Bielefeld strike of 1885 was more than a regional industrial dispute. 
Many contemporary observers saw it as a ‘forward skirmish of the working class’ 
against the repression of the Socialist Laws.160 The intervention of the military 
under the state of siege set a precedent for further military intervention in industrial 
unrest in Germany. In 1889, during the first large-scale miners’ strike in the Ruhr 
area, the military intervened again. This resulted in the killing of fourteen striking 
workers. A further escalation of this strike was only prevented by an intervention 
by the Emperor himself.161 The ‘full’ state of siege, however, was only declared on 
two occasions: during a metalworker strike in the Silesian city of Königshütte and 
during the discussed strike in Bielefeld in 1885.162 The increasing violence during 
strikes at the end of the 1880s contributed to the refusal of the Reichstag to prolong 
the Socialist Laws. Open confrontation and repressive measures were increasingly 
seen as inappropriate instruments to deal with the labour movement.163  
Nonetheless, the military remained an apparatus of repression at the free 
disposal of the Emperor. This was particularly the case after the Reichstag rejected 
the prolongation of the Socialist Laws in 1890. Immediately before and after the 
governmental crisis, which emerged in the wake of the repeal of the Socialist Laws 
and which eventually resulted in Bismarck’s dismissal, leading generals urged the 
Emperor to use his prerogative under article 68 to declare an empire-wide state of 
siege. With the landslide victory of the Social Democrats in the 1890 Reichstag 
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elections, ultra-conservative generals promoted the detention of leading Social 
Democrats and the suspension of the constitution as the only viable option to 
preserve the old monarchic order.164 Although eventually not put into action, the 
existence of this plan underlines the argument that the state of siege was seen as a 
legal instrument to abolish constitutional order. The army remained a bulwark of 
the established political order and against any drive in the direction of 
democratisation. On 20 March 1890, with the end of the Socialist Laws looming, 
the Prussian minister of war, Julius von Verdy du Vernois, issued an order to all 
commanding generals of the Prussian army instructing them to suppress any social 
democratic agitation within the troops and urging them to gather intelligence about 
local socialists, their press and party leaders.165 This echoed the widespread belief 
within the officer corps that the army now had to take the lead in the struggle against 
social democracy after the majority in the Reichstag rejected further support.166 The 
special position of the army was also highlighted in a speech of Emperor Wilhelm 
II during a swearing-in of recruits of a Guards Regiment in Potsdam in 1891. The 
Emperor pointed out that the army’s only allegiance was to be with the monarch: 
(...) There is only one enemy for you and that is my enemy. With the 
current socialist machinations, it may occur that I order you to shoot 
your own relatives, brothers, even your parents – may God prevent it – 
but even then, you have to follow my order without muttering.167 
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Yet, without risking civil war, and without the emergency powers granted by the 
Socialist Laws, other ways to tackle Social Democracy had to be found.  Since the 
enactment of the Socialist Laws in 1878, the Royal Police Presidency in Berlin had 
started to gather domestic intelligence about the labour movement.168 Initially 
beginning with the surveillance of socialists and anarchists in Berlin, it soon 
extended its scope to all other provinces of Prussia and later began to collect 
information beyond the borders of the empire. Department VII (Abteilung VII), also 
known as the Politische Polizei (political police) of the Police Presidency 
established a closely tied net of surveillance consisting of a large number of 
confidential informants.169 Additionally, local police officers regularly compiled 
reports about the activities of socialist groups in their districts and the Department 
issued yearly secret reports about the issue to the Imperial Government. The 
activities of Department VII remained mostly secretive and widely defied public 
control. The institution of a political secret police was particularly problematic 
because it unified the functions of a domestic intelligence agency with the general 
powers of the regular police such as the right to arrest and collaboration with the 
bodies of public prosecution. This combination of intelligence and policing made 
the political police in Prussia the historical predecessor for later agencies such as 
the Secret State Police (Geheime Staatspolizei, Gestapo) during the Third Reich. 
As we shall see, Department VII significantly extended its already broad activities 
during the First World War. In combination with the ruling military, the police 
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would become the main agent of enforcing the Belagerungszustand in the German 
Empire. 
 
 
The Failure of Military Intervention and the Rise of the Central State in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain 
 
A number of incidents during the nineteenth century changed relations between 
civil society and the military in Britain profoundly. The shortcomings of military 
deployment for domestic purposes became increasingly manifest – particularly 
against the backdrop of growing industrial unrest. These developments were one of 
the main reasons for the establishment of countrywide police forces that 
consequently took over the responsibility for keeping peace and public order.170 The 
call for ‘bringing the troops on to the streets’ was increasingly seen as a 
contradiction to the British values of liberty and rule of law. The emergence of this 
notion in nineteenth-century Britain can be reconstructed with the example of a 
number of incidents in which the military was used against protesters and striking 
workers.  
The so-called Peterloo Massacre was one key event in this respect. On 16 
August 1819, the Manchester and Salford Yeomanry Cavalry attacked a huge 
crowd of 50-60.000 people. The militia had been called in by the local magistrates 
to assist in the detention of some of the speakers present at the field. The subsequent 
confrontation resulted in fourteen protesters and bystanders being killed and several 
hundred injured.171 The use of trained soldiers against mostly peaceful 
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demonstrators caused a public outcry. Nevertheless, the direct aftermath brought a 
number of repressive acts of parliament that restricted freedom of assembly and 
curbed the freedom of the press by introducing new taxes. Although those acts were 
soon repealed, not much changed immediately in the approach to policing public 
order. The maintenance of order remained the key responsibility of local 
magistrates, many of them representatives of the oligarchy, who often used their 
prerogatives to suppress local protest movements. The Riot Act proved to be a 
useful legal instrument to call in the assistance of troops for this purpose. For 
instance, the repression of the Chartist movement and its public assemblies in the 
1840s was predominantly based on readings of the Riot Act.172  
However, the level of violence the troops applied against public meetings was 
soon seen as excessive. Representatives of the central government in London, 
primarily the Home Secretaries and the War Office, worried about the perception 
of the military as a repressive organ of the local ruling classes rather than an 
impartial institution of the Empire.173 From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, 
attempts were made to replace the military with local police authorities for the 
purpose of keeping public order. However, the emergence of new, nationwide forms 
of political organisations such as national trade unions soon brought new 
challenges, which local police authorities were not able to cope with. From the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century until the eve of the First World War, the military 
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again played a central role in policing industrial unrest, particularly during the Great 
Labour Unrest of 1911-1913.174  
The first of these occasions was the first nation-wide labour dispute in 
Britain’s coal mining industry in 1893.175 An incident in Featherstone, in the West 
Riding of Yorkshire, proved to be crucial for the further development of civilian-
military relations.176 The pit owner of the Ackton Hall Colliery, Lord Masham, and 
the owner of the Featherstone Main Colliery, decided to lock out their workers in 
order to stockpile their coal and wait for an increase in market prices. Stripped of 
the means to support their families, the miners soon assembled in protest meetings 
all over the coalfield. After a number of incidents of rioting in which the police 
were outnumbered and incapable of maintaining public order, the assistance of 
troops of the South Staffordshire Regiment from Bradford was called in. A small 
detachment consisting of three officers and 36 soldiers was sent to Featherstone. As 
the mere presence of soldiers proved to be no deterrent for the protesters, a local 
magistrate arrived and read the Riot Act which legally enabled the soldiers to use 
lethal force to disperse the assembled strikers.177 The unit was soon surrounded by 
an angry crowd and forced to retreat to a boiler house. The commanding magistrate, 
Bernard Hartley, then ordered the soldiers to fire a volley of warning shots over the 
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heads of the crowd. As this had apparently no effect, he ordered the detachment to 
shoot another volley directly into the crowd. This time eight people were injured, 
two of them so severely that they later died in hospital. The shooting caused a severe 
panic among the assembled crowd which immediately dispersed.  
The incident at the Ackton Hall Colliery was soon called the ‘Featherstone 
massacre’ and caused intense public debate. A parliamentary inquiry was conducted 
investigating the deaths of those who had been shot. It concluded that use of lethal 
force by the soldiers was a ‘justifiable homicide’ for which they could not be 
prosecuted.178 However, after an intervention by MPs, the two families of those 
who had been killed at least received compensation. On the political side, MPs such 
as Labour’s Keir Hardie pressed for a Parliamentary Commission into the incidents 
at Featherstone. The then Home Secretary Herbert Asquith saw himself confronted 
with accusations that the Home Office had not done enough to ensure police were 
available, and that the local magistrates were uncontrolled in their partisan 
acquisition of troops.179 Although Asquith personally had nothing to do with the 
escalation in Featherstone, he was seen as the main person responsible. The labour 
press soon gave him the nickname ‘assassin Asquith’ and ‘Featherstone 
murderer’.180 A direct result of the Parliamentary Commission was that by 1895 the 
local magistrates lost their right to call in troops directly. The deployment of troops 
for domestic purposes became a prerogative of the Home Office.181 In 1908 a Select 
Committee on the deployment of troops in civil disorders was instated. One of its 
key recommendations was to use military force in domestic affairs as a last resort 
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when all other available means of policing had failed. Yet, the eventual 
centralisation of these emergency powers did not mean an end to the deployment 
of troops in the interior.  
Already in 1910, however, during another nation-wide miners’ strike, troops 
were deployed in the southern Welsh mining town of Tonypandy.182 After a series 
of riots there, the local constabulary called for help from Home Secretary Winston 
Churchill. His initial reaction was to dispatch 200 officers of the Metropolitan 
Police to Tonypandy. After this did not calm down the situation, Churchill gave 
marching orders to the 18th Hussars, which were later reinforced by detachments of 
the Lancashire Fusiliers under Major-General Neville Macready.183 In cooperation 
with local Welsh police units, all potentially riotous assemblies were suppressed. 
The massive presence of troops in the Rhondda Valley and their more or less 
partisan intervention on the side of the mine owners soon evoked the feeling among 
many miners that they were experiencing some sort of military occupation. 
Tonypandy was the first occasion on which the military was deployed under 
command of the Home Secretary but not much had changed in the actual practice 
on the ground. On the contrary, whereas before 1895 the domestic deployment of 
the army was a spatially limited issue, the subsequent centralisation under the Home 
Office opened up the way for the large-scale use of troops in the interior. The first 
nation-wide railway strike in August 1911 saw another stage of escalation of labour 
unrest when two protesters were shot dead by soldiers who were protecting a train 
in Llanelli (South West Wales) and several more injured during the following 
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riots.184 During this strike, soldiers were not only used to maintain public order but 
also as replacements for the striking workers themselves.  
Another innovation was a nationwide scheme for the deployment of troops. 
In anticipation of the national railway strike the cabinet had grouped the available 
troops in the mainland into seven areas under the command of senior military 
officers. Within these regional commands, the officers were autonomous in their 
responses to local strike movements. The coordination of these military commands 
was centralised at the War Office. Already on 11 August 1911, Home Secretary 
Churchill urged Prime Minister Asquith to allow the use of troops against strikers 
in London. Asquith denied this request and the situation in London calmed down 
after several employers gave in to the demands of the strikers.185 Troops had, 
however, already seized strategic positions in London such as rail stations and post 
offices. On 14 August, two rioters had been shot dead during an attempt to free two 
detained strikers in Liverpool. The Admiralty deployed two battle cruisers to 
Liverpool harbour in order to overawe the strikers.186 
The large-scale deployment of troops against strikers and particularly the 
centralisation of command represented a new stage in the development of 
emergency powers and direct intervention of the central state. In a protest meeting 
held on 26 August 1911, Labour MPs criticised this development as a ‘treasonable 
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suppression of civil authority’ and ‘the institution of martial law’ in Britain.187 
Already days before, during the Parliamentary session of 22 August 1911, the 
Labour MPs Ramsay MacDonald and Keir Hardie attacked the cabinet. Hardie 
accused the ministers of having ‘overridden the law, and suppressed civil 
government in this country without the consent or sanction of Parliament, and 
substituted military rule for it.’188 He continued in his assessment: 
On this occasion (…) the military authorities – we have the statement 
from the Home Secretary himself – were given an absolutely free hand 
to act where they pleased and to do as they pleased in what they called 
the preservation of order. Talk about revolution! The law of England 
has been broken in the interests of the railway companies of this 
country.189 
 
This highlighted one of the key features of the government’s new system of 
emergency government: the military’s deployment of on a large scale and the 
submission of local police under the command of military officers were completely 
new and the most obvious breaches with established traditions of government in 
Britain. The so-called ‘Great Labour Unrest’ continued until 1913 when the Dublin 
Lockout marked its peak.190 However, the experience of the large-scale military 
intervention in 1911 and the following debates represented the most notable 
experience with emergency government in Britain immediately before the First 
World War. It also demonstrates that despite the liberal traditions of British political 
culture, emergency measures were applied rather quickly when deemed necessary.  
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Already in January 1913, the General Headquarters, War Office and Home 
Office were at loggerheads with each other about this question. The cause was a 
plan to arm the Metropolitan Police with rifles in case of a national emergency. 
Although the nature of the emergency situation in question was never fully 
articulated, the chronological proximity to the Labour Unrest of 1911-1913 
suggests that it concerned mainly the suppression of a national general strike.191 For 
this purpose, 5,000 rifles and 500,000 rounds of ammunition were stored in the 
Tower of London.192 The conflict between the government offices, however, arose 
about the question who should assume the command of the armed Metropolitan 
Police during an emergency. Generals and War Office suggested that the 
Metropolitan Police should in such cases be organised according to the battalion 
structure of the army and put under the command of a military officer. Yet, the 
Home Office under Reginald McKenna – himself political master of the 
Metropolitan Police in his function as the Home Secretary – utterly rejected these 
proposals.193 Clearly, the actual core of this debate was the question of whether the 
military could become an independent political actor with control over civilian 
institutions. This was something the liberal government under Asquith sought to 
avoid at all costs. These debates occurred in the wake of the secret negotiations 
between the military and the Home Office in the Committee of Imperial Defence 
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about emergency measures in the case of a war.194 This dispute highlights the 
increased activities of the military to influence the politics of the cabinet before the 
war. There were, however, also fears that the military might develop an 
uncontrollable praetorian spirit. These fears were additionally confirmed after the 
so-called Curragh Incident in March 1914 and the following alarms of a possible 
military coup.195  The conflict seems to have never been fully resolved before the 
outbreak of the war. The Home Office insisted on the subordinate position of the 
military in domestic affairs, limiting its actions to so-called ‘military aid to the 
civilian authorities’, which was a well-established peacetime procedure. The 
generals, however, did not pursue this question any further. Yet, with the enactment 
of the Defence of the Realm Acts in 1914 and 1915, the military assumed at least 
partial control over the police forces in Britain. 
Another reaction to the escalation during labour unrests was the establishment 
of the so-called Macready System after 1910.196 This system was developed after 
the experiences in Tonypandy and represented a national strategy to deal with 
national emergencies such as nation-wide strikes. It earmarked troops to be 
deployed across the nation and included forward intelligence and positive 
propaganda.197 From the late 1880s onwards, the Special Branch of the 
Metropolitan Police gathered domestic intelligence within the United Kingdom. 
The Special Branch was primarily created to counter terrorist acts by the Irish 
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Republican Brotherhood but it is likely that radical trade unionists and socialists 
were among those under surveillance too.198 From 1909, another agency concerned 
with domestic security came into being – the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the 
predecessor of MI5 and MI6.199 Although primarily dealing with the alleged threat 
of a German spy network, the SIS contributed significantly to the development of 
practices in use under the Defence of the Realm Act. Already before the First World 
War, the SIS monitored the postal correspondence of suspected spies and prepared 
‘black lists’ for the pre-emptive detention of suspected spies and enemy aliens. The 
intelligence services were quite aware of the dubious legality of some of their 
activities. As many courts would refuse to issue warrants just for gathering 
intelligence, Home Secretary Winston Churchill bypassed this problem by issuing 
so-called Home Office Warrants. A similar principle would be applied during the 
war when the government was empowered to issue Defence of the Realm 
Regulations (DRR) to sanction emergency measures. Officials of the intelligence 
services such as Vernon Kell, later the head of MI5, and Colonel George 
MacDonogh, head of the military intelligence MO5, played a key role in the 
drafting of those pieces of emergency legislation that later would be enacted as 
DORA.200  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
198 No clear statement is possible here because almost no records about the early activities survive 
or they are still classified: Bernard Porter, ’Secrecy and the Special Branch, 1880-1914’, Bulletin 
for the Society for the Study of Labour History, 52, 1 (1987), pp. 8-16.  
199 Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm. The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen 
Lane, 2009), pp. 1-52; Keith Jeffery, The Secret History of MI6 (London: Penguin Books, 2010), 
pp. 5-40. 
200 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, pp. 67-90. 
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Comparison 
 
Despite the different legal frameworks in Britain and Germany, the actual practices 
of the state of exception did not differ significantly. In particular, the deployment 
of troops to police industrial unrest took very similar forms in both countries. The 
military was regularly used to reinforce police units, which were often 
overwhelmed by the sheer number of protesting workers. The employment of 
troops, however, often also brought a severe aggravation of violence. The soldiers 
frequently used bayonet charges or gunfire to disperse crowds. In Britain, where 
the Riot Act indemnified the application of lethal violence against alleged rioters, 
this provoked an aggravation of already critical situations. Nevertheless, the 
military remained in a subordinate position to the civil authorities. Rather than 
being an almost autonomous political actor, the military remained an instrument of 
civilian domestic policies. In Germany, by contrast, the Belagerungszustand made 
the military a potentially independent political actor. Only in 1911, when a national 
railway strike hit Britain, did the military seem to have emerged as an actor in 
domestic affairs. This would have a significant impact on wartime emergency 
government.  
The public perception of the use of the military in the interior was, however, 
in both countries very critical. Furthermore, the often partisan intervention of the 
military on the side of the employers diminished the legitimacy of the domestic 
deployment of troops. The disputes about military intervention also reflected the 
political divides in both countries. Whereas representatives of the labour movement 
attacked the repression of strike and protest movements as features of reactionary 
militarism, conservatives tended to justify it as necessary for keeping public peace 
and order. The liberal parties, by contrast, showed no unified reaction. The anxiety 
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about potentially revolutionary socialist movements coexisted with liberal 
convictions that opposed authoritarian methods of rule. This ideological conflict 
shaped the approach that the liberal British cabinet under Prime Minister Herbert 
Asquith adopted towards the subsequent establishment of emergency government 
during the war.  
A major consequence drawn from this dilemma was the attempt to avoid 
direct confrontations with protestors. Forward intelligence and the beginnings of 
domestic surveillance marked this new approach. In Germany, the military and 
political police shared this task from the late 1870s. In Britain, however, initially 
no special organisation for monitoring the labour movement existed. From the turn 
of the century, the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police and to some extent 
also the new Secret Intelligence Service began working along similar lines. Yet, the 
related institutions and methods were underdeveloped in comparison to the German 
Empire. There, the Socialist Laws had been instrumental for the development of 
secret political policing. It is, nevertheless, remarkable how quickly the British 
institutions caught up with these developments during the First World War.  
The practices and experiences of domestic intelligence before 1914 provided 
the basis for the massive extension of the ‘secret state’ in both countries during the 
war. Against the backdrop of the emergence of security agencies, discourses about 
their potential targets and suspects – ‘enemies within’ and other ‘threats to national 
security’ – evolved rapidly. The emergence of the security agencies of the central 
state clearly took place within very different political frameworks. Police and the 
military in Germany were perceived as guardians of the existing political order 
against the threat of the emerging challenge of Social Democracy. Their function 
was primarily a political one and many contemporary observers acknowledged this 
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fact. To some extent, this reflected the authoritarian tendencies in the political 
culture of the German Empire. In Britain, on the other hand, police and military 
were not primarily seen as political instruments. The use of troops in the interior 
was often more the result of current exigencies than that of fundamental ideological 
considerations. Nonetheless, the experiences on the ground were altogether not that 
different. In both countries, troops were regularly used to quell strike movements 
and the experiences were very similar for many of those affected by such 
emergency measures. Different legal and political frameworks nonetheless 
generated in very similar experiences.  
 
 
Preparing for the War at Home: The Role of Emergency Government 
in German and British War Preparations  
 
The preceding sections have discussed the German and British experiences with the 
state of exception before the First World War. These were, however, timely and 
spatially limited episodes. There was virtually no experience of how to apply 
emergency government to run a whole country.  
Yet, military strategists on the German and British general staffs began to 
include aspects of emergency government in their plans for an anticipated great war 
from the turn of the century onwards.201 The traditional historiography of the First 
World War tends to neglect these plans for domestic policies whilst focussing on 
the operational aspects of the grand strategies.202 This neglect, however, cannot be 
                                                          
201 For a comprehensive discussion of the domestic factors in Britain’s and Germany’s build-up to 
the First World War, see Michael R. Gordon, ‘Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World 
War: The British and German Cases’, Journal of Modern History, 46, 2 (1974), pp. 191-226.  
202 See for example Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (eds), War Planning 1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009);  Paul M. Kennedy (ed.), The War Plans of the 
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taken as evidence that no such considerations existed. On the contrary, especially 
the analysis of the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, the experiences of the ‘Great 
Labour Unrest’ between 1910 and 1913 in Britain and the general rise of dissident 
Social Democracy in Germany gave military planners enough reasons to include 
considerations of domestic policies into their war plans. It is, nevertheless, 
important to point out that domestic policies were not explicitly included in grand 
strategic schemes such as the German Schlieffen Plan. They formed, nevertheless, 
part of broader strategic assessments and war preparations in almost all European 
countries before 1914.203 These considerations gained particular importance after 
the 1912 conference of the Socialist International in Basle and its pledge to join the 
forces of the European working class in the ‘war against war’.204 General 
considerations for domestic policies in case of a European war thereafter developed 
a specific drive towards extensive state control of daily and political life. And, as 
we shall see, a certain notion that a major European war would have to be enforced 
against the resistance of the organised labour movement gained currency amongst 
military and civilian planners.  
 
                                                          
Great Powers (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979); William Mulligan’s study on the origins of the 
Great War at least acknowledges the importance of public opinion and the shaping of the 
international alliance system but says very little about the actual discussions about possible domestic 
policies in case of a war: William Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 133-176. See also Keith M. Wilson, ‘To The Western Front: 
British War Plans and the “Military Entente” with France before the First World War’, British 
Journal of International Studies, 3, 2 (1977), pp. 151-168. 
203 A good example outside the scope of this study is the Netherlands. There, emergency legislation 
was prepared with the aim of enforcing strict neutrality: Maartje M. Abbenhuis, ‘In Fear of War: 
The First World War and the State of Siege in the Neutral Netherlands, 1914-1918’, War in History, 
13, 1 (2006), pp. 16-41. 
204 For the Socialist Peace Movement before 1914 and particularly Basle 1912, see Kevin J. 
Callahan, ‘The International Socialist Peace Movement on the Eve of World War I revisited: The 
campaign of “War against War!” and the Basle International Socialist Congress 1912’, Peace and 
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German War Preparations, the State of Siege and the Planned Suppression 
of Socialist Dissent 
 
Within the German leadership two different designs for domestic policies in case 
of a war co-existed. The first plan envisaged the declaration of the state of siege 
only in those military districts in which enemy invasions were likely to take place, 
and for those areas where crucial lines of supply and communication had to be 
protected. By and large, these plans followed assessments of military necessity and 
were not met with major criticism within the Imperial Government. It was widely 
accepted that sabotage and espionage could only be prevented by suppressing some 
civil liberties during the mobilisation phase. This was also communicated as the 
official line of the Imperial Government towards the declaration of the state of 
siege. Moreover, it was enshrined in several regulations and orders passed on to the 
general commands and military authorities in the federal states.205  
Yet, a number of documents indicate that some military planners saw a long 
anticipated war as the perfect occasion for an all-out crack down on the Social 
Democrats.206 The secret regulations and plans for mobilisation in case of an 
external war contained explicit plans to deal with uprisings and to suppress strikes 
and protest movements that might occur in their course. It is likely that the general 
staff analysis of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and the following 
                                                          
205 This followed widely the regulations of the Law about the State of Siege of 1851.  
206 At least from April 1912 the Imperial Government began consultations with the governments of 
the federal states about the necessity to declare an empire-wide state of siege in case of a war. The 
correspondence reveals that domestic considerations had an impact on these considerations. BArch 
R1501/112215, pp. 64-77, pp. 92-112, Kriegszustand, 1910-1913.  
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revolutionary uprisings in Russia played a crucial role in the inclusion of these 
domestic aspects into German war planning.207 
Since the early 1900s, a number of service regulations had been circulated 
within the officer corps, which explained the systematic procedure for the 
declaration of the state of siege and the responsibilities of the commanding officers. 
One of these regulations was the Service Regulation Regarding the Use of Weapons 
of the Military to Suppress Domestic Unrest of 23 March 1899. In this secret 
document, the chief of staff of the 7th Army Corps and later Prussian minister of 
war, Karl von Einem, explained that ‘His majesty the Emperor’ demanded the 
‘ruthless use of the weapon’ against insurgents in order to respond to the ‘gravity 
of the situation’.208 These regulations were supposed to provide general guidelines 
for the local military commanders, who consequently set up their own orders for 
the case of mobilisation and the declaration of a state of siege. Yet, only few of 
these orders and mobilisation plans actually survive. An illustrative example is the 
order of the commander of the 7th Army Corps, General Moritz von Bissing, of 30 
March 1907.209 In this very detailed instruction to all commanders and staff officers, 
von Bissing laid out the planned actions in case of an uprising, in which the pre-
emptive declaration of a state of siege played a crucial role. Von Bissing’s 
contingency plan demanded the swift and ruthless suppression of any open uprising 
and the detention of all known socialist agitators and leaders. Even the pre-emptive 
detention of Reichstag MPs in defiance of their immunity was included in this 
                                                          
207 See Matthew S. Seligman, ‘Germany, the Russo-Japanese War and the Road to the Great War’, 
in Rotem Kowner (ed.), The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 
109-123. 
208 Deist, Militär und Innenpolitik, p. XXXV. 
209 BArch R43/1271, pp. 46-50, Order of Moritz von Bissing for the 7th Army Corps, 30 March 1907. 
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plan.210 The order concluded with a severe warning by von Bissing that no 
negotiations with insurgents should take place under any circumstances, and that 
only the complete submission and unconditional surrender of the insurgents could 
be accepted. All captured ringleaders and armed persons were to be ‘finished off 
with the weapon’.211  
Orders like these reflected in large part a strategic analysis of the general 
staff’s department of military history from 1906. In Combat in Insurgent Cities the 
general staff laid down the main principles to be applied to gain control over a 
hostile urban environment.212 The study analysed all major insurgencies in 
European cities since 1848 including the Paris Commune and the Russian 
Revolution of 1905. It concluded that the actual fighting necessarily had to be 
accompanied with pre-emptive measures such as establishing control over the press, 
the suppression of political agitation, and pre-emptive detention of alleged agitators 
and ringleaders. The study delivered a blueprint for counter-insurgency plans for 
the case of the declaration of the state of siege for all army corps commands.213 
There is, however, another aspect related to von Bissing’s order. In 1910, the order 
became public and caused a major outcry in particular in the social-democratic 
press.214 Several protest meetings were held and SPD-parliamentarians denounced 
the order as the most appalling expression of anti-Socialist policies. The 1910 party 
                                                          
210 Ibid., p. 48. 
211 Ibid., p. 50. 
212 The original German title was Der Kampf in insurgierten Städten; cf. Deist, Militär und 
Innenpolitik, p. XXXV. 
213 Similar radical approaches to deal with protesting workers can be found in the regulations of the 
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Police, 1911. 
214 BArch R43/1271, pp. 77-90, Memorandum on the Social Democratic Party Congress in 
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conference of the SPD in Magdeburg passed a resolution condemning the order and 
demanding a revision of the general military guidelines.215 The scandal was also 
used during the SPD’s 1912 election campaign. As a reaction to the public outcry, 
the Imperial Government was anxious to calm down the situation. Yet, the internal 
correspondences reveal that willingness to change the guidelines fundamentally 
existed neither within the military nor within the Imperial Government.216 The only 
concession the Imperial Government was willing to make was to guarantee the 
protection of the immunity of Reichstag MPs under the state of siege. However, 
this did not influence the procedures of the military under the state of siege 
significantly. The so-called Saverne (Zabern) Affair of 1913 demonstrated that 
censorship, pre-emptive detention and massive military presence on the streets 
remained the cornerstones of the state of siege.217  
The assumption that a confrontation between the Social Democrats and state 
was inevitable in case of a war dominated the German contingency plans. The 1912 
conference of the Socialist International in Basle and its pledge to oppose any 
imperialist war certainly reinforced this belief.218 The idea that a coming war had 
also to be fought also against ‘enemies within’ gained considerable momentum 
within the general staff. Plans to crack down on social democratic organisations 
immediately before or after the outbreak of hostilities were consequently to be 
                                                          
215 Cf. Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 
abgehalten vom 18. bis 24. September in Magdeburg (Berlin: Vorwärts Buchhandlung, 1910), pp. 
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216 Ibid. 
217 The declaration of the state of siege over Alsace-Lorraine during the peak of the Saverne affair 
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implemented in mobilisation orders. A document of particular relevance for this 
argument is the surviving letter of the Saxon State Ministry to the Prussian Ministry 
of War from 31 March 1913. In this letter, the Saxon authorities requested updated 
lists (entitled ‘A’ and ‘B’) of persons that were to be ‘detained because of political 
or security police considerations’.219 This document is one of the few surviving 
pieces of evidence that the war plans were accompanied by extensive contingency 
planning to crack down on Social Democracy and the pre-emptive detention of 
social democratic leaders and agitators.  
 
 
The British War Book and the Creation of DORA 
 
Comparatively little attention has been paid to the role of domestic policies in 
British war plans before 1914. Yet, an analysis of the surviving records of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) for the pre-war period allows us to 
reconstruct the strategic assessments that shaped war planning. Moreover, it allows 
us to explain how the Defence of the Realm Act of 1914 came into being. We will 
see that domestic policy considerations played a much more central role in war 
preparations in Britain than many accounts of the origins of the First World War 
have hitherto acknowledged.  
The CID was formed in 1902 in reaction to the disastrous course of the South-
African War (1899-1902). Its main purpose was to inform and counsel the 
                                                          
219 German original: ‘(…) diejenigen Personen, deren Verhaftung aus politischen und 
sicherheitspolizeilichen Gründen nach Erklärung des Belagerungszustandes wegen drohender 
Kriegsgefahr oder Mobilmachung (Listen B) und aus Anlaß eines Generalstreiks (Listen A) in Frage 
kommen (…)‘; BArch R1501/112215, p. 185, Letter by the Saxon Ministry of State regarding the 
Detention of Political Activists, 31 March 1913. 
 
81 
 
respective Prime Ministers regarding military policies.220 During the 1910s, 
however, it developed into the main political body the British government for all 
things related to strategic military planning. It brought together high-ranking 
representatives of all relevant government departments including the Home Office, 
the Foreign Office, the War Office, the Admiralty, as well as other concerned 
cabinet members such as the Attorney-General, who regularly convened to discuss 
strategic decisions.221 The CID’s main responsibility was the formulation of general 
strategic assessments for the cabinet. It also coordinated the interdepartmental 
polices regarding the military and matters of imperial defence. From 1911, this also 
included the preparation of a so-called War Book that listed all measures that were 
to be undertaken by the different departments in case of an international crisis or 
the outbreak of a war.  
Between 1902 and 1907, the committee’s main concern was to assess the 
likelihood and possible course of a military conflict. Its discussions circled around 
the prevention of a Russian attack on India or a French invasion in Britain. 
However, after the agreement between France and Britain, which ended the tensions 
in Africa (Entente Cordiale), and the Treaty of St. Petersburg (Anglo-Russian 
Convention) in 1907, British war plans soon focussed on a possible confrontation 
                                                          
220 For an overview of the activities of the CID see TNA, CAB 38/1, Committee of Imperial Defence: 
Minutes and Memoranda, 1888-1914; Franklyn Arthur Johnson’s 1960 study on the CID remains 
the only comprehensive work on this institution. It lacks, however, many primary sources that were 
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Historical Review, 77 (1962), pp. 490-503. 
221 See, for example, the composition of sub-committee on the preparation of the War Book; CAB 
15/1, p. III, Interim Report of the Standing Sub-committee on the Co-ordination of Departmental 
Action on the Outbreak of War, 27 April 1912. 
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with Germany.222 Nonetheless, pre-war Britain never developed a detailed military 
grand strategy comparable to the other belligerent powers. The main concern of the 
British government was the protection of the British mainland and the effective use 
of Britain’s naval superiority to establish a blockade of the enemy-controlled 
territories. Therefore, considerations of gathering intelligence and protection 
against sabotage and espionage in defended harbours on the British mainland 
played a crucial role in the debates of the CID.223  
It is remarkable how much attention the CID paid to aspects of warfare that 
were not directly connected to military actions, for instance public opinion, the 
impact on the British economy and the need to ensure popular support for a war. 
The importance of these factors for British war planning was clearly visible in a 
strategic analysis from 1901, which considered a possible war with France and 
Russia. It stated: 
(...) But for the British Empire it is very necessary that a great war with 
Continental Powers should be brought to as speedy a termination as 
possible. A long dragged-out campaign would both enhance the cost of 
living and lessen the demand for labour; it would therefore press very 
hardly on the labouring and artisan classes in this country, and tend to 
produce a discontent which might force the acceptance of peace on very 
unsatisfactory terms. (...) but a great war may at any time break out 
through a dispute over some intricate question of African boundaries 
(...) which would be imperfectly understood by the people (...). In a war 
of this nature there would never be lacking men to preach that our 
enemies were in the right and Great Britain in the wrong; and in a 
prolonged campaign their teaching that the interests of the working 
classes of this island are not identical with the interests of the Empire 
as a whole would in the time carry weight, and might lead to lamentable 
results. (...) Governments, in shaping their military policy must 
necessarily have regard to political conditions, and there can be little 
                                                          
222 See the series TNA CAB 38/1-28: the whole series allows an excellent insight into the 
developments of British strategic planning in the 1910s.  
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considerations; TNA CAB 15/1 – 15/5, Committee of Imperial Defence; see also Sheila Sokolov 
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doubt that democratic institutions are unfavourable to the continuance 
of prolonged wars (...).224 
 
These assumptions about the impact of a war on domestic policies did not change 
significantly until the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914. 
Furthermore, they led to the inclusion of domestic policies in British war plans. 
Particularly the preparation of the War Book of 1911 illustrates this fact very well. 
The War Book was a comprehensive instruction for all government departments 
regarding actions which had to be undertaken in case of an armed conflict.  
For the purpose of the creation of the War Book, a standing sub-committee of 
the CID was created on 27 January 1911.225 During the first year of its existence, 
the committee produced a preliminary version of the War Book containing all 
designated measures. Another section of the draft provided a roadmap for those 
measures, which were not prepared yet but which were deemed necessary by the 
committee. The proposed measures were designed to prevent the publication of 
naval and military intelligence on probable mobilisation orders and troop and fleet 
movements. As the key measure to prevent this, a general imposition of censorship 
of telegraphic and postal communication was recommended. However, the military 
members of the committee insisted on a more wide-ranging regulation of the press 
and the control of ‘enemy aliens’ was desirable.226 The 1913 edition of the War 
Book already contained the results of an agreement on the control of the press in 
wartime that had been negotiated between the Admiralty, War Office and the 
                                                          
224 TNA CAB 38/1, No. 6, pp. 30-31, Military Needs of the Empire in a War with France and Russia, 
1901. 
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Newspaper Proprietors Association.227 A bill to control the movement of aliens was 
then also drafted by the War Office, and the Home Office agreed to ensure a swift 
passage of the legislation through parliament.228  
Other discussions within the CID with regards to war measures centred on the 
necessity of establishing martial law. Particularly the military representatives 
pleaded for the necessity to declare martial law in Britain to be able exercise the 
powers needed for defence and mobilisation. Their main demands included 
emergency powers that would enable the requisitioning of resources and transport 
as well as the imposition of censorship.229 The threat of an alleged German spy 
network was also quoted to justify proposed measures such as the suspension of 
Habeas Corpus in order to detain enemy aliens and alleged spies. However, here – 
different to the issue of censorship – the wishes of the military were not entirely 
met with pragmatism but with a certain reservation by the civilian members of the 
committee. It was agreed that another standing sub-committee should deal with the 
problem of emergency legislation.230 The fact that the first meeting of this sub-
committee did not take place until 30 June 1914 indicates the resistance within the 
cabinet to the institution of martial law or other forms of emergency government. 
In particular Attorney-General John Simon – who also was a member of the 
emergency powers sub-committee – opposed the idea of emergency government. 
Already in July 1913 both Law Officers of the Crown, Rufus D. Isaacs and John 
Simon, had laid down their general rejection of martial law or emergency powers 
                                                          
227 Cf. Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 7-9. 
228 TNA CAB 15/4 Committee of Imperial Defence, War Book 1913. 
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in an official legal opinion piece.231 They favoured a strategy of keeping the 
Common Law that would allow emergency measures if necessary, but would keep 
the rights of parliament and courts untouched. 
During the first and only meeting of the sub-committee before the outbreak 
of the war on 30 June 1914, no substantial consensus emerged. The War Office had 
prepared and circulated several memoranda in preparation of the meeting in which 
the necessity of a distinct piece of emergency legislation was discussed.232 The 
application of martial law was considered insufficient as it demanded a legal review 
of the actions by the military and their ex post facto legalisation by a parliamentary 
Act of Indemnity. Instead of the traditional martial law, the War Office suggested 
a piece of legislation that would empower so-called Competent Military Authorities 
(CMA) and Her Majesty’s Government to implement emergency measures without 
being scrutinised by Parliament. The proposed draft bill with the tentative title 
Martial Law Regulations contained, inter alia, the following powers for military 
authorities: the right to arrest without warrant, the right to requisition goods and 
property; the right to suppress ‘inflammatory speech and writing’; the right to enter 
and search any premises without warrant; the right to censor post and press; the 
right to impress any person for labour; and the prohibition of all meetings except 
those allowed by the authorities. Breaches of the regulation under martial law were 
to be tried by courts martial. The provisions of the draft bill were in wide parts taken 
from the declaration of martial law in Cape Province during the South African War 
in May 1901.233  
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It is obvious that the proposed emergency powers went far beyond the agreed 
measures of the War Book. They demanded nothing less than the suspension of key 
civil liberties and the introduction of rule without control by parliament or the 
courts. The explicit demand to silence possible anti-war dissent is particularly 
remarkable.  In his history of MI5, Christopher Andrews suggests that Vernon Kell 
of the SIS (later MI5) elaborated most of the proposed measures.234 This is very 
likely, as most of the additional powers in the War Office draft concerned activities 
of the Secret Service such as the pre-emptive detention of alleged spies. Between 
1911 and 1914, the SIS had already prepared lists of suspects – most of them alleged 
German spies – that were earmarked for immediate detention at the outbreak of a 
war.235 Moreover, the main author of the War Office draft was Colonel George 
MacDonogh of the military intelligence section MO5. It is therefore likely that he 
and Kell maintained a close working relationship and worked on the draft together. 
Nevertheless, the CID sub-committee on emergency powers never came to a 
definite conclusion. Before Simon and MacDonogh could convene to draft an 
amended bill in 1914, war had already broken out. The bill of the Defence of the 
Realm Act that was introduced into parliament on 8 August 1914 was essentially 
the War Office draft, however with the main difference that the emergency powers 
were concentrated within the cabinet and not assumed by the military authorities. 
Yet, most of the proposed emergency measures from the War Office were later 
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adapted by the cabinet as emergency decrees under DORA (so-called Defence of 
the Realm Regulations). 
 
 
Comparison 
 
It has been demonstrated that domestic policy considerations played an important 
role in German and British war planning before 1914. In both countries, the 
outbreak of a war was seen as an occasion that would necessarily create a state of 
exception. In Germany, the declaration of the state of siege transferred civilian 
powers to military authority. The Belagerungszustand was a long established tool 
of emergency government that had already been applied twice before the Great War 
to suppress large-scale strikes. By contrast, in Britain no clear arrangement had 
existed during the nineteenth century. Yet, the Boer War and its impact on British 
politics as well as on military thinking led to an increased effort to develop an 
imperial strategy regarding the implementation of emergency government. In the 
underlying strategic assessments, political conditions and domestic policies started 
to play a crucial role. In the War Book that was developed after 1911, domestic 
emergency measures took a central position although they did not form a 
comprehensive system of emergency government such as the German 
Belagerungszustand. Yet, from at least 1913 onwards, the military emphasised the 
necessity to declare martial law in Britain in case of a war. The measures which the 
military presented as necessary also included wide-ranging encroachments on civil 
liberties that cannot be explained by military necessity alone. Although no 
unequivocal evidence from the files exists, it could be argued that at least some of 
these measures were designed to tackle potential anti-war dissent or industrial 
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disputes. It remains, nevertheless, unclear if and how far the experiences of the 
Labour Unrest of 1911-13 played a role in these plans. The plans to arm the 
Metropolitan Police that were discussed between War Office and Home Office in 
1913 and 1914 suggest, however, that precautionary measures that military and 
cabinet anticipated an escalating domestic crisis. It also demonstrates that they were 
prepared and willing to suppress such occurrences violently. Although these plans 
did not feature straightforward political aims such as the wholesale suppression of 
dissenting political parties as in Germany, it is nevertheless striking that 
comparatively elaborated plans for counter-insurgency combat also emerged in 
Britain at a time when the Committee of Imperial Defence discussed possible modes 
of emergency government. In Germany, the declaration of the state of siege was 
clearly designed to suppress possible opposition against a war and particularly 
targeted the Social Democrats and their affiliated organisations. Wide-ranging 
preparations for this crackdown existed before the actual outbreak of the war and 
local military commands were ready to apply them immediately. This political 
dimension of emergency government was far less obvious in Britain. Yet, military 
leaders and their demands put pressure on the cabinet to implement emergency 
provisions close to martial law for the case of a war. The main difference between 
Britain and the German Empire was, however, that the civilian government 
remained in charge of the managing the state of exception.  
Nevertheless, military and political leaders in both countries anticipated the 
growing role of domestic policies and the importance of popular support for a future 
great war. And although at the time no one could with certainty predict the total war 
that would unfold between 1914 and 1918, many of the designated emergency 
measures of the pre-war strategic plans were designed to enforce support and if 
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necessary to suppress anti-war dissent. Already before August 1914, plans for 
emergency government were designed to enable the authorities to wage this new 
kind of war.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The rise of the state of exception as a paradigm of rule during the ‘long’ nineteenth 
century was closely linked to the emergence of the modern central state in Britain 
and Germany. In their specific forms, pieces of emergency legislation represented 
two very different and even contradicting developments: on the one hand – and this 
is particularly relevant for the German Empire – the expansion of constitutionalism 
and the closely entangled gradual limitation of state power by the rule of law. On 
the other hand, however, emergency laws also epitomised the attempt of state 
authorities to preserve some elements of absolute rule. This found its most obvious 
expression in the suspension or bypassing of those constitutional provisions that 
prohibited or limited state agency. With the institution of the state of siege in the 
German Empire, having constitutional rank as article 68 of the imperial 
constitution, the Emperor maintained the legal power to suspend key elements of 
the constitution and to rule under a form of military dictatorship. By contrast, in 
Britain no comprehensive system of emergency government existed before the 
Great War. Yet, this was mainly the result of the non-existence of a written 
constitution that could by suspended by such a legal instrument. In fact, British 
constitutional law provided (and still provides today) a number of instruments that 
covered the functions of emergency government. Theoretically, the King or Queen 
is able to issue so-called Orders in Council without the involvement of parliament 
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which are legally binding. Although seldom exercised, this instrument represents a 
highly problematic relic in British constitutional law. Most Defence of the Realm 
Regulations during the First World War were, for example, issued in the form of 
Orders in Council. More frequently, however, a de-facto state of exception was 
declared under the Riot Act of 1714. The Riot Act allowed local magistrates to use 
military assistance and lethal force against protestors to keep public order and 
peace. During the nineteenth century, the Riot Act was read several times to deal 
with political protest or strike movements. Particularly in the second half of the 
century, the reading of the Riot Act and the linked deployment of the military in the 
interior became instruments of a tacit emergency government.  
In this regard, the similarities between Britain and imperial Germany are 
striking. In both countries, the military was used to crack down on large-scale strike 
movements – often with fatal consequences – when local police forces were unable 
to deal with them. This triggered massive criticism by the emerging labour 
movement, which attacked the partisan deployment of the military as a tool of 
suppression of – in their eyes legitimate – protest. In Germany, the military – or at 
least the officer corps – emerged as a self-confident political actor that saw its main 
task as preserving the established political order against the threat of socialist 
subversion. For this purpose, contingency plans for a crackdown on Social 
Democracy were prepared as well as for a potential putsch in order to reverse any 
democratic reforms. No such development can be proved for the British case. Here, 
the military remained under civilian control although senior military officers could 
exercise great influence on actual policymaking.  
In addition, the experiences of the state of exception during the nineteenth 
century and the early 1900s influenced strategic war planning in both countries. 
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From the turn of the century, British and German military planners considered a 
major confrontation between the great European powers as a distinct possibility. 
Within their war plans domestic policies featured prominently. In their assessments 
the anticipated character of the coming war did not only demand the preparation of 
military measures but also organisation of the support of the home front. Military 
commanders particularly in the German Empire feared a potential socialist uprising 
against a European war. Therefore their main provisions for domestic policies were 
aimed at an all-out anti-socialist crackdown under the state of siege. Many senior 
officers saw a great war as a welcome opportunity to solve the problem of Social 
Democracy in an instant. In Britain, the main concerns seem to have been that 
organised labour protests would force the government to seek an unfavourable 
peace. From early 1914, the War Office urged for wide-ranging and intrusive 
emergency powers for the case of a war. Although no general agreement between 
cabinet and military could be achieved immediately before the war in June 1914, 
the first Defence of the Realm Act of 8 August 1914 featured most of the elements 
desired by the military.  
It can be concluded that emergency government during the First World War 
did not occur without precedent but was the result of a long chain of historic 
experiences. Most instruments of emergency government in Britain as well as in 
Germany were developed in the decades preceding the First World War. However, 
most of these were temporally and spatially limited measures and often only 
concerned comparatively small sections of society. Virtually no government in 
Europe had experience of how to run a whole country under a state of exception 
over a prolonged period. During the First World War, however, these formerly 
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limited measures would evolve into an elaborate system of emergency government 
that bore increasingly authoritarian features.  
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Chapter Two 
 
The Opening of Pandora’s Box: Emergency 
Government and Home Front Politics 1914-1916 
 
The time between the beginning of the war in August 1914 and December 1916 can 
with good reason be seen as a phase of experimentation with emergency 
government in Britain and Germany. Political and military elites in both countries 
had barely any practical knowledge of how to manage an increasingly mobilised 
society, and how to control and enforce the gigantic war efforts. Clearly, the new 
powers the military and governments received under emergency legislation were 
potentially unrestrained. But the system and the institutions to make effective use 
of them were only rudimentarily developed. As military authorities played a crucial 
role in wartime domestic policies, most military officers that took over 
administrative tasks on the home fronts had only limited experience with them. 
During the first two years of the war, a system of civilian-military relations emerged 
in both countries that became crucial for the conduct of the war and for enforcing 
endurance on the home fronts.  
We shall see that this system cannot solely be described as a ‘military 
dictatorship’ in a narrow sense. Although the military played a key role, 
commanding officers could not simply impose their will upon the civilian 
authorities. In fact, a system of close and voluntary collaboration between 
government, judiciary, civilian administration, patriotic elements of civil society 
and the military emerged in both countries. Within this system, the separation of 
 
94 
 
powers – which had been a cornerstone of pre-war conceptions of the rule of law 
and Rechtsstaat – was only superficially upheld.236  
This chapter provides an overview of the emergence and development of 
emergency government in Britain and Germany during the first half of the Great 
War between August 1914 and the aggravation of domestic conflicts in the second 
half of 1916. Up to this turning point, domestic policies were predominantly 
characterised by the coincidence of an evolving coercive system of emergency 
government and a political arrangement known as ‘truce policy’ (Britain) and 
Burgfrieden (Germany). These domestic truces included agreements between the 
different political parties not to compete against each other in elections, yet they 
were soon extended to industrial relations as well. As we shall see, these truce 
policies were a key reason why emergency measures were initially only reluctantly 
applied. 
In order to illustrate the process of establishing emergency government in 
Britain and Germany, this chapter will highlight two key developments during the 
first half of the war: firstly, it will give an overview of the various legislative actions 
in both countries. In this regard, the contemporary debates and various attempts to 
amend the different pieces of emergency legislation during this period will be 
discussed. Secondly, a focus is put on the practices of the different state agencies 
that actually exercised emergency powers and their impact on the respective home 
front politics. 
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The July Crisis, Truce policies, and the Establishment of the State of 
Exception (August 1914 – December 1914) 
 
The July Crisis 
 
When on 28 June 1914 the young Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip fired the shots that 
killed the Austro-Hungarian Archduke and heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, and 
his wife in Sarajevo, few contemporaries anticipated what grave consequences this 
event would have. The unfolding international crisis following the Austro-
Hungarian ultimatum towards Serbia on 23 July 1914 set the full mechanism of the 
European alliance system into motion that would finally lead to the beginning of 
the hostilities.237 Much has been written and argued about the actual responsibilities 
for the war.238 In fact, a multi-causal approach for the explanation for the outbreak 
of war in 1914 seems to be most promising.239 It appears that in a diplomatic system 
of alliances that was designed for a major conflict, and with a general willingness 
of all European powers to wage war as a means of solving political conflicts, the 
aggressive stance of the German political and civilian élites gave the final push into 
the abyss.240 Even this development was not as straightforward as some of the 
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traditional accounts of the July Crisis suggest.241 Whereas the British government 
sought to prevent a general major European conflict by negotiating a compromise 
between Serbia, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, the German Empire acted 
ambivalently. On the one hand, Emperor Wilhelm II and his Imperial Chancellor 
Bethmann-Hollweg opened the way up for Austria-Hungary with the so-called 
‘blank cheque’ to pursue an aggressive stance towards Serbia. This happened in the 
knowledge that this would likely mean Russia becoming involved in a possible 
conflict. But on the other hand, the Imperial Government in Berlin seems not to 
have followed this course without hesitation.242  
A consideration of domestic policies during the July Crisis can shed light on 
these issues. As we have seen in chapter one, the looming war triggered various 
mobilisation mechanisms related to the declaration of the state of imminent war 
(drohende Kriegsgefahr). Many of these measures were designed to quell potential 
resistance to a war on the part of the Social Democrats. And indeed, from 25 July 
1914 onwards, the SPD called for mass meetings to protest against the danger of a 
European war. In a resolution from 25 July 1914, published on the front page of the 
main party newspaper Vorwärts, the executive committee declared:  
Danger is at hand! World War looms! The ruling classes that 
disregard, exploit, and take advantage of you, want to abuse you as 
cannon fodder. Everywhere shall ring our call “We don’t want the 
war! Down with the war! Long live the international brotherhood of 
the people!”243 
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What followed was a hastily organised peace campaign that saw the biggest series 
of public meetings during the imperial period in Germany. Wolfgang Kruse has 
identified at least 183 individual meetings with over 1,000 participants each, in 
nearly all major German cities.244 The largest meetings took place in Berlin on 28 
July with over 100,000 participants, with others being held in Dresden (35,000) and 
Düsseldorf (25,000) on the same day.245 Overall at least 485,000 persons attended 
anti-war rallies within a few days and outnumbered the occasional patriotic pro-war 
demonstrations that took place by far.246 Enthusiasm for the war was 
predominantly, if not entirely, a phenomenon of the educated middle classes in both 
countries as Wehler, Simmonds and others have pointed out.247 It is remarkable, 
however, that the German authorities let the peace meetings happen without much 
interference leaving aside the occasional attempts by some local police forces to 
suppress some these demonstrations.248 The actions of the Social Democrats clearly 
fitted into scenarios for which contingency plans had been prepared by the military 
before the war and which could have triggered a wave of repression. But why did 
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the anticipated crackdown against the Social Democracy not happen? If there was 
any opportune moment for the authorities to set these measures into action, then it 
was in the week immediately before the outbreak of the hostilities, before a 
dissenting movement would have gained hold in the German public. The peace 
meetings and their attendance numbers vividly demonstrated that the SPD had a 
considerable potential to mobilise its rank and file against war. 
A number of different accounts of the events in Germany during the July 
Crisis suggest that the public peace demonstrations were a welcome fact for 
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to demonstrate the defensive character of 
Germany’s intentions particularly against Tsarist Russia. This suggests that this was 
primarily an attempt to win over public opinion at home, in the neutral countries 
and among potential allies.249 The notion of a defensive war against Russian 
aggression was the politically most convenient option for the German Imperial 
Government. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg was well aware of the fact that this 
would also allow him to integrate parts of the reformist wing of the Social 
Democracy into the war efforts. For these reasons, an undifferentiated attack on the 
SPD was not in the interests of the Imperial Government. In reaction to the party’s 
resolution of 25 July, an unofficial meeting between one of the members of the 
party’s executive committee, Hugo Haase, and the Under-Secretary of State of the 
Imperial Home Office, Arnold Drews, took place in Berlin on 26 July. Drews 
assured Haase that the Imperial Government did not intend to suppress the peace 
demonstrations as long as they remained peaceful and abstained from seditious 
acts.250 One day after the major peace demonstrations in Berlin, on 29 July 1914, a 
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second meeting, this time between Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and the right-
wing Social Democrat Albert Südekum, took place in the Imperial Chancellery. On 
this occasion, Bethmann-Hollweg hinted at the possibility of a – at this point tacit 
– domestic truce between the German state and Social Democrats. If the SPD 
terminated its anti-war campaign, the Imperial Government would take care that 
the military commanders refrained from cracking down on the SPD after the soon 
expected declaration of the state of siege. Südekum assured Bethmann-Hollweg that 
he would influence the executive committee towards the acceptance of this 
agreement. As a result, the party abruptly stopped its official anti-war agitation on 
30 July 1914.251 Locally, however, anti-war protest continued until mid-August.252 
Nevertheless, the threat of the declaration of the state of siege – and the wave 
of repression it would bring – hung over the heads of the social democratic 
leadership like a sword of Damocles. On 29 July the executive committee of the 
party sent out a circular note to the editorial offices of the party newspapers, 
warning them about the implications of the declaration of the state of siege and 
urging the party officials to do everything to preserve the structures of the party.253 
And despite Südekum’s meeting with Bethmann-Hollweg, the treasurers of the 
party and Reichstag faction, Otto Braun and Friedrich Ebert, left Berlin incognito 
in a train to Zurich on 30 July with a mission to bring the party coffers to safety in 
Switzerland. Other party officials prepared to go underground or into exile.254 
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However, in a letter from the Prussian Minister of War to the deputy military 
commanders of the army corps districts from 25 July 1914, a generally lenient 
handling of the state of siege was advised and in particular the planned detention of 
Social Democratic officials was mentioned as an undesirable measure.255 Although 
these were merely suggestions and wishes by the War Ministry, all corps 
commanders followed these recommendations.  
The coincidence of a patriotic integration of parts of Social Democracy and 
the threat of repression under the state of siege set the ambivalent tone that would 
become characteristic of the Burgfrieden policy. The threat of harsh suppression 
that was embodied in the term Belagerungszustand and the personal fears of many 
social democratic leaders were certainly one, if not the most crucial, factor for the 
acceptance of the party truce. In her study of the SPD during the First World War, 
Susanne Miller takes up this argument and points out that the Social Democrats 
were more or less forced into the domestic truce.256 This view, however, has been 
challenged by Wolfgang Kruse. Kruse points out that particularly the right-wing of 
the SPD had other motives, and positively accepted the war and cooperation with 
the Imperial Government as a chance to establish Social Democracy as an accepted 
political partner rather than an unpatriotic, marginalised, internationalist party.257 
Probably the best way to understand the emergence and acceptance of the 
Burgfrieden policy is to take both factors into account. On the one hand, harsh 
repression was a realistic possibility that certainly intimidated the anti-war left-
wing of the party and led to a degree of passivity when the war began. On the other 
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hand, the hope for political reforms of the Prussian three class voting franchise and 
the mooted acceptance of the SPD as a legitimate political party proved to be a 
strong incentive for cooperation for many reformist socialists.258 The latter faction’s 
focus on the benefits of cooperation for domestic policies finally outweighed 
internationalist inhibitions when it came to the question of whether or not to support 
the war effort. 
By comparison, developments in Britain during the July Crisis were less 
controversial. During the July Crisis, Britain sought to broker a compromise 
between Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and indirectly also between Russia and 
Germany.259 It was far from clear that Britain would become involved as a 
belligerent itself. During this period the Labour Party followed the anti-war 
consensus of the Second International and organised 43 anti-war rallies on 31 July 
1914. On the same day the Labour Party published an appeal by Keir Hardie and 
Arthur Henderson, in which they called for mass action by the working class: 
Workers, stand together for peace. Combine and conquer the militarist 
enemy and the self-seeking Imperialists to-day once and for all. Men 
and Women of Britain, you have now an unexampled opportunity of 
showing your power, rendering a magnificent service to humanity and 
to the world. Proclaim that, for you, the days of plunder and butchery 
have gone by. Send messages of peace and fraternity to your fellows 
who have less liberty than you. Down with class rule! Down with the 
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rule of brute force! Down with war! Up with the peaceful rule of the 
people!260 
 
The biggest anti-war rally in Britain was held at Trafalgar Square in London on 2 
August 1914.261 Key figures in the Labour Party such as Keir Hardie and party 
chairman Ramsay MacDonald openly opposed Britain’s entry into the war.262 Yet, 
the German invasion of Belgium and simultaneous consent of the German Social 
Democrats to the war credits in the Reichstag soon undermined Labour’s hopes for 
a united response of the European working class. Consequently, the Labour Party 
stopped its anti-war campaign. The Liberal Party was initially split amongst similar 
lines. Yet, the German violation of Belgian neutrality became the turning point 
towards supporting the war. Only the Conservative and Unionist Party backed, with 
very few exceptions, Britain’s participation in order to preserve its world power 
status and vital imperial interests.263  
If dissent against the war occurred, it was in most cases individually 
motivated and seldom based on clear political convictions. The Labour Party had 
only very rudimentary foreign policies before the First World War.264 Neither could 
the Gladstonian Liberals deduce a clear pro- or anti-war stance from their political 
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platform.265 This division ran through the entirety of British society. It led to the 
strange situation that, for example, the suffragette movement was split on this 
question. Christabel Pankhurst became one of the most ardent public supporters of 
a war, whereas her sister and fellow-suffragette, Sylvia would develop into one of 
the most active anti-war activists. Both, however, claimed to continue the common 
pre-war cause of women’s emancipation.266 The Labour movement was split along 
similar lines. Whereas a minority within the Executive Committee retained an anti-
war stance, the pragmatic majority around Arthur Henderson soon began to support 
the joint war effort. This was also reflected by the emergence of ‘patriotic’ labour 
organisations.267 
In contrast to the German Empire, considerations of possible repression of 
anti-war dissent played no significant role in the debates of British war opponents. 
The main reason for this was certainly the fact that none of the planned measures 
laid out in the War Book were publicly known. The discussions within the 
Committee of Imperial Defence about emergency legislation and martial law were 
highly secretive and virtually no public discussion regarding the implications of the 
war on domestic policies took place. While many military strategists were well 
aware of the necessary impact of a great war on life in Britain, most politicians and 
the general public seem not to have dedicated too much consideration to this 
question. 
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State of siege and Burgfrieden Policy in Germany (August – December 
1914) 
 
The state of siege was eventually declared in the German Empire on 31 July 
1914.268 With its declaration, the provisions of the law of 1851 were set into 
operation, handing over all executive powers within the respective army corps 
districts to the commanding generals. After the mobilisation of the units had begun, 
and after commanding generals and their staff had left the garrisons, their deputy 
commanders (stellvertretende Generalkommandos) took over the administrative 
duties.  
The public declaration of the state of siege that was issued by the commander 
of the Marken district, which included the capital Berlin and the surrounding 
province of Brandenburg, Colonel-General Gustav von Kessel, is exemplary for the 
declarations issued by other military commanders in the empire.269 Von Kessel 
suspended all articles of the constitution (with the exception of article 7) he was 
empowered to, but left the civilian administration and civil servants in office under 
his command. Simultaneously, a first decree under the new emergency powers was 
issued, prohibiting all public meetings except those approved by the police 48 hours 
in advance.270 In the accompanying public proclamation, the general command of 
the Marken assured the general public that all measures were only applied to ensure 
a swift mobilisation and transportation of the troops. All law-abiding citizens would 
have nothing to fear, and all measures would only be targeting those not following 
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their patriotic duties.271 The propagated notion that emergency measures were only 
applied where necessary and that patriotic and law-abiding citizens would be able 
to continue their lives without interference was far from true. Statements like this 
became, however, a commonplace in propaganda and public proclamations by the 
authorities. After the declaration of the state of siege, no immediate measures were 
undertaken against the Social Democrats. This was clearly a signal that the military 
commanders accepted the truce policy at least in principle. Yet it seems that this 
was merely superficial. Already days after the outbreak of the war the Berlin police 
presidency intensified its efforts to monitor the SPD in the city, and particularly the 
Berlin Police Presidency and its political branch Department VII continued to work 
against the ‘enemies of the realm’.  
Records of the Imperial Post Office surviving in the German Federal Archives 
prove that from October 1914 onwards, the staff of the General Command of the 
Marken district worked on plans for counter-revolutionary warfare in Berlin.272 The 
plans contained a detailed description of the positions for artillery units outside the 
city from which the inner-city districts could be shelled. The plan also contained 
detailed orders regarding the measures to be undertaken by the Post Office to 
completely interdict the city in case of an uprising (see figure 1). The existence of 
these top secret contingency plans is not only interesting with regard to counter-
insurgency planning of the German military during the war, it also reveals that the 
Burgfrieden policy was a fragile construction from its very beginning. The 
documents of the Imperial Post Office show that pre-war plans to crack down on 
the Social Democrats or any other dissenting movement were far from being 
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abandoned. On the contrary, they provide evidence for the continuity of certain 
conceptions of domestic enemies and the readiness of the military to preserve the 
existing societal order with force if necessary. These counter-insurgency plans were 
updated in regular intervals throughout the war until at least June 1918. 
 
Fig. 1:  Order for a interdiction of Berlin by the High Command of the Marken 
District [BArch R4701/2330, Abriegelung Berlins, 25 June 1918] 
 
 
In addition to declaring a state of siege the Reichstag passed the so-called Federal 
Council Enabling Act (Bundesratsermächtigungsgesetz) on 4 August 1914. 
Although imperial chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and his aides emphasised the 
intention to use this emergency law only to a limited extent during the debates in 
parliament, it essentially gave the democratically illegitimate Federal Council 
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(Bundesrat) the full power to enact laws without the Reichstag.273 During the First 
World War over 800 such decrees were enacted by the Prussian-dominated Federal 
Council.274  
The situation that emerged after the beginning of the hostilities on 1 August 
1914 was as follows: on the local level, the deputy commanders of the army corps 
districts and the commanders of fortresses and defended harbours had taken over 
executive powers from the civilian administration. Most commanders had 
suspended those articles of the constitution that guaranteed fundamental civil 
liberties.275 The emergency powers under the state of siege also gave them the 
power to issue decrees for their corps districts. Extraordinary courts-martial 
(außerordentliche Kriegsgerichte) were established to prosecute breeches of such 
decrees. This put the military commanders in the extraordinary position of being 
legislator and prosecutor at the same time. Given the fact that the military 
commanders were barely controlled by their supreme warlord (Oberster 
Kriegsherr), Emperor Wilhelm II, the declaration of the state of siege created a 
legal status without the rule of law. Additionally, with the enactment of the Federal 
Council Enabling Act the Reichstag had surrendered its law-making prerogative to 
the Federal Council, making the parliament a mere bystander for the time being. 
Yet, the ideology of the Burgfrieden and Bethmann-Hollweg’s attempts to establish 
a ‘policy of the diagonal’, a which aimed at maintaining a political equilibrium 
between the Reichstag parties, led to a certain self-restraint of the authorities 
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regarding the application of the practically unlimited powers the executive now 
possessed.276 
During the first months of the war, the majority of the activities of the local 
military commanders focused on regulating the practicalities of daily life. The 
decrees issued by local commanders predominantly covered matters such as food 
supply, consumption and price controls, and measures relating to the short term 
surge in unemployment during August and September 1914.277 One task that was 
taken seriously by local commanders was the maintenance of moral standards on 
the home front. In particular the allegedly excessive nightlife in larger cities such 
as Berlin and the purported neglect of the urban youth became points of concern 
during the early months of the war.278 For example – in a rare incidence for the 
whole war period – Emperor Wilhelm II personally demanded from the commander 
of the Marken district to limit the number of bars, cafés and pubs in Berlin and to 
enforce a closing hour of ten o’clock in the evening.279 The Emperor remarked that 
reports about the apparent moral decline at home would have a demoralising effect 
on the troops in the field. It is similarly remarkable that the President of the Berlin 
Police rejected this demand on the grounds that this would do more harm than good. 
He argued that such a measure would be regarded as an unnecessary interference 
of the authorities in everyday life.280 An additional factor that contributed to this 
                                                          
276 For a discussion of Bethmann Hollweg’s ‘policy of the diagonal’, see James Retallack, The 
German Right, 1860-1920: Political Limits of Authoritarian Thought (Toronto: The University of 
Toronto Press, 2006), pp. 393-405; Dietrich Orlow, Weimar Prussia, 1918-1925: The Unlikely Rock 
of Democracy (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1986), pp. 14-15; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, ‘Die Regierung 
Bethmann-Hollweg und die öffentliche Meinung, 1914-1917‘, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 
17, 2 (1969), pp. 117-159. 
277 LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030 Nr. 1465, Fabriksachen. Zur Lage der Industrie, 1914-1915. 
278 LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030 Nr. 11361, pp.267-342, War 1914-1918, July 1914-April 1916. 
279 Ibid., pp. 2-3, Letter by Emperor Wilhelm II to Police President von Jagow, 20 September 1914. 
280 Ibid, p. 3, Letter by von Jagow to Emperor Wilhelm II, 22 September 1914. 
 
109 
 
bold rejection might have been that the Berlin Police in September 1914 did not 
have enough policemen to enforce such a ban. 
Similar decrees were issued by military commanders in other districts. 
Judging from the number of cases tried at extraordinary courts martial during the 
early months of the war, the illegal serving of bread rolls in restaurants seems to 
have been a particular concern.281 Most of the 8,624 trials before courts martial 
between August and December 1914 ended with minimal penalty of a one-day 
prison sentence, with most of them almost automatically proposed for pardons by 
the commanding generals.282 This is a clear sign that most of the prosecuted 
offences were minor in nature and not seen as a vital threat to the war effort. But 
the sheer number of offences also illustrates that the local military commanders 
made extensive use of their emergency power to regulate almost every aspect of 
daily life. The legal basis for the prosecution of breeches of decrees was article 9b 
of the Law regarding the State of Siege.283  
There were, however, also draconian sentences in some cases. Again, it seems 
that the main concern was to defend the moral order of the home front. Harsh 
sentences were, for example, passed against women that had ‘inappropriate’ contact 
with prisoners of war.284 Particularly the ‘spreading of false news’ soon became 
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cypher for all kinds of diverging expressions of opinion ranging from spreading 
rumours to openly questioning the war and its conduct by the military.285 Politically 
organised dissent, however, remained rather small in scale. Nevertheless, the first 
cracks in the Burgfrieden became visible when the SPD parliamentarian Karl 
Liebknecht voted against new war credits in the Reichstag on 2 December 1914. 
But substantial public protest against the war did not occur until the end of the year 
1915.  
A heterogeneous group that became the first target of out-and-out repressive 
measures during the early months of the war in the German Empire were the so-
called ‘citizens of enemy states’ (feindliche Fremdstaatangehörige), the German 
equivalent of the British term ‘enemy aliens’.286 Although their detention had 
already been planned before the war, the German authorities were reluctant to 
engage in large-scale internment of civilians. Matthew Stibbe has pointed out that 
the German internment of enemy aliens was primarily an act of retaliation against 
the British internment of Germans in the United Kingdom.287 Yet, the term ‘enemy 
alien’ in this context is misleading. Leaving aside the interned merchant seamen in 
German harbours at the outbreak of the war and the comparatively small number of 
tourists and travellers, most of the detainees had lived in Germany for many years 
and were often married or otherwise related to German nationals. This included 
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British and Commonwealth citizens, French citizens, but also 300,000 seasonal 
Russian-Polish farm labourers who could not return home and were declared 
civilian prisoners of war after the hostilities had begun.288 The legal status of this 
group was vague and not clearly defined under international and humanitarian law. 
Most measures against enemy aliens were therefore based on the emergency powers 
under the state of siege that allowed detention without trial, in particular on the basis 
of the right to take any person into so-called protective custody (Schutzhaft) or 
military security detention (militärische Sicherheitshaft). Whereas civilian 
detainees with a high social status were often treated rather leniently, Russian farm 
labourers were soon used as a cheap work force whose treatment came to resemble 
forced labour.289 These measures, however, set the precedent for the — during the 
later course of the war increasingly arbitrary and excessive — use of protective 
custody against other groups that were also defined as ‘enemies within’. 
Another group that caused particular concerns for the German authorities was 
the population of Alsace-Lorraine. The general mistrust by the German authorities 
of the allegedly pro-French Alsatians was nurtured by reports of emphatic 
welcomes for advancing French troops in the early weeks of the war.290 The existing 
tensions between military authorities and the civilian population of Alsace-Lorraine 
were now aggravated under the state of siege. Military commanders exercised their 
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emergency powers particularly harshly here, which lead to a high number of 
Alsatians being put before courts martial or held in protective custody. Although 
the national minorities of the Poles and Danes in the empire had a similarly 
problematic status, neither of them experienced equally harsh repression by the 
authorities. 
 
 
Britain and the Defence of the Realm Acts (August – December 1914) 
 
Britain’s entry into the war on 4 August 1914 was accompanied by the enactment 
of a number of emergency laws – most prominently the Defence of the Realm Acts 
(DORA). We have already seen that discussions about emergency laws had taken 
place in Britain several years before the First World War. However, no consensus 
was reached regarding the actual legal form of these emergency measures. The sub-
committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence that was set up to draft an 
emergency powers bill had only discussed a draft by the military that contained 
some drastic proposals. These measures met with some resistance by the Law 
Officers of the Crown. Nevertheless, already on 5 August 1914 – the day after 
Britain’s declaration of war against Germany – the House of Commons passed the 
Aliens Restrictions Act 1914 and on 7 August the British Nationality and Status of 
Aliens Act 1914 (Alien Registration Act).291 The latter act compelled all persons 
defined as ‘enemy aliens’ over the age of sixteen to register at their local police 
station and to demonstrate their good character and non-threatening behaviour. This 
emergency measure was justified with the widespread fear of a German spy-
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network that would act as a fifth column sabotaging British ships and factories.292 
Christopher Andrew’s research about the SIS showed that the chief of MI5, Vernon 
Kell, played a key role in drafting the bill. However, Kell was well aware that the 
hysteria about German spies in Britain was widely unjustified.293 
Additionally, there was an already well-established anti-German sentiment 
before the war. Diplomatic tensions between the two countries existed since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, and this became increasingly visible in the 
public discourses of the other.294 Nurtured by popular novels about a future Anglo-
German war and the rather clumsy public diplomacy of the German Empire in the 
years before the First World War, a degree of popular Germanophobia resonated 
within different strata of British society.295 Recent research has shown, however, 
that the danger as perceived during the British ‘spy mania’ was in reality far away 
from being the threat portrayed by popular authors such as William Le Queux.296 
The SIS was well-informed about the activities of the comparatively small number 
of German spies operating in Britain in 1914, and most of them were arrested at the 
outbreak of the war.297 An immediate result of the Act was, however, that a whole 
group of people, in this case Germans and Austrians, was singled out as enemies 
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within. As already described with regards to the internment of ‘citizens of enemy 
countries’ in the German Empire, the term ‘enemy alien’ was widely misleading. 
Numerous cases affected persons and whole families who immigrated to Britain 
already decades ago and who had little to no ties with Germany anymore.298  
The next and most important enactment of emergency measures followed in 
the session of parliament on 7 August 1914. A bill entitled Defence of the Realm 
Act was introduced in parliament and passed all readings without discussion within 
the record time of three hours.299 The bill went through the House of Lords equally 
fast on the same day, received the royal assent immediately, and was set into 
operation on 8 August 1914.300 The speed and calm with which the bill passed both 
chambers of parliament stood in no relation to its dire consequences. Barely noticed 
by the public and merely a paragraph long, the Defence of the Realm Act provided 
powers to all persons acting on behalf of the King – particularly the army, admiralty 
and members of the cabinet – to issue regulations and orders to secure ‘public safety 
and the defence of the realm’ and to authorise court martial trials for individuals 
who contravened such regulations, endeavoured to assist and communicate with the 
enemy, or jeopardised the safety of rails, roads and ships. The act seemed primarily 
designed to ensure a swift mobilisation, and to protect against espionage and 
sabotage. Its main consequence was, however, a shift of the legislative power from 
parliament to cabinet and military, which were now empowered to rule by decree 
for the duration of the war. The establishment of courts martial also put an end to 
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the separation of powers between the legislative, the judiciary, and the executive 
branch. Under DORA, military and cabinet held a hitherto unknown concentration 
of power that was barely checked and balanced and thus created a system of 
constitutional dictatorship. 
As early as 25 August 1914, a first amendment to DORA was brought before 
parliament by Home Secretary Reginald McKenna.301 The Defence of the Realm 
(No. 2) Act extended the reach of powers of the military authorities beyond 
harbours, rails, and roads ‘to all areas in which trade is being carried on’; extended 
the section of DORA which made communication with the enemy a felony with the 
spreading of false reports; and gave the military authorities the power of ‘making 
by-laws without the existing restrictions such as consents of local authorities, 
publication in newspapers, etc., which occupy time and are inapplicable to war 
conditions’.302 The only criticism articulated in parliament came from the liberal 
MP Charles Trevelyan who questioned whether ‘the Bill in general and the 
Regulations to be issued, may not be capable of being interpreted by military 
authorities to prevent the expression in speech or in writing of any political opinions 
on the actions of the Government’.303 McKenna assured that this would not be the 
case and allayed Trevelyan’s concerns.304 The Defence of the Realm (No. 2) Act 
passed the chambers of parliament without further discussion in a similarly speedy 
manner as its predecessor.  
Against this backdrop, it is remarkable how willingly the British parliament 
surrendered much of its sovereignty to the government without questioning in detail 
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the purpose of the enacted measures. Trevelyan’s remarks did hit the right spot 
when he pointed out that most of the provisions were so general in nature that they 
barely restricted their application by the military. 
This was verified when the first problems with measures under DORA 
occurred in connection to press censorship. Although the Newspaper Proprietors 
Association, Admiralty and War Office had negotiated an arrangement regarding 
the publication of news and maintained a rather collaborative approach to 
censorship throughout the war, conflicts emerged after sanctions against 
newspapers by the censors.305 The prospect of journalists tried before courts-martial 
for reporting actually censored reports of the disastrous campaigns in Flanders in 
August and September 1914, caused massive discontent among editors and 
publishers. Influential Fleet Street magnates such as Lord Riddell soon pushed for 
an overhaul of DORA that would at least take away the imminent threat of courts 
martial for the journalists. It dawned on Lord Riddell that:  
The drastic and unique provisions of this legislation have not attracted 
the attention they deserve. The legislation has taken place so rapidly 
that the measures have not been properly discussed. The press have 
been singularly ill-informed and lacking in criticism regarding a law 
which wipes out Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, etc., in a few lines. 
We have got some alterations made, but trial by court martial still 
stands. A very dangerous innovation.306  
 
Yet, the protests of the press and the good contacts of many journalists to leading 
politicians certainly had an impact on policy making.307 When the government 
introduced a third amendment bill of DORA in the House of Commons on 23 
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November 1914 – initially designed as a further extension of the emergency powers 
for the military, such as the possibility to issue the death penalty to British subjects 
by a court martial – some vivid discussions ensued. Lord Robert Cecil remarked 
that the power to prosecute any person suspected to cause disaffection would  
(…) cover a very very large area. They practically enable the 
Government to suppress any reports of any kind of which they 
disapprove. It does not matter whether the reports are true or untrue. 
They may be perfectly true, but the Government are still entitled under 
that paragraph to suppress them altogether, and not only to suppress 
them, but to bring anyone who spreads them before a court-martial. 
That is a very extreme power, under the circumstances, to give to any 
Government.’308 
 
The Conservative leader Andrew Bonar Law appealed to the government to use its 
dictatorial powers very carefully and not to suppress legitimate criticism.309 The 
criticism in the House of Commons led to a number of minor adjustments, for 
instance the limitation of the prosecution to explicitly false reports and the 
clarification that disaffection ‘to his Majesty’ was punishable and not disaffection 
in general.310 The amended bill was brought before the Lords on 27 November 1914 
where an even more intense debate occurred.311 Lord Loreburn – former Attorney-
General and Solicitor-General – and the Conservative Lord Crawford argued that 
British subjects would be in danger of being sentenced to death by courts martial, 
something they considered a profound break with British legal traditions. Both lords 
insisted that the principle of open courts of law should be upheld. In response, the 
Lord Chancellor, Richard Haldane, proposed that this issue would be addressed in 
a later amendment to DORA. The other provisions of the bill such as the extension 
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of the competencies of the military authorities and the continuation of the power to 
rule by decree remained untouched. The bill was then passed as the Defence of the 
Realm Consolidation Act 1914 replacing the two earlier versions of DORA. This 
act formed the basis of emergency government in Britain for the coming four years. 
But DORA merely set the legal framework for emergency powers in Britain, 
leaving it to the discretion of the government and the military authorities how to 
use them. DORA served the purpose of an enabling act without clear provisions 
regarding the limits of the entailed emergency powers. These limits were supposed 
to be defined by the courts, who as we will see later, entirely failed in this task. The 
main legal instruments under DORA were the so-called Defence of the Realm 
Regulations (DRR).312 DRR were often drafted by civil servants or military officers 
and, after discussions in the cabinet, enacted as Orders in Councils with binding 
legal force. Since September 1914 a special interdepartmental committee (Defence 
of the Realm Regulation Amendment Committee) took over the task of negotiating 
proposals for amendments of existing and the enacting of new DRR. The amended 
or drafted regulations were then presented before the cabinet and most cases enacted 
without much delay. The London Gazette published these new regulations and His 
Majesty’s Stationery Office issued a monthly overview of the consolidated and 
newly enacted DRR. In the process of drafting and amending regulations 
particularly the chief of the military intelligence, George MacDonogh, and the head 
of the SIS Vernon Kell, would again play a key role.313 
The provisions of DORA limited the reach of these DRR to issues related to 
‘public security and the defence of the realm’ but this was so vaguely defined that 
                                                          
312 See Ewing and Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties, pp. 51-52. 
313 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, pp. 53-56. 
 
119 
 
soon all areas of daily life were affected by them. In addition to these nation-wide 
pieces of emergency legislation, DORA provided army and naval authorities with 
the power to enact by-laws in areas under military control. Additionally, Army 
Council and Admiralty could issue direct so-called Army Orders, or the local 
Competent Military Authorities could issue local decrees.314 At the beginning of 
the war, these areas were predominantly military harbours or fortified places. But 
soon entire towns and regions were declared restricted or Special Military Areas 
under military control.315 On a local level, civilian authorities were required to assist 
the military authorities in organising and administering the war efforts. A 
proclamation issued by the King on 4 August 1914, which declared a precautionary 
stage before the actual declaration of war a day later, stated that all British subjects 
were bound to obey orders by the military: 
And whereas the present state of public affairs in Europe is such as to 
constitute an imminent national danger, Now, THEREFORE, We 
strictly command and enjoin Our subjects to obey and conform to all 
instructions and regulations which may be issued by Us or Our 
Admiralty or Army Council, or any officer of Our Navy or Army, or 
any other person acting in Our behalf for securing the objects aforesaid, 
and not to hinder or obstruct, but to afford all assistance in their power 
to, any person acting in accordance with any such instructions or 
regulations. Or otherwise in the execution of any measures duly taken 
for securing those objects.316 
 
Nevertheless, it seems that the military only reluctantly operated as a political actor 
on the home front. Where possible, administrative and executive duties were left to 
civilian authorities and local military commanders preferred an indirect approach 
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of influencing policy making. But this should not lead to the assumption that the 
military did not exercise its wide-ranging powers. In fact, military authorities began 
to play a crucial role as an actor in domestic policies. Overall, it appears that British 
society barely grasped by the profound political changes that took place between 
August and November 1914. The principle of ‘business as usual’ guided the policies 
of Asquith’s Cabinet on the home front, and the idea that the conduct of the war 
should interfere in the economy and daily life as little as possible was deeply rooted 
in the liberal convictions of most cabinet members – certainly in those of Prime 
Minister Asquith and Home Secretary Reginald McKenna.317 The first DRR, issued 
on 12 August 1914, declared in this spirit that ‘the ordinary avocations of life and 
the enjoyment of property will be interfered with as little as may be permitted by 
the exigencies of the measures required to be taken for the public safety and the 
defence of the realm’.318 
This self-restraint may help to explain the lenient exercise of the massively 
extended emergency powers by the government. Army Council and Admiralty, 
however, immediately unfolded activities under DORA. An example for the nature 
of some of the measures enacted by the Army Council under DORA is an order to 
the chief constables of the local police forces from September 1914 regarding the 
surveillance of soldiers’ wives. In it, police constables were asked to supervise the 
lifestyle of wives of soldiers on the front. If the women were deemed guilty of 
drunkenness, immorality (a byword for promiscuity and prostitution) and gross 
                                                          
317 David French, ‘The Rise and Fall of “Business as Usual”’, in Kathleen Burke (ed.), War and the 
State: The Transformation of British Government 1914-1919 (Abingdon: Routledge, 1982), pp. 7-
31; Millman, Managing Dissent, pp. 31-34. 
318 Defence of the Realm Manual (London: HMSO, 1918), pp. 39-40. 
 
121 
 
neglect of their children, their soldier’s allowances became liable for forfeiture.319 
Local police constables were encouraged to report any moral misconduct to their 
local competent military authority and warn the women regarding their behaviour. 
This caused an outrage in parts of the press. A commentator in the Daily News of 7 
November 1914 complained that: ‘It is clear that the function of the police is that 
of a general surveillance, and not confined to reporting cases of actual misconduct 
(...)’.320 Other newspapers joined the campaign and at the end of November 1914 
the Army Council found itself in the position of having to emphasise that the order 
was not meant to punish soldiers’ families but to ensure their welfare.321 This 
example demonstrates that maintaining the moral order during wartime was a main 
concern of the authorities, too. It also highlights rather superficial nature of the 
proclaimed leniency under DORA. Moreover, we can also identify a specific class 
dimension of emergency government in its ambition to regulate daily lives. It seems 
that most of the measures predominantly targeted the working classes, whereas such 
intrusions as ordered by the Army Council in September 1914 into the privacy of 
upper and middle class families were barely imaginable.  
Yet, it seems that the introduction of emergency government did not occur 
completely unexpectedly for the labour movement. With the outbreak of the war, 
the War Emergency Workers’ National Committee (WEWNC) was formed on 6 
August 1914 to ensure that the interests of the working class would be politically 
                                                          
319 Angela Smith discusses the attitudes towards the welfare of soldiers‘ wives and widows in great 
depth: Angela Smith, Discourses Surrounding British Widows of the First World War (London: 
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(1990), pp. 983-1003. 
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represented.322 It became an influential campaigning body during war with a strong 
focus on the representation of consumer interests. Yet, the committee also criticised 
the introduction of conscription in January 1916 and led a campaign for the 
introduction of a capital levy under the motto ‘conscription of wealth’ in 1917.323 
The activities of the WEWNC were not fundamentally opposed to the war or 
emergency government in principle but aimed at preventing the excessive use of 
emergency powers against the interests of organised labour. In fact, many members 
of the executive committee, such as its secretary James Middleton, maintained close 
relations with cabinet ministers and senior civil servants and occasionally sought to 
influence the application of emergency measures for the benefit of organised 
labour.324 The attitude of wide parts of organised labour towards emergency 
government was less one of fundamental concern about democratic control and 
constitutional principles and more of utility for its own interest.325 The WEWNC 
seems to have provided a workable foundation on which the different branches of 
organised labour could cooperate with each other and the authorities during the 
war.326 Representatives of different factions within the organized Labour movement 
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such as the dissident former Labour Party chairman Ramsay MacDonald or the 
president of the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain, Robert ‘Bob’ Smillie, 
cooperated here with proponents of patriotic Labour such as Henry M. Hyndman, 
who founded the National Socialist Party in 1915. This, however, rapidly changed 
after the state increasingly intervened in labour relations and enforced Britain’s 
transformation into a war economy to accommodate the wartime necessities.327 
Nevertheless, as long as anti-war dissent remained contained within small groups 
and without the mass support of the trade unions, the problem of emergency powers 
and political repression by the authorities was not a matter of extensive debate 
within the organised labour movement. The mainstream press also barely discussed 
emergency measures when they were not directly related to their own interests such 
as censorship issues.328  
The apparent willingness of parliament and the general public to sacrifice 
substantial parts of the constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom in 
favour of a centralised powerful executive is difficult to explain. The contemporary 
argument, that the granted emergency powers were needed for the successful 
conduct of mobilisation, was barely grounded in the real necessities during the first 
months of the war. However, they were certainly no reaction to occurring wartime 
problems but pre-emptive measures that would provide the legal framework for the 
                                                          
327 Particularly representatives of ‘patriotic labour’ such as Tillet and Hyndman criticised the lack 
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conduct of an increasingly totalised war. The structure of the arguments, however, 
was strikingly similar to those applied in the German Empire to legitimise the 
necessity of the state of siege. 
We have seen that most of the measures enacted by government and military 
followed the pre-war assessments about the implications of the nature of a modern 
war. However, this does not explain why parliament granted such wide-ranging 
powers days after Britain’s entry into the war, when the official narrative was still 
that of a short but intense conflict. The question about the backgrounds, motives, 
and intentions of this willing submission of parliament under the government is still 
not answered and remains a matter of controversy. Apparently, pre-war debates 
about national efficiency already featured many of the arguments that were then 
later to legitimise DORA.329 Nevertheless, a conclusive answer to this question is 
still not found. What can be stated, however, is that the establishment of emergency 
government between August and November 1914 opened a Pandora’s Box with 
regards to civil liberties and the vanishing limitation of the powers of the state in 
Britain. 
 
 
Comparison 
 
The process of establishing systems of emergency government had different 
characteristics in Germany and Britain. As has been demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, military authorities and civilian government possessed well-prepared plans 
to put emergency laws into operation. Hardly any of the legislative measures 
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enacted in the early months of the war can thus be seen as mere reactions to the 
emerging wartime necessities. 
The declaration of the state of siege in the German Empire on 31 July 1914 
was automatic, and was based on the constitutional prerogative of the emperor 
under article 68 of the imperial constitution. In Britain, however, the enactments of 
the Defence of the Realm Acts from August to November 1914 were deliberate 
political decisions of the parliament. In their consequence the established 
constitutional arrangements in Britain – with the sovereignty of the parliament at 
its heart – were widely suspended and replaced by a strong executive, consisting of 
government and military vested with legislative and judiciary powers. As a result, 
the structures created on the British home front were not too different from their 
German counterparts. In both countries, the provisions of the different pieces of 
emergency legislation introduced the possibility for the authorities to rule by decree 
without effective control of the respective parliaments. Although to varying 
degrees, the military in both countries gained a key position within domestic 
policies.  
Furthermore, in both countries military authorities and extraordinary courts-
martial took over the task of prosecuting breaches of emergency decrees. The 
concentration of legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the hands of the 
military and governments established a de facto constitutional dictatorship although 
the term was nowhere officially used. Yet, this was met with hardly any significant 
protest or public debate. The explanations of the authorities that the exceptional 
powers under DORA and state of siege were needed to ensure a swift and smooth 
mobilisation of the troops, and to secure public safety were barely challenged. The 
general system of emergency government was scarcely criticised in the press during 
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the early stages of the war. The parliamentary debates show no sign of fundamental 
dissent either. Criticism was, however, articulated when certain measures were 
perceived as too excessive or too intrusive. This was particularly the case with press 
censorship. Government and military in both countries showed a vital interest in 
maintaining favourable relations with the press. Instead of simply suppressing 
inconvenient and undesirable reports, the press was soon integrated in a system of 
propaganda and official news that made it complicit with the official policies.330 In 
this context, role of the patriotic press in Britain with regards to domestic politics 
was exceptional. Papers such as the Morning Post or the Daily Express seem to 
have followed their own political agenda when they staged their continuous 
campaigns against ‘peace skanks’, ‘pro-Germans’ or those perceived as too lenient 
against the ‘enemies within’. The role of these papers and their proprietors differed 
fundamentally from those in the German Empire, where the freedom of the press 
was widely curtailed and censorship directly imposed. The British system, on the 
hand, worked much more through indirect steering and influencing of journalists.331 
The aggressive patriotic agenda of the right-wing press, however, sometimes went 
beyond the acceptable when members of the royal family, high-ranking generals or 
cabinet members came under fire. The example of the suppression of The Globe 
newspaper illustrates that the patriotic press was not always an asset for the British 
government.332 The few remaining critical voices, for instance the social democratic 
Vorwärts in Germany or the ILP magazine Labour Leader in Britain, soon became 
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targets of repressive measures aimed at intimidating their editors and 
contributors.333 
Generally, however, repressive emergency measures were apparently not 
perceived as a major problem by the vast majority of people. As long as they 
primarily targeted marginalised and comparatively small groups such as the so-
called ‘enemy aliens’ and other people outside of the propagated national 
collectives criticism, was barely articulated. The question of the treatment of 
‘unreliable’ national minorities – such as the population of Alsace-Lorraine – was 
a particular feature in the German Empire, where the state of siege was applied 
harshly against allegedly unreliable ethnic minorities. With anti-war dissent only 
playing a marginal role in the early months of the war, military authorities seemed 
to have acted leniently with regards to interfering with dissenting political activities 
as long as they remained rather isolated and small in scale. Yet, as we shall see, the 
repressive dimension of emergency government should soon become patently 
obvious. 
A primary concern of the authorities in both countries in this early stage of 
the war was to maintain the moral order on the home front. Considerable attention 
was drawn to the lifestyle of relatives of soldiers, particularly those of their wives; 
the limitation of leisure activities and the consumption of alcohol.334 This also 
illustrates that the dominant images of the ‘fighting home’ were shaped by socially 
conservative notions of behaviour ‘appropriate to the gravity of the situation’.335 It 
also underlines that different authorities were willing to enforce these social norms 
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with the help of their emergency powers. In this context, emergency powers were 
not only used to tackle dissent but also to control behaviour that was defined as 
deviant from the dominant social norms.336  
The major differences between the emerging British and German systems of 
emergency government are to be found in the actual organisation of their 
administrative structures. The German state of siege shifted the administrative 
powers to the deputy general commands of the army corps districts and fortified 
places. This created a situation in which 63 individual commands governed their 
army corps districts with no coordinating authority – except the Emperor – above 
them.337 The deputy military commanders were independent from the ordinary 
chain of command of the German army, and were placed under the immediate 
command of the Emperor. Wilhelm II, however, undertook no significant effort 
during the war to coordinate the activity of the different corps districts in his 
function as supreme warlord of the Empire.338 The situation was further 
complicated by the fact that the borders of the military districts were in many cases 
not congruent with the boundaries of the civilian administrative districts.339 In some 
areas of the empire, this led to the confusing situation that civil servants in some 
districts sometimes had to follow contradictory orders by different military 
commanders (see figure 2). For this reason, there can hardly be any talk of one 
consistent domestic policy in the German Empire during the First World War. It is 
more precise to speak of a number of different domestic policies by the respective 
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corps commanders. The plethora of domestic policies, however, was influenced and 
to some extent steered by frequent memoranda and policy suggestions by the 
Imperial Government, Prussian Ministry of War and military high command. 
Nevertheless, the stereotypical efficiency of the German bureaucracy was, at least 
with regards to the administration of the state of siege a mere myth.  
 
Fig. 2: Military and Administrative Structure of the German Empire during the 
First World War [Source: Deist, Militär und Innenpolitik] 
 
 
On the other side, the British administration of DORA could build on a certain 
practical knowledge gained during the Labour Unrest between 1911 and 1913. 
Particularly the MacReady System that was applied during the 1911 railway strike 
seems to have provided valuable lessons for the authorities. Generally, the chains 
 
130 
 
of command and competencies of the different authorities on the British home front 
were much more clearly defined and worked with far fewer frictions than in 
Germany despite the large number of different committees and agencies that existed 
here too. The Competent Military Authorities, which had taken over the 
administrative duties in defended harbours and fortified places, were integrated in 
consistent chains of command that allowed a more unified approach to steering 
domestic policies.  
Another significant difference between the German and British models of 
emergency government can be found in the role and appearance of the military 
commanders as agents of the state of exception. In the German Empire, the local 
military commanders assumed a rather dominant position in the public perception. 
They signed decrees and proclamations – which were then often printed as posters 
– and civilian authorities acted upon their direct orders (see figure 4 for an 
example). The military became the central political actor on the German home front. 
In Britain, the local military authorities seem to have acted more in the background, 
leaving most of the civilian executive functions to the established offices and 
agencies. Orders by the military were often directly communicated to the respective 
civil servants, avoiding too much public scrutiny. This indirect approach to 
emergency government on the local level seems to have helped to conceal the 
influence of the military on domestic affairs from the British public. During the 
later stages of the war, these different degrees of exposition or covertness of the 
military to public scrutiny would prove an important factor for the public 
acceptance of emergency government. Whereas emergency government in the 
German Empire was increasingly seen as an outright military dictatorship, its 
British counterpart could maintain the impression of the military only playing a 
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minor role in its domestic policies. This should, however, not entirely blur the 
historical analysis of the profound impact the military had on British domestic 
policies during the war. 
 
 
Emergency Government between Domestic Truce, Enforced 
Endurance and Emerging Dissent (January 1915 – mid-1916) 
 
The phase between the beginning of the year 1915 and the unfolding of the military 
and domestic crisis of 1916 marks a period of relative calm at the home fronts 
compared to the unfolding crises in 1917 and 1918. This was, of course, a fragile 
composure under the circumstances of the continuing war.  After the consolidation 
of the Western Front in December 1914 following the hitherto unknown large-scale 
battles in France and Belgium, hopes for a quick victory and a swift conclusion of 
the war vanished on all sides.340 The continuation of the war brought new and barely 
anticipated consequences. The static warfare on the Western Front with its extended 
firefights and artillery bombardments led to a high consumption of ammunition, 
which soon created shortages that jeopardised the further conduct of the war. The 
British ‘ammunition crisis’ of May 1915 questioned Prime Minister Herbert 
Asquith’s conviction that this war could be waged while continuing ‘business as 
usual’ at home.341  
In Germany, the first cracks began to show in the policy of the Burgfrieden, 
too. After the first act of public dissent in December 1914 by Karl Liebknecht, 
growing numbers in the social democratic movement began to question the war and 
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its support by the SPD leadership. Additionally, wider spheres of the civilian 
population started to experience wartime hardships such as inflation, shortages in 
food supply, and the effects of profiteering that soon stirred the first large scale 
protest movements.342  
The challenges that wartime governments now faced were increasingly 
complex: the civilian industries had to be transformed to satisfy the ever increasing 
demand for military supplies. At the same time, they had to ensure that enough 
goods for civilian consumption were produced.  Manpower shortages and the 
mounting number of war casualties led to new government policies aimed at 
mobilising the entire societies for the war efforts. Against this backdrop, emerging 
protest movements gained momentum and slowly grew into mass movements by 
the end of 1916 and thus increasingly posed a challenge to the continuation of the 
war. The terms ‘endurance’ (Durchhalten) and guerre à outrance became central 
reference points for the war discourses, particularly in the German context.343 War 
was no longer a mere political or military phenomenon but was increasingly 
perceived as a test for the moral qualities of the whole nation. Or, as a later historian 
put it, the war became a ‘test of endurance, a match of material resources of the 
belligerents, of their ability to transform these into immediate tools of war, shells 
and guns, and of the spirit of men on both sides’.344 
Parallel to the dissolution of the traditional boundaries of war on the front, the 
established limitations of state power under the rule of law were abandoned to wage 
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an increasingly totalised war. Now, wartime governments and their agencies began 
to make extensive use of their wide-ranging emergency powers to enforce this 
endurance. Yet, this does not mean that societal mobilisation was solely a product 
of state coercion. It was a combination of positive efforts to mobilise support for 
the war and the repression of dissent where necessary. Emergency powers were 
extensively used in those fields where voluntary mobilisation or propaganda failed. 
Often these were issues where the state had a vital interest in exercising control and 
surveillance, for example regarding the economic mobilisation of society or the 
handling of anti-war dissent and protest. Hence, the development of emergency 
government can therefore only be understood if we also take into account the 
emergence of dissenting groups and organised labour. These phenomena stood in a 
dialectic relation to each other. And although we should be careful not to interpret 
emergency measures as mere reactions to dissent, the radicalisation of protest and 
the aggravation of repressive emergency measures have to be regarded as strongly 
intertwined.  
 
 
The Failure and Reform of the State of Siege in Germany (January 1915 – 
November 1916) 
 
After taking over much of the administrative duties of the civilian authorities, the 
local military commanders in the German Empire were soon overwhelmed by the 
sheer scale of these tasks. Particularly the enforcement of local decrees soon proved 
to be a Sisyphean challenge. The initial ambition to regulate a wide range of daily-
life issues soon clashed with the limited personal resources to enforce them. The 
personnel of many police authorities had been significantly thinned out since the 
beginning of the war as many constables had volunteered or were drafted to the 
 
134 
 
armed forces.345 A similar situation occurred regarding the civilian administration, 
where many junior civil servants who used to be the backbone of the German pre-
war bureaucracy had joined the colours. It is nevertheless remarkable that the 
number of trials before the 46 extraordinary courts martial in the German Empire 
soared up to 76,864 in 1915.346 From the beginning of 1915, local military 
commanders and the chairs of the extraordinary courts martial repeatedly reported 
severe overwork.347 Statistically, this resulted in over 1,600 hearings per 
extraordinary court martial per year, or nearly five hearings per court on every day 
of the year. 
The main reason for this was the fact that even the smallest breaches of 
emergency decrees were to be tried before courts martial. Internal assessments and 
an analysis of verdicts by the Imperial Home Office soon indicated that most 
offenses brought before the military authorities were of a minor nature.348 The Law 
Regarding the State of Siege, however, only provided the possibility to gaol 
convicted offenders, however small their offence might have been. This led to the 
absurd situation that the courts martial convicted a high number of persons to the 
minimum sentence of one day, and then almost automatically petitioned the military 
commanders to issue a pardon. Here, the ambition to maintain certain standards of 
legality by the courts triggered a significant burden of administrative work that soon 
threatened to paralyse the military administration of the home front. In order to free 
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LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030 Nr. 11361, p. 361, Report about the Wartime Activities of the Berlin Police, 
4 May 1916. 
346 BArch R1501/112217, p. 277, Survey about the Business of the Extraordinary Courts Martial, 
July 1916. 
347 See e.g. Deist, Militär und Innenpolitik, pp. 29-34. 
348 For a rather comprehensive list about the trials before extra-ordinary courts-martial compiled by 
the Imperial Office of Justice see the series BArch R3001/6647 to R3001/6656. 
 
135 
 
up the courts martial for their actual duties – to try spies, saboteurs and other threats 
to the conduct of the war – amendments to Law Regarding the State of Siege were 
drafted in order to relieve them.  
Another contributing factor for this revision was that the practice of the 
military commanders was increasingly scrutinised by the Reichstag. During plenary 
debates, SPD deputies began to demand a repeal of the state of siege for those parts 
of the empire that were not directly affected by combat operations. A motion 
brought forward by the social democratic parliamentarian Adolf Albrecht in July 
1915 demanded the restoration of the suspended civil liberties and the return to 
civilian government by repealing the state of siege.349 In the budget committee of 
the Reichstag the Social Democrats threatened to boycott further budget talks 
should there be no changes to the current domestic policies. Due to the limited 
powers of the Reichstag, the adoption of the budget was one of the few occasions 
where political concessions could be demanded from the Imperial Government. The 
budget committee of the Reichstag was therefore a key battleground of domestic 
policies in the German Empire.  
Yet, the Imperial Government and the military leadership showed no 
significant willingness to give in to these demands as they saw even the smallest 
concessions to such demands as a threat to their central position of power. However, 
in order to maintain the political truce, a reform of some aspects of the state of siege 
was hinted at. In July 1915, the legal counsellor of Lieutenant-General Wilhelm 
Groener in the Prussian Ministry of War, Eugen Schiffer, introduced the draft of a 
bill that was soon commonly known as ‘Lex Schiffer’. Essentially, it introduced the 
ability to hand out fines as punishment for minor breaches of emergency decrees 
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and to transfer petty offences under the state of siege to civilian courts of summary 
jurisdiction.350 This was a clever gambit by the Imperial Government: on the one 
side it publically demonstrated a certain willingness of the authorities to 
compromise. Yet, on the other side, it was effectively a remedy for a situation that 
had anyway proved unworkable, enabling the military to focus on the more relevant 
aspects of security policy and the management of the growing anti-war dissent. It 
nevertheless took until December 1915 for the new regulations to be set into 
operation.351  
The stance of the social democratic MPs in the Reichstag budget committee 
was symptomatic for the emerging discontent with the way the war was conducted. 
After Karl Liebknecht’s rejection of further war credits in December 1914, other 
SPD deputies began to question the Burgfrieden policy. Since March 1915, splits 
within the SPD became more and more visible.352 Local activists became 
increasingly active in protests against emerging food shortages and the increasing 
cost of living, with female party members often in prominent roles.353 The inactivity 
of the trade unions, which mostly observed the industrial truce declared in August 
1914 by the Central Commission of the official trade unions under Carl Legien, and 
the failure of the SPD to effectively represent working class interests to the military 
authorities, soon led to the emergence of spontaneous grass-roots protests and food 
riots.354 The reaction of the local authorities was mixed. Police surveillance of 
meetings was increased and the publication of news about protests in many cases 
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prohibited. Radical activists and leading organisers were often taken into protective 
custody to curb their influence on local protests. Another way to get rid of 
unwelcome agitators was to draft them into the army in order to bring them under 
military discipline. This happened to Karl Liebknecht, who was called up in March 
1915. Faced with a ban on any political activity outside the actual sessions of the 
Reichstag, Liebknecht soon found himself in conflict with his military superiors. A 
similarly repressive approach was taken towards other leading organisers of anti-
war dissent. This was not limited to radical socialists. Also the ‘bourgeois’ peace 
movement, particularly the German Peace Society (Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft) 
and its wartime camouflage organisation New Fatherland League (Bund Neues 
Vaterland), were soon faced with the suppression of their activities.355   
However, many military commanders often felt compelled to allow some 
public protest meetings to give the growing discontent a controlled outlet as long 
as they were limited to the discussion of – from their point of view – non-political 
issues. Allowing protest meetings was part of a quasi-appeasement policy by the 
authorities that seemingly accepted the need to address legitimate grievances 
without challenging the conduct of the war in general.356 In the wake of the 
proclamation of the domestic truce, notions of a national community of the German 
people (Volksgemeinschaft) regardless of social class were propagated.357  
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It seems that many local authorities felt bound to this moral category although 
it barely informed actual policymaking in favour of working-class interests. Yet, 
the idea of a homogeneous national collective established certain categories of 
people that were excluded from it and posed a threat to its functioning. Just like the 
external enemy, groups of ‘enemies within’ had to be combated and contained to 
protect the people. We have already seen that these ‘enemies in the midst’ were at 
the beginning predominantly enemy aliens and members of ethnic minorities. 
Against the backdrop of growing discontent and protest, however, the older 
categories of the ‘enemies of the realm’ (Reichsfeinde) were evoked again by the 
right-wing press.358  
In addition, the discourse about wartime hardships became increasingly 
fuelled by anti-Semitic stereotypes that were propagated by right-wing groups such 
as the Pan-German League. One consequence of this campaigning was the so-called 
‘Jewish Census’ (Judenzählung) of May 1916.359 Reacting to the pressure of the 
Pan-German League, the Prussian minister of war ordered a secret census of 
Jewish-German soldiers in the army to find evidence for alleged shirking and war 
profiteering of the Jews in the Empire. Eventually, the investigation found no proof 
for the allegations of the Pan-German League and the census was declared a top-
secret issue prohibiting any reports about it.360  
In general, the activity of right-wing groups such as the Pan-German League 
and its handling by the authorities offers a very interesting perspective on the 
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political preferences of many military commanders. Although the Imperial 
Government, in particular Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and his entourage, was 
keen on combating the influence of extreme-right circles and their propagation of 
an expansionist war aims policy, local military commanders only reluctantly used 
their emergency powers to curb the activities of these groups.361 Whereas left-wing 
publications and activists were increasingly confronted with pre-emptive 
censorship and protective custody from mid-1915 onwards, right-wing 
organisations barely experienced any interference with their activities from the 
authorities.362 
In particular the partisan and often arbitrary use of protective custody was 
increasingly seen as an excess of emergency government. During the Reichstag 
sessions of 1916, deputies of SPD, Liberals, and even the catholic Zentrum began 
to criticise the excessive use of protective custody by the military commands.363 For 
example, military commanders had ordered protective custody in cases where 
individuals were acquitted of charges by the civil courts. In other cases protective 
custody was used to prolong already spent prison sentences. Protective custody was 
in strict legal terms no form of punishment but an instrument of security policy to 
protect against threats to public safety. Who was to be seen as such a threat, and 
how long protective custody was necessary, however, was completely in the 
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discretion of the military commanders who ordered it. Therefore it was not bound 
to court hearings or criminal conviction but based on often arbitrary definitions of 
security interests and potential threat. There were no effective legal means for 
detainees to challenge their imprisonment, and no protection against the arbitrary 
use of this emergency power by the military.  
The subsequent parliamentary debates about a reform of protective custody 
started once more in the budget committee. In hitherto unknown unity, the centre-
left parties demanded profound changes to the legal framework of the state of siege. 
The dictatorial powers of individual military commanders were no longer deemed 
acceptable. In the accompanying campaign in the liberal and social democratic 
press, the regime under the state of siege was described as a ‘cancerous ulcer’ for 
the German people that had started as small measure to ensure mobilisation but had 
developed into a complete system of political repression.364 In a series of Reichstag 
speeches, the left-wing SPD parliamentarian Wilhelm Dittmann described the 
system of the state of siege as a downright military dictatorship during the debate.365 
The Imperial Government reacted reluctantly, although internal assessments backed 
most of the claims that were articulated in the Reichstag.366 A first concession to 
the critics was the establishment of a central authority for complaints regarding the 
actions of the local military commanders situated in Berlin in March 1916. The so-
called Supreme Military Commander (Obermilitärbefehlshaber) had no particular 
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powers in the actual chain of command but could be addressed to review decisions 
of the local commanders. This minor reform was enacted as royal decree 
(königlicher Erlaß) to avoid the impression of a success for the parliamentary 
campaign.367 
Yet, the threat of obstruction in the budget committee put additional pressure 
on the Imperial Government to undertake further reforms. Protective custody 
remained the key issue for the parties and the pressure for its reform was 
maintained. It took until December 1916 for a first draft of a Law Regarding the 
State of War (Gesetz betreffend den Kriegszustand) to be presented before 
parliament. The draft remained far from banning the instrument of protective 
custody but merely gave detainees the right to consult a legal counsel and to appeal 
against their detention. For the first time, the possibility of compensation for illegal 
detention was introduced but detainees only had a right to be freed after the war had 
ended. Nonetheless, the power of the local military commanders to detain any 
person without trial was not abolished. The Protective Custody Law 
(Schutzhaftgesetz) was passed by the Reichstag on 2 December 1916 and was set 
into operation on 4 December 1916.368  
The actual background of this concession was that the new Third Supreme 
Army Command (Dritte Oberste Heeresleitung) under Hindenburg and Ludendorff 
was pushing for a swift enacting of the Auxiliary Service Law (Gesetz über den 
Vaterländischen Hilfsdienst). The public debate about protective custody seems to 
have strained the negotiations so that at least a minor victory was conceded to the 
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Reichstag parties.369 The historical significance of the parliamentary campaign for 
the reform of the state of siege, however, is not necessarily to be found in the 
Protective Custody Law itself. The actual handling of the new legal provisions soon 
proved to be an ineffective protection against arbitrary detention by the military 
authorities. More relevant was, in fact, that the parliamentary campaign against 
protective custody brought together – for the first time –those parties that would 
later form the so-called Reichstag majority. In 1918, this unlikely alliance became 
the forerunner of the first Weimar coalition.  
 
 
Emergency government in Britain under the Asquith Cabinet (January 1915 
– December 1916) 
 
Emergency government in Britain under the cabinet of Prime Minister Herbert 
Asquith remained an ambiguous matter. Certainly, the enactment of the Defence of 
the Realm Acts in 1914 had provided the government with a barely restricted range 
of powers to the executive. But they were not systematically applied on a large scale 
as long as Asquith remained in office as Prime Minister.  
If we follow the argument put forward by Brock Millman, then the main 
reason for this hesitation is to be found in the liberal inhibitions of the cabinet 
members.370 This is, however, not entirely convincing when we take into account 
that Asquith as well as cabinet ministers such as Winston Churchill had previously 
proved to be rather pragmatic when it came to the application of drastic domestic 
measures. The handling of the Labour Unrest between 1911 and 1913 provides 
ample evidence that liberal inhibitions did not necessarily limit willingness to apply 
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harsh emergency measures. A more likely explanation for this reluctance is to be 
found in the concerns of the British government that too repressive a policy would 
damage Britain’s reputation in the neutral countries and particularly in the USA and 
cause undesirable domestic debates. Among the liberal Home Secretaries Reginald 
McKenna (1911 – 27 May 1915), John Simon (27 May 1915 – 12 January 1916) 
and Herbert Samuel (12 January 1916 – 7 December 1916) the notion that 
emergency measures against prominent anti-war dissenters would in most cases ‘do 
more harm than good’ prevailed.371 Harsh measures against dissenters were seldom 
taken although the early trials against the Clydeside labour leader John MacLean 
were used as a clear warning.372 However, throughout 1915 until the introduction 
of conscription in January 1916, organised anti-war dissent remained a 
marginalised phenomenon. The Union of Democratic Control (UDC) that 
functioned as a collective movement for the various milieus in opposition to the 
war was still a comparatively small organisation. Millman states quite convincingly 
that the comparative harmlessness of organised anti-war dissent did not make it 
necessary to establish a complete system of state repression.373 This is, nonetheless, 
a limited picture of the situation merely focused on dealing with organised dissent.  
The main challenges for the British government were the manifold problems 
regarding the necessary increase of industrial production and, in this regard, mainly 
the manpower shortages and strike movements. Another pressing problem were 
protests against hardships such as inflation and the rising costs of living. Local 
protest movements, often appearing in industrial centres such as Glasgow, 
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Newcastle, or the South Welsh coal-mining areas were often not generally directed 
against the war.374 What was widely criticised was the perceived unfair share of the 
war burdens and the virulent war profiteering of landlords and shop owners.375 The 
large-scale and quickly radicalising Glasgow rent strike from April until November 
1915 was a first warning sign to the government that these forms of social protest 
could in some cases merge with a more general anti-war stance.376 A main objective 
for the authorities was therefore to prevent this from happening. The British 
situation was additionally aggravated by the unfavourable course of the war itself. 
A lack of military successes and mounting casualty numbers led to a situation in 
which the numbers of voluntary recruits could barely make up for the losses.377 
Consequently, the introduction of conscription became a pressing issue for the 
Asquith Cabinet from mid-1915. Yet it seems that the cabinet hesitated to introduce 
conscription due the perception that it would be unpopular.378 And, without a doubt, 
the protest against conscription eventually generated a growing anti-war protest 
movement that united hitherto split parts of the moderate labour movement, radical 
socialists, disenchanted liberals and pacifists. From late-1915, more and more 
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dissenting groups appeared on the political stage. This included the No 
Conscription Fellowship (NCF) already founded in 1914, the National Council 
Against Conscription (NCAC) founded in mid-1915 as well as the majority of the 
Independent Labour Party (ILP), the British Socialist Party (BSP), local trade union 
councils and Christian pacifists such as the Society of Friends.  
The development of actual emergency legislation in 1915 was, nevertheless, 
negligible. In March the promised amendment bill to DORA was introduced in the 
House of Commons, giving British subjects the right to appeal against decisions of 
courts martial and referring most cases that dealt with breaches of Defence 
Regulations to ordinary courts of law.379 With its amendment, all offences that 
would in peacetime be punished with a maximum sentence of six months hard 
labour or a 100 pounds fine, civil courts could be used instead of courts martial. 
The new amendment represented a compromise between cabinet, military and 
parliament that took into account the criticism articulated against the Defence of 
the Realm Consolidation Act in December 1914. Additionally, it enabled the 
military to curtail the distribution of liquor in areas under military command – 
probably one of the longest lasting legacies of DORA in Britain.380 After some 
debate the amendment passed the House of Commons and the Lords. This was the 
last major amendment of DORA, giving it its final shape until the end of the war. 
The government made, however, extensive use of its right to issue defence 
regulations. Between August 1914 and February 1918 a total of 246 Defence 
Regulations was set in operation. Most of these were enacted in the time between 
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January 1915 and December 1916.381 The number of local by-laws issued by the 
Competent Military Authorities cannot be assessed. Together with the numerous 
amendments to existing DRR, we can assume that the number of individual pieces 
of legislation ran into the thousands. Some of them extended the powers of the 
executive considerably, whereas others represented only minor changes.  
One significant piece of legislation that can with good reason be defined as 
an emergency measure was the Munitions of War Act of August 1915.382 The 
background of the act was the profound change towards trench warfare on the 
Western Front that created a major demand for ammunition of all kinds. Above all, 
the massive bombardments that prepared for larger offensives consumed millions 
of shells. Production soon lagged behind military consumption and created an 
ammunition shortage that endangered the combat readiness of the British 
Expeditionary Force. The so-called Shell Crisis of May 1915 had demonstrated how 
vital the production of war-relevant materials had meanwhile become. The British 
economy, however, had trouble adapting to war production and was additionally 
challenged by a number of strikes that occurred during the year 1915. Those strikes 
were often desperate reactions to rapidly rising costs of living that put workers 
under immense strain.383 
The Munitions of War Act was designed to tackle this complex issue.384 It 
sought to combine repressive elements such as the prohibition of strikes in factories 
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producing war supplies with the regulation of labour relations through the 
establishment of arbitration committees. In order to appease political protests, so-
called Munitions Tribunals were established to try offences under the act – mostly 
strikes – that were likely to withhold labour and products from the war effort.385 
These tribunals were comparable to the institution of courts martial that tried 
breaches of DORA. Factories that produced war supplies could now be declared 
‘controlled establishments’ and thereby put under special supervision by the 
Ministry of Munitions. 
The establishment of state-sanctioned courts of arbitration for labour relations 
was an attempt to force trade unions and employers into a wartime economy. But it 
was to a certain extent also a concession to the organised labour movement, as well 
as an attempt to integrate it into the war effort. Under the Munitions of War Act, 
so-called National Factories were created, with the largest in Gretna on the Scottish-
English border.386 For the first time, planned economy and nationalisation of key 
industries was practised on a large scale in Britain. It was also the first time that 
representatives of organised labour were put in positions of (partial) control over 
the means of production. This rudimentary ‘war socialism’ met with ambiguous 
reactions from the left. For some, this was a step closer to the feared industrial 
conscription, for others – mainly Fabians around the Webbs – this was a living 
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experiment that could prove the superiority of nationalised production and a 
planned economy.387  
Another attempt to use the emergency powers to create some relief for the 
working class, the so-called Emergency Powers (Courts) Act was enacted already 
in August 1914. This act allowed courts to postpone evictions and enforcement 
orders, if the affected persons could prove that their incapacity to pay their debts 
was caused by the war. The War Emergency Workers’ National Committee lobbied 
the government to make extensive use of this emergency measure and provided 
legal aid for affected families.388 This is remarkable as it shows that the emergency 
powers were not always applied in a partisan way to tackle strikes and dissent but 
also to meet some of these working-class grievances that were seen as legitimate. 
With the enactment of the Munitions of War Act, a special ministry under the 
former Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, was created to 
coordinate the transformation into a war economy.389 The new Ministry of 
Munitions also maintained its own intelligence division, named P.M.S.2, which 
made efforts to infiltrate strike movements and collect evidence about upcoming 
labour disputes.390  
Yet, the act also created new problems for the government. Although the 
industrial output of war materials increased significantly, it also contributed to a 
radicalisation of dissent and led to the gradual rapprochement of formerly disparate 
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protest movements. With the looming introduction of conscription anti-war groups 
intensified their efforts among working class audiences. The coincidence of the 
Munitions Act and the escalating debates about the introduction of military 
conscription paved the way for a combination of anti-war dissent and trade unionist 
protests against industrial conscription.  
A good example of this new quality of anti-war protest that merged social and 
political arguments was the formation of the Clyde Workers’ Committee (CWC) in 
Glasgow in late 1915.391 Here, socialist activists such as William Gallagher, John 
MacLean, and James Maxton joined forces with the local shop stewards to organise 
protests against the dilution of skilled labour by female and unskilled workers and 
the imposition of the Munitions of War Act.392 In an attempt to appease the 
protesters, Munitions minister Lloyd George tried to address a mass meeting with 
Clydeside workers at St. Andrew’s Hall, Glasgow, in December 1915.393 The 
speech was interrupted and the meeting eventually broken up by enraged workers. 
Lloyd George had been publicly embarrassed and silenced by the Clyde Worker’s 
Committee. Immediately afterwards, an order was issued that every newspaper 
report about the catastrophic meeting had to be curtailed and censored.394 When the 
Glaswegian BSP paper Vanguard defiantly published a full report of the event, it 
was immediately banned from further publication. The Glasgow experience 
certainly influenced Lloyd George’s rather oppressive handling of dissent and strike 
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movement during his term as Prime Minister from December 1916 onwards.395 The 
following crackdown on the CWC exemplifies for the way emergency powers were 
increasingly used to suppress protest movements when they were perceived as 
getting too dangerous. Against the leaders of the Clydeside movement the whole 
range of repressive measures was applied when they protested dilution between 
January and March 1916. The most active shop stewards of some Clydeside 
shipyards, for example David Kirkwood, were arrested and deported to Edinburgh. 
A sedition trial against William Gallagher, John MacLean, and James Muir for 
breaches of the Defence of the Realm Act ended with a prison sentence of three 
years for MacLean, and one year each for the other two.396 The government 
established a strategy for suppressing strike movements and dissent that favoured 
the detention of leading activists over the wholesale repression of entire protest 
movements. This approach would become a main feature of the British system of 
repressing anti-war dissent.  
With the introduction of conscription a new tool for silencing was added to 
the arsenal of the authorities. As in Germany, many leading figures of anti-war 
groups were drafted and put under military discipline. Even if most activists could 
have been recognised as conscientious objectors, many refused to appear before the 
mustering commissions, disobeyed orders by the military and were held in 
detention. One of the most prominent examples is the case of Clarence Henry 
Norman, chairman of the anti-war No Conscription Fellowship. Norman was 
arrested in June 1916 after refusing to appear to get mustered. He was then put 
before a court martial and eventually kept in military detention until the end of the 
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war in November 1918.397 The threat of drafting undesirable dissenters or striking 
workers was used as a means of intimidation throughout the rest of the war.398  
Although a distinct willingness to increase the use of repressive measures 
against strikers and dissenters came to the fore during Asquith’s last months as 
Prime Minister, also the dilemmas of emergency government became apparent. 
When over 200,000 South Welsh miners went on strike in July 1915, there was 
virtually no way to enforce DRRs and the Munitions of War Act, except to suppress 
the strike with the massive deployment of the military.399 This would have meant 
to use the military against striking workers to an extent that would have endangered 
the war effort as a whole. Police and civilian authorities alone did not have enough 
personnel to suppress such a large-scale strike effectively. Within four days 
Munitions minister David Lloyd George had to give in to all the demands of the 
South Welsh miners. The Munitions of War Act was essentially a toothless tiger 
when it came to dealing with large-scale strike movements such as that in South 
Wales because it was not underpinned by the necessary resources to enforce it. 
Consequently, more effort was invested in domestic surveillance and pre-emptive 
measures against emerging strikes. At the same time massive propaganda efforts 
were undertaken to mobilise patriotic sentiments within the working class.  
On the other side, however, the brutal suppression of the Easter Rising in 
Ireland by the British army also illustrated the consequences that a direct 
confrontation with the military potentially would have. The events in Ireland 
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certainly had an intimidating effect on organised dissent in England, Scotland, and 
Wales.400 But also the government actions were also restrained by external factors. 
Public opinion about Britain in the neutral countries, especially in the USA became 
an important point of reference.401 This included the fear that overly repressive 
measures would damage Britain’s image and its attempts to bring the USA into the 
war. Nevertheless, since Britain did not declare its official war aims until late 1917, 
the claim to fight a war for liberty did not allow contradicting this cause by overly 
authoritarian measures on the home front. The combination of these factors led to 
a certain self-restraint on both sides of the internal divide. Nevertheless, under the 
leadership of Prime Minister David Lloyd George this would profoundly change 
opening the way for a new and in many respects more repressive handling of 
dissent. 
 
 
Comparison 
 
We can discern remarkable parallels between the domestic situation in Germany 
and Britain in 1915 and early 1916. The prolonged nature of the war and its 
consequences created unanticipated challenges for the economies in both countries. 
The immense consumption of ammunition and shells jeopardised the conduct of the 
war on both sides. Also, the huge sacrifices in human lives soon put strains on the 
industrial and military manpower reserves. However, the German Empire was 
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under additional pressure as the British naval blockade began to deprive the country 
of much needed resources and vital trade links.402  
In both countries, the civilian population began to feel the effects of the war. 
Rising costs of living in Germany and the extended periods of hunger due to the 
blockade triggered the first serious protest movements against the war. Riots and 
food protests emerged during the year 1915 and remained a constant feature of 
wartime society. The first massive strike that combined political and social 
demands occurred in May 1916 when 55,000 metal workers in Berlin went on 
strike. The background was the trial of Karl Liebknecht, who was detained after 
speaking at an illegal May Day demonstration in Berlin. In his speech Liebknecht 
had demanded an immediate end to the war and promoted the overthrow of the 
Imperial Government. Consequently, the court martial passed a sentence of four 
years gaol. The May Strike in Berlin and parts of Saxony revealed the growing 
discontent among the German workers that could no longer be entirely channelled 
by the majority fraction of the SPD.403 
However, although anti-war groups and activities emerged in both countries, 
authorities acted in most cases rather leniently against them. The main concern was 
to control and steer these spontaneous outbreaks of discontent, which on the local 
level often related to questions of food supply or profiteering. Where these 
grievances were seen as legitimate, authorities in both countries showed a 
surprisingly high degree of forbearance. In both countries, the concept of the 
‘fighting home’ (kämpfende Heimat) or home front was ideologically framed as a 
national collective transcending traditional class divides. Nonetheless, ideal and 
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reality soon clashed. This was particularly the case regarding the unequal share of 
wartime hardships between the working classes and the upper and middle classes. 
And, as we shall discuss later, the concept of a war-socialist Volksgemeinschaft in 
Germany was soon loaded with racial stereotypes and anti-Semitism. The notion of 
wartime national unity was also used to legitimise the application of emergency 
measures for social welfare.  
In Britain, this community on the home front was constructed against 
‘enemies in the midst’, predominantly German and Austrian enemy aliens. 
Occasional xenophobic and anti-Semitic riots occurred throughout the war, for 
instance after the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915.404 The British government, 
however, reacted sensitively to public opinion and feelings and knew how to utilise 
them. The large-scale and militarily unnecessary internment of so-called ‘enemy 
aliens’ from early 1915 onwards demonstrated the ability of the British government 
to accommodate and mobilise public moods quite effectively.405 Police and military 
intervened only leniently in such occurrences.406 Here, local police authorities often 
appeared themselves as patriotic actors whose action were led by conceptions of 
the ‘enemy within’. This indicates, however, that the authorities in Britain and 
Germany perceived their emergency measures not as directed against the people 
but as attempts to preserve the domestic truce and national unity against internal 
                                                          
404 Regarding the Lusitania riots see Nicoletta Gullace, ‘Friends, Aliens, and Enemies: Fictive 
Communities and the Lusitania Riots of 1915‘, Journal of Social History, 2, 39 (2005), pp. 345-367; 
Leonhard, Büchse der Pandora, pp. 353-356; Panayi, The Enemies in Our Midst, pp. 223-258.  
405 Panikos Panayi, ‘An Intolerant Act by an Intolerant Society: The Internment of Germans in 
Britain during the First World War’, in David Cesarani and Tony Kushner (eds), The Internment of 
Aliens in Twentieth Century Britain (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 53-78. 
406 After the German foreign press launched a number of reports about the maltreatment of Germans 
in Britain, the Home Office ordered an enquiry of the allegations. Although, most of the German 
claims proved to be exaggerated the enquiry shed light on the often lenient prosecution of anti-
German excesses; TNA HO 45/10787/298199, Aliens: Alleged Maltreatment of German Women 
and Children in the United Kingdom, 1915-1916. 
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and external enemies. A significant difference between Britain and Germany in this 
context seems to have been that the idea of the home front did not become as 
ideologised as the German ideal of the Volksgemeinschaft.  
The means to preserve this idealised national unity and to enforce endurance 
were emergency measures. Their increased application also highlights that societal 
mobilisation was an ambiguous and sometimes rather superficial phenomenon. 
Particularly in Britain, where voluntarism in wartime was an ideological principle 
of the Liberals, the hitherto unpopular application of coercive measures was soon a 
necessary element of wartime policies. During the year 1915, the emergency 
powers of the executive in Britain were increasingly extended. The Munitions of 
War Act from August 1915 introduced the principles of industrial conscription for 
strategic industries. It also established a full apparatus of repressive instruments to 
suppress strikes and increase production such as an own labour intelligence unit or 
the so-called Munitions Tribunals. This restriction of trade union rights was partly 
counter-balanced by the introduction of arbitration and the establishment of 
nationalised industries. This could, however, not prevent the emergence of large-
scale protest movements that soon radicalised. Another step towards total societal 
mobilisation was the introduction of conscription in January 1916, which led to a 
rapprochement of initially quite disparate protest movements that would create 
severe challenges for the British government. The combination of labour protest, 
social unrest, and fundamental anti-war dissent was to a certain extent a direct 
product of the described government measures.  
Parallel to this constant expansion of emergency government in Britain, the 
development in Germany turned in a slightly different direction. Here, the 
unrestrained and de facto absolute powers of the military were partially hedged by 
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new pieces of legislation. The Lex Schiffer in December 1915, the creation of the 
supreme military commander in March 1916 and the Protective Custody Law in 
1916 were attempts by the parliament to regulate and limit the use of emergency 
powers. Although consequently not restricting the actions of the local military 
commanders, the debates about the state of siege began to forge a coalition of liberal 
parties, Centre and moderate majority social democrats that, during the later course 
of the war, pushed for further political reforms and finally formed the first Weimar 
coalition after the war in 1919.     
However, when serious opposition to the authorities and the war efforts 
occurred, the reactions were often extremely harsh. The Clyde Workers’ Committee 
that was formed to resist the implementation of the Munitions of War Act in 
Glasgow was soon repressed when its leading figures were gaoled and grass-roots 
activists expelled from Glasgow and issued with exclusion orders. Another 
instrument that was increasingly used in both countries was to call up leading 
dissenters in order to put them under military discipline and prevent them from 
being politically active. This happened to the key figure of German anti-war dissent, 
Karl Liebknecht, in 1915 but also to figures such as C. H. Norman, the chairman of 
the dissenting No Conscription Fellowship. The treatment of conscientious 
objectors in Britain became a major issue for the British anti-war groups. On the 
one hand, dissenting groups sought to present COs as martyrs of peace who were 
repeatedly maltreated in prison. The British government on the other hand, had no 
interest in creating these martyrs but also sought to deter others from objecting. 
Additionally, the military authorities treated COs often rather harshly.407 A 
                                                          
407 TNA HO 144/5802, War: Treatment of Conscientious Objectors Sentenced to Imprisonment, 
1916-1926; TNA HO 45/10886/348601, War: Conscientious Objectors – Refusal to Work, 
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comment by Home Secretary Herbert Samuel that a CO should rather ‘be left alone 
if we can’t have him shot’, may illustrate the ambivalence of the issue.408 However, 
despite the problematic handling of conscientious objection in Britain, it still 
provided some alternative to military service for pacifists. The German Empire only 
conceded the possibility of a non-combatant military service that put pacifists 
nevertheless under military discipline. At later stages, this method was extensively 
used to suppress strike movements and dissent. A special feature of the German 
system of suppression was the so-called protective custody that allowed the military 
authorities to detain anybody without trial for an undetermined period of time. 
Throughout the course of the war, several thousand people were held in such a 
protective custody with detention times ranging from several days to several months 
and years. The Protective Custody Law only brought minor changes that did not 
provide any effective protection for the victims. Protective Custody was an out-and-
out means of political suppression on the German home front that had no real 
equivalent in Britain in terms of quantity and quality. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Emergency government emerged during the first months of the First World War as 
a framework to control, steer and mobilise wartime societies. Most of the measures 
that were enacted in Britain and Germany were designed to quell potential protest 
and disturbances of the mobilisation process. However, after domestic truce 
policies were negotiated, authorities increasingly used their emergency powers to 
transform their societies answering the necessities of wartime production. The 
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occurrence of war profiteering, rising costs of living, and shortages in food supply, 
however, did soon vividly demonstrate the limits of patriotic mobilisation and 
national unity propaganda. Emergency powers were extensively used to regulate 
these aspects of daily life under the circumstances of a prolonged war. The 
application of these measures was guided by the enforcement of a certain set of 
social norms by the authorities in both countries as the mentioned examples have 
illustrated. After the beginning of the war concerns about moral decline, 
inappropriate behaviour and consumption were tackled with decrees that limited 
opening hours of pubs and the sale of liquor. The state of exception during the First 
World War was from its early stages also a system to impose a set of hegemonic 
social norms and a specific moral order. In this context all possible forms of 
deviance could easily fall into categories of behaviour allegedly endangering the 
public safety or the moral quality of the newly won national unity. Many of these 
cases involved groups that had already been socially marginalised in the pre-war 
period. They were now increasingly targeted by emergency measures and were 
disproportionally often victims of repressive measures. Another rather 
heterogeneous group that was victimised by the authorities were so-called ‘enemy 
aliens’. Large-scale internment, legal discrimination, and sometimes abuse 
characterised the treatment of these people in Britain and Germany. Enemy aliens 
were the first group that experienced the full scale of repressive instruments under 
the state of emergency already days after the outbreak of the war.  
With the prolonged continuation of the war, anti-war dissent and strike 
movements emerged in both countries on a larger scale by the end of 1915. After a 
period of relative forbearance, authorities increasingly suppressed these protest 
movements. However, this was guided by the ambition to maintain the domestic 
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truce policies. This often meant that repressive measures primarily targeted the 
leaders of protest movements who were often gaoled or drafted into the military in 
order to silence them. Against the rank-and-file, however, full-blown repression 
was rather infrequent and not enforceable. Instead, public protest was allowed 
within certain limitations and local authorities sought to address some of the 
grievances.  
In Britain the War Emergency Workers’ National Council sought to influence 
the application of emergency measures for the benefit of the working classes. The 
WEWNC had no direct equivalent in Germany. Industrial commissions the trade 
unions participated were only established as a consequence of the Auxiliary Service 
Law (Gesetz über den vaterländischen Hilfsdienst), the German counterpart to the 
Munitions of War Act, in December 1916. However, the increasing integration of 
trade unions and organised labour into the state in both countries also limited their 
ability to campaign for working-class interests. This paved the way for the 
emergence of more radicalised grass-roots movements that would become 
characteristic of the aggravated conflicts in the second half of the war.  
Generally, it can be stated that the period between August 1914 and mid-1916 
was marked by a continuous process of establishing and honing the mechanisms 
and instruments of emergency government. On the one hand, governments enforced 
a necessary economic transformation and mobilisation of society with the help of 
emergency powers and established systems of social control and surveillance. On 
the other hand, these measures were often limited in range and efficiency. The 
ambition to control the mobilised societies was certainly dominant, but the means 
to enforce this were often scarcely available. The maintenance of the war effort and 
the endurance can therefore not entirely be explained as results of coercive policies. 
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However, it seems that already by the end of 1915, this self-mobilisation of society 
was in a crisis and enforced endurance became increasingly important.409 The crisis 
of voluntarism in Britain illustrates this development very well. The voluntary 
contributions of the British people to the war effort were certainly immense, but the 
established ways were increasingly inappropriate with regards to the necessities of 
a totalising war. The imposition of a coercive system of wartime economy and 
conscription would create a background against which a growing radical protest 
movement emerged during 1917 and 1918. In Germany, the aggravation of wartime 
hardships and hunger led to an increasing radicalisation of protest movements that 
would eventually erupt in a number of mass strikes that soon combined social and 
political demands and finally led to the revolution of November 1918. 
  
                                                          
409 John Horne, ‘Remobilizing for “Total War”: France and Britain’, in John Horne (ed.), State, 
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Chapter Three 
 
From Crisis to Revolution: Emergency Government 
and Totalised War (1916-1918) 
 
 
With hindsight, 1916 was a turning point of the First World War. By the end of this 
year profound changes within wartime governments would pave the way to an 
increased mobilisation of ever greater parts of British and German society. In the 
German Empire, the so-called Third Supreme Command (Dritte Oberste 
Heeresleitung) under Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich 
Ludendorff emerged as a dominant political actor. They had taken over the control 
of the German military in August 1916 after their predecessor Erich von 
Falkenhayn had been forced to resign due to the disastrous Battle of Verdun. The 
duumvirate Hindenburg and Ludendorff eventually established an ever closer grip 
on German politics for the last two years of the war. With faltering popular support 
for the war and growing unrest among the working class, the means of coercion 
under the state of siege became crucial for preventing the German home front from 
collapsing. At the same time, governments undertook ever-increasing attempts to 
mobilise the industrial and military manpower reserves of the German Empire.  
At about the same time, a new coalition government under the ambitious 
former Munitions Minister and then Secretary of State for War, David Lloyd 
George, was formed in Britain in December 1916. Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, 
who was held responsible for the unsuccessful course of the war including the 
disasters of the Gallipoli campaign in 1915 and the Somme offensive in 1916, was 
forced to step down and make way for a ‘national coalition’. Here too, new attempts 
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and strategies evolved to re-mobilise broad public support for a war that attracted 
growing criticism. The futile offensive on the Somme and its horrendous casualties 
caused serious doubts as to whether the war could be brought to a victorious 
conclusion. The so-called Lansdowne letter affair was exemplary of the faltering 
belief in a victorious peace. Having served as a Conservative minister in the Asquith 
Coalition Cabinet, Lord Lansdowne circulated a memorandum in November 1916 
in which he pleaded for immediate peace negotiations with the Central Powers. 
With the – in his view imminent – prospect of being forced to submit to German 
conditions, a peace under the conditions of the status quo ante was more 
desirable.410 Although Lansdowne’s defeatism was repudiated by other cabinet 
ministers, it reflected a growing tendency within British society at the turn of 1916. 
This general pessimism influenced the policies of the new cabinet profoundly. The 
focus of the British war policy in late 1916 and early 1917 was pre-eminently to 
avoid defeat and to maintain morale on the home front at least long enough until an 
anticipated American intervention could change the fortunes of war. If we follow 
Brock Millman’s study on pessimism and British policy during the second half of 
the war, the principal British war aim was less to win the war than to avoid being 
forced into a peace on German conditions.411 Against this background, the growing 
anti-war protests and emergent strike movements were perceived as vital threats to 
the perseverance on the British home fronts. The initially reluctant application of 
                                                          
410 Douglas Newton, ‘The Lansdowne “Peace Letter” of 1917 and the Prospect of Peace by 
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the wide-ranging emergency powers under the Defence of the Realm Act was now 
progressively used to suppress protest and intimidate activists. At the same time 
extensive and coordinated propaganda efforts were undertaken to re-mobilise 
support for the war. 
The impact of the Russian Revolutions of March and November 1917 gave 
the British and German home front politics a new dimension.412 On the one hand, 
the fear of similar developments in their own countries grew within government 
circles and the military. A repetition of events similar to those in Russia was to be 
prevented by all means. On the other hand, many activists were challenged by the 
prospect of a possible revolutionary turn in their anti-war protest. After all, anti-war 
dissent was a chequered phenomenon whose lowest common denominator was 
opposition to the war, but this not necessarily implied support for a socialist 
revolution. In Germany hunger and the collapse of the military in mid-1918 led to 
the revolutionary overthrow of the old order in November 1918. Britain was spared 
a revolutionary uprising, but here as well the discourse about the threat of the 
‘enemies within’ shifted from alleged ‘pro-Germans’ and ‘peace cranks’ to 
Bolsheviks and communists. This chapter will reconstruct these developments in 
home front politics and the consequential escalation of emergency government in 
Britain and Germany during the second half of the war. A particular focus will be 
put on the impact of the Russian Revolutions and the reactions of activists and state 
agencies.  
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according to the Julian calendar which was used in Russia at the time.  
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The Military and Political crises of 1916, Changes in Government and 
Their Impact on Emergency Government 
 
The Rise of the Third Supreme Command as a Key Political Actor in 
Germany, 1916-1917 
 
The battle for Verdun that raged from March to November 1916 was designed to 
be the decisive struggle for the German army in order to win the war in the West.413 
What was meant to be a ‘blood mill’ (Blutmühle) to bleed the allies white turned 
out to be just as costly for the Germans themselves. Supreme commander Erich von 
Falkenhayn had hoped to turn Verdun into a battle of total attrition in which German 
superiority would cause so many allied losses that at least France would have to 
enter peace negotiations on German terms. The immediate result, however, was a 
depletion of the German offensive potential on the Western front.414 The failure at 
Verdun turned into a downright military crisis for Germany due to Romania’s entry 
into the war on the allied side, and the increasing pressure of Russia’s ‘Brusilov’ 
offensive in June 1916.  
Yet, the military crisis of mid-1916 had other and much more far-reaching 
consequences for politics on the German home front. The attrition warfare at 
Verdun had finally demonstrated that the alleged superiority of the individual 
German soldier would not be the decisive factor for victory. Instead, industrial 
output and the full mobilisation of all manpower reserves were crucial in the view 
                                                          
413 Robert T. Foley has presented an enlightening study on the German grand strategy under 
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of the chief strategic planners.415 Von Falkenhayn, however, was seen as incapable 
of mobilising the last reserves of the German Empire. If the war was to be won, 
then it could only be with a new Supreme Command that understood the growing 
need for further societal mobilisation on the home front. On 23 August 1916, von 
Falkenhayn was pressured into requesting his dismissal as Supreme Commander of 
the German army.416 In his stead, the ‘heroes of Tannenberg’, Field-Marshal Paul 
von Hindenburg and his aide General Erich Ludendorff were appointed as new 
supreme commanders of the German army. They maintained the symbiotic 
relationship that had evolved during their time as commanders of the Eastern front. 
In this partnership Hindenburg mainly acted as the charismatic leader whereas 
Ludendorff steered the actual political and military decision making.417  
Ludendorff and his aide Colonel Max Bauer launched immediate activities to 
influence the general policy making of the Imperial Government under Chancellor 
Bethmann Hollweg.418 The policy of the Imperial Government was already under 
attack by right-wing groups that pressured for a more resolute conduct of the war. 
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The pressure of the extreme right eventually led to the lifting of censorship 
regarding the debate on war aims in December 1916. This, however, was more in 
favour of the right as they seized the moment to propagate ideas of total war and 
wide-ranging annexations.419 
Bauer and Ludendorff, too, were convinced that only the total mobilisation of 
all available resources would give Germany a chance to succeed. Ludendorff began 
his direct interference with the policy of the government with a series of warning 
memoranda in which he urged the introduction of a system of industrial 
conscription for all male Germans between the age of sixteen and 60.420 From 
September 1916 a draft of the so-called Auxiliary Service Law was circulating 
within the government and the Reichstag parties. The law included the suspension 
of freedom of labour and the obligation to work in strategic industries. The drastic 
nature of the new coercive law should be palliated by the establishment of worker’s 
councils (Arbeiterausschüsse) in factories with over 50 employees. This provision 
was designed to integrate the official trade unions into the war industry but also to 
establish closer state-control over the country’s labour force and to prevent a further 
spread of anti-war strikes.421  
Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, however, initially rejected the drastic 
proposals of the bill, fearing that it would endanger his arduously maintained 
‘policy of the diagonal’ that sought balance and maintain the fragile domestic peace 
                                                          
419 The liberalisation of the war aims debate was essentially an attempt to create another ‘controlled 
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under the Burgfrieden. But this was not the only reason. Bethmann Hollweg was 
all too aware that Ludendorff’s behaviour undermined his own position of power. 
The majority parties of the parliament, too, requested that approval of such a bill 
would only be possible if reforms of the regime under the state of siege were 
conceded.422 The bill was eventually forced through in December 1916, but only 
after Ludendorff and Hindenburg threatened to resign if the law was not enacted. 
The painstakingly slow and complicated process of enacting the Auxiliary Service 
Law triggered discussions within the military élite about the efficient reorganisation 
of domestic politics. As a consequence Colonel Max Bauer began to advocate a 
military dictatorship under Ludendorff and Hindenburg that would replace the 
Imperial Government and dissolve the Reichstag at least for the duration of the war. 
Remarkably, the Emperor played no significant role in Bauer’s considerations since 
Hindenburg was regarded as ‘untouchable’ and could not easily be replaced.423 
Ultimately, Bauer failed to win over a sufficient number of general-staff officers 
for his plans. However, even though an open military dictatorship was not 
established, the Supreme Command claimed a central political position for itself.  
In March 1917, Bethmann Hollweg issued a statement to the War Press Office 
in which he indicated a partial accountability of the Supreme Command for policies 
of the empire. What was thought of as an attempt to hedge the influence of 
Ludendorff turned into a fundamental debate about the allegiance of the military. 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff were keen to avoid any public notion that the Supreme 
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‘Extract of Major-General Mertz von Quirnheim’s Diary’, quoted in Deist, Militär und Innenpolitik, 
pp. 651-652. 
 
168 
 
Command could in any way be accountable to anyone else than the emperor. Yet, 
without the Emperor intervening in the political decision making, this was primarily 
an attempt to preserve the relative autonomy of the Supreme Command. The 
following internal row between the Imperial Chancellery and the Supreme 
Command revealed the unworkable nature of their relationship.424 The policy of the 
chancellor regarding the resumption of the unrestricted U-boat warfare in February 
1917 and his indecisive stand on the peace initiative of the Reichstag manoeuvred 
him into an impossible position between all camps. The ‘policy of the diagonal’ had 
eventually failed. The Supreme Command put pressure on the Emperor to relieve 
him from office. On 14 July 1917 Bethmann Hollweg was replaced by Georg 
Michaelis as Imperial Chancellor. The rather faint bureaucrat Michaelis, however, 
was not much more than a puppet of the Supreme Command.425      
Although there is some debate about how the Third Supreme Command 
should be characterised, it cannot be described as a full-blown military 
dictatorship.426 Nonetheless, it certainly held a hitherto unknown position of power. 
Effectively, no practical political decision could be made against their will. 
However, as we shall see it also reached its limits when it came to confronting the 
increasingly self-confident majority parties of the Reichstag. Whereas Bethmann 
Hollweg had tried to balance the interests of the different domestic actors in order 
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to maintain the Burgfrieden, the Third Supreme Command was much more willing 
to use coercion to enforce its policies. This had a direct influence on the activities 
of the local military commanders that dealt with the symptoms of the aggravating 
crisis and the increasingly antagonistic anti-war protests.  
 
 
The British crisis and the ascent of the Lloyd George system, 1916  
 
Britain also faced an emerging military and political crisis in 1916. As 1915 had 
brought no significant advantage for the Entente, the conduct of the war by Prime 
Minister Asquith came under increased criticism. The offensives on the Western 
Front had shown few results yet cost horrendous casualties. Also, the attempts to 
bring a decision in the East by focussing on crushing the Ottoman Empire turned 
into a disaster. Leading generals sought to blame the insufficient supply of weapons 
and shells for the failures, although strategic misconceptions and individual 
mistakes of commanding officers were much more crucial. The experiences of 
1915, however, led some government officials to the conclusion that the conduct of 
the war was to be led with more fervour than Prime Minister Asquith had hitherto 
shown.  
The right-wing Unionist and Attorney General Edward Carson began to 
advocate the establishment of a central War Council that would allow a more 
coordinated form of wartime government. This new government committee would 
supersede the sometimes chaotic administration of the strategic industries and war 
planning.427 The Defence of the Realm Acts had already given the cabinet and 
military extensive powers to govern without parliament. However, the different 
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factions within the cabinet became even more diverse since on 25 May 1915 the 
Conservatives had joined a coalition and the sometimes contradictory policies of 
the different departments limited their exercise to some extent. A central war 
committee such as Carson envisaged would have replaced this arrangement, making 
way for a potentially more authoritarian way of government. Asquith and most of 
the other members of the cabinet, however, rejected this proposal. Yet, the idea of 
a small and almost dictatorial war government remained present. The ‘chance’ to 
realise this would come when David Lloyd George and the Conservative leader 
Andrew Bonar-Law seized the opportunity for similar reforms in the wake of the 
disastrous Somme Offensive in November 1916.  
Similar to the German intentions for the battle of Verdun, the newly appointed 
Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, Douglas Haig, envisaged 
the Somme Offensive as an battle of attrition that would lead to a depletion of the 
manpower reserves of the German Empire. But the Germans struck first with their 
attack on Verdun leaving the French in a desperate situation. The major offensive 
on the Somme soon became a vital attempt to relieve the pressure on the French 
fighting at Verdun. However, the consecutive British thrusts proved just as futile. 
By the end of the battle in November 1916, the British casualties mounted to nearly 
420,000. In consequence none of the originally intended advantages were 
eventually achieved, although some historians have claimed that the Battle of the 
Somme shifted the long-term strategic balance on the Western Front towards the 
allies.428  
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The failure at the Somme had, however, immediate political consequences. 
Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and his infamous ‘committee culture’ were now 
increasingly seen as a liability for the conduct of the war.429 The Secretary of State 
for War, David Lloyd George, and the unofficial leader of the Tory backbench-
opposition, Edward Carson, plotted to replace Asquith.430 After an inter-allied 
conference at Chantilly in November 1916 that revealed the full dilemma of the 
allied position, Lloyd George was convinced that it was time to act.431 Carson 
pressured the Conservative Party leader and Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Andrew Bonar Law, to support the establishment of a Supreme War Council. In a 
draft from 25 November 1916 this council was envisaged to consist of four cabinet 
ministers without portfolio that would meet daily to decide war-relevant questions. 
Although Asquith would nominally preside over this special committee, its actual 
business would be managed by Lloyd George himself and included the formerly 
disgraced Carson again. Asquith rejected the proposals again but attempted to keep 
the coalition together by mooting a reorganisation of the government. However, 
after Lloyd George handed in another amended memorandum on 1 December, 
which excluded Asquith from the proposed War Council, a compromise was 
increasingly unlikely.432 What followed were five days of political cabal in which 
Lloyd George endeavoured to organise sufficient support for forming a new 
coalition. Carson played a crucial role in this process by involving the press to 
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Lloyd George’s advantage.433 Asquith eventually gave in to the pressure to step 
down on 6 December, and after some commotion Lloyd George received the 
support of Conservatives and Labour for a new cabinet. On 7 December 1916, 
Lloyd George then officially formed his ‘national coalition’. On 10 December 
Lloyd George completed the composition of the new cabinet.  
The reorganisation of the cabinet had a profound impact on the application of 
the emergency powers under the Defence of the Realm Act. The Solicitor General 
under Herbert Asquith, George Cave, was promoted to become the new Home 
Secretary. During his time in office as Solicitor General, Cave as well as his 
predecessor Carson stood for a rather repressive approach to anti-war dissent. This 
was a stance he would maintain as Home Secretary. The Labour politician William 
Brace was appointed as his Under-Secretary of State. The post of the Solicitor-
General was taken over by Frederick E. Smith, whose main task would become the 
prosecution of offences under DORA. The policies of the new government were 
increasingly shaped by the Conservatives, on whose support Lloyd George had to 
rely more and more. This was particularly the case regarding the full mobilisation 
of British society under the slogan of ‘national efficiency’.434 The partial self-
constraint in domestic policies that informed the policies of Asquith and his Home 
Secretaries McKenna, Simon, and Samuel was now replaced by a willingness to 
employ the full potential of the British home front. Ideally, extensive propaganda 
efforts would achieve this aim. But if necessary also coercive measures would be 
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used to quell strikes and ban the threat of revolution that emerged towards the end 
of the war. Under Cave the ties between military and civilian surveillance of the 
home front were intensified and administrative structures amended in a way that 
enabled military and police authorities to assist each other efficiently. What had 
been largely a process of experimentation with emergency government under the 
Asquith ministry, now evolved into a system of domestic surveillance and the 
sophisticated suppression of a potentially revolutionary threat.   
 
 
Comparison 
 
It is debatable how far the battles of 1916 at Verdun and the Somme were indeed 
military ‘turning points’ of the First World War. From a military point of view they 
were certainly not more or less decisive than many other attrition battles that cost 
hundreds of thousands of lives. Yet, their significance is more to be seen in their 
symbolism and the political changes they triggered. Debates about efficient 
mobilisation were already prevalent in Britain and Germany before the end of 1916. 
However, only the disastrous outcomes of the year 1916 finally provided the 
arguments to force through the totalised mobilisation of the British and German 
wartime societies. It is no coincidence that these attempts to re-mobilise societies 
were epitomised by the rise of charismatic leaders such as David Lloyd George in 
Britain, or the duumvirate of the revered military heroes Paul von Hindenburg and 
Erich Ludendorff in Germany.435 The fact that plans for radical economic 
mobilisation in Germany were referred to as the ‘Hindenburg Programme’ is just 
one example of this connection.  
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Although the Supreme Command seized a key position in political decision 
making and in the public eye in Germany, it is questionable whether it can be 
described as a full-blown military dictatorship. The following points may help to 
understand why: firstly, neither Ludendorff nor Hindenburg officially took over any 
political powers other than their military commands. They were dependent on the 
collaboration of the Imperial Government and its various departments for the 
implementation of their policies. Direct interference with domestic policies could 
only be exercised with the local military commanders as their intermediaries or by 
pressuring the Imperial Government. That their influence had limits was 
highlighted when they clashed with Imperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg in 
March 1917. However, after finally succeeding in replacing him with the 
bureaucratic and susceptible Georg Michaelis, the Supreme Command became 
more dominant. Secondly, the combined power of Imperial Government and 
Supreme Command was increasingly confronted with demands for political reform 
and with popular protest. The ‘parliamentarisation’ and democratisation of the 
German Empire became increasingly pressing issues for the majority parties in the 
Reichstag.436 These fields of conflict became more relevant as they challenged the 
dominant conceptions of state, society and monarchy: values, the military was 
committed to preserve by all means. The persisting intransigence of the Supreme 
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Commands towards political reforms would prove to be a key factor in the creeping 
erosion of the political system in Germany.437   
The question how the Lloyd George ministry can be characterised has 
occupied many historians. In his popular English History, A. J. P. Taylor described 
the ascent of Lloyd George as ‘a revolution, British-style’ and its main protagonist 
as ‘the nearest thing England has known to a Napoleon’.438 Although Taylor may 
have overstated his case when describing Lloyd George as a ‘dictator for the time 
of the war’, who was backed by an ‘unconscious plebiscite of the backbenchers and 
newspapers’, he certainly had a point.439  Lloyd George, like his German 
equivalents Ludendorff and Hindenburg, provided the kind of charismatic 
leadership the press and the public had demanded. Under his leadership the plans 
for a more centralised war management by a War Cabinet were instantaneously 
implemented as well as the grip on the home fronts intensified.440 Nevertheless, to 
describe the Lloyd George ministry as a dictatorship is clearly exaggerated. 
Although the Prime Minister became the public centre piece of official politics, he 
was far from being a dictator with a monopoly on political decision making. Yet, 
particularly this notion of decisionism, the capability of enforcing political 
decisions regardless of their content and legality, is what political theorists have 
pointed out as the main characteristic of modern dictatorships.441 Lloyd George’s 
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ministry was certainly marked by charismatic leadership but not necessarily 
dictatorial in the sense of an autocratic decisionism. The composition of his 
coalition cabinet demanded a sophisticated equilibrium of the different party 
interests as well as the egos of other ministers such as Bonar Law and Carson. The 
dictatorial features of the new Lloyd George Cabinet are more accurately to be 
found in the emergency powers received under the Defence of the Realm Acts. 
They, however, were already widely established under the Asquith administration 
and not significantly extended under Lloyd George. What changed was the 
willingness to make use of them to an extent that had hitherto not occurred. 
Nevertheless, the Lloyd George system was in many respects new and very modern, 
foreshadowing a new age of mass politics. The combination of extensive 
propaganda, the effective use and integration of the mainstream press into the state 
apparatus, the effective absence of an organised parliamentary opposition as well 
as the efficient suppression of dissenting voices were certainly features different 
from British pre-war politics and idealised concepts of democracy. If not a full-
blown dictatorship, then Lloyd George’s term in office was at least a flirtation of 
the British state with authoritarianism.442  
The near-simultaneity of events in Britain and Germany and their striking 
parallels, however, should not blur the vision of major differences. The German 
military maintained independence from political control. The local military 
commanders were still in charge of the administration of their army corps districts 
and effectively without central direction. With the rise of the Third Supreme 
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Command, however, the military gained a new agency to influence the civilian 
departments of government themselves. The actual centre of power within the 
German state shifted from the Imperial Government to the military commanders 
Hindenburg and especially Ludendorff. Whereas the Imperial Government had 
repeatedly been scrutinised by the Reichstag parties, the military was anxious to 
avoid similar interferences by establishing the puppet chancellor Michaelis as a 
kind of political lightning rod. However, the Supreme Command also tried to create 
a form of popular consent by presenting Hindenburg as a unifying national leader 
standing above the party struggles. The informal but de facto merging of military 
and political powers was a main feature of the Third Supreme Command. However, 
as has been shown its powers were still limited and far from being dictatorial. This 
unification of military command and political power did not take place in the British 
government. After all, Lloyd George remained a civilian leader and the military a 
subordinated institution within the state. There had certainly been developments 
towards the independence of the military. However, it seems that the coming into 
power of the energetic and charismatic Lloyd George was a crucial factor in 
avoiding any form of military dominance in British politics.443 This is, however, 
not to say that the military was entirely subdued under civilian control. Officers and 
military establishments remained crucial factors in home front politics and 
exercised considerable influence. Yet, overall they rather maintained collaborative 
relations with the civilian authorities rather than dominating them. 
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The Impact of the Russian Revolutions on British and German Home 
Front Politics in 1917 
 
In March 1917 a number of strikes broke out in the Russian capital Petrograd that 
ultimately ended Tsarist rule. Four days later, the garrison of the city mutinied and 
formed a workers’ and soldiers’ council. On the same day, 12 March 1917, a 
Provisional Government consisting of Duma members was formed. On 15 March 
Tsar Nicholas II abdicated. The revolution, however, was as much a breakdown of 
the old order as it was an active overthrow.444 The transformation of the Russian 
economy in order to satisfy the demand for weapons and ammunition had created a 
shortage of vital goods for civilian consumption. An increasing intensity of 
exploitation met with a falling level of food supplies. This was a dangerous 
combination that proved to be the straw that broke the camel’s back.  
Russia’s situation prior to the revolution in March 1917 was not too different 
from that of many other belligerent countries. In Germany the winter of 1916-17 
turned out to be catastrophic. The potato harvest had been particularly poor in 
autumn 1916 and the following winter was extremely harsh. The situation was 
aggravated by a shortage of coal and the severe effects of the British sea blockade. 
For many Germans, and particularly working-class families, turnips replaced grain 
and potatoes. By the end of 1916 the daily calorie intake was in some cases reduced 
to approximately 1,000 calories.445 Matters were complicated further by the fact 
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that approximately 50% of the food production went on to the black market from 
which ordinary working class families were widely excluded.446 Local food riots 
were often the result and began to cause serious problems for local military 
commanders. At the same time the already mentioned Auxiliary Service Law was 
introduced which led to additional unrest among many workers. Yet, the 
revolutionary developments in Russia also inspired socialist activists to intensify 
their efforts. In April 1917, the SPD officially split when the Independent Social 
Democratic Party (USPD) was formed in Gotha. The USPD incorporated those 
Social Democrats who were dissatisfied with the stance of the majority party around 
its dominant figures Scheidemann, Ebert and David.447 But it also gave outspoken 
revolutionaries a platform for their activities. Members of the USPD soon played a 
crucial role in the organisation of strike movements and the first unrests in the 
Imperial Navy. In reaction, local commanders began preparations to deal with 
revolutionary upheavals. We will see how the provisions of the state of siege were 
eventually used to quell these protest movements. Yet, also the need for positive 
mobilisation was recognised by the authorities. In early 1917 a propaganda scheme 
under the ponderous title ‘Patriotic Instruction’ (Vaterländischer Unterricht) was 
introduced. Its aim was to educate and inspire the German population about German 
politics and its war aims.448 The ways to achieve this were, however, often just as 
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cumbersome as the title and proved to be eventually ineffective. Another attempt to 
create positive integration into the war effort was the formation of the German 
Fatherland Party (Deutsche Vaterlandspartei) in July 1917. Originally, the 
designated name for the party was ‘Hindenburg Party’, which epitomised its lack 
of programmatic content. Its sole aim was to create mass support for the policies of 
the Third Supreme Command. Although the party membership soon numbered 
several hundred thousand on paper, it was merely a melting pot of extreme right-
wing pressure groups and dignitaries. The German Fatherland Party almost entirely 
failed to reach the rank-and-file of the organised working-class and to establish a 
‘patriotic’ counterbalance to radical socialism.449 
The British government, too, viewed the developments in Russia with unease. 
The question whether Britain would follow Russia into turmoil became a prevalent 
issue for the Lloyd George Cabinet.450 In a private letter from April 1917, Cabinet 
Minister without Portfolio Alfred Milner wrote to a friend: ‘I feel more sure that 
the end is nearing than I do what kind of end it will be. The social structure in all 
the old European countries shows ominous cracks – least of all perhaps in England, 
though even here there are some signs.’451 Things had been worsening in Britain 
since Lloyd George entered office. The vital food imports were increasingly 
interrupted by the shrinking number of available transport ships. The resumption of 
the unrestricted submarine warfare in February eventually brought Britain on the 
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brink of defeat in mid-1917.452 Only the entry of the United States into the war 
helped to maintain the war effort. Repeated food shortages in Britain were another 
consequence of the shipping crisis. By the beginning of 1918 the average bread 
rations had dropped to a mere pound per week.453 Meat and fats had become nearly 
unaffordable luxuries for most working people. Food riots became more frequent 
and the question of the unequal distribution of hardships triggered intensive 
criticism.454  
Consequently, strike movements occurred throughout the year 1917. Fears of 
a revolutionary uprising were fuelled after a conference of the United Socialist 
Council in Leeds in April 1917 approved a resolution congratulating the Russian 
people for the overthrow of the Tsarist regime and demanding the immediate 
beginning of peace negotiations.455 These demands were, of course, not new. They 
had featured in the platforms of organisations such as the UDC or ILP ever since 
the beginning of the war. Now, however, the government had good reason to take 
it more seriously. Anti-war dissent was no longer an isolated phenomenon but 
received wide-spread support among organised labour. One way to counter this 
development was through intensified propaganda efforts. For this purpose, the 
National War Aims Committee (NWAC) was created in mid-1917 and unfolded a 
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hitherto unknown level of activity.456 The NWAC organised thousands of meetings 
with experienced and appealing speakers as well as distributing over a hundred 
million pieces of publications.457 In February 1918, the proprietor of the Daily 
Express, Max Aitken (in 1917 ennobled as Baron Beaverbrook), became the head 
of the newly created Ministry of Information whose main task was to coordinate 
the various propaganda efforts including aspects of censorship and domestic 
intelligence.458 Nevertheless, the profound fears of the emergence of a 
revolutionary movement also led to an intensification of emergency government. 
The powers under DORA were now exercised much more severely. Moreover, 
military and police forces began with contingency planning for the case of 
revolutionary upheavals, which were soon put to the test when dealing with strikes.    
 
 
The End of the Burgfrieden: Mass Strikes and the State of Siege in Germany 
in 1917 
 
The handling of the now regularly occurring food protests presented a huge 
challenge for the local military commanders in Germany. These riots were severe 
interruptions of the public order that also threatened war production. The authorities 
were thus inclined to suppress strikes as quickly as possible. Yet, heavy-handed 
policing could trigger even more radical reactions amongst the protestors. The so-
called ‘Liebknecht strike’ in June 1916 was a warning example for this eventuality.  
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In January 1917, reports about riots by children and women were reported 
frequently.459 In a secret memorandum by the Prussian War Ministry to the local 
military commanders from 17 January 1917 guidelines regarding the handling of 
such occurrences were issued.460 It stated that although ‘meetings which only serve 
the purpose of seditious incitement’ were still to be suppressed, further ‘restrictions 
on public meetings would be rather damaging’. Local military commanders should 
allow public gatherings instead of forcing people into ‘secret conventions that 
would facilitate the dangerous subversive activities [Wühlarbeit] away from the 
control of police and public’. It further explained that ‘economic and food problems 
urge to be expressed, grievances and proposals need access to the public to be 
solved. A controlled outlet is needed to accommodate the accumulated disaffection 
and faintheartedness.’461 Against this background, it was advised to proactively 
organise public meeting and to let patriotic trade union officials address the 
assembled crowds. If necessary, the emergency powers under the state of siege 
should be used to censor speeches or ban undesirable speakers in beforehand.462  
This exemplary memorandum followed the general tendency of the early war 
years to allow meetings and protest in limited and controlled circumstances. 
However, appeasement of working-class protest soon proved insufficient to 
maintain home front morale. In February 1917, the number of wildcat strikes 
increased constantly.463 A secret memorandum addressed to the commander of the 
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Marken district from 23 February 1917 by the Police President of Berlin, Heinrich 
von Oppen, concluded that the unrest among the workers in Berlin should not be 
explained solely by deteriorating living standards but also by the political activities 
of radical socialist agitators. These radicals were trying to ‘end the current war by 
way of uprising and general strike’.464 As the best method to deal with these 
agitators, von Oppen suggested calling them up and putting them under military 
control.465 This, too, was an already established practice that had been used to 
silence prominent anti-war dissenters such as Karl Liebknecht before.  
The first real challenge for the authorities occurred when in mid-April a mass 
strike began in Berlin that soon spread to other industrial centres throughout the 
empire. The trigger for the strike movement was the announcement of a further 
reduction of the bread rations for workers.466 The authorities were well aware that 
announcement would provoke outbreaks of discontent. Already on 30 March the 
Prussian Ministry of the Interior issued a decree to the Prussian police with detailed 
preparatory orders.467 The emphasis was now put on harsh repression. The decree 
ordered the pursuit of necessary measures ‘regardless of the usual consideration of 
their consequences in peace’.468 The cornerstone of these contingency plans was 
the close cooperation between the military and the police. In cases where the 
civilian administration was not up to the task, military personnel were supposed to 
take over. At the same time, the command of the Marken district updated its scheme 
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for the suppression of revolutionary uprisings.469 Yet despite the careful 
preparations, it seems that the extent of the walkout surprised the authorities. On 16 
April, 84,000 workers in Berlin left their workplaces and joined protest 
demonstrations. Overall, between 180,000 and 200,000 refused work.470 In the 
morning, several thousand protestors attempted to march to the inner city districts, 
where the main government buildings were situated. Hastily assembled troops 
erected road blocks and guarded the area around the central boulevard Unter den 
Linden and the Wilhelmstraße. Nonetheless, most marches were suppressed by 
police squads using baton rounds, and in some cases warning shots were fired.471 
During the next day, 17 April 1917, demonstrators developed a new tactic to play 
cat and mouse with the police. When the police tried to kettle marchers, the crowds 
dispersed and reassembled half an hour later at another spot in the city. When the 
police arrived the same procedure would begin again. Occasionally, shops, food 
stores and bakeries were looted.472 In an attempt to deter further strike action, the 
chief of the central War Office, Lieutenant-General Groener, issued a warning 
statement that everyone inciting strikes would have to be considered as committing 
high treason.473  
By the evening of 17 April, the authorities were convinced that the walkout 
had been successfully suppressed. However, on the same day the workers of the 
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armaments and ammunitions factory in Spandau began a strike that lasted for 
another four days. This walkout was only suppressed after the military commander 
of the Marken district, Gustav von Kessel, intervened and prohibited every 
cessation of work. He declared that the factories were now under military command 
and that every male worker would be called up in case another strike took place.474 
In order to underline his threat, a company of infantry was stationed at the factory 
and a Lieutenant-Colonel took over the administration. After the resumption of 
work on 21 April 80 to 100 of the alleged ringleaders were sacked and immediately 
called up.475 Among them was the leader of the revolutionary shop stewards, 
Richard Müller.476 The harsh repression of the strike in Spandau was clearly 
intended to serve as a deterrent for other potential walkouts. This tactic had, 
however, only limited success.  
In June 1917, major disturbances occurred in Düsseldorf following a food 
protest march by women and children.477 The deputy commander of the 7th Army 
corps declared a ‘severe state of siege’ (verschärfter Belagerungszustand) over the 
city and several women were arrested under the provisions of the state of siege. 
During the following, hastily organised trials, several women were given draconian 
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sentences of up to six years hard labour. The severe state of siege was maintained 
until 14 July 1917.478 The events in Dusseldorf were symptomatic of the advancing 
crisis. Since June 1917, almost daily new reports about minor strikes throughout 
the empire reached the Imperial Home Office.479 Yet, strikes were not the only 
threat the authorities had to fear. In August 1917, sailors of the High Sea Fleet in 
their base at Wilhelmshaven mutinied and the following suppression ended in 
courts martial and death sentences for five of the ringleaders. Two socialists, Albin 
Köbis and Max Reichpietsch, were actually executed.480 In the wake of the mutiny, 
numerous arrests among sailors and civilians were made. Most of them were kept 
in military security detention under the provisions of the state of siege.481  
A conclusion drawn from the occurrence of continuous strikes and the mutiny 
of the High Sea Fleet was the intensification of domestic intelligence in the Empire. 
Germany had no centralised domestic intelligence agency such as the British MI5. 
Therefore domestic intelligence was mainly carried out by Department VII of the 
Berlin Police presidency, the political branch of the Prussian police. Although 
Department VII maintained its own informers and monitored all kinds of potentially 
seditious movements, no systematic approach to domestic intelligence and 
surveillance existed. A conference between the heads of the Prussian police and 
military commanders on 16 and 17 December 1917 examined strategies for a better 
surveillance of the home front and the suppression of revolutionary movements.482 
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As a result Department IIIb of the general staff extended its activities to the home 
front. For this purpose a ‘Section X’ within the department was formed whose main 
task became the surveillance of revolutionary movements in Germany. The 
Department was originally the foreign intelligence unit of the German army, but its 
range of activities increased significantly during the war.483  
In May 1917, it had already taken over the task of organising ‘patriotic 
instruction’. Now, its commanding officer, Colonel Walter Nicolai, additionally 
seized control over domestic intelligence.484 The objectives formulated at the 
aforementioned conference included the prevention of further mass strikes as well 
as the suppression of pacifist propaganda.485 Department IIIb eventually turned into 
a political intelligence unit that combined military powers under the state of siege 
with the tactics of political policing. In the wake of this extension of domestic 
intelligence, also the monitoring of political activists was gradually increased.  
After the April strikes in 1917, orders were given to monitor the postal 
communication of prominent members of the Independent Social Democratic 
Party.486 The experiences with mass strikes also led to adjustments in the counter-
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insurgency planning of the military. The Bavarian Ministry of War, for example, 
outlined principles for the suppression of uprisings in a decree to the military 
commanders from 2 April 1917.487 The described measures are exemplary for the 
contingency plans of other army corps commands.488 In fourteen points the military 
commanders were instructed to distinguish between food protests and revolutionary 
uprisings. Their dealing with the first instances should be lenient and measured. 
The main target here was to disperse the crowds without too much commotion. Yet, 
the provisions for dealing with political unrest were much more severe. The 
instruction stated that only reliable officers and troops were to be employed in such 
instances. These were preferably professional troops with no connections to the 
local people, ideally from a different area of Bavaria. It stated further that: ‘All other 
considerations have to stand back from the necessity to achieve the aim [the 
suppression of an uprising] in short time and without restrictions. Reliable troops 
and decisive leaders are necessary for this.’489  
 
 
Modes of Emergency Government in the Lloyd George System 1917 
 
The first changes in the British handling of strikes and dissent had already set in 
before the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in March 1917. The worsening 
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situation on the Western Front after the failed Somme offensive but also fears of 
domestic turmoil and strike movements led to a redrafting of domestic contingency 
plans. In August 1916, a new Home Defence Scheme was prepared by the War 
Office.490 Primarily dealing with provisions for the case of a potential German 
invasion, it also contained measures for ‘special emergencies’. Although no explicit 
explanation of what constituted such an emergency was provided, the details of the 
scheme indicate that this was likely to mean large-scale strikes and other 
disturbances. Article 26 of the emergency scheme decreed the suspension of the 
right to trial by jury that was introduced under the Defence of the Realm 
(Amendment) Act of March 1915.491 In article 27 of the emergency scheme the 
immediate detention of ‘dangerous persons’ was ordered. The scheme also ordered 
all Competent Military Authorities to collect lists labelled A, B, and Z with the help 
of local police constabularies. Class A contained all persons that were to be interned 
when the War Office would issue the code word ‘praetor’. Class B included persons 
that had to report themselves regularly to the police. Class Z represented enemy 
aliens that were to be detained as well. After the planned detention of the persons 
of the classes A and Z, they were to be transferred from the police to the military, 
who were then responsible for deporting them to so-called ‘concentration 
centres’.492 However, the War Office files give no clear picture about the persons 
actually listed for the pre-emptive detention by the military authorities. The 
existence of a separate list for enemy aliens, however, suggests that these were 
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British subjects considered as ‘dangerous’ and potentially seditious. There are good 
reasons to believe that anti-war activists were included in this group.493 
Another example for the increasingly severe approach to the exercise of 
emergency government is a memorandum of the Chief Constable of 
Glamorganshire from 23 February 1917 to the Home Office.494 It expressed the 
annoyance of the senior police officer about the alleged leniency of the prosecution 
against the ‘disloyal, mischievous speeches’ at meetings ‘convened by the 
Independent Labour Party, No-Conscription Fellowship, Union of Democratic 
Control etc.’. According to him, the ‘decision to prosecute [offences against 
DORA] had not been given often enough by the CMA [Competent Military 
Authority]’. He concluded that this leniency would lead to further disturbances as 
had been seen in Ireland and that the timely and measured prosecution of anti-war 
activities was strongly advised.495  
Yet, it remains unclear how influential anti-war groups had really become by 
this point. In a letter from 16 December 1916, Sylvia Pankhurst articulated her firm 
belief that ‘there is a great and growing volume of opinion in favour of an 
immediate peace’.496 However, this ‘voice of the people is never heard’, because 
‘the free expression of opinion is denied, newspapers told by the government what 
to say and what not to say’.497 Despite this rather optimistic outlook, dissenting 
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groups were in a crisis by the end of 1916. The introduction of conscription had 
liberated groups such as the NCF or UDC from their former isolation, but the 
increased repression took its toll on them. The conscription of young workers posed 
a severe challenge to anti-war socialists organised in the BSP and ILP. Both parties 
saw a decline in branches and membership numbers throughout 1916.498 What had 
changed, however, was that their position was increasingly supported by the trade 
unions. Deteriorating living standards, insufficient control of food supplies, and the 
repressive handling of trade disputes had paved the way for a gradual 
rapprochement of the initially disparate movements. In this context, particularly 
shop stewards and local food vigilance committees began to play an important role 
as intermediaries between political and social protest.  
On the other side, however, the parliamentary Labour Party had joined the 
Asquith coalition in 1915 and Arthur Henderson had become a member of Lloyd 
George’s War Cabinet in December 1916 despite growing internal conflicts.499 
When the Russian Revolution broke out in March the Labour Party remained intact. 
Yet, it was split between patriotic groups that supported the war effort and the 
participation in government, moderate war opponents such as Ramsay MacDonald, 
and downright revolutionaries such as the BSP leadership around Albert Inkpin and 
John MacLean. Yet overall, the events in Petrograd were clearly a turning point for 
the home front politics. Nearly all branches of the Labour Party welcomed the 
overthrow of the autocratic Tsarist regime emphatically. The interpretation of the 
significance of the events, however, differed within the labour movement. For 
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moderate socialists the end of Tsarism opened up the prospect of the defeat of its 
ideological twin Kaiserism. For them it was now much easier to argue for the war 
as a fight for liberty and democracy versus authoritarianism. In the view of anti-war 
radicals, however, the revolution was primarily driven by the wish of the Russian 
people for peace. In their eyes, this was an example that the British working class 
should follow.500 But Britain was far from having a revolutionary moment in March 
1917. Despite the fact that food riots and strikes became more frequent and anti-
war protest meetings were held nearly every day in different parts of the country, 
neither government nor dissenters really believed that the situation was close to an 
uprising. What was important, however, was the belief on both sides that if things 
continued to develop in the way they were, a situation similar to that in Russia could 
easily emerge. Lloyd George himself stated at a meeting of the War Cabinet on 6 
April 1917 that there was ‘a very considerable and highly-organised labour 
movement with seditious tendencies, which was developing in many industrial 
centres’. Although some of their grievances were legitimate, there was a danger ‘of 
these being exploited by violent anarchists’.501  
A short time after his ascent to office, Lloyd George endeavoured to suppress 
the ILP’s Labour Leader and the NCF’s Tribunal. The Home Office, MI5 and the 
Department of Public Prosecutions prepared the suppression by collecting evidence 
of offences against various DRR.502 In January 1917, Lloyd George sought to 
secure the support of Arthur Henderson for such a measure. Henderson, however, 
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refused with reference to the upcoming Labour Party conference in Manchester in 
the same month. He indicated that the conference would force the parliamentary 
party to withdraw its support for the government in such a case.503 Henderson’s 
rejection made clear that an open attack on organised labour would not be tolerated 
by the Labour Party. The same applied to the overly oppressive handling of strikes. 
Although the Minister of Labour, John Hodge, had threatened to prosecute striking 
boilermakers in Liverpool in 1916 as traitors and offenders under DORA, he 
generally sought to avoid open confrontation. With regards to a strike of Jewish 
tailors in London in December 1916 and their subsequent prosecution under the 
Defence of the Realm Act, his permanent secretary, David Shackleton, wrote in a 
memorandum that ‘(...) the real concern of this Department is that extreme action 
should not be taken where it can be avoided (...)’.504 Often, however, strikes were 
not avoided. The number of walkouts in the vital metal, shipbuilding and 
engineering trades more than doubled between 1916 (105) and 1917 (225). The 
number of strikers increased ten-fold from 305,000 to 3,063,000 during the same 
time.505 This surge was in many ways also a sign that the government was unable 
to tackle inflation and problems in food supply, which left strikes often as the only 
way for organised workers to improve their situation. In addition the revocation of 
exemption certificates for skilled workers further stirred the resistance of big unions 
such as the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE).506   
In anticipation of the troubles ahead, the government had already established 
guidelines as to how strikers could be prosecuted efficiently. As early as February 
                                                          
503 Ibid., Henderson to Lloyd George, 15 January 1917.  
504 LAB 2/444/ML1156/1919, memorandum by David Shakleton, 2 February 1917. 
505 Cf. Hinton, The First Shop Stewards Movement, p. 37. 
506 Ibid., pp. 38-40. 
 
195 
 
1916 a legal opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown suggested that strikers and 
persons inciting delay or interference with the production of war-relevant materials 
should be prosecuted under DRR 42.507 When in mid-August 1917, the National 
Union of Railwaymen threatened a national strike, local police constables were 
advised by the Home Office to suppress picketing as breaches of DRR 42, 56 (14), 
and to arrest strikers under DRR 55.508 The main anxiety was, nevertheless, to 
prevent the occurrence of strikes at all. In order to avoid them forward intelligence 
was applied by different authorities. If strikes were looming, local Competent 
Military Authorities used so-called restriction orders under DRR 27B to keep 
alleged agitators away and deprive strike movements of their leadership. From mid-
1917, more and more industrial centres were declared special military areas that 
could only be entered by non-inhabitants when the Competent Military Authorities 
gave their consent and issued special passports.509 Despite warnings by the Ministry 
of Labour regarding the negative impact of such measures, military authorities had 
issued over 600 of these orders in the period up to June 1917. The responsible 
officer at the War Office even complained that the four initially designated areas 
for deportations were meanwhile insufficient. They were too close to munitions 
centres to effectively suppress the influence of agitators.510 
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Another priority for the authorities was the surveillance of the public. MI5 
and local police authorities collected information about nearly every meeting that 
took place anywhere in the country. The priorities of gathering intelligence even 
lead to the abandonment of the practice of denying peace meetings access to squares 
and halls. Just before the Leeds Conference of ILP and BSP on 3 June 1917, the 
Chief Constable of Leeds wrote to the Home Office that ‘it was desired that the 
meeting should be held under one roof where there would be ample opportunities 
for adequate police supervision.’511 However, he also suggested that open air 
meetings were to be suppressed with the help of DRR 9A.512  
Wherever possible, police constables gathered reports about meetings and 
demonstrations. This information was then summarised and sent to the Home 
Office. Competent Military Authorities, too, compiled domestic intelligence 
summaries and dispatched them to the War Office. In addition, also MI5, MI7, the 
Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Munitions, the National Service Ministry and 
the Admiralty gathered some forms of domestic intelligence.513 In April 1917, an 
internal agreement between the different departments was achieved in so far as the 
Home Office now became the central agency for collecting intelligence reports. It 
created comprehensive weekly intelligence summaries from all available sources 
and distributed them among the other departments.514  
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Fig. 3 – Poster and leaflet advertising the Leeds conference of the United Socialist 
Council (TNA HO 45/10810/311932) 
 
 
 
The political conflicts in Britain were further aggravated in June 1917. 
Simultaneous to the Leeds conference of the ILP and BSP, an international socialist 
peace congress took place in Stockholm between 2 and 17 June.515 Initially, Ramsay 
MacDonald was delegated by the ILP to attend, but ‘patriotic’ seamen prevented 
him from entering the ship that was supposed to bring him to Sweden.516 The 
apparent unwillingness of the government to negotiate peace offers and the fact that 
                                                          
515 See Hildamarie Meynell, ‘The Stockholm Conference 1917 (I)’, The International Review of 
Social History, 5, 1 (1960), pp. 1-25; idem, ‘The Stockholm Conference 1917 (II)’, The International 
Review of Social History, 5, 2 (1960), pp. 202-225; David Kirby, ‘International Socialism and the 
Question of Peace’, The Historical Journal, 25, 3 (1985), pp. 709-716; Jay M. Winter, ‘Arthur 
Henderson, the Russian Revolution, and the Reconstruction of the Labour Party’, The Historical 
Journal, 15, 4 (1972), pp. 753-773. 
516 Millman, Managing Dissent, pp. 210-213. 
 
198 
 
he and other Labour delegates were denied passports to travel to Stockholm led to 
Arthur Henderson’s resignation from office.517 
The intransigence of Lloyd George also triggered calls to follow Russia and 
end the war with a revolution in Britain. The Chief Constable of Birmingham, for 
instance, reported a ‘patriotic’ meeting attended by Alfred Milner at which crippled 
soldiers shouted: ‘Why don’t you people start the revolution? You are too peaceful! 
Look at Russia.’ And then addressing Milner: ‘You do not care what life you 
sacrifice! All the manhood is gone!’518 A few days later, one of the soldiers was 
visited by Special Constables who threatened that his pension would be revoked in 
case he continued to agitate people and break DRR.519 The radical socialist Tom 
Mann struck a similarly revolutionary tone when he publically stated in September 
1917: ‘I have been an advocate for a revolution for this country for the least 30 
years. Russia has done it. How much longer are we going to wait?’520 And on the 
eve of the October Revolution, Home Secretary Cave concluded that revolutionary 
and pacifist propaganda had created an excitement ‘in the bulk of the populace that 
is no doubt much greater than it was. This may account for a general impression 
that they [pacifist sentiments] have become much more common.’521 The Assistant-
Commissioner of the CID agreed with this observation: ‘The officers of this 
department have noticed, lately, a distinct increase in the support given to these 
societies [the Daily Herald League, BSP and ILP] and in the circulation of their 
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literature.’522 In a subsequent order to Special Branch and CID, Cave decided that 
speakers at such public meetings were to be treated as ‘amidst the enemies of the 
King’, therefore as traitors.523 And even if prosecution for offences against DRR 
were not likely to succeed, the police should at least not interfere with mobs 
attempting to break-up such meetings as ‘they [the mob] had the right on their 
side’.524 
The growing nervousness among the authorities also influenced the treatment 
of prominent anti-war activists. Leading dissenters were kept under particularly 
close surveillance. Their postal communication was read by intelligence officers 
and often police agents monitored their contacts and conversations. The Home 
Office kept dossiers of prominent anti-war activists such as Philip Snowden and his 
wife Ethel, Charles P. Trevelyan, or Bertrand Russell.525 This information was now 
also used to prosecute influential figures of the anti-war movement. The case 
against Edward D. Morel in August 1917 is exemplary. Morel attempted to send a 
copy of his anti-war pamphlet Tsardom’s Part in the War to Romain Rolland in 
Switzerland. Allegedly he incited a female friend, Ethel Sidgewick, to smuggle the 
pamphlet abroad, which was discovered and eventually prosecuted by the 
Competent Military Authority of London. During the following trial Morel was 
convicted to six months hard labour, which he spent in Pentonville Prison.526 
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Morel’s case was clearly intended as a cautionary tale by the authorities. Yet, it also 
triggered a wave of protests against the increasingly repressive policies of the Lloyd 
George government. 
 
 
Comparison 
 
The situation in 1917 on the British and German home fronts was marked by an 
aggravating domestic crisis. Food supplies became increasingly insufficient while 
at the same time working conditions deteriorated. Even though wages rose 
nominally, they could barely keep pace with soaring inflation. Yet, not all strata of 
society were hit in the same way by wartime hardships. Jürgen Kocka’s 
characterisation of Germany as a class society at war was certainly equally true for 
Britain.527 Despite propaganda claims of national unity, the majority of the social 
elites in both countries were not willing to share or give up privileges. This 
concerned unequal opportunities for political participation as epitomised by the 
Prussian three-class franchise but also the accessibility of consumer goods and 
food. Like no other wartime phenomenon, the black market made class divides and 
entrenched social inequalities visible for everybody.528 The reluctance of the state 
to intervene – food rationing in Britain was introduced as late as February 1918 – 
contributed to a general war weariness among the working class.  
The escalation of industrial unrest during 1917 in both countries was thus the 
result of socio-economic problems rather than political incitement. In the majority 
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of cases, strikes addressed immediate demands such as wage rises or food 
shortages. In reaction, the authorities were inclined to solve these grievances if 
possible, or at least to allow a controlled outlet of protest. Nonetheless, the number 
of strikes increased significantly in both countries between 1916 and 1917. In 
Germany the number rose from 240 in 1916 to 561 in 1917. The British numbers 
were at about the same level.529 And even though the strikes in Britain and Germany 
were not anti-war actions per se, they soon gained a critical dimension after the 
Russian Revolution of March 1917. In Berlin, the radical shop stewards of the 
Metalworkers’ Union organised a mass walkout in mid-April in which 
approximately 200,000 workers participated. Among demands for better food 
supplies, the revocation of the state of siege and calls for a peace without 
annexations and indemnities were articulated.  
In Britain, strikes rarely featured similar political demands. But this should 
not lead to the conclusion that anti-war positions were isolated within organised 
labour. Despite war supported by the parliamentary Labour Party and the TUC, the 
rank-and-file of the trade unions increasingly supported the call for peace 
negotiations. A growing number of local trade councils affiliated themselves to 
organisations such as the UDC and the growth of local branches of the BSP and 
ILP after June 1917 provides evidence for this tendency. In both countries shop 
stewards played a crucial role in this process. As experienced activists, they often 
were intermediaries between local workers and political organisations. The regional 
failure or success of pro- and anti-war campaigns was often directly related to their 
stance towards the war. This also helps to explain why in Britain anti-war dissent 
could flourish in some strongholds such as Glasgow, Sheffield, Birmingham, or 
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South Wales, where the shop stewards movement had strong ties with anti-war 
dissent, whereas it could not gain ground in other parts of the country. In 
comparison, in Germany food protests and political activities occurred in all major 
cities and feature no such geographical divide. 
The Russian Revolution of March 1917 fuelled the existing dissent on the 
home fronts. It is, however, questionable whether the events in Russia actually led 
to a more revolutionary strategy of activists in Britain and Germany. There were 
certainly many emphatic articulations in support of the Russian Revolution. The 
foundation of the USPD in Germany as well as the increased activities of the United 
Socialist Council of the BSP and ILP such as their Leeds conference in June 1917 
illustrate this very well. Prominent radical socialists undoubtedly took new 
motivation from the Russian developments. However, actual revolutionary events 
such as the mutiny on ships of the German High Sea Fleet in August 1917 were 
singular events with only limited impact on the developments in Germany. Yet, it 
also demonstrated that the domestic crisis was escalating. Despite all this, there was 
neither a full-blown revolutionary movement nor mass support for such a course of 
action in Britain or Germany in 1917.  
It is in this context important to make a distinction between the advocacy of 
peace negotiations and the promotion of a revolutionary overthrow of the societal 
order: firstly, because the revolutionary question became a cause of conflict within 
the anti-war camp itself. Secondly, because patriotic wartime propaganda blurred 
this distinction by lumping together everybody opposed to the war by presenting 
them as dangerous, seditious revolutionaries that wanted to push countries into 
turmoil and chaos. This highlights that the perception of dissenting movements by 
the authorities was changed by the impact of the Russian Revolution.  
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The Russian example had demonstrated that strike movements could easily 
turn into revolutionary unrest if they were not tackled in the right way. German as 
well as British authorities therefore intensified their efforts to monitor and if 
necessary suppress such movements. The strategies they chose, however, were – 
despite some surprising similarities – rather different. We have seen that the 
coercive powers under the different pieces of emergency legislation were now 
applied with much less leniency than before. The British authorities constantly 
amended existing DRR to make them fit for their purpose to suppress strike 
movements and dissent. In this process, however, also some conflict lines between 
the different state departments came to the fore. Whereas the War Office and the 
Home Office under the Conservative George Cave were only too willing to make 
use of DORA to tackle dissent and strikes, the Ministry of Labour or the Ministry 
of Munitions urged for a more lenient handling. Yet, it seems that the repressive 
approach finally prevailed after the parliamentary Labour Party withdrew its 
support for the coalition government. In Germany, on the other hand, no unified 
approach for the handling of strikes existed. Due to the ramified structure under the 
state of siege the decision how to handle strike and protest meetings was up to the 
local commanding officers.  
Similarly to Britain, allowing a controlled outlet of protest was the most 
convenient way for the local authorities. Public meetings under police surveillance 
also allowed relevant intelligence about the development of local protest 
movements to be gathered. Yet, the incapacity to address the most urgent 
grievances such as food shortages and inflation diminished the effect of these 
appeasement policies. Simultaneously, local military commanders began to prepare 
counter-insurgency plans, which indicate a growing anticipation of looming unrest. 
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In fact, the repressive approach and the willing use of troops and police squads to 
counter demonstrations became a dominant feature of strike-breaking tactics. In 
contrast, British authorities were reluctant to employ armed troops for maintaining 
public order. Only in October 1918, when the Metropolitan Police went on strike in 
London, armed troops visibly conducted armed patrols in London. Nevertheless, 
the British authorities prepared their own contingency plans in case of strikes and 
revolutionary uprisings. These plans envisaged the large-scale employment of 
troops in the interior. The main difference between Britain and Germany in this 
regard was the fact that these plans did not materialise in Britain during the war. 
The military government in Germany collapsed before it could set them into 
operation. Yet, the crushing of the Spartacus Rising in January 1919 and later 
counter-insurgency operations during the early years of the Weimar Republic give 
an impression of the possible outcome of these plans. We should not forget, 
however, that military units were also employed in Britain to deal with the unrest 
in Ireland and the strikes in Glasgow and Liverpool in 1919. 
A similar disposition of the British and German authorities can also be found 
regarding the treatment of prominent dissenters. Whereas the German military had 
made extensive use of its power to arrest without warrant since the beginning of the 
war, the British authorities remained for a long time reluctant to intern public 
figures.530 However, the self-imposed restraint under the Asquith ministry and the 
taming effect of the Labour Party cabinet ministers in the Lloyd George coalition 
was gone by August 1917. This had the immediate effect that Edmund D. Morel a 
leading member of the UDC was convicted under DORA for a questionable 
offence. During the following months, the DPP endeavoured to prosecute other 
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leading dissenters such as Bertrand Russell. A relevant difference to Germany was 
that the British authorities avoided detention without trial (which they had the 
power to impose under DRR 14B) and used court convictions instead. This was 
obviously an attempt to avoid any notion of despotism. Nevertheless, as we will see 
later, the courts proved to be reliable allies for this purpose.  
Another relevant dimension of emergency government was the advanced use 
of domestic intelligence. Here, the British system was clearly superior to the 
German efforts. Since mid-1916, different departments had collected relevant 
information about strike movements and political dissent. By April 1917 a unified 
approach to domestic surveillance under the aegis of the Home Office was 
established. Surveillance practices included the monitoring of postal 
communication, the infiltration of political groups as well as the supervision of 
public meetings. The gathered information was used to prepare prosecutions but 
also – and more importantly – to design efficient counter-propaganda. From 
October 1917, the Home Office and MI5 shared their intelligence dossiers with the 
NWAC.531 With the establishment of the Ministry of Information in February 1918 
this practice was extended, and the Ministry consequently built its own domestic 
intelligence section.532 Its German counterpart, however, worked with less 
efficiency. Only in October 1917 did the Military Intelligence Department IIIb 
extend its activities to the supervision of domestic affairs. Although local military 
commanders did their best to gather information in their districts, there was no 
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unified approach to domestic intelligence. Only Department VII of the Berlin Police 
Presidency conducted systematic surveillance of the activities of socialist activists. 
However, its reach was effectively limited to Berlin and the province of 
Brandenburg. Reliable reports about the public mood could only be gathered in 
bigger cities such as Berlin, where local police constables submitted regular 
updates. Yet, these were mere spotlights and neither civilian nor military decision 
makers seem to have used much of this intelligence to inform their actual policy 
making.  
In many respects, the British system with its efficient combination of 
suppression, surveillance and propaganda was more modern in its anticipation of 
future developments. The heavy-handed German approach towards dealing with 
strikes and dissent was still based on paradigms of the nineteenth century. In 
contrast, the British authorities were well aware that the suppression of undesirable 
movements alone was not sufficient for maintaining the war effort. It also 
understood that broad public support for the war effort was even more crucial. 
Propaganda was in this context just as imperative as surveillance and coercion. The 
German authorities underestimated the importance of public opinion for too long 
and could not adapt their system in time. A contributing factor might have been that 
many local military commanders lacked a basic understanding of the importance of 
public opinion. The Third Supreme Command undertook efforts to change this, 
however with little success. The martial habitus and its influence on the actual 
handling of protest were additionally diminishing the chances of success for 
propaganda campaigns. The British, on the other hand, with their willingness to co-
opt civilian expertise for propaganda purposes proved to be much more successful.  
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Towards the Abyss: Emergency Government, Dissent and Enforced 
Endurance at the Home Front (1918) 
 
If the atmosphere on the home fronts was tense in 1917, it was to reach its tipping 
point in 1918. By the end of the year the war would be over and three European 
empires would have ceased to exist. Yet, despite the eventual collapse and defeat 
of the Central Powers, it is hard to establish how close the Allies had come to a 
breakdown themselves. Fear of revolutionary turmoil had emerged in Britain in the 
wake of the first revolution in Russia in March 1917. Yet, after the Bolshevik coup 
in November 1917, these fears became even more intense leading to serious 
preparations for suppressing uprisings by the authorities.  
The crisis in the German Empire was even more severe. After the last and 
eventually futile military Spring Offensive in early-1918, the economic, political 
and military problems agglomerated into the consequential collapse of the old 
order.533 The revolution that broke out in November 1918 was just the last push 
over the edge. Against the background of the escalating crisis, the handling of the 
state of siege reached its most repressive phase. As the crisis at home became worse, 
it increasingly shifted from policing the home front to militarizing it. This, however, 
also proved to be the Achilles’ heel of the oppressive state of siege system. The 
growing reliance on military units for maintaining public order finally backfired on 
the authorities when the soldiers refused to shoot on striking workers and to 
suppress the mutiny of the sailors of the High Sea Fleet.  
The situation in Britain did not develop in the same way. Yet, also here 
contingency planning emerged along similar lines. When the Metropolitan Police 
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went on strike in October 1918 the signs seemed to point in the direction of a 
revolution in Britain, too. In its secret contingency plans the Lloyd George Cabinet 
was prepared to use whatever force was necessary to preserve the existing order. 
 
 
Towards Collapse and Revolution: The Handling of the State of Siege 
Germany 1918 
 
After Georg Michaelis had replaced Bethmann Hollweg as Imperial Chancellor in 
the wake of the ‘July Crisis’ of 1917, the political conflicts in the Reichstag became 
more intense. Michaelis, who was barely more than a spokesperson for the Supreme 
Command, did not show the equal capability for political appeasement and for 
negotiating compromise of his predecessor. The SPD now demanded visible 
preparations for the promised rewards of their wartime support. Democratisation 
and a reform of the voting franchise were cornerstones of their demands. Yet, 
neither civilian nor military authorities were prepared to make substantial 
concessions. The Emperor’s ‘Easter Message’ of April 1917 fell short of all 
expectations and had no significant impact on the domestic policies.534 It had the 
adverse effect of alienating even greater sections of German society. The premature 
proclamation demonstrated yet again the unwillingness for political reforms, even 
if the war would be brought to a successful conclusion. In an act of defiance, the 
Reichstag majority eventually forced Michaelis to step down on 31 October 
1917.535 The new chancellor, Georg von Hertling – an experienced Bavarian 
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politician – proved to be more skilful in his handling of the Reichstag parties. Yet, 
he was equally anxious to appease the demands of the Reichstag and to protract the 
enactment of actual political reforms. This weakened the cohesion of the political 
class in Germany, and more importantly, it diminished the influence of the 
moderate Social Democrats and trade unionists among the increasingly dissatisfied 
working class. Whereas support for the war effort by the German left had previously 
been presented as a trade-off for more political rights, it now appeared futile against 
the backdrop of the missing political reforms. The unwillingness of the political 
élites to concede political reforms facilitated the growing influence of more radical 
protest movements. The coup of the Bolsheviks and their demand for an immediate 
peace ‘without annexation and indemnities’ reverberated within the radical German 
left and soon became their main demand.  
In January 1918, a massive strike wave swept through Germany and brought 
the country to the brink of a revolution. The strikes were inspired by a similar 
development in Austria-Hungary where approximately 700,000 to 1 million 
workers in Vienna, Budapest and other centres went on strike between 3 and 25 
January 1918.536 On 28 January 1918, a similar strike began in Berlin. The strike 
movement soon spread to other big cities in the empire and reached a new quality 
of confrontation between state and workers. In the preparations for the strike the 
revolutionary shop stewards of the Metalworkers’ Union around Richard Müller, 
USPD leaders such as Wilhelm Dittmann and members of the communist Spartacus 
Group played a key role.537 This also led to a stronger link between socio-economic 
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and political demands during the strike demonstrations. Whereas previous strikes 
were dominated by economic grievances, the political dimension of the January 
strike movement became just as important. A series of leaflets by the Spartacus 
Group declared the strike to be the ‘moment of truth’ (Stunde der Entscheidung).538 
Their hope was clearly that the strike would turn into a revolutionary uprising. Yet, 
it seems that despite the speculation on a spontaneous mass action, no preparations 
for an actual uprising were undertaken. Although essentially not a revolutionary 
anti-war strike, the strike committee demanded political reforms. A strike leaflet 
from Essen from 29 January summarised these demands as follows:  
[T]he continuation of the war, just as much as a victory of the German 
militarism (...), will lead to the blackest reaction, the rule of the sabre, 
the subjugation of the people in Germany. The work shall not be 
resumed until the following demands are achieved:  
1. The immediate repeal of the state of siege, censorship, and all other 
regulations of the press. 
2. Unrestricted freedom of assembly and association. 
3. Unrestricted right to strike and organisation in trade unions. 
4. Repeal of the Forced Labour Law [Arbeitszwanggesetz – presumably 
the Auxiliary Service Law]. 
5. Release of all political prisoners and the end of all political 
prosecution.539 
 
During the following days, mass demonstrations made their way through Berlin and 
the police were faced by masses they could not adequately control. Almost on a par 
with the strikes in April 1917, between 200,000 and 300,000 workers walked out. 
The occasional clashes between police squads and strike demonstrations were 
particularly intense. An internal report of the Berlin Police Presidency that listed 
injuries of police constables recorded ‘massive fist punches, truncheon blows, 
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stabbing and gunshot wounds’ among the injured police constables.540 It can be 
assumed that the police used equally harsh means during street fights. The situation 
was complicated further by the already tested methods of the strikers to play cat-
and-mouse with the police. Larger demonstrations split up into groups of 300 to 
500 people, dispersed and reassembled a short time later. On some occasions, the 
police could not assemble enough men to kettle such demonstrations and were 
routed by attacking mobs.541 By 30 January the police could no longer guarantee 
control of the city and the commander of the Marken district, Colonel-General von 
Kessel, assumed command over the handling of the strike. On the following day, 
the severe state of siege (verschärfter Belagerungszustand) was proclaimed over 
Berlin and military units began to conduct armed patrols in the city. Von Kessel 
issued a public proclamation in which he emphasised that ‘there should be no 
doubt’, that he would ‘suppress all disturbances of law and order with all means at 
my disposal.’ He went on to warn all ‘law-abiding citizens’ to stay away from 
public meetings because ‘in case the military makes use of the weapon it will not 
distinguish between actual troublemakers and mere bystanders.’.542 Additionally, 
extraordinary courts martial were established to try detainees under the state of 
siege – a practice that had been widely abandoned since late-1916.  
In contrast to previous strikes, the January events caused a massive panic 
among the social elites. On 30 January 1918, Wilhelm von Siemens, director of the 
important Siemens Corporation wrote a memorandum to the under-secretary of the 
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Imperial Home Office, Max Wallraff, with recommendations as how to suppress 
the strike movement.543 He stated that despite his workers being hitherto ‘immune’ 
to revolutionary incitement; they now began to show signs of upheaval, too. While 
asking for protection for his factories, he concluded that ‘a harsh suppression of the 
agitation will calm down the situation instead of aggravating it.’544 Another factory 
director, a certain Franz Kühne from Berlin-Steglitz, suggested calling up 
ringleaders and replacing them with soldiers. In order to gather the names of 
activists he offered his help and that of his factory management. For this purpose, 
he suggested, the police should send plain clothed officers as contact men into the 
factories that would help to organise and orchestrate the action.545  
Eventually, the strike movement collapsed after the military effectively 
suppressed all public meetings and numerous people were detained and kept in 
protective custody.546 In order to prevent further upheavals, the military authorities 
began to draft around 500 to 600 workers every day. Yet, about ten percent of them 
evaded the draft and went underground.547 In an analysis of the preceding events 
from February 1918, Department VII concluded that the strikes could only be 
suppressed because the powers under the state of siege were rigorously exercised. 
In the aftermath of the January strike, it became apparent that the preparation of 
repressive responses was the main concern for the authorities. The editors of the 
SPD’s Vorwärts, Friedrich Stampfer and Erich Kuttner, were prosecuted for treason 
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because their paper had documented the demands of the strikers. In another political 
trial, the spokesman of the USPD and member of the Reichstag, Wilhelm Dittmann, 
was sentenced to five years’ severe imprisonment (Festungshaft) for attempted high 
treason. The same fate befell the Bavarian USPD leader Kurt Eisner, who had 
organised the strike in Munich.548  
The harsh repression seems to have had a chilling effect on the anti-war 
movement. Also, the beginning of the large-scale Spring offensive of the German 
army on the Western front and its initially overwhelming success seem to have 
triggered a last momentum of self-mobilisation of the German home front. Yet, 
already in June 1918, the looming collapse became a distinct possibility for the 
German government. On 8 June the Imperial Chancery concluded that the financial 
reserves in foreign currency were almost completely depleted and that the 
acquisition of vital resources from the neutral countries would soon become 
impossible.549 On 16 June 1918, Ludendorff wrote to Chancellor Hertling that not 
enough replacements for the losses of the preceding offensives were available and 
suggested a levée en masse of all Germans no matter what age.550 Ludendorff was 
certainly aware that such a proposal was highly unrealistic and politically not 
feasible. Ludendorff’s increasingly alarmist memoranda are therefore to be seen as 
attempts to create a myth of the alleged betrayal of the unbeaten army by the home 
front. 
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Effectively, the war was lost for Germany in June 1918. Wilhelm Deist 
concludes that at least from this point a covert military strike spread within the 
German army that eventually lead to a rapid decline of morale among the troops. 
The main aim of many German soldiers was now rather to survive the war than still 
trying to win it.551 It took, however, until the end of September for the Supreme 
Command to officially acknowledge the fact of military defeat. On 26 September, 
Ludendorff confessed that the war could not be won anymore and negotiations for 
a truce should be commenced. At the same time, the Supreme Command urged a 
shift of political responsibility to the parliamentary parties. Hertling’s attempts to 
integrate the majority parties into a coalition eventually failed and he was forced to 
resign on 28 September 1918. On 3 October Prince Max of Baden was appointed 
Imperial Chancellor with the explicit task of transforming the Imperial constitution 
towards a constitutional monarchy. This was a last hopeless attempt to fulfil the 
preconditions of US President Woodrow Wilson for entering peace negotiations on 
the basis of his ’Fourteen Points’.552  
In order to address some of the main grievances of the Reichstag parties, the 
regime under the state of siege was hastily reformed. As early as 25 September 
1918, the Imperial Home Office concluded that ‘without a reform of the state of 
siege no effective calming down of the parliamentary situation will be achieved’.553 
Yet, whereas an immediate reform of the law itself would be impossible, its 
handling should be softened. A first step in this direction would be to abandon the 
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in many cases arbitrary administration of the state of siege by the individual military 
commanders and to transfer their emergency powers to the Supreme Military 
Commander (Obermilitärbefehlhaber) who had already been introduced in October 
1916.554 On 15 October, an imperial decree was issued subsuming the local military 
commanders under the control of General Groener, the head of War Office. At the 
same time, leading socialist anti-war activists such as Wilhelm Dittmann were 
released from prison. A short time later Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and Kurt 
Eisner followed after a general amnesty. This was supposed to be a sign of goodwill, 
and opened up the way for the negotiations of the state reform with the 
representatives of the Reichstag parties.555 
However, the protracted parliamentary process to enact the reforms came too 
late make any significant difference. On 29 October, the sailors of the High Sea 
Fleet in Kiel, Lübeck, and Wilhelmshaven began to mutiny.556 Already on 26 
October the Supreme Command had urged the Emperor to leave Berlin and seek 
refuge at the Great Headquarters in Spa in occupied Belgium.557 Plans were worked 
out to use the remaining loyal division as forces for a looming civil war. Leonidas 
E. Hill suggests that in this context the order for a last battle of the High Sea Fleet 
that eventually triggered the revolution was intended as signal for a military coup 
against the new parliamentary system and not as a last heroic stand of the German 
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Navy.558 But the officer corps had lost its grip on the troops and attempts to mobilise 
them against strikers and sailors turned out to be entirely futile.559 Eventually, the 
spread of the revolution forced the Emperor to abdicate and on 9 November 1918 
Germany was declared a republic. The new revolutionary government of the 
Council of the People’s Deputies (Rat der Volksbeauftragten) officially repealed 
the state of siege by decree on 12 November 1918 and thus officially ended the war 
on the home front – one day after the armistice in Compiègne was signed.560 
 
 
Between Collapse and Victory: Britain’s Home Front Politics in 1918 
 
The direction in which the situation in Britain would develop at the turn of 1917 
was unclear. Despite the persisting crisis of food supplies and continuing strikes, 
no escalation of domestic protests towards a revolution was perceivable. The labour 
movement’s reaction to the Bolshevik coup in November 1917 had been 
ambiguous. Whereas the overthrow of the Tsarist regime in March 1917 was almost 
unanimously welcomed, the Bolsheviks could only muster limited support in the 
British labour movement. Apart from the BSP and some factions in the ILP, the 
labour movement seems to have repudiated Lenin’s putsch. Yet, those who 
supported it intensified their activities to bring about a revolution in Britain as well. 
Whether the situation was ripe for a Bolshevik-style upheaval remained, 
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nevertheless, a matter of debate. On 17 February 1918, the general secretary of the 
BSP, Albert Inkpin, wrote to the later Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Giorgi 
Chicherin:  
We live in a time of great expectation, though things don’t seem to be 
moving much – perhaps it is the lull which precedes the storm – we 
hope so. We do not, however, want any uncontrolled outbreak, which 
can easily be turned off by palliating immediate wants – but we do wish 
to take advantage of the disaffection of the people and guide it into the 
right course.561  
 
Within the radical left, the call of following Russia and ‘its splendid revolution’ 
became commonplace.562 The question how this could be achieved, however, was 
answered in different ways. In January 1918 the revolutionary shop steward 
movement adopted a policy of mass strikes to bring the war to an end. After the 
government had introduced another amendment to the Military Service Bill on 15 
January that revoked exemptions from military service for certain protected trades, 
the ASE threatened a national strike.563 At the same time the National Vigilance 
Committee campaigned for state regulation of food supplies.564 If the state would 
not intervene then a national strike would be called and workers’ councils and local 
food vigilance committees would take things into their own hands.565  
However, the mobilisation for these strikes proved to be painstakingly 
difficult. In the end, no mass strike movement materialised. The BSP, as the main 
revolutionary organisation in Britain besides the shop stewards, adopted a different 
strategy. As Inkpin had outlined in his letter to Chicherin, they rather favoured 
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Lenin’s model of the vanguard party rather than hoping for a spontaneous strike 
movement. Although the membership numbers remained comparatively low, this 
did not necessarily account for a lack of influence as Francis L. Carsten 
suggested.566 The usually well-informed CID estimated that in the six weeks after 
the Bolshevik coup in Russia, over 200 new branches of the BSP were set up in the 
whole country.567 And in its strongholds such as Clydeside the influence of the party 
on the rank-and-file of the labour movement was a real factor. Nevertheless, the 
revolutionary tendency was far from being dominant within Labour. Despite 
adopting the famous Clause IV at its party conference in Nottingham and London 
in January and February 1918, the Labour Party essentially rejected the peace 
agenda of the Stockholm conference and endorsed the war aims laid down by the 
allies.568 The now reaffirmed explicit commitment to socialism was in no way a 
turn towards an explicitly revolutionary policy.569 For leading Labour politicians 
such as Arthur Henderson, the British wartime state with its immense emergency 
powers was a tool of transformation that had to be used by the party rather than 
overthrown by a revolution.570 The peace of Brest-Litovsk also demonstrated what 
dire consequences a peace with Germany would have in case of a defeat.  
The importance and reality of a revolutionary movement in Britain was at 
least as much exaggerated by its enemies as it was by its exponents. The alleged 
existence of a revolutionary mass movement with ‘100,000 workers in London 
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ready to strike against the war’, was a convenient construction used to generate a 
moral panic among the British people.571 The alleged revolutionary threat provided 
the material for the right-wing press to rally their troops. Victor Fisher proclaimed 
in the Empire Citizen and Worker of 26 January 1918: ‘In opposition to the ragged 
standards of a crazy and criminal cosmopolitanism, we will raise the banner of 
Nationality, Motherland and Empire […]. Those who are not with us are against us. 
‘572 Patrick Hannon, secretary of the British Commonwealth Union, spoke of the 
need to create ‘a national scheme of propaganda to counteract the increasing 
activities of the poisonous missionaries of Pacifist and Bolshevist doctrines who are 
now energetically in almost every part of the United Kingdom’.573 It is hard to 
assess how seriously the threat of a revolution was actually taken by the British 
government. The more severe handling of labour unrests and dissenting activities 
was continued in any case. After Edmund D. Morel had been gaoled in August 
1917, the prosecutors tackled figures such as Bertrand Russell and John 
MacLean.574 Both, however, were also keen on using the trials as public platforms 
for their own causes. Other genuine and alleged revolutionaries were called up to 
limit their influence on home front politics.  
The case of the BSP executive, which was almost entirely called up, in 
February 1918 is exemplary for this well-approved tactic. Already on 12 October 
1917, the head of MI5, Colonel Vernon Kell, had written to the recruiting officer 
for London Piccadilly with an enquiry about the service status of Albert Inkpin and 
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the other clerks at the BSP office. He suggested that Inkpin ‘would be more useful 
in the Army as a clerk than carrying on an anti-militarist and pacifist’ 
propaganda.575 By the end of February 1918 all party workers at the BSP head office 
had been called-up to the army. In January 1918, the BSP offices had been raided 
by the Special Branch and all its publications confiscated.576 The fact that this 
happened just days before the Labour Party conference in Nottingham, for which 
most of the confiscated pamphlets were intended, was certainly no mere 
coincidence. This was an attempt to influence party politics in a very direct way. In 
April 1918, the authorities targeted the NCF’s The Tribunal. However, neither the 
editors nor the sellers were harassed but the printers. The police raided the printing 
press where the journal was produced and destroyed it, apparently with the intention 
to deter other printers from taking on orders by dissenting groups.577 A similar raid 
at the National Labour Press in Salford in 1915 had caused a massive outcry in the 
House of Commons and the press. Now, however, after four years of life under the 
state of exception, a certain callousness and indifference had become normal. Leo 
Maxse, editor of the arch-conservative National Review epitomised this stance, 
when he wrote: ‘the drastic domination of “Dora“, which threatens every writer 
who has a soul above licking our Prime Minister’s boots, is nothing to the present 
reign of terror in Bolshevika‘.578 The cause had begun to justify almost every 
means. Nevertheless, The Tribunal continued its publication, now however, 
produced in a wooden shed in Surrey and smuggled into London.579 
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In addition to prosecuting political activists and curtailing the publication of 
anti-war propaganda, the structures of domestic surveillance were changed in the 
new circumstances. In July 1918, the Home Office restructured the number of 
Competent Military Authorities and brought their districts in congruence with the 
police districts of the countries. This was designed to make collaboration between 
military and police more efficient when dealing with labour unrest and anti-war 
protest. As another novelty, so-called Assistant Competent Military Authorities 
(ACMA) were established whose main task was the coordination of domestic 
intelligence and policing in their respective districts.580 In August 1918, the Home 
Defence Scheme was redrafted but maintained the provisions for the internment of 
‘dangerous persons’ as well as enemy aliens.581 After the shock of the successful 
German Spring offensive had disappeared, a new strike wave of strikes swept 
through Britain in August 1918. The two most significant of them were the railway 
strike that soon spread to major industrial centres and the one-day strike of the 
Metropolitan Police on 30 August.582 In reaction to both strikes, troops were 
mobilised to deter any upheaval. Battalions of the London Rifle Brigade were 
mobilised and sent to South Wales to protect the trains of the Great Western Line.583 
Faced with the police strike, the cabinet seemed to lose its composure. Soldiers in 
full battle-gear seized crucial points in London such as post offices and train stations 
in anticipation of what might come. This was a lesson learnt from the events in 
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Russia almost one year earlier where the authorities had missed the chance to secure 
these key points before the Bolsheviks did. The police strike, however, lasted only 
a day and was immediately over after most of the strikers’ demands were met. Yet, 
the reaction of the government gives an impression of how tense the atmosphere at 
the home front was even in the face of imminent military victory.  
Various strikes continued to occur throughout the rest of 1918 and reached a 
new peak in 1919. Although most DRR were revoked after November 1918, a 
significant number of the most relevant remained in force. Since DORA only 
granted emergency powers ‘for the duration of the present war’, the newly elected 
parliament extended the duration of the war by definition until 31 August 1921 with 
the so-called Termination of the Present War (Definition) Act.584 This allowed the 
government to exercise emergency powers as long as it deemed necessary. Most 
regulations, however, were set out of operation and DORA was subsequently 
transformed into the Emergency Powers Act of 1920.585 The impact of the wartime 
experience of emergency government, however, had a profound impact on British 
political culture. After the First World War, emergency powers were primarily used 
to suppress strike movements in the 1920s. The British government could hereby 
draw on the experiences under DORA and the strategies that had been developed 
to suppress domestic unrest.586  
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Comparison 
 
The impact of the Bolshevik coup of November 1917 is crucial for understanding 
developments on the British and German home fronts in 1918. There was clearly 
no unified perception within the anti-war or the labour movements regarding the 
events in Russia. The Bolshevik seizure of power was not the overthrow of a hated 
autocratic regime but of a more or less social democratic government. The moderate 
socialists that dominated the Labour Party and SPD were clearly shocked by the 
Bolshevik putsch and tried to use it as cautionary tale for their own governments to 
advocate their own demands for political reform as a way to avoid similar 
developments. On the other side, revolutionary socialists saw the Bolshevik actions 
as proof that only a social revolution would be able to end the war. For each side, 
the Bolshevik coup had its own significance and implications. Revolutionaries 
found a model of action, which they attempted to copy whereas governments were 
increasingly alert about the dynamics of aggravating social and anti-war protests. 
This shaped the perception of the continuously growing strike movements in both 
countries. Whereas the previous handling of strikes was marked by a certain 
leniency, authorities were now more likely to use the full range of their emergency 
powers to quell them. Moreover, the activities of anti-war dissenters were now 
taken much more seriously as the harsh treatment of E. D. Morel and Bertrand 
Russell in Britain, or the convictions of Wilhelm Dittmann and Kurt Eisner in 
Germany demonstrate. The growing willingness to use repression became even 
more apparent with the now regular use of troops for maintaining public order. 
However, whereas the German authorities increasingly relied on their employment 
to manage strikes and demonstrations since the January strikes, their British 
counterparts only began to employ troops for this purpose towards the end of the 
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war. Yet, the events in Britain in 1919 and the use of the military to deal with 
protests illustrate that a willingness to use the military in the interior also existed in 
Britain. 
The fact that the British situation did not escalate along similar lines to that 
in Germany has two main explanations: firstly, the strikes did not feature the same 
political dimension as in Germany, Austria or Russia. The strikes of 1918 certainly 
articulated grievances and expressed a prevalent war weariness amongst the British 
working class but they lacked a profound political dimension and revolutionary 
direction. In comparison, during the January strikes in Germany political demands 
dominated the strike demonstrations and featured prominently in pamphlets. 
Attempts to copy the tactics of revolutionary mass strikes by the shop stewards’ 
movement in Britain eventually proved to be futile. A second explanation, was 
however, that the British government was prepared to concede to demands of 
strikers, if it was possible and not too costly. The combination of extensive 
propaganda, concession when possible and harsh repression where necessary 
proved to be efficient in order to palliate and appease social protests. This was much 
to the frustration of ardent revolutionaries such as Albert Inkpin, whose hope for a 
revolutionary crisis proved to be fruitless. The German elites, on the other side, 
were not able and not willing to concede political and social demands. The 
economic situation in Germany in 1918 was increasingly deteriorating and could 
not sufficiently be stabilised. At the same time, growing demands by the Social 
Democrats for a political war dividend for their support in the form of the abolition 
of the discriminatory Prussian three-class franchise and a democratisation of 
government was met with reluctance and protraction by the Imperial Government 
and the Supreme Command. The inability to properly address grievances eventually 
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contributed to the profound social and political disintegration of the German 
Empire. The looming erosion of political power finally came to the fore in 
November 1918. Faced with military defeat and faltering morale on the home front 
the old elites could not muster enough support to maintain the old order. The 
constitutional reforms of October 1918 were too hesitant and came too late to make 
any significant difference. The British government, on the other hand, was more 
prepared to concede to popular political demands. The reform of the franchise that 
came with the Representation of the People Act in February 1918 as well as the 
mooted reconstruction policies after a victorious conclusion of the war, helped to 
contain the spread of militant anti-war protest to a similar extent as in Germany.  
Another relevant reason why the British handling of the domestic crisis 
eventually proved to be more successful than in Germany was the sophisticated and 
systematic use of propaganda and domestic intelligence. The German authorities 
were too slow and too reluctant to apply modern concepts of propaganda and 
advertising. Whereas the British propaganda targeted individual groups with 
especially designed material, the German idea of ‘Patriotic Instruction’ conducted 
by military officers proved to be inefficient. Both systems, however, also relied 
heavily on repressive methods to suppress undesirable publications and control 
public debates. Propaganda, surveillance and censorship were intertwined 
phenomena when it came to maintaining morale at the home fronts.  
This should, however, not distract from the fact that the use of repressive 
methods became an ever increasing aspect of home front politics in 1918. The 
suppression of public meetings, the detention of activists, as well as the call-up of 
‘troublemakers’ were common practices in both countries. Harsh sentences for 
sedition and treasonable acts occurred several times often in relation to public 
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speeches or demonstrations. John MacLean’s sedition trial in March 1918 can be 
easily compared to the conviction of Wilhelm Dittmann after the January strikes in 
Berlin. Both were apparent examples of political justice. The main difference 
between Britain and Germany is thus not necessarily to be found in the quality of 
oppressive practices but in their quantity. Whereas the British authorities primarily 
targeted the prominent heads of anti-war protest to create cautionary tales for others, 
the military in Germany often arbitrarily prosecuted also minor offenders. The 
strategy of the British government to favour targeted repression of political 
dissenters over the blanket suppression of whole strike and protest movements can 
be seen as a main reason why emergency rule under DORA never attracted the same 
public criticism as in Germany. The British system was designed to exercise 
indirect and less publically noticeable control through intelligence agencies, 
censorship, surveillance and targeted repression. Most of these activities were 
concealed from public scrutiny and therefore never created the same public 
conscience and debates about emergency measures as in Germany. This lack of 
public criticism – apart from those affected by repressive emergency decrees – is 
probably the most striking feature of Britain under DORA during the First World 
War.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The almost two years between December 1916 and the end of the First World War 
in November 1918 were marked by escalating military, political and social crises 
in all belligerent nations. The failed attempts on both sides to seek military victory 
on the Western Front through battles of attrition eventually led to far-reaching 
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political consequences. The ascent of the Third Supreme Command under the 
duumvirate Hindenburg and Ludendorff marked a distinct turning point in the 
politics of the German home front. Particularly Ludendorff, as the political 
mastermind of the Supreme Command, almost immediately began to unfold 
activities to enforce the complete mobilisation of Germany’s remaining resources. 
The enactment of the Auxiliary Service Law in December 1916 was just one sign 
that the German state’s response to the intensifying crisis lay in even more intrusive 
measures. The strikes of April 1917 in Germany, which were primarily triggered 
by worsening living and working conditions, demonstrated that the internal 
cohesion of the Burgfrieden was gradually eroding. Although there were attempts 
to create positive mobilisation through propaganda schemes such as Patriotic 
Instruction or the creating of the German Fatherland Party, the authorities 
increasingly relied on the emergency powers under the state of siege to enforce 
endurance on the home front.587 From 1917 and then particularly in 1918, strike 
movements could only be suppressed by the massive use of the military in the 
interior as police forces were increasingly overwhelmed by the scale of the task. 
The result was the militarisation of the home fronts, accompanied by an even more 
excessive use of emergency powers by the local military commanders. The 
overreliance of the authorities on repressive measures contributed to the simmering 
political crisis in the Empire. The Imperial Government and the Supreme Command 
were unable and unwilling to make concessions to the majority parties of the 
Reichstag and their demands for a gradual democratisation of Germany. Combined 
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with the experiences of economic hardships and hunger the intransigence of the 
political elites eroded the national consensus that had at least partially pacified the 
home front during the first two war years. Consequently, strike movements and 
food protests gained a significant anti-war dimension in Germany that was 
additionally fuelled by the impact of the Russian Revolutions in 1917. The result 
was an escalation of protest that was countered by an aggravation of repressive 
emergency measures. Yet, this level of repression could only be upheld as long as 
the troops – who were now the main agency for enforcing the state of exception – 
remained loyal. With the mutiny of the High Sea Fleet and the breakdown of 
military discipline in most other units in early-autumn 1918, however, this was no 
longer the case.  
In Britain, the internal situation in late 1916 was similar to that in the German 
Empire. The futile offensive at the Somme facilitated the eventual downfall of 
Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and the accession of David Lloyd George’s 
government. If the first two years of the war had been marked by a certain self-
restraint of the government that was in parts based on the liberal inhibitions of 
leading cabinet members, the new government soon used the full extent of 
emergency powers for the conduct of the war. Particularly, the new Home Secretary 
George Cave was more than willing to use the powers under DORA to suppress any 
serious attempt to challenge the British war effort. The Russian Revolutions 
additionally fuelled the fears of the government about a similar development in 
Britain. Yet, although some left-wing activists now indeed began to promote a 
revolutionary overthrow of the existing political and social order as a means to end 
the war, Britain never came to close to a revolutionary moment during the war. 
Nevertheless, the moral panic about a revolutionary movement stimulated increased 
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efforts to establish a sophisticated system of domestic surveillance and led to the 
preparation of counter-revolutionary contingency plans. The British government 
was, however, well aware of the importance of positive mobilisation and the public 
perception of its actions against anti-war protests. Repressive measures were 
applied in a way that made them less perceptible for the general public. Instead of 
suppressing public meetings by police or the military, patriotic mobs were 
organised that often violently broke up such meetings. This was a specific 
phenomenon of the British home front, which barely occurred in Germany. The 
authorities nevertheless extended their efforts to establish a closely-knit net of 
surveillance on the British home front. The avoidance of open confrontation with 
protestors was certainly the main reason why the developments in Britain 
eventually did not follow the same logic of escalation as they did in Germany. Yet, 
the violent confrontations immediately after the war in 1919 in Glasgow, Liverpool 
and other parts of the country give an impression that the Lloyd George government 
was prepared and willing to use violence and military force to suppress dissenting 
movements.  
Overall, the fact that the German and British societies continued to maintain 
their war efforts despite the described multiple crises for another two years has not 
least to be attributed to the intensification of emergency government in both 
countries. Despite various attempts to create positive mobilisation through 
propaganda schemes such as Patriotic Instruction in Germany or the National War 
Aims Committee in Britain, endurance increasingly needed to be enforced by the 
authorities. The main tools for enforcing this endurance on the home fronts were 
the emergency powers under the Defence of the Realm Act and the state of siege. 
In Germany, this process mainly depended on the military as most police forces 
 
230 
 
proved to be incapable to deal with large-scale strike and protest movements. Yet, 
this visibility also provided a target for intense criticism, thus additionally 
aggravating the existing crisis. The British authorities, on the other hand, sought to 
avoid public scrutiny of their actions and avoided open confrontations. This, 
combined with the ability to address grievances and accommodate popular 
demands, made the British system of emergency government eventually more 
efficient than its German counterpart. Yet, also here repressive emergency 
measures remained a crucial part of home front politics and would remain part of 
British political culture throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Guardians of the Home Front: Military, Police and Courts 
as Agents of Emergency Government 
 
 
A study of the state of exception during the First World War would be incomplete 
without taking into account the institutions and agencies entrusted with the 
enforcement of the state of exception. A look at the actors in both countries helps 
us understand how emergency powers were exercised on the ground. It also allows 
us to reconstruct the actual system of emergency government below the level of 
high-ranking military and civilian administration and decision-making that was the 
focus of the preceding chapters. Furthermore, it reveals how different traditions of 
policing and jurisdiction influenced the respective systems of emergency 
government. We shall see that actors such as police officers and judges were far 
from mere recipients of orders, often acting on their own initiative and according 
to their own perceptions of their roles on the home front.  
In both countries, the enforcement of emergency measures was mainly the 
responsibility of the police, although occasionally military personnel were 
employed to suppress strikes. Yet, despite being a predominantly civilian 
institution, the police forces came either under direct military control, as in 
Germany, or were readily available for use by the Competent Military Authorities 
as in Britain. The inclusion of the police forces into the system of emergency 
government also brought a considerable extension of their responsibilities, which 
soon comprised surveillance tasks, the gathering of intelligence, and the 
suppression of dissenting activities in addition to their traditional police duties. This 
extension of powers and responsibilities changed the face and character of policing 
in both countries profoundly. 
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Within the system of emergency government, the judiciary was another 
relevant actor. If we take the initial characterisation of the state of siege and DORA 
as ‘constitutional dictatorships’ into account, courts were supposed to play a crucial 
role in controlling – and where necessary limiting – the potentially excessive 
application of emergency measures by the governments and their agencies. Yet, the 
judicial institutions in both countries almost entirely failed to exercise this function 
during the war. In both countries, the circumstances of the war and the increasing 
mobilisation and polarisation of the wartime societies changed the self-perceptions 
of the judges and their function on the home fronts. The effective judicial control 
of emergency government was inadequate not because the powers of the judicative 
branch were curtailed, but because judges often operated according to their self-
perceived role as patriotic actors. A number of court proceedings during the war 
illustrate the anxious ambition of many judges to defend their independent position 
and established powers against attempts to subsume them under the control of the 
executive branch. At the same time, however, many judges used the law as a 
weapon against the alleged enemies within. 
This chapter explores how police and judges exercised their functions within 
the system of emergency government. We will see that both institutions were 
crucial for the enforcement of the state of exception. Moreover, their actions were 
often guided by emerging concepts of ‘enemies within’. The way in which 
emergency powers were used during the war can only be understood in conjunction 
with these concepts of domestic enmity, which shaped the wartime mentalities of 
many police officers and judges. 
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Enforcing the state of exception: German and British police within the 
system of emergency government 
 
Professional police forces were a comparatively new social phenomenon when 
Europe went to war in 1914. Most forces were established during the early decades 
of the nineteenth century, but policing only became a specialised profession by the 
end of the century. The structural organisation of most police forces in Europe 
predominantly followed military models, and the majority of their rank-and-file 
recruited itself from discharged former professional soldiers.588 However, a more 
detailed comparison demonstrates that the degree of militarisation of the police 
differed significantly from country to country. Whilst the German-Prussian ideal of 
a police officer was — in the words of Herbert Reinke — that of a ‘bureaucrat-
soldier’, the British authorities sought to avoid an overly martial appearance of the 
police.589 Nevertheless, the military ideals of order and obedience and a strictly 
hierarchical chain of command dominated the style of policing in both countries. 
The military model also provided a specific ésprit de corps for the police that would 
become important during the war and influenced their interpretations of the role of 
the police on the home front.  
The enforcement and administration of the emergency measures was also 
influenced by structural differences in Britain and Germany. The Prussian police, 
for example, was subdivided into three different organisations: the Gendarmerie 
was directly affiliated to the army and employed to patrol rural areas. Meanwhile, 
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the so-called Kommunale Ortspolizei (municipal police) was used in larger towns 
and cities. Finally, the Königliche Schutzmannschaft (Royal Constabulary), which 
was stationed in Berlin but was also employed to police strikes and to quell potential 
unrest in other parts of the country.590 Whereas the tasks of Gendarmerie and Royal 
Constabulary were mainly traditional security tasks such as maintaining public 
order and crime fighting, the municipal police forces also dealt with the whole range 
of administrative tasks such as licensing, supervision of hygienic standards, health 
and safety in factories, or the security of construction sites and buildings. 591 The 
command structure of the Prussian police, as the biggest force in the German 
Empire, was highly centralised, with the Berlin Police Presidency as its 
administrative headquarters and the Prussian Ministry of the Interior as its political 
supervisor. The tight grip of the government made the Prussian police an 
‘uncontrolled instrument of the Prussian state-bureaucracy’.592 The majority of 
Germans perceived the police officer as a direct representative of the authority of 
the central state. Uniform and professional habitus made the police officer a person 
of authority for the middle classes and at the same time a hated symbol of the 
authoritarian state for many political activists. The structure of the British system 
of policing was different. With the exception of the Metropolitan Police in London, 
direct influence of the central state on policing was limited. Each borough and 
county maintained its own borough or county police under the command of a Chief 
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Constable and controlled by either a Watch or Joint Committee.593 This ensured a 
degree of public scrutiny and democratic control of the police. In the perception of 
the British population, the role of a police constable was more that of a public 
servant than a representative of state authority. 
The political significance of policing in both countries, however, was shaped 
by the different responses of the state to the rise of popular political movements. 
The emergence of the organised labour movement during the second half of the 
nineteenth century and more specifically the surge in labour disputes before the 
First World War had led to a change in the conceptions of public order and security. 
Whilst the newly formed German Empire under Bismarck aimed at marginalising 
and eventually crushing the organised labour movement with the means of a police 
state, the British experience differed.594 Here, the Liberal Party offered for a long 
time a platform for trade unions to articulate their political demands. These 
differences regarding the political integration of the labour movement had a 
profound impact on the development of the police forces. The repression of the 
Social Democrats in Germany led to an unprecedented expansion and structural 
reforms of the police apparatus during the 1870s and 1880s. They were designed to 
establish the police as an instrument for maintaining the political status quo.595 
Consequently, policing in Germany was highly politicised and marked by clear 
concepts of true and alleged ‘enemies of the realm’. This political animosity had a 
profound influence on the professional identity of the German police officers. The 
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dominant notion of being a hybrid ‘bureaucrat-soldier’ received an additional 
dimension during the war. In addition, the subordination of the police under military 
command also changed the context of policing significantly. Concepts of domestic 
enmity were radicalised and the political function of the police steadily extended. 
Within the system of the state of siege, the already existing tendencies of the pre-
war period were aggravated and the legal restrictions of policing gradually eroded.  
In Britain, by contrast, policing did not attain a similar political dimension 
before the First World War. The main task of the police forces was seen in crime 
fighting and the maintenance of public order.596 At times, however, police forces 
were involved in violent confrontations with protesters that required the assistance 
of the military under the Riot Act.597 The earlier mentioned examples of the 
incidents at Featherstone in 1893, Tonypandy in 1910 and Llanelli in 1911 were 
particularly relevant for the development of security policies in Britain. Yet, these 
experiences caused no significant changes to the general liberal concept of policing 
that dominated in Britain before the First World War. Only the Labour Unrest 
between 1911 and 1913 seems to have triggered debates about the political role of 
the police. Nonetheless, political policing directed against the labour movement 
similar to the German model did not fully emerge until the outbreak of the First 
World War. Domestic intelligence was predominantly applied to counter the threat 
of the Irish Republicans and to monitor the activities of foreign political refugees 
in Britain.598 The organised labour movement was – at least judging from the 
available archival sources – not particularly targeted by special policing measures 
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or domestic intelligence before 1914. The Special Branch of the Metropolitan 
Police was the only dedicated unit that was gathering domestic intelligence and that 
was involved in activities that came closest to the German model of political 
policing.599 For many contemporary politicians, continental-style secret policing 
was an un-British manner in contradiction to the long-established political 
traditions of the country.600 Although this last claim was only partially true, it 
influenced the public perception of policing before the war profoundly. The police 
was seen less as an instrument of state power or an extension of the government, 
but as an impartial public institution entrusted with keeping peace and order.601 
Whilst the German police officer often met with open hostility by working-class 
activists, who perceived him as their natural enemy, the British ‘bobby’ never 
received a similar negative symbolic status.602 Yet, despite this different initial 
situation, the scope and scale of policing dramatically changed during the war under 
the provisions of DORA. Not only did the emergency measures extend the powers 
of the police, they also triggered fundamental changes within the police force 
themselves, leaving a lasting impact on them. Against the backdrop of the dominant 
liberal conceptions of the state before 1914, the nature of these changes was even 
more radical and disruptive than in the German Empire. 
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The German Police and the State of Siege 
 
The police had already featured prominently in German pre-war emergency 
planning. The various military schemes for a crackdown on the organised labour 
movement assigned very specific tasks to the police in case of a declaration of the 
state of siege. The primary duty for the police was here to monitor potential 
troublemakers and to collect names for the planned round-ups of social democratic 
activists.603 This was in many respects just an intensification of activities the police 
were already involved in anyway. The main difference under the state of siege 
would have been that the constitutional limitations for detentions and the 
infringement of civil liberties would have been abandoned. In addition to these 
assigned tasks, the police were expected to assist the military in any way the 
commanding generals deemed necessary. These plans for the declaration of the 
state of siege made the police an almost paramilitary institution. They were, 
however, primarily designed for the case of a domestic crisis. It is remarkable how 
little prepared the German police actually was for the eventualities of a prolonged 
war. Clearly, there were provisions for the police to guard the swift and smooth 
mobilisation of the troops, and to some degree also for protecting vulnerable points 
against possible acts of sabotage. Yet, there were almost no plans for how the police 
was supposed to react to the necessities of managing a wartime society.  
One task the police took over right from the beginning of the war was the 
monitoring of public opinion.604 Although not all local police forces had sufficient 
capacity to conduct this form of domestic intelligence, at least the Berlin Police 
                                                          
603 See Chapter One. 
604 For an annotated edition of these reports, see Materna and Schreckenbach, Dokumente aus 
geheimen Archiven, op. cit.  
 
239 
 
Presidency and its various departments undertook a significant effort in collecting 
information for their weekly reports regarding the public mood.605 Police officers 
on the beat were ordered by their superiors to collect and document all relevant 
events in their areas.  The vast number of weekly reports was then summarised by 
the Berlin Police President’s office. The Berlin Police President, Traugott von 
Jagow, then passed them on to the military commanders as well as to the Imperial 
Government, often with written statements highlighting particularly important 
developments.606  
Whilst the précis forwarded to the generals and government represent highly 
aggregated information, the reports by departments and individual police officers 
allow a unique insight into the authorities’ perceptions of the situation on the home 
front. The language and topics of these reports are not only valuable because of 
their factual content, but also because they express the mentalities, observations and 
perceptions of those who wrote them. For example, the description of suspects often 
followed established stereotypes of domestic enemies with anti-Semitic undertones. 
Frequently, officers used formulations such as ‘has a typical Jewish face’, ‘has 
unpleasant mouth odour’, or ‘Jewish shamble’ when referring to suspected 
persons.607 The virulent anti-Semitic language of some police officers was 
symptomatic of a widespread conception of ‘enemies within’ that also included 
other groups such as Alsatians, socialists, pacifists, enemy aliens and persons 
showing a socially deviant behaviour. Although being disparate groups, they were 
soon merged into one category of enemies at the home front. Whilst socialists and 
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pacifists opposed the war on political and ethical grounds, other groups such as the 
Alsatians, enemy aliens and to a certain extent also Jews were seen as inherently 
‘hostile towards Germans’ (deutschfeindlich) and therefore a threat to the war 
effort. Socially marginalised groups such as homosexuals, prostitutes, vagrants and 
travellers were victimised because they supposedly threatened the moral order of 
the home front in the eyes of the authorities. What connected these groups was less 
a shared political agenda than the fact that they were targets of repression and 
surveillance by the police and the military.  
Initially, the activities of dissident Social Democrats, and concerns about the 
moral order of the home front and the neglect of youth were a priority for the 
authorities.608 Already in August 1914, the leadership of the Berlin police 
highlighted in a circular to its officers that despite the Burgfrieden policy the Berlin 
socialists still followed ‘the golden thread of internationalism’ and that they had to 
be kept under close surveillance.609 The responsible political branch of the Berlin 
police, Department VII, conducted this task in close co-operation with the local 
military commander of the Marken district. The head of Department VII 
summarised its activities in an internal report from 4 May 1916 as follows: 
Berlin is still the hotbed […] of the radical opposition within Social 
Democracy, which has its main strongholds within the police district. 
For this reason, there was always the urgent danger that the general war 
situation and rising food prices would have been used to incite 
considerable unrest among the population. Only because of – and 
despite its other demanding tasks – the constant contact of the officers 
of Department VII with the concerned levels of the population, all of 
these attempts could be stifled. This was the only way in which all 
seditious activities could be suppressed in due course.610  
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The files of the Berlin police also give an impression of what this ‘constant contact’ 
meant. Since the times of the infamous Socialist Laws, the department had 
maintained a network of secret informers within the capital’s socialist and anarchist 
circles.611 As a result, the officers of the political police were well informed about 
the content of most meetings of oppositional groups. In order to gather relevant 
intelligence about the activities of dissident socialists and pacifists all possible 
sources were used. Leaflets were collected, speeches recorded by shorthand writers, 
popular meeting points such as pubs and cafés were monitored by plain-clothed 
officers, and party offices frequently raided and searched. There were even police 
officers whose main task it was to monitor conversations in buses, trams and the 
Berlin overground trains, the S-Bahn. In addition to the surveillance of public places 
by the police, also the postal communications of leading anti-war activists were 
closely monitored. The provisions of the state of siege gave the military 
commanders, and therefore by extension the Berlin police, the power to read and 
censor every letter sent and received by suspects. If the commanding general of a 
district ordered the so-called Briefkontrolle (letter control) or Briefsperre (letter 
ban) for a suspect, letters were usually intercepted by the Imperial Post and then 
forwarded to military intelligence officers, censors or the officers of Department 
VII. Depending on the severity of the ordered measures, the letters were then either 
kept, destroyed, or resealed and delivered to their original recipients.612  
Yet, despite the significant effort of the police and military authorities to 
monitor public places and opinion, stretched resources and depleted reserves 
limited its efficiency. The ambition to establish a tightly knit net of surveillance 
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was, however, clearly visible. A major problem for the police was the doubtful 
substance of many reports. Police officers on the beat often just repeated 
widespread rumours, and the means to investigate the validity of some allegations 
were very limited. In particular, after the strike waves in April 1917 and January 
1918, the police reports show a number of wild speculations about imminent strikes 
and even fears of an armed uprising in Berlin.613 Despite the significant efforts to 
monitor public life and collect information about all sorts of dissenting activities, 
the police seem to have been overwhelmed by the overabundance of information. 
Florian Altenhöner has pointed out that rumours and uncontrolled public 
communications were a main concern for the authorities because of their 
unpredictable impacts on military and civilian morale. Following a dialectical 
dynamic, the steady expansion of state-controlled media outlets and censorship 
caused an almost proportional increase in fast-spreading rumours and 
disinformation. Moreover, it seems that the excessive attempts of the police and 
military authorities to control the public sphere only increased the appeal and 
credibility of these rumours among the war-weary population.614  
Attempts to counter this tendency by a better organisation of the propaganda 
efforts under the so-called ‘Patriotic Instruction’ scheme from 1917 onwards 
remained widely unsuccessful. Where censorship, official information policies and 
propaganda failed, repressive measures were readily applied to control public 
communications. Yet, these measures had an ambiguous character themselves. On 
the one hand, the authorities hoped for an intimidating effect of harsh repression. 
For this purpose, a degree of publicity for the emergency measures was desired and 
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indeed intended. Cases of ‘seditious speeches’, ‘undermining of the civilian and 
military morale’, lése majeste, or most frequently the ‘spreading of wrong news’ 
and their prosecution were regularly reported in the newspapers. The punishment 
for these offences under the state of siege were often severe. Yet on the other hand, 
reports about the most serious cases against political activists were often censored 
and curtailed.615 The authorities were interested in giving their repressive measures 
enough publicity to have a deterring effect, but at the same time sought to avoid 
providing additional material for further protest. This systematic intimidation was 
a crucial part of the management and control of public opinion. Then again, there 
were concerns that too much publicity would harm the image of the German Empire 
in the neutral states.  
A way to circumvent this dilemma was the extensive use of emergency 
powers under the state of siege. With their help, undesired activities could be 
suppressed without causing the unwanted publicity of public court trials. Already 
in early 1915, the Prussian Minister of War, Adolf Wild von Hohenborn, ordered 
in a letter to the Berlin Police Presidency to avoid prosecutions under the provisions 
of the Imperial Penal Code (especially article 89 ‘treason in wartime’) because of 
the publicity court trials would cause. Instead, the emergency powers of the state of 
siege were to be used to deal with the matter without attracting too much public 
scrutiny. The minister made clear that the publicity caused by public trials would 
be detrimental to the interests of the Empire.616 The main instrument to deal with 
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alleged offenders against the state of siege was the increasingly arbitrary use of 
‘protective custody’ by the police and the military. The power to keep people in 
prolonged custody without a trial was a convenient option for the authorities to 
silence dissenting voices. In many cases, the police were far from being a mere 
executive agency of the military commanders but acted according to their own 
agenda. The various departments of the Berlin police – particularly the Criminal 
Investigations Department (Abteilung III) and Department VII – often conducted 
investigations and observations on their own initiative. The military commanders 
were in most cases only involved when warrants for protective custody had to be 
issued. This only changed in 1918 when the policing of the home fronts became 
increasingly militarised as a consequence of the escalating domestic crisis. There 
were, of course, always cases where the police acted on orders and on behalf of the 
local military commanders, yet it seems that the police undertook the majority of 
these proceedings proactively in its own capacity.617 
The prosecution of offences under the state of siege was not always the result 
of proceedings by the police alone. In many cases, the police only initiated its 
investigations and prosecutions after receiving information from members of the 
public. For the period immediately after the outbreak of the war in August 1914, a 
surge of denunciations and accusation letters is documented in the files. The war 
situation and the omnipresent patriotic propaganda created a climate in which even 
the slightest careless critical remark could bring people into trouble. The Berlin 
police regularly received letters with accusations regarding offences against decrees 
under the state of siege or general ‘hostile behaviour’. These files also highlight the 
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evolution of certain concepts of ‘enemies within’. Initially, denunciations and 
accusations mainly concerned alleged and actual ‘enemy aliens’ and also people 
from Alsace-Lorraine. However, during the later course of the war all kinds of 
critical or dissenting expressions of opinion could lead to denunciations. It seems 
that anonymous allegations were often used to settle old accounts: landlords 
accused unruly tenants, people wrote letters about their neighbours, shop owners 
denounced competitors and employers their employees and vice-versa.618 Some 
examples illustrate the emergence of this culture of accusations and denunciations 
in wartime Berlin: in September 1916, the factory supervisor Arndt Reuther was 
taken into protective custody after a female worker had accused him of ‘hostile 
propaganda’. After almost two months in solitary confinement (Isolierungshaft), 
Reuther was released without ever being charged.619 In November 1915, the worker 
Emma Nehring was arrested and taken into protective custody for ‘illegal contacts 
with prisoners of war’ after a denunciation. She had passed on photos, letters and 
socks to a French prisoner.620 Often, mere suspicion was sufficient for the 
authorities to apply harsh measures such as protective custody. The fact that these 
methods were legally barely restricted and politically insufficiently controlled 
facilitated their arbitrary use.   
The language of the denunciations also reflects how deep-rooted certain 
stereotypes and concepts of domestic enmity were within the population. In a letter 
to the Berlin police from November 1916, a Mrs Hoffmann complained about 
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‘French and Russian Jews’ who allegedly regularly met in the flat of a Dr Eisner to 
‘incite hatred against the Emperor and Germany’.621 In another letter, a dismissed 
cook complained about his former employer’s ‘inherent affection for all things 
French’ (Franzosentümelei). What caused suspicion in many cases was not concrete 
evidence for offences but the belonging to certain groups or an allegedly hostile 
attitude. The frequent reference in accusation letters to certain personal features of 
suspects rather than their actual deeds reveals how widespread conceptions of the 
‘enemies within’ were during the war. From the limited evidence in the sources, it 
can also be inferred that many of the denunciators came – with few exceptions – 
from the middle classes, whereas the accused were often workers or belonged to 
socially marginalised groups.622  
Exceptional powers and barely restricted practices were used to exercise 
social control and monitor the population on the home front. That said, many police 
officers initially sought to maintain the established codes of practice. It seems that 
certain notions of professionalism and rule of law at least partially informed the 
actions of some police officers. Even when the case reports reflected the negative 
views of many police officers on the suspects, they still sought to obtain objective 
evidence for possible prosecutions. This approach highlights the conflicting 
priorities of police work during the war. Nevertheless, the professionalism of the 
police in Berlin and other parts of Germany vanished during the course of the war. 
Many police officers were either called up or had volunteered.623 New recruits to 
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the force were often either wounded soldiers released from the army, or raw recruits 
that lacked substantial experience. The quality of policing and morale within the 
force was mitigated further by the declining supply of goods. By 1916, many 
officers were more concerned with obtaining additional rationing cards and queuing 
to buy food than actually fulfilling their duties.624 By the beginning 1917, the 
president of the Berlin police admitted that his forces were no longer numerous 
enough in numbers to maintain public order in the city.625 Consequently, the 
policing of the home front became increasingly militarised, with military personnel 
taking over important tasks from the police.626 By the end of 1917, the military 
police (Militärpolizeistellen) in Berlin seized the responsibility of monitoring strike 
movements and dissent in the city.627 At least in Berlin, the police became an 
appendix of the military authorities until the end of the war. The political policing 
of the home fronts occupied the best part of the available police resources 
throughout the war in Germany. It is remarkable how little space actual criminal 
cases occupy in the internal correspondence. This does not necessarily reflect a 
decline in criminal activity during the war but rather a lack of prosecution and law 
enforcement. The pre-war fear of a dramatic rise in crime rates did not materialise. 
Recent research suggests that crime rates remained comparable the pre-war 
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levels.628 The only category of offences that featured a significant rise were 
breaches of emergency decrees under the state of siege.629  
However, for the last two years of the war with its severe food shortages, the 
number of crimes such as theft or black market trading increased significantly.630 
Departments traditionally concerned with crime fighting adjusted their activities to 
the wartime necessities of the political and moral policing of the home front. The 
Criminal Investigations Department of the Berlin police, for example, began to 
concentrate on prosecuting activities that were perceived as prejudicial to the war 
effort. A report of the department from May 1916 names very distinctive categories 
of persons taken into protective custody at the request of the police, representing 
the whole range of the alleged ‘enemies within’.631 The report also emphasised the 
significant efforts undertaken by the department and the close collaboration 
between police and military authorities in this matter. Yet again, the report stressed 
that the initiative for these prosecutions lay with the police. Most remarkable, 
however, is the fact that the exceptional instrument of protective custody was not 
only used to quell political dissent. It became the main instrument to deal with all 
kinds of deviant behaviour that occurred during the war. Its application by the 
Criminal Investigation Department soon replaced the established legal procedures 
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in many cases supplanting court hearings and severely limiting the defendants’ 
rights. Already in May 1915, for example, the High Command of the Marken 
District issued an order – after a suggestion by the Berlin police – that all 
transvestites (Päderasten in Weiberkleidung) and homosexuals in the province were 
to be taken into protective custody for the duration of the war. Although not entirely 
enforced by the police, this remarkable order demanded the wholesale detention of 
an entire social group.632 Even after the hesitant reform of the protective custody in 
December 1916, the number of cases did not significantly fall. Another report from 
1916 reveals the full extent to which the police meanwhile used detention without 
trial. It names eleven categories of offenders against which protective custody was 
ordered, they included: ‘fortune tellers, pederasts, peace protestors, participants of 
food riots, army insulters, vagrants, charlatans, pimps, prostitutes […], [and] 
persons who had unauthorised contact with prisoners of war’.633 The variety of 
affected groups demonstrates that the originally exceptional measures for the case 
of an emergency had become a regular instrument for exercising social control on 
the home front. The excessive use of emergency powers was possible and accepted 
because it could build on prevalent negative stereotypes and conceptions of 
‘enemies of the realm’. Many of these concepts had already been shaped before the 
First World War but became aggravated by the war situation and were gradually 
extended to all groups defined as being outside the national collective. By targeting 
groups that opposed the war politically or were perceived as threats to the unity and 
morale of the home front, the police established the boundaries of the imagined 
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wartime Volksgemeinschaft.634 Whereas those inside these imagined boundaries 
could expect at least a degree of rule of law and even leniency when faced with the 
authorities, those outside where often deprived of the most basic legal protections. 
Against this backdrop, the police acted not only as an executive agency for the 
military and the government but it also exercised exceptional powers at its own 
discretion. Police officers acted according to their self-assigned role as guardians 
of the home front. Their activities protected the patriotic sections of the nation 
against the perceived threats of subversion and moral decline.  
 
 
Defenders of the Realm: The British Police and the Defence of the Realm 
Acts 
 
The beginning of the First World War also transformed policing in Britain 
fundamentally. This transformation was primarily caused by the extraordinary 
extension of powers under DORA. The expansion of policing reflected the overall 
growth of the British state during the First World War.  Initially, however, the 
question which authority – military or civilian – would be primarily responsible for 
the enforcement of emergency measures was intensively discussed in the early 
stages of the war and even before. After the declaration of war on 8 August 1914, 
all civilian administration, including the police forces, were obliged to assist the 
military in the defence of the realm.635 This did not mean that military officers 
assumed direct command over the police forces – after all the civilian supervision 
by the Watch Committees remained intact – but that the Competent Military 
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Authorities could now order the police to assist them at their discretion. However, 
there seem to have been significant differences regarding the requisition of police 
forces by the military commanders. Some Competent Military Authorities used 
military personnel to enforce emergency decrees under DORA and to perform 
police duties. Others, however, employed local police forces regularly to ensure the 
enforcement of defence regulations. The use of police or military for the 
administration and enforcement of emergency measures seems to have depended 
mainly on local circumstances such as the availability of qualified personnel and 
the size of the population. In the large urban and industrial centres, the police force 
became the central agency for the enforcement of emergency measures, because its 
existing administrative infrastructure was a valuable asset for the military 
authorities. In smaller ports and fortresses, however, military personnel also took 
over policing tasks.636 It is, therefore, not possible to completely disentangle the 
police and military as agents of emergency government on the British home front.  
It was, however, initially not clearly defined which officers were to be 
regarded as Competent Military Authorities with the emergency powers established 
under the first Defence of the Realm Act. As result, the first months of the war were 
marked by rather chaotic structures of emergency government, which were only 
rectified after the Army Council and the Admiralty intervened. This confusion of 
competencies sometimes led to dramatic consequences. The tragic case of William 
Smith from October 1914 illustrates how military authorities and police tried to co-
operate, but also how responsibilities were shifted between the two when measures 
turned out to be controversial. Smith – a schoolmaster in the Essex village of 
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Henham – was issued with a so-called removal order by the commanding officer of 
the East Anglian Division based in Ipswich.637 The order was given after the Chief 
Constable of East Suffolk suggested that Smith was likely to assist the Germans in 
case of an invasion as he was ‘[…] undoubtedly pro-German in conversation, 
behaviour, and sympathy […]’, and urged the military to remove Smith from his 
village.638 The suspicion was based on the fact that Smith had taught German at 
school, had visited Germany and had received guests from Germany before the war. 
What was neglected, however, was the fact that his son had volunteered and fought 
in France as a junior officer. Tragically, Smith committed suicide almost 
immediately after receiving the order, with his wife also taking her life shortly 
afterwards. The internal enquiry by the Army Council following the incident 
revealed two things: firstly, that the evidence on which the police had based their 
request was merely hearsay and village gossip. An inquest from May 1915 stated 
that Smith was the victim of ‘silly tittle-tattle of the village’.639 The police, however, 
were more than willing to believe these rumours without trying to check the 
allegations. Only after the tragic outcome did the Chief Constable of East Suffolk 
police seek to clarify that Smith was indeed innocent and not dangerous and thereby 
shifted the blame to local police constables. The military authorities, however, also 
rejected all responsibility, stating that the Chief Constable had provided wrong 
information.640 Secondly, the enquiry also revealed the confusion about the 
question who was actually responsible and accountable for the application of 
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emergency powers on the home front. For example, the Assistant Provost Marshall, 
who had signed of the removal order, apparently did so ultra vires as he was 
officially not considered a Competent Military Authority.641 Yet, the commanding 
general felt that such issues were below his actual responsibilities. The Smith case 
– alongside with a larger number of similar ones – is exemplary of the initially 
chaotic handling of emergency powers by the military and police. This led to a 
number of orders by the Army Council clarifying, which officers and commands 
were to be considered Competent Military Authorities vested with powers under 
DORA.642  
From the beginning of 1915, however, the responsibilities seem to have been 
divided more clearly. The military assumed responsibility for the administration of 
DORA, whereas the police forces were responsible for upholding public order and 
– in close cooperation with MI5 – the gathering of domestic intelligence in addition 
to traditional policing tasks. Police constables also enforced decrees and monitored 
the observation of DRR issued by the cabinet. Soldiers and military police were 
rarely directly concerned with the enforcement of emergency measures. This 
reluctance to employ troops on a large scale on the home front was certainly 
influenced by pre-war experiences during the Great Labour Unrest and the negative 
image such measures had amongst the British public.  
Nevertheless, military and police eventually became omnipresent sights in 
Britain during the war. With each new Defence Regulation and emergency decree, 
the British state tightened its grip on its citizens. David Englander has trenchantly 
pointed out that under DORA ‘(…) Britain came to resemble a nation dominated 
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by soldiers and policemen.’643 From the enactment of the first Defence of the Realm 
Act in August 1914 onwards, the powers of the police were constantly extended 
throughout the war. The established pre-war approach of policing and its legal 
limitations were gradually pushed to the background. Some DRR increased the 
powers of police constables to a degree that would have been deemed impossible 
before 1914. For example, DRR 52 allowed constables to stop and search vehicles 
without warrants.644 DRR 53 enabled police officers to question and interrogate any 
desired person.645 With the enactment of DRR 55, the police gained the 
extraordinary power to arrest persons without a warrant.646 This remarkable 
extension of powers limited the possibilities of a legal review of police actions. 
Under DORA, the protection of individual rights and the important role of the courts 
in the legal review of police actions were in many respects rendered irrelevant. The 
British state entered almost every sphere of life and with it, so did the police and 
military authorities. Yet, the majority of DRR concerned the Competent Military 
Authorities and their exceptional powers. In addition, the police became principally 
responsible for their enforcement. In these cases, the constables acted on behalf of 
the military. DRR 9, for example, gave the authorities the power to clear certain 
areas of undesirable persons. It was soon extended, providing the police with the 
power to prohibit meeting and processions (DRR 9A), and later to enter every 
meeting and seize distributed materials without writs or search warrants (DRR 
9AA).647 The control and surveillance of public places was a central task for the 
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police forces to which significant resources were dedicated. This included control 
of the population within certain specified areas, but also the movement of people 
between places. Major efforts were also made to curtail the movement of prostitutes 
near the vicinity of military camps (DRR 13A).648  
The most radical shift from British legal traditions was, however, the power 
to arrest and detain people without trial. On 10 June 1915, the cabinet enacted DRR 
14B, which allowed the infinite and unrestricted detention of ‘persons of hostile 
origin or association’.649 The procedure for such detention provided that the Home 
Secretary could issue warrants, after ‘recommendation of a competent military or 
naval authority or one of the advisory committees’ for the detention or confinement 
of any person that was considered a threat to public safety.650 In the majority of 
cases, either the intelligence services (predominantly MI5) or the Chief Constables 
presented the CMAs with names of suspects, which were then passed on to the 
Home Office. With very few exceptions, the Home Secretaries followed these 
recommendations. This radical restraint of personal freedom could come in the 
form of confinement to a certain area such as a city or even a specific district with 
the obligation of regular reporting to the local police. Yet, in more severe cases, it 
meant arrest by the police and subsequent detention by the military authorities. 
Although subject to review by especially assembled ‘Advisory Committees’ 
presided over by a senior judge, the possibilities of legal challenges were highly 
restricted.651 DRR 14B was initially applied to detain British subjects of German 
origin, but its application was later extended to Irish-republican insurgents and to 
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political dissenters. The restriction to persons of ‘hostile origin or association’ was 
a formulation so imprecise that every British citizen could fall under it if the 
authorities made the case for it. Yet, it also abandoned the traditional protection of 
individual freedoms established in Habeas Corpus and the Bill of Rights. As a 
result, the Home Office could arbitrarily exclude a British subject from the legal 
protections of the constitutional law on the grounds that they were considered a 
threat to national security. This was a particularly ambiguous matter concerning the 
status of naturalised aliens, British people married to enemy aliens and the children 
of German-born parents. On 17 June 1915, Home Secretary John Simon justified 
the extensive character of the regulation and its application to British-born subjects 
as well as to enemy aliens as: 
I do not myself think that you ought to draw a strict line of legal division 
between persons who are naturalised and persons who are natural born 
citizens of this country. When a person is naturalised and given a 
certificate he is, by the terms of that certificate, assured by the State that 
henceforward he will stand in the same position as a person who is a 
natural-born British subject. I think we should be acting very foolishly 
if we did not remember that we had given that promise. The right way 
to deal with the matter is to say, "I do not care whether a man is natural 
born or naturalised. There is a rule which, in time of war, we must apply, 
and that rule is, that when it is fairly shown that an individual is 
dangerous to the State, because he is at large, whether it be because of 
his hostile origin or because of his hostile associations, then if it is fairly 
shown, even if he is a British-born subject, he must submit to 
restraint."652 
 
What Simon was advocating in his statement was less equality before the law for 
enemy aliens but the power of the Home Secretary to deprive British subjects of 
their civil liberties and rights. Whoever was declared a threat to national security 
could be indefinitely detained by order of the Home Secretary. Simon was, 
nevertheless, anxious to emphasise that, as a former lawyer, he would not use this 
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power arbitrarily.653 Yet, this could not hide the fact that with DRR 14B, an almost 
unknown degree of power was conferred to the executive. As a result, the legal 
differences between external enemies, enemy aliens and the ‘enemies within’ 
increasingly vanished. 
The main difference between the internment of enemy aliens and the 
detention of British subjects was less a qualitative one but a matter of quantity. 
Whilst thousands of enemy aliens had been deported and interned up to 1916, the 
number of prisoners under DRR 14B remained comparatively small.654 Prior to 
February 1916, only 36 persons were held in custody.655 These numbers quadrupled 
by the end of the war. Brian W. Simpson estimates the number of detainees under 
DRR 14B for the duration of the war in mainland Britain at around 160 persons.656 
Half of them were detained because of their ‘hostile origin’, meaning that they were 
naturalised British subjects, and the other half detained because of their ‘hostile 
association’, implying that they were political prisoners.  
The case of Hilda Howsin demonstrated how mere suspicion or contacts with 
the wrong persons could provide enough reasons for the authorities to be detained 
under DRR 14B. Howsin was arrested in September 1915, and kept in detention 
until August 1919. Howsin was imprisoned for almost four years because of her 
                                                          
653 Ibid., c 850. 
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allegedly ‘hostile associations’. The evidence for this was found in her contact with 
a leading member of the Indian independence movement who now resided in Berlin 
and it the fact that she had authored a book on Indian nationalism in 1909.657 There 
was, however, no evidence that she was involved in any dissenting activities during 
the war itself. In fact, Howsin had even volunteered to work as a Red Cross nurse. 
The Howsin case was discussed several times in parliament during the war, and 
particularly war-critical MPs raised the issue. Yet, despite this publicity, the 
government refused to make any concessions.658  
The initiative for the detention of suspects usually came from the police, 
military authorities and primarily the intelligence services. The Home Secretaries 
rarely rejected such requests, as they depended on their assessments of the situation 
on the home front. In this context, the Chief Constables acted as links between the 
Home Office, military authorities, MI5 and the police forces. They frequently 
submitted reports and observations to the military authorities and the Home Office 
and were in many ways the ears and eyes of the government on the home front. 
Their perceptions of individuals and ‘hostile associations’ shaped many domestic 
policies during the war. Whilst the majority of the reports contained neutral 
accounts of the current situation, some Chief Constables also expressed their heart-
felt contempt for strikers and peace activists. The description of local activists as 
‘pro-German’ was amongst the more favourable terms used to describe suspects. 
There were almost no aspects of daily life that were not interesting enough not to 
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be monitored by the CMA and police authorities.659 The central position of higher 
police officers elevated them above the level of mere recipients of orders. With their 
reports, the Chief Constables regularly submitted direct requests and 
recommendations concerning necessary actions to the Home Secretary.  
The police became a political actor in its own right – either by the way 
emergency measures were enforced or by not exercising their legal duties. The latter 
was a subtle way of dealing with anti-war dissenters. Many police constables 
conveniently looked away when patriotic mobs disrupted peace meetings and 
attacked demonstrators. This had happened in Cardiff in November 1916, when 
Ramsay Macdonald only narrowly escaped a physical assault from a mob of 
soldiers on leave.660 However, these situations occurred throughout the country on 
many other occasions.661 Many police constables and their superiors were unwilling 
to provide — technically legal — peace meetings with the necessary protection 
against violent attacks. The consequence of this tacit policy was that public 
meetings could only be held in strongholds of the peace movement or where 
sympathetic local organisations could provide enough self-organised protection 
against assaults.  
Overall, the First World War radically transformed the British police. Having 
been a civilian institution with limited powers before the war, it emerged as a 
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cornerstone of British national security policies after the conflict. The close 
entanglement of intelligence agencies and the police was emphasised when in May 
1919 the Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and head of the CID 
and Special Branch, Sir Basil Thomson, was appointed as ‘Director of (Civil) 
Intelligence’ at the Home Office. His main task was the co-ordination and oversight 
of all domestic intelligence activities in the country and to counter ‘threatened 
disturbances (whether arising out of labour troubles or otherwise), seditious 
meetings and conspiracies, and revolutionary movements, both home and 
abroad’.662 
With the extension of its responsibilities to political policing and domestic 
intelligence, the profound changes in policing reflected the revolution in British 
politics during the Great War. The liberal inhibitions and self-constraint in domestic 
policies were gradually replaced by an emerging system of domestic surveillance 
and political policing. This transformation also changed the role of higher police 
officers and the intelligence services. Before the war, they had been marginal actors 
in British politics, after 1918, however, they increasingly emerged as self-confident 
actors in British security policies.  
 
 
Comparison 
 
The role of police and military as institutions entrusted with the enforcement of the 
state of exception during the First World War in Britain and Germany was the result 
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of very different historical developments. Yet, despite these differences, the same 
organisations emerged as key actors of emergency government of home front 
politics in both countries. Police, military, and intelligence agencies became 
cornerstones of the respective systems of emergency government. Nevertheless, the 
way in which emergency measures were enforced was influenced by a number of 
factors such as the structures of emergency government, civilian-military relations 
but also by certain conceptions of ‘enemies within’ against whom most of the 
repressive emergency measures were directed.  
 
 
Developments before the First World War 
 
The police as a professional organisation in Britain and Germany emerged during 
the second half of the nineteenth century. They evolved along different lines in both 
countries. Whereas the German police – with the Prussian police as its largest force 
– was controlled by the central state, the British police remained a predominantly 
local or regional institution under the control of municipal or county Watch 
Committees. The decentralised civilian supervision of the British police forces also 
ensured a degree of democratic control. In Germany, the Prussian police was under 
the control of the Prussian Minister of the Interior, who was only partially 
answerable to the Prussian Diet. The structure and organisation of the Prussian 
police was designed to ensure its function as a guardian of the political and social 
order of the German Empire. The Prussian police itself was organised according to 
military principles and the majority of its senior officers had served in the military. 
The appearance and habitus of the German police resembled that of the military, 
which also influenced a certain ésprit de corps within the police force. Highly 
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qualified civilian professionals without a military background were rare in the 
German police before the First World War.663 Political reliability and allegiance to 
the Emperor were considered as the most important qualities of a German police 
officer.  
Although many senior British police constables were also former soldiers, the 
authorities sought to avoid an overly martial appearance of the police. The liberal 
conceptions of the state that dominated the decades before the war in Britain also 
influenced the assigned role of the police as an explicitly civilian and apolitical 
institution.664 With the exception of the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police, 
no significant efforts to establish a system of political policing were undertaken 
before the First World War. This was mainly due to the better integration of the 
organised labour movement in Britain, where the Lib-Lab Pact ensured a degree of 
political representation for the working class. In Germany, by contrast, the 
authorities regarded the emergence of Social Democracy as a significant threat to 
the social and political order. The police and particularly its political departments 
such as Department VII of the Berlin Police Presidency were on the frontline in the 
fight against the allegedly subversive activities of the labour movement. The 
eminent German police historian Albrecht Funk characterised the most significant 
spheres of activity of the Prussian police since the era of the Socialist Laws as the 
‘registering, monitoring, breaking up and ostracising’ of the organised labour 
                                                          
663 The entry of ‘educated gentlemen’ into the police service only occurred at the beginning of the 
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movement.665 Consequently, the German police had clearly established conceptions 
of ‘enemies within’ when the First World War began. In Britain, a similarly clearly 
shaped concept of domestic political enemies – perhaps with the exception of Irish 
republican terrorists – did not exist before the First World War. This liberal 
conception of policing seem to have shifted in the context of the Labour Unrest of 
1911-13, yet without resulting in significant structural or political changes before 
the outbreak of the war.  
To sum up, the German police were an established cornerstone of the 
authoritarian domestic politics of the German Empire at the eve of the First World 
War. Its function and self-understanding was that of a guardian of the existing social 
and political order directed against the alleged subversive threat of the organised 
labour movement. In Britain, the liberal idea of the state continued to influence the 
conception of policing as a legally limited means of securing public order and 
fighting crime. Only against this backdrop does it become comprehensible why the 
experience of the state of exception during the war truly revolutionised the British 
state and its agencies, whilst it merely aggravated already existing tendencies in 
Germany.  
 
 
Military-Civilian Relations within the System of Emergency Government 
 
The German state of siege established a polycratic system in which the respective 
military commanders of an army corps district ruled almost supreme. With the 
acquisition of executive power in their districts, the police forces became 
subordinated under their control. Within the system of emergency government 
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under the state of siege, the police’s primary responsibility became the enforcement 
of decrees issued by the local military commanders. In Britain, similarly clear-cut 
provisions were initially not made. Nonetheless, the mentioned Order in Council of 
4 August 1914 obliged all British subjects to assist the military in the defence of the 
realm. This also included the police forces.666 Officially, police constables acted on 
behalf of the Competent Military Authorities when they enforced emergency 
decrees, defence regulations or the Aliens Restriction Act. Yet, it would be wrong 
to see the police as a mere extension of the military authorities. The police 
constables were the eyes and ears of the authorities and provided the best part of 
the available domestic intelligence. With their regular reports about the situation in 
their districts, the Chief Constables had a significant influence on the actual 
application of emergency powers. Home Office and CMA often only acted on the 
recommendation of senior police officers. During the second half of the war, the 
indirect influence of the Chief Constables was put into perspective by the growing 
influence of domestic intelligence agencies such as MI5. The advancing 
professionalisation of domestic intelligence also facilitated the emergence of 
dedicated political police units. Officers of the Metropolitan Police’s Special 
Branch and of the Criminal Investigations Division gradually assumed surveillance 
tasks and the political policing of the British home front. Both departments also 
acted as the enforcers for MI5 when it came to arresting suspects. Despite its 
substantial influence, the intelligence service had no legal power to arrest and detain 
persons, and depended on co-operation with the police in such cases.  
In Germany, the police held a similarly influential position. It acted as the 
main domestic intelligence agency providing regular reports about the situation in 
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the country and therefore influenced political decision making. The selection of the 
provided information and the frequently explicit policy recommendations shaped 
the decisions of the local military commanders. In both countries, senior police 
officers assumed important roles in the politics of the home fronts. Military as well 
as civilian decision-makers depended on the expertise and information they 
provided. Towards the end of the war, the balance between civilian police and 
military began to shift. Confronted with growing strike movements and better-
organised political dissent, the thinned out police forces were unable to cope with 
the sheer scale of their tasks. From mid-1917, the policing of the German home 
front became increasingly militarised. Soldiers were now regularly employed to 
crush strike-movements. This was certainly a sign of the aggravating domestic 
crisis in the Empire and a contributing factor for the escalation of conflicts. In 
Britain, too, the military intensified its control over the civilian police. Here, 
however, uniformed soldiers were only reluctantly used for policing tasks. 
Nevertheless, in early 1918 each military district in Britain established so-called 
Assistant Competent Military Authorities (ACMA) whose main task was to 
supervise and coordinate the policing of their districts. Moreover, although civilian 
oversight by the Watch Committees technically remained intact in Britain, they do 
not seem to have interfered too much with the actual policing. Apart from providing 
the necessary funds and administering the recruiting of new constables, actual 
political influence on policing was rather rare. The influence of the Home Office 
was also rather limited. It received regular reports from the different police forces 
yet also here a hands-off approach concerning the police guided its policies. 
Moreover, many Chief Constables were in regular contact with the head of MI5, 
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Vernon Kell, and the commanders of their military districts.667 The separation 
between the military and the civilian police was essentially a superficial one. Yet 
this superficial separation was at least officially a perpetuation of the civilian 
control over the police force. In addition, the reluctance to employ uniformed 
soldiers seems to have helped to avoid an uncontrollable escalation of domestic 
conflicts in Britain.  
Overall, it can be concluded that neither the German nor the British police 
were merely subaltern institutions during the war. Despite being under direct 
military control (Germany) or at least strong military influence (Britain), senior 
police officers acquired an important role in their respective systems of emergency 
government. Due to their key role in acquiring domestic intelligence and their 
technical expertise in the administration and enforcement of emergency measures, 
they gained a prominent position with significant influence on the actual decision 
making processes. The ineffective political supervision of the police forces 
additionally contributed to their role as influential and often self-willing actors in 
the politics of the home fronts.  
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Conception of ‘Enemies Within’ and the Use of Emergency Powers: The 
Example of Detention without Trial 
 
The self-understanding of police officers and their role on the home front is another 
crucial element of understanding wartime emergency government. Many police 
officers in Germany and Britain saw the protection of the country against the enemy 
within as their main wartime task. Initially, this meant the prevention of sabotage 
and espionage. Especially in Britain, where a downright spy mania emerged before 
and during the first months of the war, police constables were supposed to fight the 
fifth column of German spies. This widespread fear was a particular feature of the 
British home front. Nevertheless, the fear of enemy spies was present in Germany, 
too.668  
The initially narrow concept of enemies on the home front changed during 
the further course of the war. Apart from enemy aliens, a group that caused 
suspicion from the beginning of the war, other groups were considered to be 
prejudicial to the successful conduct of the war. This primarily concerned groups 
that opposed the war on political, ethical or religious grounds. Nevertheless, later 
during the war socially marginalised groups became a particular concern for the 
police forces in both countries. These images of domestic enemies were shaped by 
public discourses – the British press campaigned regularly against ‘peace cranks’ 
and ‘pro-Germans’ – but it could also build on certain pre-war conceptions. 
Whereas the groups that caused concern for the German police were almost 
identical with the established notions of ‘enemies of the realm’ of the era of the 
Socialist Laws, the war facilitated the emergence of a new concept of ‘enemies 
within’ in Britain. Speaking out against the war was increasingly identified with 
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directly or indirectly assisting the enemy. For many contemporaries the difference 
between the external enemy and its alleged collaborators on the home front was 
minimal. The surge of accusations and denunciations that reached the Berlin police 
shows how widespread these concepts were in Germany. Against this backdrop, 
police officers in both countries understood their role as being the guardians and 
defenders of the home front.  
It is essential to understand how deeply engrained these conceptions were to 
grasp why harsh emergency measures were so readily applied. The language of 
police reports reflected the antipathy of many police officers towards their suspects. 
A particularity of the British situation was that the police was still obliged to provide 
security for legal peace meetings. However, in many cases, police constables 
plainly rejected to intervene and to provide security when mobs of self-proclaimed 
patriots broke up such meetings. These acts of tacit disobedience, however, had no 
serious consequences. One reason may have been that police superiors as well as 
their political masters shared the same contempt for peace activists. Nevertheless, 
this withholding of protection by the police almost seems negligible in comparison 
with openly repressive measures against dissenters.  
Among the most radical and intrusive emergency powers in both countries 
was the detention of suspects without trial. The extra-judicial arrest and detention 
was the most radical break with pre-war conceptions of the rule of law. This was 
particularly the case in Britain, where Habeas Corpus and The Bill of Rights 
protected individuals from arbitrary arrest. With the enactment of DRR 14B in 
1915, however, this historically well-established protection of individual freedom 
was almost casually suspended. In Germany, the ‘protective custody’ was 
established as a practice deriving from the royal prerogatives in the Prussian 
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Constitution of 1851, although barely practised before the war. The cases where 
protective custody was ordered during the war offer a unique opportunity to analyse 
and compare how images of domestic enemies influenced the application of the 
harshest emergency measures by police and military. Detention without trial was 
ordered either by the local military commanders (Germany), or by the Home 
Secretary (Britain). In the majority of cases, however, the initiative for such 
measures came from senior police officers. In both countries, police officers applied 
for warrants because the suspects allegedly posed a significant threat for public 
order and security. Yet, what was considered as such a threat was heavily dependent 
on the individual interpretations of the respective police officers. The described 
cases of the Berlin police illustrate that this category of the enemy within was 
gradually extended to an even greater number of people, including pacifists, 
socialists, homosexuals, vagrants and ordinary criminals. Yet, the persecution of 
minorities and groups of undesirables was clearly more extensive and more 
pronounced in Germany. A fact that can be explained by the central role of state 
agencies such as the police and military in dealing with them. In Britain, the indirect 
approach of the state to deal with these groups shifted parts of the task of the ‘moral 
policing’ on the home front to volunteers and patriotic organisations.  
This becomes particularly clear regarding different ways of regulating of 
sexuality and prostitution in both countries. In both countries emergency powers 
were extensively used in attempts to control and regulate sexual behaviour.669 
Firstly, because military authorities were concerned about the role of prostitutes in 
spreading venereal diseases amongst the troops but also amongst workers in 
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wartime industries. Similar concerns existed in Germany, where the vice squads 
were extending their surveillance of known prostitutes to suspicious single women 
in general.670 In Britain, the monitoring of prostitutes, soldiers’ wives and single 
women in the proximity of barracks and training centres by the police was 
complemented by – often female – volunteers. Already in 1914, the largely middle-
class National Union of Women Workers established so-called Women Patrols that 
saw their task in maintaining the moral order of the home front. Later, police forces 
also employed Women Police Constables, whose main task was to control the 
public behaviour of young women and alleged prostitutes.671 The use of patriotic 
volunteers for the moral policing of the home front helped the British government 
to avoid allegation of being overly oppressive. This has to be considered the main 
difference between Britain and Germany, where uniformed police was a clearly 
visible actor. Yet, the motivations for controlling and regulating sexualities were 
not only influenced by concerns about the spread of venereal diseases.  They were 
also influenced by attitudes towards sexuality that had emerged before the First 
World War and now received an additional ideological dimension.672 The emerging 
ideas about national unity were – at least in the eyes of the authorities – deeply 
rooted in notions of decency and ordered gender relations. The regulation of 
sexuality, the suppression of ‘wild prostitution’ and the persecution of homosexuals 
can thus also be interpreted as attempts to maintain the moral order of the home 
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front. The legal instruments provided by the various emergency decrees did now 
allow to impose and enforce these conservative notions of sexuality at least in 
public.673 
It seems as if later in the war protective custody was increasingly used by the 
German police to bypass the established legal procedures even in cases without 
political significance. Even without providing substantial evidence for these 
allegations, the simple belonging to certain groups was often enough to be arrested 
and kept in custody. Police officers, local military commanders but also judges 
often shared the same notions of a Volksgemeinschaft and its enemies, which shaped 
their attitudes towards certain groups. 
In Britain, the powers of the executive under DDR 14B were similar to the 
German institution of protective custody. Here, too, merely belonging to a group 
defined as a threat to public security was sufficient to be detained without a trial. 
This concerned German-born British subjects but also politically undesirable 
persons. Particularly after the Easter Rising of 1916, DRR 14B was excessively 
used for the detention of Irish Republicans. Nevertheless, if Irish prisoners are 
excluded, the number of people detained under DRR 14B remains relatively small 
compared to the figures for the German Empire. Despite this quantitative 
difference, the similarity of approaches towards groups of ‘enemies within’ in 
Britain and Germany is striking. The application of DRR 14B was in the majority 
of cases the result of recommendations by military officers or Chief Constables to 
the Home Secretary. Also in Britain, government officials, senior police officers 
                                                          
673 Magnus Hirschfeld’s Sexual History of the World War suggests that these attempts were 
eventually futile and that notions of morality and hetero-normative sexuality were indeed radically 
changing in Germany during the war. See Magnus Hirschfeld (ed.), Sittengeschichte des Weltkriegs, 
2 vols (Leipzig: Verlag für Sexualwissenschaft, 1930). 
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and military officers shared a common notion of domestic enemies. However, this 
concept was less ideologically loaded than in Germany. The connection between 
political, racial and, to a certain degree, anti-Semitic notions of domestic enemies 
was a distinctive feature of the German developments during the war. 
 
 
Law as a Weapon: Courts and Judges as Agents of the State of 
Exception 
 
The agencies of the executive branch were not the only actors concerned with the 
application of emergency powers during the First World War. Within the systems 
of emergency legislation, the courts maintained an important position. Pre-war 
conceptions of the rule of law assigned the courts a key position in the legal 
limitation of state power. British theorists such as Albert Venn Dicey affirmed the 
key role of the judges as the cornerstones of the rule of law that protected the 
individual rights of British subjects against the arbitrary use of state power.674 
Despite its different legal traditions, comparable notions of a Rechtsstaat emerged 
in nineteenth-century Germany.675 Here, however, courts acted more as supervisory 
bodies of the administration rather than as guarantors of individual liberties. 
Nevertheless, the German courts were also supposed to act as independent 
intermediaries between individual citizens and the state.  
Yet, the unprecedented extension of the state under the emergency legislation 
of the First World War challenged this established constitutional equilibrium. It is 
worth bearing in mind that neither the function nor the powers of the courts were 
                                                          
674 Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Constitution, pp. 178-180; Ewing and Gearty, The 
Struggle for Civil Liberties, pp. 6-17. 
675 See Chapter One. 
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dramatically changed under DORA or the state of siege. The provisions of 
emergency legislation mainly concerned the powers of the executive and the 
establishment of a ‘delegated legislation’, but technically the courts remained in 
place for the judicial review of acts of the executive. This gave judges a unique 
position in the system of emergency government, which they could use to review 
and challenge actions by the government and its executive agencies. But how did 
judges use their prominent position and how did this influence the system of 
emergency government on the home fronts? 
 
 
German Courts and the State of Siege 
 
Article 10 of the law regarding the state of siege demanded the establishment of 
extraordinary courts martial for the prosecution of all felonies such as sabotage and 
high treason but also for breeches of decrees by local military commanders. These 
extraordinary courts consisted of five judges, two of whom were senior civilian 
judges and three of whom military officers. The ordinary civilian courts, however, 
also remained intact and continued to sit throughout the war. After the first months 
of the war, a number of legal disputes arose about which courts would be 
responsible for which cases. Many military authorities and their associated courts 
martial did indeed act under the impression that their powers were unrestrained and 
that a legal review of their decisions by civilian courts was impossible. Against this 
backdrop, it is remarkable how persistently some judges sought to uphold their own 
prerogatives against the military commanders. In 1915, a number of cases were 
heard before the Imperial Court of Justice (Reichsgericht) in Leipzig, highlighting 
these conflicts, or at least uncertainties, between the established ordinary courts and 
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the military commanders. They also show that the enforcement of the state of siege 
was far from being without complications but created a number of disputes.676  
At this early stage of the war, however, the courts often demonstrated a degree 
of understanding of the complaints against the actions of local military 
commanders. In a decision of 11 June 1915, the Reichsgericht sought to limit the 
power of military commanders by emphasising that with taking over the executive 
civilian powers in their districts they were also subject to the established legal 
obligations and limitations.677 In another decision of 5 July 1915, the judges ruled 
that the military only controlled the executive but not the legislative powers, and 
were hence bound the existing laws.678 Many higher provincial courts held similar 
opinions. For instance, the Oberlandesgericht in Königsberg, ruled that military 
commanders could only suspend individual rights of German citizens under 
exceptional circumstances.679 Yet, there were also decisions that favoured the 
unrestricted use of emergency powers by the military. The Bavarian High Court 
decided that military commanders had to accept no legal restrictions to maintain 
public security and order. The court concluded that neither the Bavarian Law 
regarding the State of War nor the Law regarding the State of Siege ‘provide any 
restrictions to the military commanders to secure public safety and order. Moreover, 
he is entitled and obliged to counter any threat to public safety and security […] 
with any means at his disposal he considers useful and necessary.’680  
                                                          
676 For an impression of the sheer number of cases, see BArch R1501/112246, Court Decision 
Regarding the State of Siege, 1914 to BArch R1501/112253, Court Decision Regarding the State of 
Siege, 1917.  
677 BArch R1501/112253, RG 2 D 211/15-Nr. 39, 11 June 1915. 
678 Ibid., RG 3 D 324/15 Nr. 49, 5 July 1915. 
679 Ibid., OLG Königsberg 3 W 610/14 Nr. 3, 22 December 1914. 
680 Ibid., Oberstes Landesgericht in Munich Rev.Rg.Nr. 291/15-Nr. 73, 18 November 1915. 
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This view seems to have prevailed eventually. After 1915, no other landmark 
court decisions were made. It seems as if the main concern for many senior judges 
was less the protection of civil liberties than the preservation of their own status 
against the intrusions of the military. By upholding the established legal procedures 
against the provisions of the state of siege, the judges also protected their own 
professional status and position within the state. Nevertheless, this neither meant 
that they were in fundamental opposition to the regime under the state of siege nor 
that they saw their main task as protecting individuals against the acts of the state. 
This becomes particularly clear when the regular court decisions during the war are 
taken into account. The courts rejected almost all legal challenges against decisions 
by local military commanders. The judges tended to follow the argumentation of 
the military and police even when the evidence provided was thin. Moreover, 
ordinary courts themselves became involved in the repression of anti-war protests.  
The remit of the Reichsgericht in Leipzig extended to all cases of high treason 
(Hoch- und Landesverrat) but also to specific war-related offences such as the so-
called ‘treason in wartime’ (Kriegsverrat), which included all actions supposedly 
‘assisting the enemy’.681 These cases included prominent public figures such as 
Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin, Franz Mehring and other anti-war Social 
Democrats indicted for treason and offences against emergency decrees under 
article 9C of the Law regarding the State of Siege.682 Zetkin, for example, was 
convicted for her participation in international peace conferences and for her ‘active 
incitement of class hatred’ to two years gaol but was released on medical grounds 
a few months later. Luxemburg shared the same fate. Only weeks after her release 
                                                          
681 Article 89 Imperial Penal Code (Reichsstrafgesetzbuch). 
682 BArch NY4002/61, pp. 59-66, Files of the Chief Prosecutor of the Empire (Oberreichsanwalt) 
in the case against Luxemburg, Zetkin, Mehring et al, September 1915. 
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in 1916, the military commander of the Marken district ordered her protective 
custody because she had published a pamphlet about Karl Liebknecht, who was 
convicted of high treason after an illegal May Day demonstration in Berlin in 1916. 
Nevertheless, conviction for wartime treason also concerned many less prominent 
people. For example, supporters of the Spartacus Group were convicted for 
publishing and distributing leaflets and participating in anti-war protests, and were 
given long-term sentences.683 Alsatians who had supposedly articulated opinions 
hostile to Germans (deutschfeindliche Äußerungen) were regularly subject to trials 
before courts martial, too. The sentences in these cases were often particularly 
harsh.684 These examples illustrate how crucial state attorneys and courts were for 
the prosecution of anti-war dissenters. In addition to the powers of the state of siege, 
the ordinary criminal law was used as weapon against alleged ‘enemies within’ in 
Germany.685 There are, nevertheless, contradictory elements in the practice of the 
courts. After the reform of the state of siege in December 1916, the Reichsgericht 
and the Imperial Military Court also occasionally revoked decisions made by local 
military commanders. These were mainly cases where protective custody had been 
ordered against non-political suspects such as prostitutes or homosexuals.686 Yet, 
the number of these revisions remained rather small. Nevertheless, if such legal 
                                                          
683 An example is the prosecution of Gustav Alvin Herre from Leipzig who was convicted for 
‘inciting class hatred’ and ‘wartime treason’ in December 1916 after he was caught distributing 
leaflets against the detention of Karl Liebknecht: BArch NY4002/61, p. 90-96, Indictment of the 
Chief Prosecutor of the Empire against Alvin Herre, 22 December 1916. 
684  A number of cases against Alsatians – particularly those heard before the Imperial Military Court 
and Reichsgericht – are documented in the files of the Imperial Office of Justice; see for example: 
BArch R3001/6667, Gerichtsentscheidungen betreffend Schutzhaft und Belagerungszustand, pp. 1-
10. 
685 Richstein, Das belagerte Strafrecht, pp. 172-176. 
686 See for example the case of Julius Thiele from Berlin, who was detained on the grounds that he 
was a ‘professional pederast’. The hearing before the Imperial Military Court ended with his release 
and the award of a compensation for having been unlawfully detained. The case is also interesting 
because the witness statements reveal that the protective custody was primarily used to compensate 
the staff shortage of the police. BArch R3001/6667, p. 16-18, Case file Julius Thiele, 1917. 
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review was successful even compensation payments to the victims were ordered. 
Overall, the German courts played an ambiguous role during the First World War. 
On the one hand, they defended their professional status and powers within the state 
against the challenges of the state of siege. On the other hand, they also were 
cornerstones of the system of emergency government particularly concerning the 
prosecution of anti-war dissenters. Upholding the principle of legality did not 
guarantee protection of the individual citizen against the state’s arbitrary use of 
power, if the laws were designed as weapons against the enemy within.    
 
 
British Courts as Agents of Emergency Government 
 
For a long time, the role of the British courts has received little scholarly attention 
from historians. Nevertheless, landmark cases such as Rex v Halliday ex parte 
Zadig of 1917 have been broadly discussed in the legal literature.687 This lack of 
scholarly interest is remarkable when we take into account how unique the role of 
the courts within the British system of emergency government was in comparison 
to most other belligerents. Dicey’s conception of the rule of law assigned them a 
central role in the review of government agency and in the protection of the 
individual rights of British subjects. The enactment of DORA and the consequent 
almost complete lack of parliamentary scrutiny put the courts in an 
                                                          
687 There is almost no recent legal discussion of emergency measures in the Anglophone world, 
which does not refer to Rex v Halliday ex parte Zadig. Yet, despite its relevance historians of the 
First World War and the home fronts have widely neglected it. The discussion of the case is almost 
entirely confined to legal historians. For some examples, see Ewing and Gearty, The Struggle for 
Civil Liberties, pp. 84-88; Simpson, In the highest degree odious, pp. 24-26; Charles Townshend, 
Making the Peace, pp. 65-68; Vorspan, Law and War, pp. 278-282; Bonner, Executive Measures, 
National Security and Terrorism, pp. 57-61. 
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‘unprecedentedly responsible position’ to review and limit acts of the 
government.688  
The particularities of the historical constitutional developments in Britain and 
the prevalence of case law made by the courts gave the judges a significant 
influence within the political sphere of the country. In the context of case law, 
individual judges and their interpretations of the law were more powerful than, for 
example, their German counterparts. This position was in danger of being replaced 
by a system of extraordinary courts martial after the first Defence of the Realm Act 
was enacted in August 1914.689 Yet, after the intense criticism articulated by some 
of the Law Lords, this issue was rectified with the Defence of the Realm 
Consolidation Act, which reinstated the right of British subjects to be tried before 
an ordinary civilian court.690 Rachel Vorspan and others have argued, however, that 
this was less an effort to secure the principles of the rule of law then an attempt to 
preserve the positions of power of the judges. By upholding the principle that 
nothing was beyond the law and thus outside the responsibility of the courts, the 
judges reasserted their own institutional power.691 This, nevertheless, created a 
situation in which the judges were frequently confronted with the emergency 
measures of the police and military under DORA, which they were supposed to 
interpret and control. Yet, recent research into the role of the courts almost 
unanimously concludes that they failed entirely in this function during the war. The 
criticism of the British judiciary is perhaps most radically articulated by Rachel 
                                                          
688 Ewing and Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties, p. 81. 
689 The possibilities to trial British citizens before courts martial was additionally extended with the 
Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act of 27 November 1914; 5 Geo. 5, c. 8, para. 1 no. 5-6. 
690 Defence of the Realm Amendment Act 1915; 5 Geo. 5, c. 34. 
691 Vorspan, Law and War, pp. 263-265.  
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Vorspan. She claims that ‘during the war the English judiciary used its power and 
resources to promote not personal freedom but other substantive priorities such as 
military success, property rights, and traditionalist and nationalist moral values’.692 
Charles Townshend also presents a critical view of the wartime judiciary but 
concedes more sympathetically that ‘the paralysis of the traditional standards in the 
shock of war was plainly marked in the judicial interpretation of cases which arose 
under DORA and its regulations’.693  Ewing and Gearty, despite expressing a 
similarly pronounced criticism regarding the protection of civil liberties, 
acknowledge the limited ability of the courts to control the executive.694 Many court 
decisions did not only confirm the actions of police constables and military, 
however doubtful they might have been: they sometimes even went beyond the 
already harsh policies of the government.  
Most cases concerning the legal review of emergency measures were heard 
before the King’s Bench, which was presided over by Sir Rufus Isaacs, later 
Marquess Reading, in his function as Lord Chief Justice and Attorney General. 
During the war, however, Isaacs was most active as diplomatic envoy rather than 
as a judge. In his absence, Lord Darling replaced him in court sittings.695 Both 
judges were ardent supporters of the war effort and this was reflected in their 
decisions. Isaacs was a member of Asquith’s Cabinet and entrusted with a number 
of diplomatic missions to the USA to organise American war credits, whilst Lord 
Darling anonymously wrote opinion pieces that advocated the ruthless conduct of 
the war. This proximity to the government and their support for an unreserved 
                                                          
692 Ibid., p. 343.  
693 Cf. Townshend, Making the Peace, p. 65. 
694 Ewing and Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties, pp. 91-93. 
695 Ibid., p. 83. 
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conduct of the war clearly influenced their rulings in DORA cases. In Ronnefeldt v 
Phillips, a DRR 14B case, Darling argued that the actions of the executive were 
justifiable even if there was ‘very, very little ground to suspect’ that Ronnefeldt 
actually committed the offences on which grounds the CMA issued its removal 
order.696 The Ronnefeldt case is particularly revealing because it shifted the 
responsibility to prove that the removal order was ultra vires to the plaintiff while 
at the same time denying Ronnefeldt access to police reports that could prove his 
claims.697 Other judges went further, stating that any suspicion – even based on 
rumours – by anyone could justify the use of the DRRs 14B and 55 even if the CMA 
itself had no presentable evidence.698 This also included the fact that orders for 
indefinite detention under DDR 14B could be issued without stating the reasons for 
it, if the Home Secretary could assure that he held justified suspicion, as in the 
aforementioned case of Hilda Howsin. This was nothing less than the willing 
abdication of judges in favour of the executive.  
Rex v Halliday ex parte Zadig was certainly one of the most significant 
landmark cases concerning measures under DORA. This case was heard in March 
1917 before the House of Lords.699 Like no other, it represented the ‘watershed 
between Victorian liberalism and the world of the vigilante state’ that emerged 
during the First World War, as Brian W. Simpson has argued.700 The plaintiff, Artur 
Zadig, a German-born naturalised British subject had been detained under DRR 
14B in October 1915 because he was considered to be of ‘hostile origin’, despite 
                                                          
696 Ibid., p. 84. 
697 David Bonner, Executive Measures, Terrorism and National Security: Have the Rules Changed? 
(Ashgate, 2007), p. 54-55. 
698 Ibid., p. 56. 
699  Rex v Halliday ex parte Zadig, UKHL 1917, 1.  
700 Simpson, In the Highest Degree Odious, p. 25. 
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having been a British subject since 1905. As a legal challenge to his detention, 
Zadig issued a writ of Habeas Corpus against the commander of the detention centre 
he was held in. The case made its way through all courts and was finally heard 
before the House of Lords in March 1917. The legal counsel for Zadig argued that 
with the original Defence of the Realm Acts of 1914-15, parliament had never 
granted the government the power to suspend Habeas Corpus and that therefore the 
DRRs limiting the personal freedom of British subjects without a trial were 
categorically ultra vires.701 The Law Lords rejected this argument with only Lord 
Shaw of Dunfermline articulating a dissenting opinion.702 The majority of judges, 
however, argued that parliament as the nation’s sovereign body had entrusted the 
government with exceptional powers for the period of national emergency and that 
it was not within the responsibility of the courts to limit the application of these 
powers.703 Hence, Zadig’s detention was not only lawful but also justified on the 
grounds that the authorities had supposedly good reason for it.  
With such rulings, the judges presented themselves, according to Rachel 
Vorspan, as ‘judicial warriors, enthusiastically advancing executive powers and 
military policies that went well beyond both parliamentary intent and common law 
precedent’.704 This became especially clear in cases involving the prosecution of 
leading anti-war dissenters and activists such as the UDC’s E. D. Morel or the 
Scottish revolutionary John Maclean for breaches of censorship regulations and 
treason.705 The courts not only abdicated their traditionally assigned role as 
                                                          
701 Ewing and Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties, pp. 85-86. 
702 Ibid., p. 86. 
703 UKHL 1917, 1.  
704 Vorspan, Law and War, p. 264. 
705 See chapter 3. 
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guardians of civil liberties, they also took an active role in the suppression of anti-
war dissent. Yet, this self-restraint of the courts to scrutinise acts of the executive 
was mainly a matter of civil liberties. Judges were in fact more willing to challenge 
emergency measures and more likely to side with plaintiffs when property rights 
were concerned.  
An explanation for this contradictory development during the war is that the 
cases in which civil liberties were discussed predominantly affected persons who 
were alleged ‘enemies within’. This concerned enemy aliens but also pacifists, 
radical socialists and Irish republicans. The perception and hence the treatment of 
suspects was influenced by established Victorian standards of worthiness and 
respectability but also by conception of ‘enemies at home’. Many judges assumed 
a moral hierarchy that put the English at the top, followed by the Irish, and 
naturalised British subjects, citizens of neutral countries and enemy aliens at the 
bottom.706 Hence, the judges showed little sympathy when members of these 
undesirable groups sought legal protection against actions of the executive.  
Overall, the British courts constituted a vital part of the British system of 
emergency government under DORA. Their central position within the British 
constitutional framework traditionally gave the judges a level of responsibility for 
the legal review of executive measures and the protection of individual civil 
liberties. Yet, the judges almost entirely abdicated this function and granted the 
authorities a ‘free hand’ when it came to the limitation of civil liberties. They were, 
however, more willing to intervene and limit government intrusions when property 
rights were concerned. This stance highlights that the judges had legal means at 
their disposal to limit the excessive use of emergency powers but often chose not 
                                                          
706 Vorspan, Law and War, p. 265. 
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to use them. Moreover, the courts did not only passively assist the executive, but 
also took an active role in the enforcement of defence regulations and the 
prosecution of anti-war dissenters. Many judges became active actors within home 
front politics in Britain who followed their own specific agenda. On the one hand, 
they sought to preserve their own professional status. On the other hand, they 
interpreted their role as judges as being patriotic actors who had to contribute to the 
war effort by fighting the ‘enemy within’ with the weapon of the law.  
 
 
Comparison 
 
The role of courts and judges on the British and German home fronts was complex 
and ambiguous. Despite their different historical starting points, notions of rule of 
law and Rechtsstaat had developed before the outbreak of the First World War in 
both countries. Within these conceptions, the courts held the role of legal 
supervisors of executive measures. Whilst the German judges mainly interpreted 
the provisions of the imperial constitution, their British counterparts were 
themselves creating constitutional law through their decisions. The lack of a written 
constitution and a strong case law tradition put them in a uniquely responsible and 
powerful position. Their German counterparts, too, held an influential position 
concerning the legal review of government actions. Nonetheless, they never gained 
political influence or independence to such a degree as the British judges before the 
First World War. Yet, despite these differences, British and German courts and 
judges became key actors on the home front with striking similarities. These 
similarities become particularly visible when attempts to preserve the power status 
of the courts in both countries are compared. Moreover, the comparison of rulings 
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concerning the legal review of executive emergency measures helps to understand 
what role the courts played within the system of emergency government in both 
countries. 
 
 
The Status of the Courts within the System of Emergency Government 
 
The enactment of emergency regimes under DORA and the state of siege 
established a system of courts martial that threatened to replace the established 
courts. In their function as general enabling acts, both pieces of emergency 
legislation already minimised parliamentary control of state agency. Yet, with the 
establishment of a system of extraordinary courts, the possibilities for a legal review 
of executive measures by the civilian courts were equally limited. Whilst the 
concept of an absolute executive power was not entirely alien to German political 
thought at the time, it was almost irreconcilable with British pre-war ideas of the 
liberal state and the rule of law.707  
DORA represented a radical shift from these principles and the British courts 
had to reassert their established role. Against this backdrop, it is no mere 
coincidence that the Law Lords Halsbury, Loreburn and Parmoor were amongst the 
most articulate critics of the first Defence of the Realm Acts in the House of 
Lords.708 The Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act of March 1915 and its 
reaffirmation of the role of the ordinary civilian courts was a direct consequence of 
their interventions in the House of Lords. However, this did not mean that the judges 
were in fundamental opposition to emergency government. After asserting their 
                                                          
707 Sydney Clark, The Rule of DORA, op. cit. 
708 See Chapter Two. 
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established power position, the judges became crucial actors within the system of 
British emergency government. The German courts played an equally ambiguous 
role. On the one hand, several decisions of the highest imperial court early in the 
war limited the absolute exercise of the executive powers by the local military 
commanders. This mainly concerned the reassertion of the responsibilities of the 
ordinary courts. On the other hand, the courts and state attorneys played an active 
role in the suppression of anti-war protest. Yet, political justice during the war was 
in many ways just a continuation and escalation of already existing tendencies in 
Germany. Emergency laws and ordinary criminal law were deliberately used as 
legal weapons against domestic enemies such as pacifists, socialists and allegedly 
hostile minorities such as the Alsatians. It is, nevertheless, remarkable how 
similarly the British courts interpreted their role under DORA. Ewing and Gearty 
have highlighted that the judges ‘abdicated’ their traditional role as guardians of 
individual civil liberties.709  
This manifested itself in extreme reluctance to scrutinise and interfere with 
any executive measure. High-ranking senior judges such as Lord Darling repeatedly 
argued that in times of national emergency the dictate of necessity almost forbade 
legal limitations of emergency powers. Throughout the war, the majority of judges 
adapted the principle that the interest of the nation was the highest law (salus populi 
suprema lex).710 The role of the judges was, however, not limited to a benevolent 
passivity. The judiciary took an active role in the enforcement of emergency decrees 
and the prosecution of offences under DORA. In this respect, the British and 
                                                          
709 Regarding a case where wheat had been seized by the government in 1915, Lord Darling 
articulated the principle of non-interference in executive measures. He stated that ‘We are in a state 
of war; that is notorious. […] Salus populi suprema lex is a good defence and the enforcement of 
the essential law gives no right of action to whomsoever maybe injured by it’; 3 KB 676 p. 684. 
710 Ewing and Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties, pp. 89-90. 
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German judiciary followed similar notions of their roles on the home fronts and 
perceived themselves as what Rachel Vorspan called ‘judicial warriors’.711 
Moreover, their legal interpretation enabled the authorities to prosecute and 
suppress dissenting voices on the home front. The judiciary in both countries did 
not only fail to protect civil liberties during the war: it actively facilitated the almost 
unrestrained use of emergency powers by government, military and police. 
 
 
The Courts and ‘Enemies Within’ 
 
The fact that judges were autonomous actors with their own political agenda 
becomes patently obvious when the treatment of ‘enemies within’ is considered. 
Judges in both countries issued harsh sentences for offences that concerned anti-
war activism. This either happened on the grounds of alleged breaches of 
emergency regulations or after accusations of treasonous acts. Yet, the judiciary 
also tended to treat members of other allegedly hostile groups particularly harshly. 
This concerned enemy aliens – no matter whether they actually were naturalised 
citizens or citizens of enemy countries – but also people from allegedly ‘unreliable’ 
ethnic minorities such as the Irish in Britain or the Alsatians in Germany. Already 
before the First World War, the German judiciary played a crucial part in the 
prosecution of ‘enemies of the realm’ (Reichsfeinde), a tendency that was continued 
and aggravated throughout the war. The circle of those seen as potential domestic 
enemies was consequently expanded to almost all groups that opposed the war on 
ethical or political grounds.  
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The treason cases against leading dissenting socialists such as Liebknecht, 
Luxemburg, Zetkin and their supporters highlights how partisan and repressive the 
German courts were in exercising their role. The British courts followed a similar 
policy. Yet, startling public trials against prominent war opponents were avoided 
wherever possible. The trials against Morel, Russell and Maclean towards the end 
of the war were certainly exceptional in their publicity. The judges followed a 
systematic policy of non-interference in executive measures. This was at least the 
case when the civil liberties of German-born British subjects or anti-war dissenters 
were concerned. When British subjects were confronted with encroachments of 
their property rights, the courts were indeed able and willing to limit executive 
measures. The cases of Ronnefeldt and Zadig are telling examples of how the judges 
effectively denied legal protection for the civil liberties of German-born British 
subjects, a stance they also took concerning Irish prisoners after the Easter Rising 
in 1916. The strong position of individual judges within the British legal system 
made their own motivations and their perceptions of allegedly hostile groups 
especially important for their interpretations of the law. If a group was by definition 
hostile or a threat to national security, then many judges sought to use their 
interpretations of the law to combat these ‘enemies at home’. Judges used all 
possible ways to interpret the 
(…) wartime statutes audaciously and broadly, reversing the narrow 
canons they had previously applied in civil liberties cases. They inferred 
massive governmental powers from legislative silence, purposefully 
selected certain statutory provisions to control others, facilitated 
governmental efforts to achieve indirectly what legislation prohibited, 
interpreted regulations to impose minimal standards, of conduct of the 
administration, and manipulated a variety of technicalities to extend the 
scope of restrictive legislations to unanticipated factual situations 
(…).712 
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Yet, it is necessary to acknowledge that this passivity concerning the protection of 
civil liberties was not only the result of pressure by the government but also the 
deliberate decision of many judges. The idea that legal restraints of government 
measures would be prejudicial to the war effort and a shared notion of the enemy at 
home shaped this judicial policy. It is remarkable that no legal challenges to the 
extra-judicial detention under the defence regulations 14B or 55 were successful 
during the war. Judges such as Lord Darling were most unwilling to accept any 
infringement of the executive powers thus giving up long established constitutional 
principles.713 In contrast, the German courts at least occasionally ruled in favour of 
defendants that were held unlawfully in protective custody. With the reform of the 
Protective Custody Law in December 1916, some judges even granted them 
compensation payments. 
In summary, it can be concluded that the British and German judiciary 
fulfilled similar functions within their respective systems of emergency 
government. Both institution were anxious to preserve their professional status and 
their positions of power that were threatened by the initial establishment of 
extraordinary courts martial. In both countries, the courts succeeded in maintaining 
their position after amendments to the emergency laws and landmark rulings 
cleared the smoke. Yet, the different constitutional traditions profoundly influenced 
the judges’ ability to shape and influence executive measures. The exceptionally 
prominent position of the British judges gave them the opportunity to intervene 
directly in executive measures and to limit their application. The German courts 
were far less influential when it came to limiting executive powers.  
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289 
 
Yet, neither used their potential powers to do so to protect civil liberties. 
Instead, judges in both countries interpreted their role on the home fronts in a way 
that made them ‘legal warriors’ who used the law to combat allegedly hostile groups 
of enemies within. For British judges, this mainly meant a policy of non-
interference that gave the executive a free hand for their measures. Large-scale 
active prosecutions and spectacular trials that could cause public debate and would 
trigger intensified parliamentary scrutiny were mostly avoided. Their German 
counterparts, however, took a much more active role in the suppression of anti-war 
protest. The political justice undoubtedly underlined the perception of the German 
Empire as an authoritarian and almost dictatorial system. Yet, the agency of the 
British judiciary – despite its different legal foundations – led to very similar 
developments. With their deliberate inactivity and unwillingness to protect civil 
liberties against executive measures and the simultaneous gradual extension of 
emergency powers, the British judiciary actively facilitated the transformation of 
the liberal Victorian state into an increasingly authoritarian and intrusive ‘vigilant 
state’.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The state of exception during the First World War was a multifaceted phenomenon 
that influenced politics on the home fronts on many levels. In order to understand 
the respective systems of emergency government it is essential to incorporate their 
actors into our consideration. The emergency laws enacted during the war mainly 
widened the powers of the executive and in extension those of the military, 
intelligence agencies and the police. Yet, the way these exceptional powers were 
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exercised depended on a number of different factors. It has been demonstrated that 
the historical preconditions for the emergence of emergency government in 
Germany and Britain differed significantly. The historical self-understanding of the 
British and German police, civilian-military relations but also diverse conceptions 
of the state and its legitimate boundaries provided different backgrounds for the 
wartime practices of the executive agencies. It is, nevertheless, remarkable how 
similarly police and the military interpreted their roles in the system of emergency 
government despite these considerable differences. In both countries police forces, 
intelligence services and the military co-operated closely to monitor almost all 
aspects of the daily life on the home fronts. Moreover, they were actively involved 
in the suppression of anti-war protest. In both countries, similar methods were used 
to manage dissent and quell strike movements, and thus to enforce endurance on 
the home fronts.  
A similar development concerned the judiciary in both countries. The courts 
failed almost entirely in their function to limit and control the potentially arbitrary 
use of emergency powers. Moreover, many judges became actively involved in the 
prosecution of anti-war dissent. They regularly interpreted wartime regulations in 
favour of the executive and made the law effectively a weapon in the fight against 
‘enemies within’. Generally, the application of the most repressive emergency 
measures such as the detention of suspects without trial can only be understood 
against the backdrop of the prevalent stereotypes of domestic enemies. Police, 
military authorities and judges apparently shared very similar notions of those 
outside the national collective they supposedly served. Pacifists, socialists, 
homosexuals, prostitutes and enemy aliens all became targets of emergency 
measures by the police and the military. At the same time, the judiciary either 
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actively participated in their prosecution or denied them the essential protection of 
the law. The developments in Germany can arguably be interpreted as a 
continuation and escalation of already existing authoritarian tendencies. The 
practices of the executive agencies as well as the conceptions of ‘enemies of the 
realm’ were deeply engrained in the political culture of the German Empire since 
the era of the Socialist Laws. By contrast, the wartime emergency measures in 
Britain were distinctively new and truly revolutionary. The extension of executive 
powers and the almost complete abdication of judiciary and parliament as 
supervisory bodies of the executive had no real precedent in British history. The 
wartime experience of emergency government did not only revolutionise British 
politics, it also transformed the function and self-understanding of executive 
agencies such as the police and military.  
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Chapter Five 
 
‘Enemies Within’: Activists, Emergency Measures and the 
Struggle for Civil Liberties 
 
The preceding discussion of emergency government in Britain and Germany has 
highlighted that emergency measures targeted and affected a large number of 
diverse groups. This included dissident socialist and trade union activists, pacifists, 
foreigners and so-called ‘enemy aliens’ but also socially marginalised groups such 
as vagrants or prostitutes. What connected these disparate groups was less a 
common political programme or a shared identity, but the fact that they were all 
targets of emergency measures under the state of siege and DORA. As we have 
seen earlier, the application of these measures was often justified by presenting 
these groups as threats to the collective war effort and by defining them as being 
outside the national wartime communities. This was particularly the case in Britain 
were newspapers such as the Morning Post or Daily Express agitated against ‘peace 
cranks’, ‘pro-Germans’ and ‘Hun-lovers’ on an almost daily basis.714 Yet, as the 
previous chapter has demonstrated, the idea of ‘enemies within’ also informed the 
actions of those responsible for the exercise of emergency powers within the 
military, police, intelligence and the judiciary. In the German Empire the repressive 
handling of protest and dissent by the authorities was often based on long-
established notions of ‘enemies of the realm’ that can be traced back to the time of 
the infamous Socialist Laws of the 1880s.  
Yet, despite being lumped together by an often hostile environment, wartime 
dissent was in both countries a diverse and complex phenomenon. The motivation 
to oppose the war could derive from a variety of sources: religious beliefs, political 
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convictions, personal ethics, or particularly during the later stages of the war also 
social grievances and worsening living conditions. There were, of course, numerous 
activists whose opposition to the war was influenced by a combination of these 
motivations. Many socialist dissenters in Britain, for example, also often referred 
to their Christian beliefs to justify their case. In Germany, many middle-class 
pacifists who had traditionally been linked to liberal politics moved closer to 
socialism due to their wartime experiences. It is, nevertheless, problematic to use 
‘dissent’ or ‘pacifist protest’ as catch-all terms for developments during the First 
World War. Despite their shared opposition to the war, neither political aims nor 
motivations were necessarily coherent amongst the various dissident activist 
organisations that emerged during the war.  
The complexity of the phenomenon has inevitable implications for a 
comparative analysis. The following discussion of the wartime experiences of 
activists will therefore try to avoid undue generalisations. Instead, it focuses on how 
two organisations, the British Union of Democratic Control (UDC) and the German 
Peace Society (Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft, DFG) and its various partner 
organisations such as the New Fatherland League (Bund Neues Vaterland, BNV) or 
the Central Office for International Law (Zentralstelle Völkerrecht, ZV), were 
affected by repressive state measures under DORA and the state of siege.715 These 
organisations were targeted by the German and British authorities because of their 
criticism of the war, and most importantly, both experienced the whole range of 
emergency measures as a means of quelling dissent. A look at the ways in which 
activists perceived and discussed these measures is crucial for the overall 
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understanding of the phenomenon of emergency government during the First World 
War. It highlights how the experiences of confrontation with the wartime state and 
rule under the state of exception influenced the relationship between activists and 
the state. Yet, it also helps to reconstruct the emergence of new fields and themes 
of activism during and after the First World War such as the struggle for human 
rights and civil liberties.  
The wartime history of the UDC and the DFG provide excellent case studies 
that illustrate how the state targeted activists with emergency measures. The two 
organisations are also particularly well-suited for a comparative analysis because 
of a number of shared characteristics. Both organisations featured a similar 
composition of their members that consisted initially of liberals and moderate 
socialist activists rooted in the traditions of nineteenth-century peace activism. 
Moreover, they shared similar political aims, namely the demand for democratic 
control of foreign affairs and international treaties and later also the plea for a just 
peace without annexations and indemnities. And, despite the aforementioned 
diversity of dissent in Germany and Britain during the war, both organisations were, 
to a certain extent, representative of the overall experiences of activists during the 
conflict. 
 
 
Pacifists and the state in Germany and Britain before 1914 
 
In order to assess the impact of wartime emergency measures on the changing 
relations between activists and the state, it is necessary to briefly analyse 
developments before 1914. Pacifism as an organised political movement was a 
relatively new phenomenon at the turn of the nineteenth century. In fact, the term 
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pacifism only emerged towards the end of the nineteenth century to describe the 
numerous campaigns for international arbitration and the prevention of war. There 
were, of course, long-standing traditions of pacifist thought but modern activist 
organisations campaigning for peace only emerged in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.716  
And despite different political environments and national peculiarities, the 
pacifist organisations throughout Europe featured many common characteristics. 
Karl Holl has pointed out that in most European countries, pacifist organisation 
followed the established patterns of bourgeois associational culture and thus mainly 
attracted members of the middle and upper classes for their activities.717 The 
composition of their membership also strongly influenced the forms of activism 
most peace associations used. Rather than confronting the state the bourgeois peace 
movement concentrated on publishing pacifist literature and lobbying governments 
regarding the implementation of some of their core demands such as the 
disarmament or international arbitration.718 Attending international conferences and 
maintaining their transnational networks was another relevant aspect of their 
activism before 1914. Yet, campaigning against war also increasingly became an 
issue for socialist activists particularly during the last decade before the First World 
War.719 Their criticism, however, was more directed against militarism as an 
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ideology and the military as an instrument of repression against the working class. 
Yet, despite the intersections in their political aims and occasional contacts between 
activists, both strands of anti-war activism remained for the most part 
organisationally separate.720 As we will see, the eventual rapprochement between 
middle-class pacifism and socialist anti-militarism in Germany but also in Britain 
was not least a direct result of shared wartime experiences. 
 
 
The Peace Movement and the State in Imperial Germany before 1914  
 
The pacifist movement in Germany was a latecomer compared to other countries 
such as France or Britain, where pacifist organisations had emerged in the middle 
of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the first German peace association was 
already established in 1850 in the East-Prussian city of Königsberg, the same city 
where Immanuel Kant had in 1795 published his pamphlet on perpetual peace that 
eventually became a foundation text of modern pacifism. The Königsberg Peace 
Society, however, was banned a year later in 1851 by the Prussian authorities. This 
coincided with the enactment of the law regarding the state of siege, whose 
provisions would be used extensively against pacifists during the First World War. 
As Karl Holl has pointed out, pacifism in Germany remained a negligible quantity 
for the most part of the nineteenth century following these early attempts.721 In the 
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40 years between the 1850s and the 1890s, few serious attempts were undertaken 
to establish a nation-wide organisation for the German ‘friends of peace’.722  
This changed in 1892 when a circle predominantly liberal politicians and 
intellectuals inspired by the Austria writer Bertha von Suttner and the later Nobel 
Peace Prize winner Alfred Hermann Fried formed the German Peace Society in 
Berlin.723 The formation of the German Peace Society was strongly influenced by 
similar developments in neighbouring Austria, where Bertha von Suttner and Alfred 
Hermann Fried had played a crucial part, too.724 Before the establishment of the 
society, the promotion of pacifist ideas was mainly based on the private initiative 
of individual activists. The foundation of the German Peace Society was initially 
marked by a quick expansion of the association and the establishment of numerous 
local branches, particularly in the south-western states of the empire.725  
The debates about imperial chancellor Leo von Caprivi’s Army Bill in 1894 
then drove many left-liberal politicians and members of the Reichstag to join the 
German Peace Society. Pacifism remained, however, a peripheral matter in the 
politics of the German Empire. At no point before the First World War could the 
German Peace Society muster significant mass-support.726 The predominantly 
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upper- and middle-class membership and its seclusion from genuine mass politics 
and public campaigning at least partially accounted for the lack of working-class 
support for the German Peace Society. There were also significant differences in 
the regional spread of pacifist organisations. The strongholds of pacifism in 
Germany were almost entirely congruent with the traditional heartlands of left-
leaning Liberalism in the south and southwest such as Baden, Wurttemberg, and 
Bavaria. In Prussia, on the other hand, pacifist organisation had a far more limited 
reach. Karl Holl argues that this regional concentration can be explained by the fact 
that pacifist activism in Germany had a strong anti-Prussian undertone. Criticism 
of militarism and advocating a peaceful international order seems have been a way 
to articulate subtle criticism of the Prussian dominance within the German 
Empire.727 In a way, pacifism was one of the last resorts of democratic left-leaning 
Liberalism in the authoritarian political environment of the Empire.728 It would, 
nevertheless, be misleading to portray pacifism in the German Empire as an out-
and-out dissident movement. The German Peace Society saw its main role certainly 
not in confronting the state or in organising public protests. Its characterisation as 
a well-connected lobby and pressure group seems therefore more appropriate.  
Yet, despite the comparative weakness of the pacifist movement in pre-war 
Germany, individual pacifists indeed clashed with the authorities. The pacifist 
campaigner Eduard Löwenthal is a case in point. After being prosecuted and 
sentenced for lèse majeste and his open criticism of the German armaments policies, 
Löwenthal had to flee to Brussels in 1874. He later lived in Paris and London and 
returned to Germany after fourteen years in exile in 1888, following an amnesty 
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granted by the ‘100-days Emperor’ Frederick III.729 Another interesting case is that 
of the historian and later Nobel Peace Prize winner Ludwig Quidde. Coming from 
an established merchant family in the city of Bremen, Quidde had started a 
promising academic career as a medievalist. However, this came to an abrupt end 
in 1894 after Quidde published a pamphlet titled Caligula: A Study in Imperial 
Insanity.730 What appeared to be a historical study about the erratic Roman emperor 
Caligula was by many contemporaries interpreted as a thinly veiled attack on the 
‘personal rule’ of Emperor Wilhelm II. Although Quidde denied having made any 
such insinuations in the direction of the Emperor to avoid prosecution, the Caligula 
affair ended his academic career almost instantly. Moreover, he remained the target 
of victimisation by the authorities. Despite the failure to prosecute Quidde 
immediately for publishing the Caligula pamphlet, he was sentenced to three 
months in prison on a charge of lèse majeste in another case just two years later in 
1896. In a way, Quidde became one of the very few liberal causes célèbres of 
Wilhelmine Germany. The significance of the Caligula affair was underlined by 
the fact that the pamphlet saw several editions and became one of the most read 
political pamphlets of the time in Germany. Consequently, Quidde began to 
dedicate his work entirely to the pacifist cause and emerged as one of the key 
organisers and activists of the movement. 731 
Cases such as those of Löwenthal and Quidde, however, were rather 
exceptional than regular instances within the German pacifist movement. Roger 
Chickering argues that the pacifists were neither confronted with ‘a coherent pattern 
                                                          
729 Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
730 Ludwig Quidde, Caligula: Eine Studie über den römischen Cäsarenwahn (Leipzig: W. Friedrich 
Verlag, 1894).  
731 Karl Holl, Ludwig Quidde (1858-1941): Eine Biographie (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2007), pp. 93-100. 
 
300 
 
of harassment’ nor with ‘a systematic campaign to prosecute them’.732 Unlike for 
many Social Democrats, state repression was thus not a major concern for most 
pacifists. Yet, particularly in the years before the First World War, pacifist activities 
attracted an increasingly hostile response from the extreme right in the Empire. 
Organisations such as the Imperial Federation against Social Democracy 
(Reichsverband gegen die Sozialdemokratie) or the German Army League openly 
attacked pacifist activities establishing them as potential ‘enemies within’ 
alongside, for example, the Social Democrats.733 Moreover, unlike any other 
European country pacifist campaigning was countered by a flood of anti-pacifist 
pamphlets and newspaper articles in Germany. Prominent public figures such as 
historians, generals and politicians publically and outspokenly rejected pacifist 
ideas.734 Such discourse arguably fostered notions of pacifism as a potential threat 
to the state within police, military and judiciary circles.  
It can be concluded that neither systematic repression nor willing 
confrontation with the state were dominant features of the pacifist movement in 
Germany before the First World War. Instead of open conflict, an uneasy 
cohabitation seems to have prevailed. The relationship between the pacifists and 
the state, however, was also the result of the ‘pathetic weakness’ of the movement 
in Germany.735 Despite their considerable membership – the DFG had 10,000 
nominal members in 1914 – organisations such as the German Peace Society were 
simply too focussed on functioning as lobby and pressure groups within the existing 
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political order to pose a real threat to the ruling elites of the empire. Against this 
backdrop, it is nevertheless remarkable that the pacifist movement became one of 
the main targets of repressive measures under the state of siege with many of its 
organisations banned, its publications summarily censored and many of its activists 
either forced into exile or imprisoned for their activities. 
 
 
British Pacifism and the State before 1914   
 
Alongside the United States, Britain was one of the birthplaces of the modern peace 
movement. The London Peace Society, for example, was founded in 1816 and 
belonged to the oldest pacifist organisations in the world. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, numerous pacifist organisations emerged in Britain at the local, 
regional and national level.736 In its early years, the main ideological input for the 
developing pacifist movement came primarily from non-conformist Christian 
traditions such as the Quakers and Mennonites. Yet, pacifist ideas had also gained 
currency in British liberal and radical thought. The emerging labour movement also 
embraced anti-militaristic and to a degree also pacifist ideas. Already in 1871, the 
Workmen’s Peace Association was formed in London following an initiative of the 
trade unionist William Randal Cremer, who in 1903 was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize in recognition of his activism for peace and international arbitration.737 The 
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peace movement could flourish in nineteenth-century Britain because of a number 
of factors: firstly, the established parliamentarian system was able to integrate non-
conformist and minority opinions such as pacifism into its political culture.738 
Secondly, the financial backing provided by Quaker philanthropists facilitated the 
establishment of comparatively stable organisational structures for the pacifist 
movement in Britain, which enabled, for example, the regular publication of pacifist 
literature and newspapers. Thirdly, the British public developed a heightened 
interest in international relations and foreign affairs particularly in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. Pacifist ideas featured prominently in these debates, and 
thus had an undeniable impact on the political culture in Britain. 
 Yet, despite the early peak in pacifist activism in the wake of the Crimean 
War (1852-54), the period between the 1860s and the 1890s was marked by 
stagnation. The absence of British involvement in major international conflicts and 
their lack of criticism of imperialism deprived organisations such as the Peace 
Society of campaigning issues. This resulted in a trend towards ‘organisational 
introspection’ rather than public activism.739 Pacifist ideas nevertheless influenced 
other emerging social movements such as socialism or feminism, thus creating what 
Martin Ceadel calls ‘secondary pacifist organisations’, which included pacifist 
demands into the broader context for their politics.740 The rapprochement between 
pacifism and broader social movements was reflected, for instance, by the close 
connections between Lib-Lab MPs and the Workmen’s Peace Association. In 
addition, the International Arbitration and Peace Association, which was founded 
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in 1880 by Hodgson Pratt, moved ever closer to a socialist agenda.741 Only the 
traditionally Christian and Quaker-dominated Peace Society maintained its 
staunchly anti-socialist stance. This inability of the Peace Society to connect with 
the emerging social movements additionally aggravated the organisational crisis of 
the association in 1890s.742  
An impulse for the revitalisation of the pacifist movement came with the 
Second Boer War (1898-1901). The war was for a number of reasons, a watershed 
moment for pacifism in Britain. In its wake, ad hoc committees and coalitions such 
as the Stop-the-War-Movement were formed, and pacifists made for the first time 
use of the new tools of mass politics such as public meetings and protest marches.743 
The public protest against the war was supported by a number of politicians such 
as David Lloyd George and Ramsay MacDonald. The latter travelled to South 
Africa in 1902 and published a vivid report of his observations there.744 Yet, the 
protests against the Boer War failed to muster significant support in the British 
public. The main obstruction for peace campaigning was, however, not the British 
state. The authorities undertook no significant efforts to suppress protest meetings 
or curtail the publication of critical literature. Instead, a hostile press and so-called 
‘patriotic’ elements of the working class posed the main challenges for anti-war 
protestors.745 Nonetheless, the experiences of the Boer War provided a model for 
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organised anti-war dissent was to be widely followed by pacifists during the First 
World War.  
The period following the Boer War saw the initiative and momentum within 
the peace movement in Britain shift further towards labour activists. Traditional 
Christian pacifist organisations such as the Peace Society went further into decline 
and became almost moribund by the beginning of the 1910s. On the other side of 
the pacifist spectrum, figures such as Norman Angell sought to promote the case of 
pacifism by emphasising the catastrophic economic implications a major armed 
conflict would have.746 Rather than seeing war as a product of the existing social 
order, as most socialists did, Angell and his followers represented a current of 
traditionally liberal pacifism that sought to avoid conflicts by establishing 
democratic control of foreign policies and the promotion of free trade.747  
On the eve of the First World War, the pacifist movement in Britain was 
marked by a contradictory development: on the one hand, pacifist ideas had become 
an accepted part of British political culture. Many activists in the emerging labour 
movement as well as many feminists embraced pacifist ideas as part of their 
politics.748 The traditional pacifist organisations such as the Peace Society, on the 
other hand, slipped further into decline and became almost irrelevant. This is 
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underlined by the comparatively small number of members of the Peace Society. 
By 1914, it only counted around 1,500 individual members.749 Yet, according to 
Martin Ceadel, the fact that the government saw itself compelled to justify Britain’s 
entry into the war in August 1914 with essentially pacifist arguments has to be 
considered a testimony for the latent strength of  pacifism in the country.750 The 
developments before the First World War help to understand why predominantly 
left-leaning Liberals and Labour activists took leading roles within the peace 
movement whilst organisations such as the Peace Society became virtually defunct. 
Individual Christian pacifists including many prominent Quakers, however, 
remained highly active in the anti-war movement. This also gives some indications 
why organisations such as the UDC followed a rather moderate political programme 
that was in many respects more a continuation of liberal conceptions of foreign 
policy than a radical socialist anti-war protest.  
 
 
Comparison 
 
When we compare the development of the pacifist movement in Germany and 
Britain before 1914, one main difference is evident: the British movement had – 
despite its comparatively small size – a notable influence on the political 
mainstream of the country, whereas its German counterpart remained on the 
political side-lines. The reasons for this can be found in the different political 
cultures of both countries. The popular liberal conceptions of state and foreign 
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politics at the end of the nineteenth century were a fertile ground for pacifist ideas 
in Britain. Despite the gradual decline of primary pacifist associations, for instance 
the Peace Society, pacifist ideas became common currency in many political 
movements. The emerging labour movement as well as some feminist activists, for 
instance Sylvia Pankhurst and the East London Federation of Suffragettes 
integrated a commitment to peace into their broader politics and thus created what 
Martin Ceadel and A. J. P. Taylor called ‘secondary pacifism’ or ‘pacificism’.751 
This also helps to understand the gradual rapprochement between traditional 
Christian pacifists and leftist anti-war activists in associations such as the UDC, the 
No-Conscription-Fellowship or the Fellowship of Reconciliation during the war.  
By comparison, the German peace movement faced much greater obstacles. 
It seems that the experiences of the Wars of Unification in the 1860s and 1870s 
facilitated a dominance of militaristic and Social-Darwinist conceptions with 
regards to foreign policies. German society was thus far less receptive to pacifist 
ideas than, for example, people in Britain.752 In addition, the upper- and middle 
class membership profile of pacifist associations such as the German Peace Society 
also made it difficult to reach into the working classes and muster support from the 
labour movement. Yet, within Social Democracy – just as in Britain – certain 
aspects of pacifist thinking such as anti-militarism were integrated into the broader 
politics of the movement.753 Despite these ideological intersections, there was – 
with the exception of individuals such as Quidde – only limited contact and 
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cooperation between pacifists and socialists before the First World War. Unlike in 
Britain, the German pacifists were also confronted with hostile campaigns against 
them. These were primarily led by conservative newspapers and extreme-right 
associations such as the Pan-German League or the various militaristic associations 
in the empire. The combination of the mentioned internal and external factors led 
to the German peace movement remaining a negligible quantity before the First 
World War. 
With regards to the relationship between the peace movement and the state, 
however, the situation in both countries was overall very similar. Before 1914, 
neither in Britain nor in Germany was the peace movement the target of systematic 
persecution and repression. This was partially the case because in both countries 
pacifism remained the resort of upper- and middle class activists who refrained 
from direct confrontation with the state and thus created little reasons for the 
authorities to intervene. Moreover, traditional pacifist thought approached the state 
as a means for its purpose rather than seeking to radically change it as many 
socialists did. It can therefore be concluded that the relationship between pacifism 
and the state before 1914 was overall not marked by conflict or confrontation. 
However, particularly in Germany, individual peace activists did undoubtedly 
experience episodes of repression. The most notable case here was certainly that of 
Ludwig Quidde and the disputes in the wake of the publication of his Caligula 
pamphlet. Confrontation with the state was certainly also a defining experience for 
those ‘secondary pacifists’ in the labour and suffragette movement in Britain. 
Overall however there was no established pattern of persecution and state 
repression of the pacifist movement before the war. Against this backdrop, it is 
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nevertheless noteworthy that pacifist associations became a main target of 
repressive emergency measures in both countries.  
 
 
British and German Activists and the State of Exception 
 
The First World War radically changed the relationship between the state and 
pacifist activists in Britain and Germany. Organisations such as the German Peace 
Society and the British UDC sought to avoid all allegations of sedition and initially 
kept a low profile to avoid state repression. They instead presented rather innocuous 
demands such as the reform of international relations towards a system of 
arbitration and the public democratic control of foreign policies. Even calls for 
peace were initially rather vague and undetermined. It is therefore hard to explain 
why from early 1915 onwards pacifist and pacificist organisations became a 
primary target of repressive emergency measures. One possible answer to this 
question is that pacifists and their activities were increasingly construed as a 
challenge to national unity and the collective ‘will to victory’. Against the backdrop 
of the totalisation of warfare and rising casualty numbers, the authorities understood 
demands for peace and reconciliation with the enemy as a challenge to national 
unity and endurance. The hostile reactions in the right-wing press in Britain, for 
example, suggest that pacifists were increasingly included in the conception of the 
‘enemies within’. In Germany a similarly hostile view was propagated by the 
annexationist right-wing press, which was barely contained by the censors. 
The organisations chosen for the following case study are particularly well-
suited for a comparative analysis. Furthermore, for both organisations, enough 
archival sources are available to reconstruct the impact of emergency measures on 
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their activities and individual activists. Against the backdrop of the described 
different pre-war developments, the comparison of both organisations allows to 
understand how their experiences under the state of exception facilitated the 
emergence of new fields of activism. Activists in both countries began to campaign 
for civil liberties and set up bodies to protest against the emergency measures. In 
Britain, the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) was created in early 1916 
under the leadership of the president of the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain, 
Robert Smillie. In Germany, members of the New Fatherland League such as Otto 
Lehmann-Rußbüldt developed the League into a campaigning body for peace, 
democratic reform and civil liberties. Eventually, in 1922 the league was renamed 
the German League for Human Rights (Deutsche Liga für Menschenrechte). The 
fact that many pacifist and anti-war activists were also involved in the emerging 
civil liberties campaigns suggest a link between the experiences of repression and 
persecution and the emergence of civil liberties as a campaigning issue.  
 
 
The German Peace Movement under the State of Siege 
 
The outbreak of the First World War initially stunned the German peace movement 
almost completely. There was no noticeable public intervention from the German 
Peace Society and no serious attempt to coordinate a response to the imminent war 
with the pacifist societies in other European countries. This passivity in the face of 
the outbreak of the war reflected the ambiguous relationship many pacifists had 
with war itself. Leading activists such as Alfred Herman Fried were convinced that 
it was not the pacifists’ business to prevent imminent wars or to campaign for the 
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end of ongoing conflicts.754 The German Peace Society was as a consequence 
paralysed by the events in August 1914 and almost ceased to exist as an 
organisation. On the one hand, some pre-war members of the society virtually 
instantly switched their ideological allegiances and lent their voices to the 
nationalist war propaganda. A telling example for this volte-face of some founding 
members of the German Peace Society is the fact that some of them even signed the 
infamous pamphlet An die Kulturwelt of October 1914, in which the German attacks 
on Belgium and France were justified.755 Some local branches of the German Peace 
Society, such as the one in the East-Prussian city of Königsberg dedicated their 
activities to patriotic war relief work for German refugees from the regions affected 
by the fighting in the East.756  
Yet, this ‘patriotic pacifism’ also alienated a considerable number of activists 
such as Ludwig Quidde or the later founding member of the German League for 
Human Rights, Otto Lehmann-Rußbüldt.757 Frustrated with the weak reactions of 
the society in August 1914, members of the German Peace Society set up the New 
Fatherland League (Bund Neues Vaterland) in November 1914. The League was 
conceived as an elite society of intellectuals, academics and politicians. Among its 
founding members were illustrious figures such as the aristocratic officer and 
equestrian Kurt von Tepper-Laski or the industrialist and engineer Count Georg von 
Arco. Later, a number of well-known scientists such as Albert Einstein or the 
astronomer Wilhelm Förster joined the League alongside representatives of the 
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various factions of the SPD such as the reformists Eduard Bernstein and Rudolf 
Breitscheid, or the later leader of the Munich Soviet Republic, Kurt Eisner.758 The 
key figure of German revolutionary socialism, Karl Liebknecht, also occasionally 
attended meetings of the League in 1914 and 1915.759 The constitution of the 
League defined its primary aim as ‘to foster politics and diplomacy of the European 
countries in the spirit of peaceful competition and supranational confederation’.760 
In view of the founders, this was only possible ‘if the existing system is abandoned 
in which very few decide about the fate of hundreds of millions’.761 Therefore, the 
League would work to reform domestic as well as foreign policies to achieve its 
aims ‘for the benefit of all Germans and the cultured world’.762  
This last point probably drew the attention of the authorities towards the 
League. Department VII of the Berlin police immediately started to monitor the 
activities of the League and military commanders in their districts began to curtail 
its activities.763 Yet, the repression of pacifist activities also affected the much more 
cautious German Peace Society. This was mainly the case because military 
commanders and government officials construed every open criticism of the war as 
a signal of inner weakness and threat to national unity. The aide of Imperial 
Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, Kurt Riezler, emphasised in a memorandum from 
October 1914 that ‘every doubt of the national convictions and determination of 
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any German, or party, or newspaper is undue’.764 He went on to state that every 
criticism of German foreign policies was ‘unpatriotic and to shatter the confidence 
in them reprehensible’.765 As a consequence he demanded a repressive approach to 
all public challenges of the policies of the Imperial Government: ‘Exceptional 
circumstances demand exceptional measures. Where self-restraint fails […] 
coercion has to take over’.766 Riezler also included the censorship of extreme 
annexationist views in his recommendation. Yet, the military commanders in the 
army corps districts clearly interpreted the direction differently. For example, 
already ten days later when the Berlin-based Tägliche Rundschau published an all-
out attack on Bethmann Hollweg’s defensive public speeches, the military 
commander of the Marken district only issued a warning.767 Pacifist and socialist 
publications, on the other hand, faced much harsher and more meticulous 
censorship. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the military authorities imposed 
pre-censorship on the periodical of the German Peace Society, Völkerfrieden 
(People’s Peace).768 This was an unusually harsh measure compared to the 
forbearance of the military commanders towards the moderate socialist and liberal 
press – not to mention the conservative and right-wing newspapers – during the 
Burgfrieden period until 1916.  
Apart from the severe censorship, however, the German Peace Society could 
continue its activities until mid-1915, when a wave of repression hit the pacifist 
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societies. The New Fatherland League, on the other hand, was since its foundation 
in November 1914 confronted with the most severe repressive measures. Initially, 
this mainly concerned the censorship of pamphlets, which the League had 
circulated among members of the Reichstag and other political decision makers. Its 
weekly periodical Mitteilungen (Transactions), for example, was already banned on 
18 March 1915 by the commander of the Marken district.769 Members of the 
League, amongst them Ludwig Quidde and Kurt von Tepper-Laski, were 
nonetheless granted passports to attend an international pacifist meeting in The 
Hague in early-April 1915.770 Von Tepper-Laski sent a public memorandum to the 
members of the League and sympathetic members of the Reichstag, summarising 
his impressions of the Hague conference. However, its contacts with foreign 
pacifists – primarily the Dutch Anti-Oorlog-Raad (Anti-war Council) – and the anti-
annexationist stance of the League soon made it the target of the right-wing press. 
The League was publically accused of treasonous activities because of their alleged 
distribution of ‘anti-German material to foreign powers’. Despite all attempts to 
clarify that the neutral Dutch pacifists were far from being an ‘anti-German’ 
organisation, the patriotic press launched an all-out campaign against the League.771 
The conservative Rheinish-Westfälische Zeitung, for example, published an article 
about the New Fatherland League on 26 September 1915, in which the author 
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equated the activities of the league with a stab in the back of the soldiers on the 
front.772 This represented a remarkably early version of the stab-in-the-back myth.  
The League nevertheless continued its activities throughout the year 1915. 
The main focus of its activities was put on the publication and circulation of a 
number of memoranda, which were authored by Ludwig Quidde. Two of the 
pamphlets published in mid-1915, Shall We Annexe? (Sollen wir annektieren?) and 
Real Garanties For a Permanent Peace (Reale Garantien für einen dauernden 
Frieden), attracted the particular attention of the military authorities.773 In both 
works, Quidde rejected all German ambitions to annexe parts of other European 
countries and advocated the immediate commencement of peace negotiations. This 
was construed by the military commanders as a breach of the official ban on 
discussing the German war aims. On 2 October 1915, the High Command of the 
Marken district issued a blanket ban on all publications of the New Fatherland 
League.774 Days later, the office of the League in Berlin were raided by the police 
and all stored publications and files confiscated.775 This was, however, only the 
prelude to an all-out crackdown on pacifist associations in Germany. The raid of 
the offices of the League was apparently an attempt to seize incriminating evidence 
for alleged seditious activities. On 7 November 1915, the Prussian Ministry of War 
circulated a memorandum to various high-ranking generals and police authorities 
in the country.776 In it the deputy-minister of war, Lieutenant-General Franz Gustav 
von Wandel, argued that the international activities of the ‘German apostles of 
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peace’ would jeopardise Germany’s image in the neutral countries.777 Furthermore, 
their actions were ‘on the verge of high treason and suited to diminish the resilience 
of the German people whilst they strengthen that of our enemies.’778 As a 
consequence he recommended using the powers under the state of siege legislation 
to avoid the negative international publicity that a prosecution under article 89 of 
the Imperial Penal Code (treason in wartime) would cause.779 The powers of the 
military commanders were to be used to ‘ban any further public activity’ of the 
pacifists in the Empire.780 The memorandum then listed a number of measures that 
should be applied against the pacifist organisations. They included the surveillance 
of postal communications and the refusal to issue passports to activists to prevent 
their participation in international meetings. Furthermore, the publication and 
circulation of pacifist literature was to be prohibited as well as all private letters by 
leading pacifists confiscated and analysed by intelligence officers.781  
These recommendations were almost entirely adopted by the local military 
commanders. In November 1915, the corps commands in Munster, Stettin, Kassel, 
and Breslau issued bans against the activities of the New Fatherland League. Their 
decrees read almost like word-for-word copies of the memorandum of the Prussian 
Ministy of War.782 Three months later, on 7 February 1916, the High Command of 
the Marken district then eventually prohibited all activities of the League for the 
duration of the war.783 On 31 March 1916, the chief executive officer of the League, 
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the feminist pacifist Lilly Janasch, was arrested by the Berlin police and held in 
protective custody for fourteen weeks. Department VII of the Berlin police then 
sought to seize the membership register of the League during another raid of the 
League’s offices possibly to prepare the detention of other members.784 In the wake 
of the repression of the New Fatherland League the German Peace Society also 
faced increased repression. Meetings of local branches of the German Peace Society 
could only be held in the presence of police officers who took notes of everything 
that was said. The Stuttgart-based bookstore of the society was eventually also 
raided and closed by the authorities. This was accompanied by a targeted 
intimidation of the rank and file of the pacifist movement. Several military 
commands sent letters to members of the German Peace Society in which they 
advised them to cease their membership to avoid prosecution for high treason.785  
The strategy of the military authorities was quite clear: systematic 
intimidation of the rank and file was combined with the destruction of the 
organisational infrastructure of the associations. Consequently, the German Peace 
Society as well as the New Fatherland League were effectively silenced for the rest 
of the war. Activists of the New Fatherland League, among them once more Ludwig 
Quidde, set up a substitute organisation named Central Office for International Law 
(Zentralstelle Völkerrecht) in July 1916. The association was, however, almost 
immediately confronted with the same restrictive measures as the other pacifist 
associations. Individual members continued their attempts to lobby members of 
Reichstag and Imperial Government, yet the associations themselves widely ceased 
to function. The ban on pacifist publications and public meetings was upheld until 
                                                          
784 Ibid. 
785 Ibid. 
 
317 
 
January 1918 when the censorship about the war aims question was partially 
lifted.786 
The concerted crackdown against the pacifists was unprecedentedly harsh. 
Even radical Social Democrats did not face similarly intrusive measures and blanket 
repression at the time. The ruthlessness with which military commanders 
suppressed the pacifist societies can only explained by their comparative weakness. 
Similar actions against radical socialist leaders would have triggered solidarity 
strikes as the example of Karl Liebknecht’s detention in May 1916 demonstrated. 
Reactions on a comparable scale were not expected from the mainly middle-class 
and academic membership of the pacifist associations. On the contrary, the German 
Peace Society and the New Fatherland League sought to publically distance 
themselves from the radical anti-war left.787 This could be considered a tactical 
move to avoid further prosecution, yet the dominance of Liberals, intellectuals and 
industrialists in the pacifist associations also created an ideological barrier to certain 
forms of activism that was hard to overcome. Different from many socialist anti-
war activists, there were also almost no attempts to organise clandestine activities 
or public protest. The prevailing legalism of the pacifists in the face of all-out 
repression is remarkable yet it also demonstrates how unjustified allegations of 
sedition and treason actually were.  
The German Peace Society and the New Fatherland League mainly reacted 
by lodging appeals against the decrees of the military commanders and trying to 
bring their cases before the courts. Yet, almost none of these appeals were 
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successful. Local military commanders often simply ignored the complaints or 
refused to repeal any of their decrees. When the courts decided to hear the appeals 
of pacifists, the judges were often extremely reluctant to repeal decisions of the 
military authorities. This procedure was typical for the handling of alleged ‘enemies 
within’ – a category that increasingly also included the pacifists – by the authorities. 
The attempts to raise their issues with sympathetic members of the Reichstag were 
more successful though. Leading pacifists were after all well-connected within the 
political elite in Germany. Examples of overly harsh measures against pacifists 
featured, for example, during the debates about a reform of the law regarding the 
state of siege in the budget committee of the Reichstag in mid-1916.788 Yet, despite 
the eventual reforms of the state of siege legislation in December 1916, the majority 
of the measures against the pacifist organisations were upheld by the authorities. 
Against this backdrop, a joint open petition signed by the chairs of the German 
Peace Society, New Fatherland League, the Central Office for International Law 
and the National Women’s Committee for a Permanent Peace was addressed to the 
Reichstag on 1 July 1917.789 The main intention behind the petition was to provide 
material for the negotiations in the budget committee of the parliament. The annual 
budget negotiations, in which the parliament granted new war credits to the 
government, were one of the few occasions on which the parliament could directly 
influence the policies of the Imperial Government. The petition meticulously listed 
all decrees and emergency measures that had been enacted against the pacifist 
organisations in the country.  The main complaint was that the emergency powers 
were one-sidedly applied against the pacifists, whereas annexationist and pan-
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German propaganda was treated with utmost leniency by the military. For most 
contemporary observers this was just stating the obvious. Yet, the petition and the 
discussion in the budget committee had at least some impact on the handling of 
emergency measures by the military. From September 1917 the Imperial Home 
Office began to pressure the Prussian Ministry of War to loosen some of its 
measures against the pacifists.790 This was intended as sign of goodwill towards the 
increasingly self-confident coalition of the majority parties in the Reichstag. It took 
nevertheless over three months until January 1918 to repeal at least the blanket ban 
on pacifist publications. In a letter from 10 January 1918 to the deputy army corps 
commands, the Supreme Military Commander decreed that the ban on ‘strictly 
scientific pacifist literature’ was to be lifted.791 This partially repealed the decree 
from 7 November 1915, in which the commander of the Marken district prohibited 
all pacifist activities. It was nevertheless emphasised in the same letter that ‘the 
movement for a peace at all costs is to be combated with all certainty’.792 
Furthermore, ‘all activities that are suited to undermine the perseverance and hope 
for final victory with the population’ were to be suppressed. It ended with the 
unambiguous statement that ‘acting with uncompromising severity is therefore the 
highest duty of all military commanders’.793 This suggests that the concessions were 
rather superficial and did not indicate a substantial change in policies towards the 
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pacifist movement. In fact, most of the restrictions were only lifted in October 1918 
in the face of looming defeat.794 
The petition of July 1917 is, however, also interesting for another reason. The 
presented arguments and the language used provide some insights into the ways 
German pacifists themselves perceived their role during the war. The petition 
argued, for example, that ‘the suppression of the German pacifism by the military 
commanders plays into the hands of those who again and again incite a negative 
opinion against Germany by claiming that permanent peace is only possible if 
Germany was overpowered’.795 The effects of the harsh repression on Germany’s 
image in the neutral countries was mentioned as a major threat to German interests. 
Whereas the annexationist and Pan-German propaganda would jeopardise the 
sympathies for Germany’s cause, the visibility of the German pacifist movement 
was needed to counter-balance it. Rather than seeing the German peace movement 
as a sign of weakness, it should be used by the Imperial Government to demonstrate 
the righteousness of the German cause. It is remarkable that the petition explicitly 
referred to British pacifists to make its case: ‘Are the activities of English pacifists 
such as Ramsay Macdonald, Snowden, Trevelyan etc. a sign of English weakness? 
No because everyone sees that it is the result of fundamental convictions and not of 
tactical games’.796 The text concluded:  
[…] The repression of the pacifists in Germany by our military 
commanders strengthens anti-German [deutschfeindlichen] 
propaganda and helps to prolong the war. […] We face the upsetting 
fact that public opinion in the whole world increasingly believes 
Germany was “the enemy of all”, the “hostis generis humani” who 
needs to be overpowered for the sake of humanity. By suppressing the 
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German pacifists the military commanders do their utmost to strengthen 
this belief. The patriotic interest therefore commands the liberation of 
the German pacifist from the yoke of the state of siege.797 
 
This highlights several interesting aspects of relations between the German pacifists 
and the state. Although the patriotic language can be interpreted as an attempt to 
rebut allegations of seditious and treasonous activities, it also reflects the fact that 
the pacifists saw themselves not in fundamental opposition to the state. It was also 
a way to distance themselves from the revolutionary defeatism of the radical 
socialists around Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. Yet, the apparent emphasis 
on German interests also demonstrates that the pacifists fundamentally understood 
themselves as patriots.798 The German pacifists saw themselves faced with a similar 
ideological challenge that many socialists faced in August 1914. How could the 
internationalist principles of cooperation and supranational federation be reconciled 
with the self-image of being German patriots? At least for some activists the answer 
to this challenge seems to have been the commitment to political reforms and a 
reinvention of Germany as a democratic nation that would have its place in the 
international community. It is thus an interesting fact that the New Fatherland 
League was eventually transformed into the German League for Human Rights in 
1922, an association which mainly sought to promote the issue of civil liberties 
during the Weimar Republic.799 The experiences of repression by an autocratic 
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military regime during the war was certainly a major contributing factor for this 
rededication of the association after the war. 
In conclusion, the pacifist movement in Germany faced the most severe 
measures under the state of siege and was effectively suppressed for the duration of 
the war. Despite neither being a popular mass movement nor being involved in the 
activities of the radical anti-war opposition, military commanders used the whole 
range of available emergency measures against the pacifist societies. This 
repression was only paralleled by actions against the radical wing of the socialists 
and later the anti-war mass strike movements. It becomes clear that this was 
grounded in the perceptions of the pacifists by the authorities as being outside the 
national collective and thus as being a threat to the war effort and perseverance at 
the home front. The radicalisation of these conceptions of the ‘enemies within’ from 
1916 onwards might help us to understand why they became targets of emergency 
measures despite their strictly legalistic public appearance and defensive activities. 
Confronted with the severity of emergency measures the pacifists resorted to the 
means of the rule of law such as court appeals, yet often to no avail as most judges 
shared the same disdain for those perceived as unpatriotic as did the military 
commanders.800 The only help came from sympathetic members of the Reichstag 
who pressured the Imperial Government into some concessions towards the end of 
the war. Yet, the fact that most of the repressive measures against the pacifists 
remained in force until the end of the war underlines that the military commanders 
exercised the powers under the state of siege widely independent from the Imperial 
Government and parliamentary scrutiny. 
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‘The Enemies in Our Midst’: Pacifists, the Union of Democratic Control and 
the British State under DORA 
 
Similar to the German pacifists, the traditional pacifist associations in Britain were 
absolutely unprepared for the outbreak of the First World War. The Peace Society 
widely failed to articulate any decisive answer to the challenge of war and became 
widely defunct for the duration of the war. The political representation of the peace 
movement in Britain was consequently superseded by those ‘secondary pacifists’ 
who had emerged in the years before the war. The Union of Democratic Control 
was probably the most important of these new associations that merged radical 
Liberalism, labour anti-war protest and sections of the traditional Christian 
pacifism. It was, nevertheless, not the only active body. In October 1914, the editor 
of the ILP-newspaper Labour Leader, Fenner Brockway together with Clifford 
Allen set up the No-Conscription Fellowship, which agitated against any form of 
compulsory military service.801 In December 1914, mainly Quakers set up the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation in Cambridge. The Fellowship soon established a 
transnational network and similar associations were set up in other countries such 
as the predecessors of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).802 On a local 
level there were even more associations that opposed the war.803  
The UDC was, nevertheless the most important of these associations as its 
active membership included eminent Liberal and Labour MPs such as Ramsay 
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Macdonald, Phillip Snowden, Charles Trevelyan, and Arthur Ponsonby.804 Yet, its 
reach extended far beyond the traditional spheres of Liberal and Labour radicalism. 
Influential Quakers such as the ‘chocolate magnates’ Arnold Rowntree and George 
Cadbury joined the UDC as did intellectuals such as the philosopher Bertrand 
Russell. Other influential members and supporters of the UDC included the 
campaigner Edmund D. Morel, who built up his reputation during the campaign 
against Belgian atrocities in the Congo, the economist John Maynard Keynes and 
the pacifist writer Norman Angell.805 The diversity of its membership made the 
UDC a melting pot for dissidents during the war. Programmatically, the UDC was 
officially not an anti-war association. It opposed the secret diplomacy that led to 
the British entry into the war and called for democratic parliamentary control of 
foreign policies. At its inaugural meeting on 17 November 1914 the aims of the 
UDC were laid out as campaigning for ‘durable peace, and in favour of a general 
scheme of international policy designed to avert a repetition of the horrors we are 
witnessing’.806 Yet, during the further course of the war, the UDC increasingly 
began to advocate peace negotiations and adopted the calls for a peace without 
indemnities. Furthermore, many activists of the UDC were also members of other 
campaigning bodies. Ramsay Macdonald remained the chairman of the 
Independent Labour Party, which broadly maintained an anti-war stance. Rowntree 
and Cadbury continued to support the Society of Friends and the Friends Service 
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Committee financially. The Red Clydesider David Kirkwood was to become a key 
figure in the Clyde Workers’ Committee. During the course of the war over 300 
different organisations associated themselves with the UDC bringing its individual 
membership up to over 10,000 by 1918 and its associated membership rose to 
around 750,000.807 From the beginning, the UDC sought to build popular support 
for its demands by organising public meetings and distributing pamphlets and 
literature. The driving force behind the campaigns of the UDC was Edmund D. 
Morel, whose experiences as an organiser were a crucial asset for the Union.808 In 
1915, Morel made clear that for him the UDC was not a ‘mere academic debating 
society [… but …] known and felt – and in some quarters even dreaded – as a live 
thing.’809 It has been argued that the UDC remained marginal in British politics and 
that it widely failed to influence policy making.810 Despite its marginalisation, the 
UDC could muster some popular support in Britain. This is true in so far as the 
UDC never posed a real threat to the British war effort and actually never intended 
to do so.  
It is nevertheless remarkable that the UDC became the target of the most 
aggressive press campaigns and since the end of 1915 also of harsh repression by 
the British state. The press campaign against the UDC started after the anti-German 
Lusitania Riots in May 1915. Until then the UDC operated without much public 
scrutiny. Since May 1915, however, it faced concerted efforts to break up its public 
meetings and the authorities began to prosecute members of the UDC for breeches 
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of DRR. Particularly newspapers such as the Morning Post and Daily Express were 
at the forefront of a poisonous campaign against everything and everyone construed 
as opposing the war effort. The language used in the attacks against pacifists and 
members of the UDC such as Clarence H. Norman, Clifford Allen or Ramsay 
Macdonald was demeaning and at times even dehumanising.  
An illustrative example for the hostile language and hatred in these articles is 
a text by the ‘patriotic’ Labour MP Charles B. Stanton in the Daily Express from 
28 January 1916 titled ‘The Enemies in our Midst’.811 What makes the article 
remarkable is the fact that Stanton was elected as a Labour candidate after the death 
of Keir Hardie in 1915 in his Merthyr Tydfil constituency. Stanton started out as a 
radical trade unionist but moved to the sharp right of the labour movement during 
the war. At the 1918 general elections Stanton eventually stood as a candidate for 
the right-wing National Democratic and Labour Party. In the article of 1916, 
Stanton denounced the pacifist ‘claptrap’ of ‘this horde of Quakers, cranks, 
Radicals, Little-Englanders, violent pacifists, vocal pro-Germans, and slobbery 
I.L.Peers’.812 He went to demand that ‘this fungus-growth in our social life’ and 
‘wealthy, obese Quakers’ should be tackled by the, in his opinion apathetic, 
government:  
If we are too mealy-mouthed to hang them, or even to give them a 
hero’s death at the end of a firing party, they might at least be deported. 
They are useful for Germany here, their proper place is Germany; or, if 
there are diplomatic difficulties in transporting them to the dear 
Fatherland, there are plenty of No Man’s Lands dotted about the ocean 
where they could be sent to make a little hell of their own, and to build 
the “New Society” without the exercise of force.813  
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Stanton then went on to emphasise that for him the principles of socialism and trade 
unionism meant the complete submission of the individual under the state. Those 
socialists in the peace movement upholding the idea of ‘the dignity of the human 
soul’ and individual liberty were doing nothing less than ‘their best to snatch away 
from British courage and British determination the immortal wreath of victory’.814 
This hateful language was not exceptional for articles in the Daily Express and 
Morning Post.815 These articles were often used to mobilise ‘patriotic’ mobs to 
attack public meetings of pacifist organisations. A meeting of the UDC on 27 
November 1915 in London’s Memorial Hall was, for example, broken up by an 
angry mob and soldiers on leave. The mob stormed the hall, seized the stage and 
forced the UDC sympathisers in the audience and the speakers to leave the venue. 
Already days before the Daily Express began to publicise the venue of what they 
called ‘the peace crank congress’ and urged its readers to obtain tickets for the event 
and to use them to prevent the meeting from taking place.816 The author of these 
articles was a certain Richard H. Glover, a self-confessed member of the Anti-
German League.817 The organiser of the meeting, a Miss Longbourne of the London 
Federation of the UDC, had already on 25 November – after the first threatening 
articles in the Daily Express had appeared – appealed to the City Police in London 
to provide protection for the meeting.818 And although some police constables were 
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present at Memorial Hall, none of them intervened to protect the UDC 
sympathisers. This was a pattern that was consequently repeated throughout the war 
all over Britain.819  
At the same time, the authorities began to increasingly censor publications of 
the UDC. The police now regularly raided the offices of the UDC to seize materials 
and pamphlets and systematically intimidated printing houses, which produced 
UDC literature. Public meetings were – when not broken up by patriotic mobs – 
monitored by officers, who took notes of everything said by the speakers to later 
search for indictable breeches of DRR. The peak of repression was reached when 
in autumn 1917, the secretary of the UDC was imprisoned for six months for a 
dubious breach of DORA. Only weeks later, Bertrand Russell, another prominent 
member of the UDC was charged for a breach of a DRR and also imprisoned for 
six months after he had published an allegedly seditious article in the NCF-journal 
The Tribunal.820 The combination of open hostility by the right-wing ‘patriotic’ 
press, severe censorship and the targeted repression against leading members 
effectively suppressed most activities of the UDC.  
The reactions of the UDC members to these challenges were often helpless. 
Since mid-1915, the executive committee of the UDC was mainly concerned with 
matters of censorship and the breaking up of their meetings. At a meeting on 25 
July 1915, the MPs Charles Trevelyan and Arthur Ponsonby presented a report 
about the ‘rowdyness instigated by the Daily Express’ which lead to the breaking 
up of UDC meetings in Kingston, Brixton and Norwood earlier that year. Yet, the 
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executive committee decided not to press charges against the Daily Express because 
it was convinced that no jury would vote in favour of the UDC during the war. As 
we have already seen these fears were not unfounded. Instead, meetings should only 
be held where ‘large labour audiences could be expected’ to provide sufficient 
protection against attacking mobs.821 Trevelyan also approached his party 
colleague, Home Secretary John Simon, to demand that more needed to be done to 
protect the freedom of speech. Yet, Simon blocked every such attempt and 
undertook no significant effort to provide security for public meetings of the UDC. 
He was, however, also reluctant to directly apply repressive measures against the 
union. After Attorney-General Edward Carson ordered a raid against the National 
Labour Press in London and Manchester and shortly prohibited the production of 
further UDC materials in August 1915, Simon was compelled to backpedal in the 
House of Commons and to order the return of all seized UDC materials.822 Yet, this 
was only a temporary success. Under Simon’s successors Herbert Samuel and 
George Cave repressive measures were more readily applied. And despite the 
frequent interventions of the UDC-friendly MPs, the British government acted 
increasingly uncompromising in the last two years of the war.823 Initially the UDC 
sought to counter the joint campaign of government, police and patriotic press by 
trying to distance itself from the radical anti-war left and pacifist groups in order to 
avoid giving any occasion for further repression. When in September 1915 the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation sought to affiliate itself with the UDC, the executive 
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committee rejected this emphasising that it did not see itself as an anti-war 
organisation.824  
The executive committee was equally anxious to avoid any allegations of 
being pro-German as the patriotic press had frequently purported. Especially Arthur 
Ponsonby and Ramsay Macdonald in particular raised the issue of enemy aliens and 
German-born British subjects in the ranks of the UDC. Although these groups were 
not significantly represented within the UDC, Macdonald and Ponsonby suggested 
that membership applications and donations from people ‘with German-sounding 
names’ should be rejected by the union. The ensuing debate within the executive 
committee highlights how intimidated and torn the UDC already was by then. 
Whilst Macdonald and Ponsonby argued that allowing German-born British 
subjects and alleged enemy aliens would fuel the hostile campaign against the 
Union, Charles Trevelyan and Helena Swanwick opposed this as it would mean a 
capitulation before outside pressure.825 The debate represented a turning point in 
the activities of the UDC. After Macdonald’s and Ponsonby’s defensive approach 
was rejected in the executive committee, the Union made the issue of democracy 
and civil liberties in wartime a centrepiece of its campaigning. This also meant that 
the issue of foreign policy increasingly faded from the spotlight of the UDC 
activities. The UDC alongside the reformed National Council for Civil Liberties 
(NCCL), which emerged from the National Council against Conscription in January 
1916, became the two main organisational actors in the struggle for civil liberties 
in Britain during the war. In the case of the UDC this new focus on democracy and 
civil liberties was a direct result of the experience of state repression under DORA. 
                                                          
824 HHC U DDC/1/4 Minute Book, Minutes Meeting 21 September 1915. 
825 Ibid., Minutes Meeting 10 August 1915; ibid., Minutes Meeting 17 August 1915. 
 
331 
 
The development was also reflected in the internal discussions of the UDC. The 
executive committee and the rank and file now increasingly discussed the question 
of what democracy actually meant for the Union. In the wake of these debates, the 
initially narrow understanding of democracy as ‘parliamentary control’ was now 
extended to deeper issues such as the voting franchise and the equality of men and 
women. The latter was clearly a direct result of the prominent role leading 
suffragettes such as Helena Swanwick, Ethel Snowden, Olive Schreiner or 
Margaret Sackville played in the activities of the Union. Another major driving 
force behind this new orientation of the Union was Charles Trevelyan. Yet, Ramsay 
Macdonald also soon embraced the new mission and used his contacts in the labour 
movement to support the new campaign in defence of the freedom of speech. 
From November 1915, the UDC urged all local branches and affiliated 
organisations to document all incidents where meetings were broken up and the 
freedom of speech had been suppressed. On 7 December 1915, the central office 
circulated a memorandum authored by Ramsay Macdonald to all trade councils in 
Britain, in which he warned of the ‘danger to free speech in tolerating the breaking 
up of meetings by men in khaki’ and the potential ramifications for the rights of the 
trade union movement.826 This information was then used for enquiries in the House 
of Commons by Trevelyan, Macdonald, Ponsonby and other MPs sympathising 
with the UDC.827 It was again particularly Charles Trevelyan who proved to be a 
useful link between the Union and increasingly alienated Liberal MPs such as 
William Pringle, John Howard Whitehouse and Arthur Sherwell.828 In addition, 
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Bertrand Russell became gradually more active in the Union and toured the country 
on behalf of the NCCL with a lecture series on the topics of freedom, liberty and 
democracy.829  
The turn towards the issue of civil liberties coincided with the campaign 
against the introduction of conscription by the No-Conscription Fellowship and 
National Council against Conscription under the leadership of Robert Smillie, 
which gathered pace towards the end of the year 1915. The campaigns against the 
introduction of conscription as well as those for the protection of civil liberties 
emphasised the traditions of British liberties and democracy which were now under 
threat from compulsive service and intrusive state measures. Many pamphlets 
argued that whilst the soldiers allegedly fought to defend these values, the British 
government now used every mean to introduce ‘Prussianism’ at home. The fight 
‘against Prussianism at home’ became an often evoked formula in the campaign for 
civil liberties. This view was probably best described by Frederick Seymour Cocks 
in an article for the Union’s journal The UDC: 
‘[...] After all, what is Prussianism? It is the reversal of the law of 
civilised progress. […] Prussianism means the rule of force instead of 
the rule of reason. It means government by conquest instead of 
Government by consent. […] It means the exploitation of democracy 
by financial conspiracies and military juntas working through the 
medium of secret diplomacy instead of control of foreign affairs as well 
as of home affairs, by the people. It means the Government of the 
people by autocratic decree instead of the full democratic principle of 
government of the people, by the people, for the people for which the 
Union stands. It means the standard of autocracy, once planted by King 
Charles the First at Nottingham, and now again by Mr. Lloyd George 
at Downing Street, instead of the banner of the Commonwealth which 
once before triumphed over the demands of Privilege and Kings, and 
which will triumph again over the power of Press-gangers and of 
Premiers. [...]’830 
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This was an attempt to evoke a liberal patriotism founded in the traditions of British 
radicalism and liberalism to counter the prevalent jingoistic propaganda. However, 
the campaign failed to reach a public beyond the UDC’s audiences. Censorship and 
hostile press campaigns continued, and throughout the year 1916 the UDC faced 
increased repression. In June 1916, the local UDC offices in South Wales were 
raided by the police and all copies of the pamphlet The Attack On The Freedom of 
Speech confiscated. At the same raid the police also seized materials of the 
Women’s Labour League on childcare and contraception.831 The central office of 
the Union provided financial assistance for a legal appeal and Charles Trevelyan 
raised the case in parliament.832 Yet again to no avail. In September 1916, a number 
of local UDC-activists were prosecuted for breaches of DRR.833 Only weeks later, 
the homes of the main organisers of the Union, Egerton Wake, and Arnold Lupton 
were raided and searched by the police.834 The UDC reacted to these new intrusions 
by deciding to establish a closer collaboration with the National Council for Civil 
Liberties by providing finances and support for the distribution of its literature.835 
This led to the War Office prohibiting the postal delivery and export abroad of UDC 
materials.836 A breach of this decree eventually also provided the occasion for the 
authorities to prosecute Edmund D. Morel in 1917.837  
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The confrontation with the state also triggered a shift further to the left. In 
April 1917, the UDC encouraged its local branches to hold meetings in honour of 
the Russian February Revolution. In June 1917, a short time after the revolutionary 
Leeds convention, the UDC executive decided to affiliate itself to the short-lived 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council movement.838 The fact that a short time later 
Edmund D. Morel and Bertrand Russell were prosecuted and sentenced to 
comparatively harsh prison sentences is certainly no coincidence. Targeting the 
prominent leading figures of the organisation was undoubtedly intended as a 
warning to other activists not to overstep a certain mark. In the last year of the war, 
the Union dedicated much of its resources to campaign on behalf of its imprisoned 
members. Verbatim reports of Morel’s and Russell’s court hearings were published 
and their cases discussed in parliament.839 Yet, despite the joint efforts by the UDC, 
ILP and NCCL on behalf of Morel the government refused to concede any easing 
of Morel’s detention conditions. As a consequence Morel’s health rapidly 
deteriorated during his six months in prison. Deprived of its main organisers the 
UDC’s activities declined significantly during the year 1918. The government 
finally repealed its restrictive decrees concerning the activities of the Union on 18 
December 1918.840 The UDC remained in existence for another 50 years and helped 
to shape the foreign policy of the Labour Party after most of its Liberal members 
such as Charles Trevelyan, Arthur Ponsonby or Edmund D. Morel eventually joined 
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the party after the war.841 The NCCL, on the other hand, soon became inactive and 
disappeared from the public perception. It re-emerged in the 1930s as a civil 
liberties action group of the political left with close links to the Communist Party 
of Great Britain.842 It continues its activities under the name Liberty until the present 
day. 
In conclusion, the Union of Democratic Control was by far the most relevant 
dissenting organisation in Britain during the First World War. By the end of the 
war, over 100 local branches existed and around 300 organisations had affiliated 
themselves with the Union, bringing its associated membership numbers up to 
750,000.843 The UDC started as an ad hoc committee in the tradition of similar 
organisations during the Boer War. Its agenda was not explicitly directed against 
the war but demanded the reform of foreign policy and its democratic control. Yet, 
the Union soon became a melting pot for various political currents in Britain that 
criticised the war. Liberal MPs, Labour politicians but also activists from social 
movements and Christian pacifists (often with a Quaker background) became 
involved in its activities. Due to the organisational crisis of the traditional pacifist 
associations such as the Peace Society, the UDC became the main body for peace 
activism during the war. In it Christian pacifist traditions merged with the 
‘secondary pacifism’ of the labour movement and the suffragettes. It is thus not 
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surprising that within the Union the post-war rapprochement between progressive 
Liberals and the labour movement was anticipated.   
The UDC sought to popularise its ideas amongst the wider public by extensive 
propaganda efforts. It particularly targeted working-class audiences with its public 
meetings and, as a consequence, soon attracted numerous trade unions and labour 
activists. These meetings, however, soon caught the attention of the ‘patriotic’ 
press, particularly the Morning Post and Daily Express. Meetings of the Union were 
regularly broken up after articles in these newspapers called for ‘patriotic actions’ 
against ‘peace cranks’ and ‘pro-Germans’. For the right-wing press, the UDC 
epitomised the ‘enemies in the midst’, which needed to be combatted. The patriotic 
press did not only incite the violent breaking up of public meetings, the flood of 
articles also created pressure on the government to act against the allegedly 
treacherous pacifists. Whilst the Liberal home secretaries Reginald McKenna, John 
Simon and Herbert Samuel were hesitant to employ all too repressive measures 
under DORA against the UDC, the Lloyd George Cabinet and its Home Secretary 
George Cave used the whole range of emergency powers to suppress the activities 
of the Union.  
The restrictive handling of emergency powers in combination with the 
unofficial repression by patriotic mobs made campaigning for the core issue of the 
UDC increasingly difficult. Consequently, the UDC turned more and more towards 
the fundamental issues of civil liberties and democracy in wartime. For this purpose 
it collaborated closely with organisations such as the National Council for Civil 
Liberties and dedicated much of its available resources to campaign for political 
prisoners such as its prominent members E. D. Morel and Bertrand Russell. 
However, the UDC never subscribed to any form of ‘revolutionary defeatism’ and 
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never saw itself in fundamental opposition to the British state. On contrary, the 
campaign for civil liberties was based on a liberal version of British patriotism that 
emphasised the libertarian and democratic traditions of the British people. In this 
view, the UDC defended genuinely British values against the increasingly 
authoritarian wartime state. Instead of overthrowing the liberal democratic state, 
which many revolutionary socialists wanted to replace with a Soviet-style system, 
the UDC insisted that liberty and democracy should be taken seriously even in times 
of severe crisis and must not become mere shibboleths of the wartime propaganda. 
The explicit commitment to civil liberties was a direct response to the experiences 
of activists under the state of exception. Yet, instead of defining itself in 
fundamental opposition to the political system as a whole, the UDC developed 
further its own conceptions of democracy and civil liberties.  
 
 
Comparison  
 
At the beginning of the First World War very similar activist organisations, which 
were critical towards the war, emerged in Britain and Germany. Despite being 
labelled ‘pacifist’ by an often hostile press, neither UDC nor DFG and BNV were 
fundamentally in opposition to the war. What they criticised was the international 
system of secret diplomacy and the lack of democratic control of foreign affairs. In 
this respect organisations such as the UDC and the BNV followed very similar aims 
and continued the liberal pacifist traditions of the pre-war period. The strategies 
these organisations used, nevertheless differed significantly. Whilst the New 
Fatherland League explicitly constituted itself as an elitist academic lobby group, 
the UDC sought to create popular support for its aims. The propaganda of the UDC 
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particularly targeted working class audiences and had considerable success in doing 
so.  
A possible explanation for this difference in strategy of the German and 
British organisations can be found in the different political cultures of both 
countries. Pacifism in Britain was after all an established part of the political culture 
of the country. The German Peace Society, on the other hand, had remained on the 
margins of national politics. And despite its well-connected political network, the 
German pacifists never achieved a similar public recognition as their British 
counterparts. Additionally, the conditions for popular pacifist politics were more 
favourable in Britain during the first two years of the war. Under the liberal Asquith 
Cabinet and coalition government, repressive emergency measures were only 
hesitantly used against the UDC. In contrast, in Germany military commanders and 
police banned public political activities almost entirely thus limiting the 
possibilities for public meetings and mass propaganda significantly. Yet apart from 
these internal factors, the established associational culture of German pacifism was 
also intrinsically elitist and never really adopted the methods and strategies of 
popular mass politics. Whereas the UDC could build on the practical experiences 
of leading liberal and labour activists such as Ramsay Macdonald or E. D. Morel, 
the German organisations lacked similar popular figures. Yet another feature both 
movements shared are the close links to sympathetic parliamentarians. The UDC’s 
main executive consisted almost entirely of Liberal and Labour MPs and the 
German peace movement could at least build on the support of some liberal and 
SPD members of the Reichstag. These connections to the political elites in Germany 
and Britain might help to explain why neither UDC nor DFG and BNV saw 
themselves in fundamental opposition to the state and political system. Unlike 
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radical socialist anti-war activists they never actively promoted the revolutionary 
overthrow of the existing order but rather its gradual democratic reform.  
Yet, despite this rather tame pacifist stance, organisations in both countries 
faced the hostile reactions of the right-wing press and consequently prosecution by 
the authorities. In both countries, excessive censorship was used to limit the 
publicity for the activities of dissident groups. Moreover, particularly during the 
later course of the war individual activists were also targeted by emergency 
measures and gaoled on the grounds of dubious accusations. The mentioned cases 
of E. D. Morel’s and Bertrand Russell’s imprisonment and the protective custody 
against the BNV secretary Lilly Janasch are exemplary for the escalation of 
repression after 1916. Activists in both countries reacted to these emergency 
measures in similar ways. The initial response to repressive emergency measures 
was to use the traditional instruments of the rule of law. The responses of the 
organisations in both countries were marked by a deeply-rooted legalism. This strict 
legalism also distinguished the activities of the UDC and German pacifist groups 
from those of revolutionary socialist groups or radical trade unionists. Members of 
UDC and BNV regularly filed legal appeals against emergency decrees in the hope 
that the judiciary would protect them against all too intrusive state measures.  
Yet as we have seen earlier, judges themselves often understood their role on 
the home front more as legal warriors whose role it was to fight the ‘enemies 
within’. That organisations such as the UDC and the BNV were seen as part of this 
category was not least the result of press campaigns against them. Ironically, the 
severe handling of censorship in Germany at least partially prevented a similarly 
extensive and hostile campaign as that which took place in Britain. Yet, in both 
countries the exercise of censorship was unbalanced and mainly targeting 
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dissenting newspapers and publications whilst the ‘patriotic’ press broadly operated 
without too much interference. The ways activist organisations reacted to the 
described state repression yet again featured some interesting similarities but also 
significant differences. In Germany, the DFG and BNV limited themselves to 
lobbying the Reichstag. This was at least partially successful when the majority 
parties in the parliament forced the Imperial Government to enact some reforms of 
the state of siege. The military commanders, however, kept most of the bans on 
pacifist activities in force until the end of the war.  
Yet despite the obvious limitations of their strictly legalistic approach, neither 
the DFG nor the BNV attempted to collaborate with the radical socialist anti-war 
activists around Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. On the contrary, the 
German peace movement emphasised its patriotic motives and distanced itself from 
radical war resisters. Instead it was pointed out that allowing pacifist activities 
would benefit the German war effort as it would show the world that Germany was 
not the hotbed of militarism which the allied propaganda presented it as. This 
argument was most likely a tactical one but it also demonstrates that the German 
pacifists did not consider themselves as outside the national collective or as 
‘enemies within’. The UDC, on the other hand, took another route in its struggle 
for civil liberties in wartime. After the Union faced increasing repression by the 
British state, it changed the focus of its activities to the protection of civil liberties 
in wartime. For this purpose it collaborated closely with the National Council for 
Civil Liberties and other dissident organisations. In contrast to their German 
counterparts, the British campaign for civil liberties in wartime sought to address a 
mass audience. The UDC and NCCL also used a language of patriotism, which 
pointed out the liberal and democratic traditions of the British people. This was the 
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subversive attempt to turn the claims of the state propaganda to fight a war for 
freedom and democracy into a weapon of critique. The criticism that Britain had 
turned into a copy of what it claimed to combat by adapting authoritarian and 
militaristic policies became a commonplace in the debate about the state of 
exception. It was probably also the first time that this argument was broadly used 
in political discourse in Britain. Activists in Germany followed this development, 
however, it was not until 1920 that the New Fatherland League was renamed the 
German League for Human Rights. In both countries, however, civil liberties 
activism emerged as a direct result of the experiences of pacifist activists with the 
state of exception during the First World War.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The discussion of the experiences of pacifist activists under the state of exception 
demonstrated that the First World War was indeed a severe rupture in the political 
cultures of Britain and Germany. Under the circumstances of an increasingly total 
war, even politically well-integrated and middle-class organisations such as the 
UDC in Britain or the various academic-pacifist organisations in Germany became 
the target of repressive emergency measures. This cannot be entirely explained by 
the activities of these groups themselves. In contrast to the radical and revolutionary 
socialist anti-war movement, neither the UDC nor German groups such as the BNV 
openly opposed the war nor did they undertake significant efforts to end it by mass 
action. Instead of advocating revolutionary action against the war, pacifist 
organisations in both countries demanded the gradual democratic reform of foreign 
policy and the establishment of an international system of open diplomacy and 
arbitration. They faced, nevertheless, almost the same degree of repressive 
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emergency measures such as censorship, surveillance and imprisonment of leading 
activists. A probable explanation for this is the fact that pacifist activities were 
construed as a threat to the national war effort and national unity. As a consequence 
pacifist activists were also indiscriminately integrated into the vague category of 
‘enemies within’. This gave the authorities and, particularly in Britain, ‘patriotic’ 
press and associations enough justification to suppress their activities. The role of 
the right-wing press was here of particular importance in the process of constructing 
the category of ‘enemies within’. The hostile press was certainly also a contributing 
factor to the authorities’ attitude towards pacifist activities during the war.  
Yet, activists reacted in similar ways to the challenges posed by emergency 
government under the state of exception. In both countries, organisations adhered 
to an almost exaggerated legalism and sought to avoid evoking the impression that 
the public accusations of seditious or treasonous acts would be right. The UDC 
sought to discourage German-born British subjects and enemy aliens from joining 
the Union, and in Germany the DFG and BNV publically distanced themselves 
from the radical anti-war opposition. These public statements and symbolic 
renunciation of radical anti-war activism, however, had no significant impact on the 
attitudes of the right-wing press and most authorities. They furthermore sought to 
use their contacts with sympathetic parliamentarians to raise their grievances in the 
House of Commons and the Reichstag. Whilst the German pacifists broadly limited 
themselves to lobbying the parliament, the UDC also embarked on a campaign for 
the protection of civil liberties in wartime. For this purpose it joined forces with 
anti-conscription groups and supported the activities of the National Council for 
Civil Liberties. This campaign addressed primarily other activists and working class 
audiences, yet it essentially failed to achieve its aims. For example, the campaigns 
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for prominent political prisoners such as Bertrand Russell or E. D. Morel could not 
achieve any major improvements of their internment conditions. Moreover, the 
majority of emergency degrees that were used to suppress the activities of pacifist 
groups remained in force until the end of the war and beyond. In Germany, it took 
until 1920 before the German League for Human Rights, a similarly dedicated 
activist organisation materialised. The fact, however, that it emerged from the New 
Fatherland League suggests a similar connection between the experiences under the 
state of siege and the commitment for civil liberties and democracy.  
Despite the failure of the struggle for civil liberties during the First World 
War, the campaign has a particular historical significance. The issue of civil 
liberties as a field of dedicated activism emerged as a direct response to the 
experiences of activists under the state of exception. These experiences triggered 
an intensified debate about the character of the state, the legitimate boundaries of 
its actions and the individual rights of its citizens. It is thus necessary to understand 
the impact of emergency government and the activist responses to it as a defining 
moment in the history of the struggle for civil liberties. Moreover, the emergence 
of civil liberties activism during and after the First World War shaped the arguments 
and language that would later also be found in the discourses about human rights. 
Not least in this respect the experiences of the First World War shaped the political 
culture of the twentieth century. 
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Conclusions 
The phenomenon of the state of exception offers a unique insight into the question 
of how European societies experienced and endured the First World War. The 
domestic politics of war, which were epitomised by its legal frameworks such as 
the Defence of the Realm Act in Britain or the state of siege in Germany, provide 
excellent materials to understand and analyse this problem. Furthermore, the 
comparative approach offered in this thesis helped to establish some of the shared 
essential features of the state of exception in Britain and Germany during the First 
World War as well as their national particularities. As we have seen, the First World 
War and its developments on the home fronts featured many aspects that affected 
the belligerent societies in very similar ways. The experience of emergency 
government during the war in Britain and Germany and its impact on their political 
culture illustrate this very well.  
 
 
Continuity and Change: The First World War as a Laboratory for Radicalised 
Practices 
 
The rise of the phenomenon of the state of exception as a paradigm of rule was a 
direct consequence of the emergence of the central state and of conceptions of the 
rule of law during the nineteenth century. In the German Empire and its predecessor 
states (particularly Prussia), the establishment of a written constitution in the wake 
of the 1848-49 revolutions triggered the almost simultaneous enactment of 
emergency laws. In Prussia, the Law regarding the State of Siege was enacted as 
early as 1851. It allowed the authorities to suspend those articles of the Prussian 
constitution that protected the most essential rights and liberties of its citizens. It 
 
345 
 
subsequently became part of the German imperial constitution of 1871 and 
remained unchanged until 1914.  
The development of emergency government in Britain followed a different 
path, primarily due to the fact that no written constitution existed and hence no 
legislation suspending it was required. Instead of explicit comprehensive pieces of 
emergency legislation, individual acts of parliament served similar purposes to that 
of the state of siege in Germany. The Riot Act of 1714, for example, enabled local 
authorities to establish a temporary and spatially confined state of exception to deal 
with occurrences of public unrest. The proverbial reading of the Riot Act also 
enabled them to requisition troops and to order the application of lethal force against 
protesters. Throughout the nineteenth century, these powers were primarily used to 
suppress political dissent for example by the Chartists in the first half of the century, 
and social protest in form of strike movements in the second half. The development 
in Prussia and Germany bore similar trends. Troops were regularly brought in to 
quell strike movements particularly in the 1880s and 1890s. Yet, especially the 
Socialist Laws demonstrated that the concept of the state of exception had a 
profound political character apart from its function in keeping public peace and 
order. The militarisation of policing industrial unrests, however, increasingly 
clashed with liberal and progressive conceptions of the state. Incidents where the 
use of military force had led to fatalities amongst protesters triggered an intense 
criticism of the ways in which public order was policed. They eventually led to the 
emergence of modern professional police forces in both countries as agents of 
public order and security policies. In Germany, the emerging police forces also 
assumed the task of monitoring and suppressing the allegedly subversive activities 
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of the labour movement, something that emerged in Britain only a short time before 
the outbreak of the First World War.  
Against this backdrop, the development of emergency government during the 
First World War has to be considered a continuation and aggravation of already 
existing tendencies in both countries. In Germany, the surveillance of labour 
activists and dissenting organisations and the militarised policing of strikes and 
protests were already well-established practices when the war came in 1914. The 
state of siege legislation merely abolished civilian control of the police forces and 
enabled the local military commanders to rule by decree in their districts. This 
removed the existing legal restraints to the described practices and facilitated their 
radicalisation. There was a strong element of continuity between the pre-war 
practices and the regime under the state of siege in Germany. The enactment of the 
Defence of the Realm Act in Britain, by contrast, marks a much more significant 
rupture with established pre-war practices. Ideals of the rule of law and liberal 
conceptions of the state such as those enshrined in the influential theories of Albert 
Venn Dicey explicitly rejected emergency laws. The Defence of the Realm Act with 
its wide-ranging emergency powers, its system of delegated legislation and the 
initial establishment of extra-ordinary courts martial was therefore probably the 
most radical break with legal and political traditions in modern British history. 
However, whereas the legal forms and the political circumstances of DORA were 
certainly marked by rupture, the exercise of emergency powers continued 
developments of the pre-war period.  
In both countries, the emerging systems of emergency government and their 
development during the war should be understood as a process of modernisation of 
existing political practices. The prolonged character of the war and the escalating 
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domestic crises in both countries worked as a catalyst for the development of the 
state of exception from an instrument of public order policing into a complete 
paradigm of authoritarian rule. 
 
 
Crises, Protest and Enforced Endurance: The Dynamics of Emergency 
Government during the War 
 
 In order to understand what drove the modernisation and radicalisation of 
emergency government during the war, we have to understand the societal contexts 
in both countries. The legal frameworks of emergency government in both countries 
were established in the first days of the war and then gradually amended and 
adapted throughout the duration of the war. Overall, however, the establishment of 
emergency government cannot entirely be explained by the necessities of war itself. 
Most of the policies set into operation in the early weeks of the war had been 
designed in the years before 1914 and were strongly influenced by pre-war 
assessments of the potential political developments in case of a major European 
war. In Germany, the authorities maintained their repressive attitude towards the 
organised labour movement despite the domestic truce policy of the Burgfrieden 
even though no serious opposition to the war emerged until mid-1916. The British 
War Book, which contained the main departmental policies, was strongly 
influenced by the experiences of the Second Boer War of 1899-1902. In the years 
immediately before the First World War, the British military pushed for the 
preparation of a wide-ranging emergency powers bill, which was, nevertheless, 
blocked by the Asquith Cabinet. In August 1914, however, government and 
parliament met the demands of the military almost entirely fulfilled and without 
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discussions. Whereas in Germany the declaration of the state of siege was merely 
an automatic response to the outbreak of the war, it was a deliberate political 
decision in Britain. The reasons for this decision cannot be established with 
certainty and will remain open for interpretation and discussion.  
Nonetheless, although the given powers were wide-ranging and barely 
controlled by legal and political instances, the first two years of the war were 
marked by a remarkable self-restraint in both countries. In Britain, the Asquith 
administration favoured a ‘business as usual’ approach to the conduct of the war. 
However, the growing need to fully mobilise the industrial and manpower resources 
of the country and the linked pieces of legislation such as the Munitions of War Act 
of 1915 and the introduction of conscription in January 1916 facilitated the 
emergence of large-scale protest movements. Anti-war protest was soon perceived 
as a vital threat to the war effort and, in reaction, emergency powers were 
increasingly used to suppress it. Developments in Germany featured a similar 
dynamic. Here, the local military commanders in their army corps districts 
monopolised the executive power and followed their own political agenda in 
exercising them. And despite the fact that soon after the outbreak of the war, 
emergency decrees regulated almost every aspect of daily life, a certain leniency 
seems to have prevailed at least for those who were perceived as being part of the 
wartime national community. Yet, with the aggravated crisis in food supplies and 
the increasing mobilisation of industrial and manpower resources from 1916 
onwards, emergency powers were exercised increasingly harshly. 
The total mobilisation on the home fronts triggered a dynamic of protest and 
repression in which emergency powers played a crucial role. Yet, repressive 
emergency measures must not only be understood as a reaction to radicalised 
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protests. They were also means to enforce endurance against the backdrop of 
faltering self-mobilisation and growing war weariness in Britain and Germany. 
There were, of course, attempts to use extensive propaganda campaigns to stimulate 
societal mobilisation, yet the repression of protests and strikes was a crucial factor 
to maintain the war effort. The ways this was achieved differed to a degree between 
Britain and Germany. In Germany, the police forces soon proved to be 
insufficiently staffed and equipped to deal with large-scale protest. This led to an 
increased militarisation of the policing of strikes and additionally fuelled to logic 
of radicalisation and confrontation. In Britain, on the other hand, the military was 
only reluctantly used to suppress strikes and protest. Instead, patriotic civilian 
organisations and newspapers such as the Daily Express and the Morning Post 
organised violent mobs that regularly broke up anti-war meetings and 
demonstrations often with the tacit support of the police. This strategy, however, 
helped the authorities to avoid the use of uniformed policemen and soldiers in direct 
confrontations with organised dissenters, thus avoiding a similar spiral of escalation 
of protest and repression as in Germany. Nevertheless, the violent suppression of 
strikes in Liverpool and Glasgow in 1919 as well as the deployment of troops in 
Ireland after 1916 illustrates that the British government and military leadership 
was prepared and willing to use harsh violence to quell unrest. The development 
and gradual extension of emergency powers during the war has to be seen as part 
of a dynamic development. The totalisation of warfare, the total mobilisation of 
national resources, strikes and anti-war protest as well as emergency measures were 
entangled and interdependent aspects of wartime politics in both countries.  
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The Enemies Within 
 
The exercise of emergency powers during the war did not affect everyone in the 
same way. The agents of emergency government in the police, military and the 
judiciary were strongly influenced by concepts of domestic enmity and understood 
their function on the home fronts as being the guardians of the wartime national 
collective. Hence, the majority of repressive emergency measures were directed 
against specific groups that were construed as outside these wartime national 
communities. Initially, this concerned groups of enemy aliens against whom the 
first extremely repressive emergency measures such as detention without trial were 
directed. These persons were often treated as representatives of the external enemy 
on the home front. Yet, the measures against enemy aliens seem to have been a 
testing ground for practices that were eventually also used against anti-war 
dissenters and strike leaders. Practices such as detention without trial, restriction 
orders or deportations from certain areas were first used against enemy aliens but 
later also used to prevent or quell protest. In the same way that repressive 
emergency measures were extended to more and more groups, so too were the 
accompanying discourses about ‘enemies within’. This initially narrow concept was 
gradually extended throughout the war and eventually included diverse groups such 
as pacifists, socialist dissenters, communist revolutionaries but also marginalised 
groups such as prostitutes, homosexuals and vagrants. They all had in common that 
they were perceived as being outside the national communities and as a threats to 
the successful conduct of the war. The discourses about the enemies helped to 
reinforce the ideas and boundaries of national unity and solidarity, yet they also 
justified the unrestrained use of emergency powers against those outside these 
imagined communities. The ideas of the enemies within were often based on pre-
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existing stereotypes. In Germany, the concept of ‘enemies of the realm’ formed part 
of the professional mentality of the police, judges and military at least since the 
time of the Socialist Laws. In Britain, these concepts seem to have emerged in their 
elaborate form during the war but they were certainly founded in Victorian notions 
of respectability and reliability. Yet, also here emergency measures primarily 
targeted those constructed as ‘enemies in the midst’ – a term initially used for 
enemy aliens but later also extended to anti-war dissenters and strikers. These 
definitions were in many cases arbitrary and not necessarily based on the actual 
activities of those defined as enemies within. It seems, however, the more idealised 
and the more ideologised the construction of the wartime national communities 
became, the more antagonistic and radicalised the conceptions of the enemies 
within appeared. 
 
 
Responses to Emergency Government 
 
The case studies of the Union of Democratic Control and the German pacifist 
organisations have demonstrated that the responses to repressive emergency 
measures were indeed ambiguous. Organised anti-war protest in both countries was 
heterogeneous and far from being a unified movement. Nevertheless, the perception 
of these diverse activist organisations by the authorities often showed little 
differentiation and made them almost indiscriminately targets of emergency 
measures. Members of these organisations reacted in different ways, yet they also 
showed some comparable patterns in their responses to emergency measures. For 
activists with a background in the radical labour movement experiences of 
repressive emergency measures certainly contributed to a radicalisation process and 
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antagonistic politics. The initial enthusiasm with which, for example, the 
Independent Labour Party and the British Socialist Party welcomed the Russian 
February Revolution in 1917 provides evidence for this tendency. Yet, it seems that 
this radicalisation in Britain remained constrained to a comparatively small group 
of activists during the war. In Germany, by contrast, the combination of social 
grievances and anti-war protest facilitated a radicalisation of large swathes of the 
organised working classes from 1917 onwards. This process was reinforced by the 
increasingly militarised policing of the home front and eventually paved the way 
for the revolutionary overthrow of the old political order of the Empire. A 
comparable radicalisation of working class protest occurred in Britain only after the 
war in 1919. 
The example of moderate critics of the war demonstrates, however, that the 
responses to emergency measures were often complex and multi-faceted. Instead 
of rejecting the existing political order, organisations such as the Union of 
Democratic Control in Britain and New Fatherland League in Germany advocated 
democratic reforms and appealed to progressive notions of national identity. 
Particularly the UDC emphasised the liberal and democratic traditions in British 
history and saw its main task as defending established ‘British’ liberties and 
freedoms against the intrusions of the wartime state. In its wartime pamphlets and 
speeches, the UDC used strikingly modern concepts of civil liberties and ‘deep’ 
democracy, which seemed to foreshadow some of the later discourses about civil 
liberties and human rights. In the context of these campaigns for civil liberties in 
wartime, being patriotic and being critical towards the war were not necessarily 
incompatible. The German activists also sought to present their activities as an 
expression of pacifism, yet they were not as able to appeal to a positive notion of 
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patriotism as long as the authoritarian order of the Empire prevailed. Nevertheless, 
many German pacifists embraced the newly-founded Weimar Republic and 
promoted similar ideas and ideals to those the UDC sought to popularise during the 
war. In 1922, this development was underlined by the renaming of the wartime New 
Fatherland League as the German Society for Human Rights. During the interwar 
years the leadership of the UDC and the German activists established and 
maintained amicable contacts and promoted a shared notion of democratic pacifism 
based on the concept of civil liberties.  
For some activists the experience of massive state repression seems to have 
facilitated a turn towards revolutionary and antagonistic politics. This was certainly 
the case for those already on the left of the organised labour movement. Other 
activists, however, reacted to the experience of unrestrained repressive state power 
by re-appreciating and reaffirming concepts such as democracy, the rule of law and 
the idea of civil liberties.  
 
 
Perspectives for Future Research 
 
As a whole, this thesis has offered a comparative perspective on the phenomenon 
of emergency government in Britain and Germany during the First World War. Yet, 
some questions about the impact of experiences with state of exception during the 
First World War on the developments in the interwar period remain open. More 
comparative studies are needed to understand how the various systems of 
emergency government influenced endurance on the home fronts in other 
belligerent countries such as France, Russia, Austria-Hungary or Italy. 
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Furthermore, the impact of these phenomena on the development of political 
thought in Europe and beyond deserve a thorough analysis. 
In addition, the question how practices and experiences of the First World 
War fed into the emerging systems of totalitarian rule in the 1920s and 1930s 
provides a fascinating avenue for further research. All of these future projects 
should, however, appreciate the possibilities of comparative and transnational 
approaches to understanding the First World War and to locating it in the wider 
trajectory of the political, social and cultural history of the twentieth century. This 
is something that can only be achieved, if the established constraints of national 
historical narratives are overcome.  
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Appendices 
 
1. Law regarding the State of Siege of 4 June 1851 (Gesetz über den 
Belagerungszustand vom 4. Juni 1851) 
 
§1 – In case of a war, every commander of a fortress, or commanding general of an army 
corps district, in areas threatened or already occupied by the enemy, is authorised to declare 
the state of siege for his fortress and the belonging rayon, or army corps district either in 
parts or as a whole. 
§2 – The state of siege can also be declared in times of peace and war in cases of 
insurgencies when urgent danger for the public security is imminent. 
In these cases the declaration of the state of siege is issued by the State Ministry, but can 
also provisionally be ordered by the highest commanding military officer in a district, 
which is subject to the confirmation by the State Ministry. Under usual circumstances the 
chief administrative officer of a governmental district will request this from the respective 
local military commander. However, in cases of exigencies and imminent danger local 
military commanders will be able to declare the state of siege on their own capacity. 
§3 – The declaration of the state of siege is to be announced with drum beat and bugle-call, 
notice to local authorities as well as printed notices in public places without delay. The 
revocation of the state of siege is to be announced by notice to the local authorities and 
public notices. 
§4 – All executive powers demise to the military commander with the declaration of the 
state of siege. The civilian and municipal authorities are bound to follow decrees and orders 
of the military commanders. 
The military commanders are personally accountable for their respective orders. 
§5 – If it is deemed necessary to suspend the articles 5, 6 , 7, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 36 of the 
constitutional charter, individually or as a whole, temporally and district-wise, a public 
notice as described viz. §3 is required. 
The suspension of the mentioned articles is only permissible for districts in which the state 
of siege has been declared, and only for the duration of its declaration. 
§6 – For the duration of the state of siege all military personnel is subject to the laws enacted 
for the state of war. They are also subject to §8 and §9 of this law. 
§7 – In places and districts under the state of siege the local military commander exercises 
the military jurisdiction over all military personnel. 
He also has the right to confirm all martial law verdicts. Exempted from this prerogative 
are in peace time death sentences, which are subject to confirmation by the commanding 
general of the province. 
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Regarding the handling of minor military offences, the provisions of the military penal code 
remain in force. 
§8 – If a person commits intentional arson, intentionally endeavours to bring about a flood, 
commits an armed attack with weapons or dangerous articles on the armed forces or 
representatives of military or civilian authorities shall be sentenced to death. 
If there are mitigating circumstances the death sentence can be commuted to 10 or 20 years 
of penal servitude. 
§9 – If a person, in a district or place in which the state of siege is declared, endeavours to: 
a) make false statements regarding the numbers, marching directions, or alleged 
successes of the enemy or insurgents, which are likely to mislead the civil and 
military authorities, or 
b) break a decree or prohibition issued by the military commander in the interest of 
the public security, or incites others to do see, or 
c) incite others – successfully or without success – to the felonies of insurgency, 
resistance, liberation of prisoners, or other offences viz. §8, or 
d) incite military personnel to the felony of insubordination or breeches of military 
discipline, shall be – if the laws do not provide a more severe punishment – sentenced 
to 1 year of penal servitude. 
§10 – If article 7 of the constitutional charter is suspended, the established courts martial 
are responsible for the investigation and prosecution the felonies of high treason, treason, 
murder, insurgency, resistance, destruction of railways and telegraphs, liberation of 
prisoners, mutiny, robbery, looting, ransom, incitement to insubordination, and the 
offences under §8 and §9 in so far as the aforementioned offences are committed after the 
declaration of the state of siege. 
High treason and treason are – until a penal code for the whole monarchy is enacted – 
defined in accordance to the §§ 75 and 106 of the Rhenish penal code all offences and 
felonies against the domestic and foreign security of the state. 
If the suspension of § 7 is in peace time not ordered by the State Ministry, the proceedings 
and sentences of courts martial are suspended until the State Ministry confirms them. 
§11 – Courts martial consist of five members, of which two have to be judges of the local 
civilian courts of law and three military officers appointed by the local commanders. The 
appointed officers should at least hold the rank of captain. If no sufficient numbers of high-
ranking officers are available, the next lower ranking officers are to be co-opted.  
If in a besieged fortress no civilian judges are present, the local commander can replace 
them by members of the municipal council. Is no civilian judge present in a fortress, at least 
an auditor is always member of the court martial. 
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The number of courts martial depends on the necessities of the commanding generals in 
which the state of siege is declared. The size of the circuit is defined by the commanding 
general. 
§12 – Courts martial are presided by a judge. The presiding judge is responsible to ensure 
that the civilian and military members of the court who are no professional judges 
themselves are instructed and sworn in on the impartial, legal, and conscientious conduct 
of the trial.  
The commanding general appoints an auditor or officer as a reporter. The reporter is 
obliged to control the application of the law and to facilitate the finding the truth. The 
reporter has no vote in the trial. 
A civil servant appointed by the military commander serves as court writer. 
§13 – The proceedings before courts martial shall be conducted as follows: 
1. The proceedings is to be held in presence and public; the public can be excluded 
by a public declaration if it is in the interest of the public good. 
2. The defendant has the right to a legal counsel. If he does not choose a barrister 
and the offence is likely to be punished with more than one year of penal servitude, 
the president of the court will provide him with one ex officio. 
3. The court reporter reads out the charges brought forward against the defendant. 
The defendant is then asked to explain himself. The presentations of the other bodies 
of evidence follows. The court reporter presents the results of the parole evidence 
and the provisions of the law, the last statement is made by the defendant and his 
legal counsel. The verdict is decided by majority decision of the court after 
immediate non-public deliberation and is handed-down to the defendant 
immediately. 
4. The court can pass a sentence according to the law, acquit the defendant or refer 
the case to an ordinary court of law. Acquitted defendants are to be immediately 
released from custody. The referral to an ordinary court of law is chosen if the court 
martial declares itself not competent, in such case the custody is either to be 
prolonged or suspended by the court. 
5. The verdict – which includes the day of the trial, the names of the judges, the 
summary statement of the defendant, the summary of the reviewed evidence, and the 
legal basis of the verdict – is to be signed by all judges and the court writer. 
6. There is no appeal to decisions of the court martial. The death sentences are subject 
to confirmation by the commanding military officer viz. §7, and peace time by the 
commanding general of the province. 
7. All sentences with the exception of the death penalty are to be executed within 24 
hours after the rendition of the sentence. Death penalties are to be executed with 24 
hours of their confirmation. 
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8. Death sentences are executed by firing squad. Death sentences not executed after 
the revocation of the state of siege, are commuted by an ordinary court of law into 
the equivalent punishment of the same felony under civilian jurisdiction. 
§14 – The courts martial cease their activity after the state of siege is revoked. 
§15 – After the revocation of the state of siege all passed sentences and bodies of evidence 
and proceedings are to be transferred to the ordinary courts of law. The ordinary courts of 
law will hear all unresolved proceedings and will pass sentences according to the ordinary 
laws except for those offences created under §9. 
§16 – Also in cases of war and insurgency in which the state of siege is not declared, the 
State Ministry can suspend the articles 5, 6, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 36 of the constitutional 
charter, individually or as a whole, for certain defined districts. 
§17 – The chambers of parliament are to be informed immediately respectively at their next 
convention about the suspension of the articles viz. §5 or viz. §16. 
§18 – All laws and decrees with contradicting provisions are hereby revoked. 
(Source: Preußische Gesetzsammlung 1851, p. 451, translation by André Keil) 
 
 
2. Law regarding the Detention and Restriction of Presence on Basis 
of the State of War and State of Siege of 4 December 1916 (Protective 
Custody Law) 
(Gesetz betreffend die Verhaftung und Aufenthaltsbeschränkung auf Grund des 
Kriegszustandes und des Belagerungszustandes vom 4. Dezember 1916) 
 
Great Headquarter, 4 December 1916 
We Wilhelm, by the grace of god German Emperor, King of Prussia etc. 
decree in the name of the Empire, after receiving consent of Reichstag and Federal Council 
what follows: 
§1 - Detention or restriction of presence by the executive power on the basis of the state of 
war and siege are only permitted if they are necessary to avert dangers for the security of 
the empire. 
§2 - The warrant is to be issued in written form and to be given to notice to the detainee 
immediately during or after the arrest. A written copy is to be issued if demanded. The 
reasons for the detention are to be stated in the warrant. 
§3 - Every detainee has the right to appeal against his detention at the Imperial Military 
Court [Reichsmilitärgericht]. Detainees have to be informed about this possibility when 
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the warrant is issued. The Imperial Military Court decides about appeals with a staff of four 
judges and three military members. 
The Imperial Military Court can order an oral proceeding. It is obliged to do so, if the 
detainee demands it. The detainee can be interrogated by a judge or his deputy. 
§4 - The detainee has to be interrogated at latest one day after his arrest by a judge regarding 
whether and if so what objections against his detention are raised. 
§5 - A warrant is to be revoked if the reasons and purpose of the detention have become 
obsolete, or after three months after the date of arrest have passed.  
A new warrant for the continuation of the detention after a period of three months can only 
be ordered after the renewed examination of the circumstances. For this purpose a decision 
by the Imperial Military Court is necessary even if no appeal has been made. 
§6 - §116 of the code of criminal procedure applies to the execution of the detention. 
§7 - The detainee has the right to a legal counsel. The provisions of §§137 para. 2 and 
§§138 of the code of criminal procedure apply here. 
§8 - The judge in whose circuit the arrest has been made or in which the detainee is present, 
can provide the detainee with a legal counsel ex officio. A legal counsel has to be provided 
if the detainee demands it after a period of two weeks of detention. The detainee has to be 
informed about this right during his interrogation. The appointment of a legal counsel is 
obsolete if the detainee chooses his own legal advisor. 
§9 - The defence barrister has the right to see the occurring files regarding the detention. 
Written and oral communication between detainee and legal counsel is admitted. 
§10 - The legal counsel of a detainee and her husband are to be admitted as amices curiae 
and are to be heard if demanded. 
§11 - The provisions of §§2 to 5 and §§7 to 10 of this law are also to be applied to 
restrictions of presence. 
§12 - A detention under this law is offsettable against other prison sentences. 
§13 - If the Imperial Military Court revokes the detention because its reasons and 
circumstances were not given for its declaration and continuation, the detainee is entitled 
to compensation. 
The Imperial Military Court can award claims for compensation also in cases, in which it 
did not revoke the detention or restriction of presence itself.  
The claim for compensation arises against the Empire, if the detention was ordered by a 
military commander or imperial civil servant. In all other cases the claim arises against the 
federal state of which a civil servant ordered the arrest.  As for the rest, the provisions of 
the Imperial Law of 14 July 1904 apply to the claim of compensation and its proceeding. 
The necessary guidelines for its execution are issued by the Federal Council. 
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(Source: Gesetz, betreffend die Verhaftung und Aufenthaltsbeschränkung auf Grund des 
Kriegszustandes und des Belagerungszustandes vom 4. Dezember 1916.“ Reichs-
Gesetzblatt, p. 1329, translation: André Keil) 
 
 
3. The Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914 
(5 Geo. 5, c. 8). 
An Act to consolidate and amend the Defence of the Realm Acts. 
[27th November, 1914.] 
BE it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, 
and by the authority of the same, as follows: 
1. 
(1) His Majesty in Council has power during the continuance of the present war to issue 
regulations for securing the public safety and the defence of the realm, and as to the powers 
and duties for that purpose of the Admiralty and Army Council and of the members of His 
Majesty's forces and other persons acting in his behalf; and may by such regulations 
authorise the trial by courts-martial, or in the case of minor offences by courts of summary 
jurisdiction, and punishment of persons committing offences against the regulations and in 
particular against any of the provisions of such regulations designed — 
(a) to prevent persons communicating with the enemy or obtaining information for 
that purpose or any purpose calculated to jeopardise the success of the operations of 
any of His Majesty's forces or the forces of his allies or to assist the enemy; or 
(b) to secure the safety of His Majesty's forces and ships and the safety of any means 
of communication and of railways, ports, and harbours; or 
(c) to prevent the spread of false reports or reports likely to cause disaffection to His 
Majesty or to interfere with the success of His Majesty's forces by land or sea or to 
prejudice His Majesty's relations with foreign powers ; or 
(d) to secure the navigation of vessels in accordance with directions given by or 
under the authority of the Admiralty ; or 
(e) otherwise to prevent assistance being given to the enemy or the successful 
prosecution of the war being endangered.  
(2) Any such regulations may provide for the suspension of any restrictions on the 
acquisition or user of land, or the exercise of the power of making byelaws, or any other 
power under the Defence Acts, 1842 to 1875, or the Military Lands Acts, 1891 to 1903, 
and any such regulations or any orders made thereunder affecting the pilotage of vessels 
may supersede any enactment, order, charter, byelaw, regulation or provision as to pilotage. 
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 (3) It shall be lawful for the Admiralty or Army Council — 
(a) to require that there shall be placed at their disposal the whole or any part of the 
output of any factory or workshop in which arms, ammunition, or warlike stores or 
equipment, or any articles required for the production thereof, are manufactured 
(b) to take possession of and use for the purpose of His Majesty's naval or military 
service any such factory or workshop or any plant thereof; 
and regulations under this Act may be made accordingly. 
(4) For the purpose of the trial of a person for an offence under the regulations by court-
martial and the punishment thereof, the person may be proceeded against and dealt with as 
if he were a person subject to military law and had on active service committed an offence 
under section five of the Army Act: 
Provided that where it is proved that the offence is committed with the intention of assisting 
the enemy a person convicted of such an offence by a court-martial shall be liable to suffer 
death. 
(5) For the purpose of the trial of a person for an offence under the regulations by a court 
of summary jurisdiction and the punishment thereof, the offence shall be deemed to have 
been committed either at the place in which the same actually was committed or in any 
place in which the offender may be, and the maximum penalty which may be inflicted shall 
be imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term of six months or a fine of one 
hundred pounds, or both such imprisonment and fine ; section seventeen of the Summary 
Jurisdiction Act, 1879, shall not apply to charges of offences against the regulations, but 
any person aggrieved by a conviction of a court of summary jurisdiction may appeal in 
England to a court of quarter sessions, and in Scotland under and in terms of the Summary 
Jurisdiction (Scotland) Acts; and in Ireland in manner provided by the Summary 
Jurisdiction (Ireland) Acts. 
(6) The regulations may authorise a court-martial or court of summary jurisdiction, in 
addition to any other punishment, to order the forfeiture of any goods in respect of which 
an offence against the regulations has been committed. 
2.  
(1) This Act may be cited as the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914. 
(2) The Defence of the Realm Act, 1914, and the Defence of the Realm (No. 2) Act, 1914, 
are hereby repealed, but nothing in this repeal shall affect any Orders in Council made 
thereunder, and all such Orders in Council shall, until altered or revoked by an Order in. 
Council under this Act, continue in force and have effect as if made under this Act. 
(Source: Defence of the Realm Manual, 28 February 1918 [London: HMSO, 1918], pp. 1-
5) 
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4. The Defence of the Realm (Amendment) Act, 1915 
(5 Geo. 5, c. 34). 
An Act to amend the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914. [16th March 1915.] 
BE it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, 
and by the authority of the same, as follows: 
(1) Any offence against any regulations made under the Defence of the Realm 
Consolidation Act, 1914, which is triable by court martial may, instead of being tried 
by a court martial, be tried by a civil court with a jury, and when so tried the offence 
shall be deemed to be a felony punishable with the like punishment as might have 
been inflicted if the offence had been tried by court martial. 
(2) Where a person, being a British subject(a) but not being a person subject to the 
Naval Discipline Act or to military law, is alleged to be guilty of an offence against 
any regulations made under the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914, he 
shall be entitled, within six clear days from the time when the general nature of the 
charge is communicated to him, to claim to be tried by a civil court with a jury instead 
of being tried by court martial, and where such a claim is made in manner provided 
by regulations under the last-mentioned Act the offence shall not be tried by court 
martial 
Provided that this subsection shall not apply where the offence is tried before a court 
of summary jurisdiction: 
Provided also that before the trial of any person to whom this section applies, and as 
soon as practicable after arrest, the general nature of the charge shall be 
communicated to him in writing and notice in writing shall at the same time be given, 
in a form provided by regulations under the said Act, of his rights under this section. 
(3) In addition and without prejudice to any powers which a court may possess to 
order the exclusion of the public from any proceedings, if, in the course of the trial 
of a person for a felony under this section, application is made by the prosecution, in 
the interests of national safety, that all or any portion of the public should be excluded 
during any part of the hearing, the court may make an order to that effect, but the 
passing of sentence shall in any case take place in public. 
(4) The Vexatious Indictments Act, 1859, as amended by any subsequent enactment 
shall apply to a felony under this section as if it were included among the offences 
mentioned in section one of that Act, but a felony under this section shall not be 
triable by a court of quarter sessions. 
(5) For the purpose of the trial of a person for a felony under this section the offence 
shall be deemed to have been committed either at the place in which the same 
actually was committed or in any place in the United Kingdom in which the offender 
may be found or to which he may be brought for the purpose of speedy trial. 
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(6) An indictment under this section shall not be deemed void or defective by reason 
that the facts or matters alleged in the indictment for the felony amount in law to 
treason; and if the facts or matters proved at the trial of any person indicted for any 
felony under this section amount in law to treason, the person shall not by reason 
thereof be entitled to be acquitted of such felony; but no person tried for such felony 
shall be afterwards prosecuted for treason upon the same facts. 
(7) In the event of invasion or other special military emergency arising out of the 
present war. His Majesty may by Proclamation forthwith suspend the operation of 
this section, either generally or as respects any area specified in the Proclamation, 
without prejudice, however, to any proceedings under this section which may be then 
pending in any civil court. 
(8) The expression "British subject" in this section include a woman who has married 
an alien but who before the marriage was a British subject. 
(9) In the application of this section to Scotland "a civil court with a jury" means the 
High Court of Justiciary, and subsection (4) shall not apply. 
(10) This section shall apply in the case of offences committed and persons arrested 
before as well as after the passing of this Act. 
2. In Ireland a person charged with an offence against any regulations made under the 
Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914, before a court martial shall not, nor shall 
the wife or husband, as the case may be, of a person so charged, be a competent witness, 
whether the person so charged is charged severally or jointly with any other person.  
3. This Act may be cited as the Defence of the Realm (Amendment) Act, 1915. 
(Source: Defence of the Realm Manual, 28 February 1918 [London: HMSO, 1918], pp. 5-
8) 
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